US v. Anthony Phillips

Filing 920090630

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4976

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ANTHONY LEE PHILLIPS, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Judge. (3:04-cr-00083-4)

Submitted:

June 4, 2009

Decided:

June 30, 2009

Before MICHAEL, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Christian M. Capece, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, R. Gregory McVey, Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Anthony order twelve revoking months Lee Phillips appeals release to be the and district sentencing by court's him to

his of

supervised

imprisonment

followed

twenty-four

months of supervised release.

Phillips argues that his sentence

is plainly unreasonable because it does not further the purposes of supervised release. This court We affirm. will affirm a sentence imposed after

revocation of supervised release if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United We

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). first assess the sentence for reasonableness,

"follow[ing]

generally the procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of original sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences." Id. at 438-39; see

United States v. Finley, 531 F.3d 288, 294 (4th Cir. 2008) ("In applying determine, the `plainly the unreasonable' given standard, in Gall we [v. first United

using

instructions

States, 552 U.S. 38, __, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)], whether a sentence is `unreasonable.'"). Only if a sentence is found procedurally or

substantively unreasonable will we "decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable." Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439; see Finley, 2

531 F.3d at 294.

Although the district court must consider the

Chapter 7 policy statements and the requirements of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a), 3583 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009), "the [district] court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum." Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Phillips does not challenge the procedural aspects of his sentence. Rather, he argues that the district court's

sentence is plainly unreasonable because it fails to further the purposes of supervised release to assist his transition back into the community, and that the district court unreasonably focused U.S.C. on the twelve-month (2006) in reduction he received the under 18 on

§ 3582(c)

determining

sentence

revocation. we `give due

"In determining the reasonableness of a sentence, deference to the district court's decision.'"

Finley, 531 F.3d at 297 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 597). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that

the sentence is not unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. dispense with oral argument because the facts and We

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 3