US v. Charlie Green
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHARLIE VAYSHONE GREEN, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:02-cr-00163-FDW-1)
May 26, 2009
June 15, 2009
Before KING, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sandra J. Barrett, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Mark A. Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM: Charlie order revoking of by two Vayshone his and term Green of appeals the district court's a be and
supervised months of of
imposing a special condition of supervised release that Green have no contact with his mother unless approved by the probation officer. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion, and affirm. On appeal, Green first argues that the district court abused its discretion of his in concluding release. Green that At he violated the the the
Although Green stated that he understood the requirement that he report to a residential reentry center was optional, our review of the record convinces us that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding otherwise. Green also argues that the district court erred in imposing the special condition of supervised release without
providing advance notice of its intent to do so, and that it abused its discretion in imposing the condition. Green did not
object to the lack of prior notice by the district court, and thus his assertion of error is reviewed under the plain error standard. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 2
507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). court did not err, as there
We conclude that the district is no explicit requirement for
advance notice of a special condition of supervised release. Green next asserts that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the special condition that he have no contact with his mother without prior approval by the probation officer. district Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the court complied with the requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d) (2006), and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in imposing this condition. Green's final argument is that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the imposition of the special condition of supervised release. Claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel are generally not cognizable on direct appeal. States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997).
allow for adequate development of the record, a defendant must bring his claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. See id.; An
United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1994). exception exists when the record conclusively
United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d Our review of show that
192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999); King, 119 F.3d at 295. the record reveals that it does not
counsel was ineffective. argument on appeal.
We therefore decline to consider this
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
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