US v. Charlie Green

Filing 920090615

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4687

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHARLIE VAYSHONE GREEN, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:02-cr-00163-FDW-1)

Submitted:

May 26, 2009

Decided:

June 15, 2009

Before KING, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sandra J. Barrett, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Mark A. Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Charlie order revoking of by two Vayshone his and term Green of appeals the district court's a be and

supervised months of of

release,

imposing to

sentence followed

one-half months

incarceration

sixty-nine

supervised

release,

imposing a special condition of supervised release that Green have no contact with his mother unless approved by the probation officer. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion, and affirm. On appeal, Green first argues that the district court abused its discretion of his in concluding release. Green that At he violated the the the

conditions hearing,

supervised that

revocation violation.

counsel

stated

admitted

Although Green stated that he understood the requirement that he report to a residential reentry center was optional, our review of the record convinces us that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding otherwise. Green also argues that the district court erred in imposing the special condition of supervised release without

providing advance notice of its intent to do so, and that it abused its discretion in imposing the condition. Green did not

object to the lack of prior notice by the district court, and thus his assertion of error is reviewed under the plain error standard. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 2

507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). court did not err, as there

We conclude that the district is no explicit requirement for

advance notice of a special condition of supervised release. Green next asserts that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the special condition that he have no contact with his mother without prior approval by the probation officer. district Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the court complied with the requirements of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d) (2006), and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in imposing this condition. Green's final argument is that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the imposition of the special condition of supervised release. Claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel are generally not cognizable on direct appeal. States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997).

United

Rather, to

allow for adequate development of the record, a defendant must bring his claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. See id.; An

United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1994). exception exists when the record conclusively

establishes

ineffective assistance.

United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d Our review of show that

192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999); King, 119 F.3d at 295. the record reveals that it does not

conclusively

counsel was ineffective. argument on appeal.

We therefore decline to consider this

3

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. dispense with oral argument because the facts and

We

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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