US v. Robert Smith

Filing 920090710

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4815

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ROBERT DAWAYNE SMITH, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (1:07-cr-00580-AMD-1)

Submitted:

June 23, 2009

Decided:

July 10, 2009

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher Flohr, BLACKFORD & FLOHR, LLC, Severna Park, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Cheryl L. Crumpton, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Robert Dawayne Smith was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon of and 180 sentenced months to the statutory On We

mandatory

minimum

sentence

imprisonment.

appeal, Smith challenges both his conviction and sentence. affirm.

I. Smith first asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on the untimely

disclosure of a police report. of the defense was that the

According to Smith, his theory police did not do a thorough

investigation to determine the owner of the firearm at issue, and counsel spoke in his opening argument about that fact that, of all the police officers involved, only Officer Mezan created a report. Smith's counsel highlighted this fact in attempting Thus,

to create a picture of lackadaisical police procedure. Smith asserts that counsel's credibility was

"irreparably

damaged" when a second police report authored by Mezan surfaced. We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. 257 (4th Cir. 1997) United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248, (stating that a district court's ruling

denying a motion for a mistrial "will be disturbed only under the most extraordinary of circumstances"). 2 "In order for the

trial court's ruling to constitute such an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show prejudice." F.3d 809, 817 (4th Cir. 1995). there is a clear that the abuse of United States v. Dorsey, 45

Reversal is required only if discretion and a "reasonable by the

possibility error. 1992).

jury's

verdict

was

influenced"

United States v. Seeright, 978 F.2d 842, 849 (4th Cir. Because our review of the record clearly shows that

Smith cannot show any prejudice from the untimely production of the second police report, his claim fails.

II. Smith asserts that the court's requirement that a

United States Marshal escort Smith to the bench during voir dire was prejudicial, especially in the absence of a finding that Smith was dangerous. Because Smith did not object below, the To establish plain error,

issue is reviewed for plain error.

the defendant must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the United error States affected v. the 507 defendant's U.S. 725,

substantial

rights.

Olano,

732-34 (1993); United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating defendant bears burden of establishing each of the plain error requirements). A court's decision with regard to a security measure is subject to limited review for 3 abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 1970). Here, the court's requirement was apparently standard practice. Moreover, the court offered Smith an accommodation, whereby he could still participate in voir dire while remaining seated at counsel table. Smith voluntarily chose to approach the bench,

ostensibly so that the jurors could view him at close range, knowing that a Marshal would escort him. Especially given that

Smith had a lengthy criminal record and was in custody on a firearm charge, even we in find the no error of in an the district court's of

requirement,

absence

explicit

finding

dangerousness.

Further, even if the court's decision was error,

due to the overwhelming evidence against Smith, he cannot show that the error affected his substantial rights. this claim is without merit. Accordingly,

III. Smith manufactured Maryland was in asserts a that evidence state that the firearm was to

different to

and

then the

transported interstate

insufficient

establish

nexus

element of the charge against him. our precedent holds that such

However, as Smith concedes, is sufficient. See

evidence

United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 1997).

4

IV. Smith raises several conclusory challenges to the

predicate offenses used to establish his Armed Career Criminal status. violates A 18 defendant U.S.C. § is an armed career and criminal has when he

922(g)(1)

(2006)

three

prior 18

convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). in the presentence report

Smith's predicate convictions listed ("PSR") are as follows: (1) a

conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Robbery with Deadly Weapon, (2) a conviction for Second Degree Assault, and (3) two

convictions for Manufacture, Distribution, or Dispensation of a Controlled Dangerous Substance. Smith first asserts that the two prior drug felonies should not have been counted it is separately undisputed because that they were

consolidated.

However,

the

offenses

occurred on different dates and were separated by an intervening arrest. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2 comment.

(n.3) (2007) (prior sentences are not related if offenses were separated by intervening arrest). indication sentencing, that and Smith's Smith Further, the PSR provides no were consolidated in this for

convictions no

provides

evidence

regard.

Absent formal consolidation, a single sentencing proceeding and concurrent sentences do not make convictions related for

5

criminal history purposes. 296-98 (4th Cir. 1995). Next, Smith

United States v. Allen, 50 F.3d 294,

asserts

that,

because

the

two

drug

offenses involved small amounts of drugs and money, they should not have been considered "serious drug offenses" as defined by the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). under the ACCA is "an offense or under A serious drug offense State law, with involving intent . . . to for

manufacturing, manufacture or

distributing, distribute, a

possessing

controlled

substance

which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law." undisputed that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). predicate drug offenses satisfy It is this

Smith's

definition; thus, the quantity of drugs or currency involved in each offense is irrelevant. Finally, Smith asserts that his misdemeanor assault

was not a "violent felony" because it resulted in a suspended sentence. a Smith is incorrect. sentence, Smith The PSR shows that, rather than was sentenced to a year of

suspended

probation.

Further, the relevant inquiry under the ACCA is the Because it

maximum penalty to which the defendant was subject.

is undisputed that Smith faced a maximum ten-year sentence on the assault charge, it was properly characterized as a violent felony. 1993). 6 See United States v. Thomas, 2 F.3d 79, 81 (4th Cir.

V. Smith contends that the statutory mandatory minimum

was cruel and unusual punishment given that he had never been given drug treatment shorter. not legally and that However, his previous sentences that Court were his has

significantly argument is

Smith

recognizes Supreme

cognizable.

"The

never held that a sentence to a specific term of years, even if it might turn out to be more than the reasonable life expectancy of the defendant, States v. constitutes Khan, 461 cruel and unusual 495 (4th punishment." Cir. 2006).

United

F.3d

477,

Though "[s]evere, mandatory penalties may be cruel, . . . they are not unusual in the constitutional sense." Harmelin v.

Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991). Based on the foregoing, we affirm Smith's conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process. AFFIRMED

7