Lloyd Brown v. John LaManna

Filing 920081229

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6840

LLOYD EUGENE BROWN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JOHN J. LAMANNA, Warden of FCI-Edgefield; WAYNE SMITH, Camp Administrator; BRIAN FINNERLY, Special Housing Unit Lieutenant; JASON KAPRAL, Special Housing Unit Officer and in their official capacities, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. (2:06-cv-00390-RBH)

Submitted:

November 21, 2008

Decided:

December 29, 2008

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lloyd Eugene Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Beth Drake, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Lloyd Eugene Brown appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants in his suit regarding prison conditions. Brown raises claims under Biven v. Six

Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"). We

find that Brown's claims of overcrowding and violations of the ADA and RA were we correctly the rejected judgment by on the these district claims court. for the

Accordingly,

affirm

reasons stated by the district court.

Brown v. LaManna, No. However, we vacate granting summary

2:06-cv-00390-RBH (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2008). the portion of the district court's

order

judgment on Brown's claims that his crutches were improperly confiscated, that he was denied recreation for sixty-five days, and that he was not given a handicapped accessible shower.

Finding that Brown has raised disputed issues of material fact concerning these claims, we remand them for further proceedings. To state a claim for relief under the Eighth

Amendment, the plaintiff must establish that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious condition, medical

need, or risk of harm. (4th Cir. 2006). of basic In

See Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422, 427 addition, needs, pain, 2 conditions involve or that the deprive wanton a and

prisoner

human of

unnecessary

infliction

constitute

extreme

deprivation disproportionate to the severity of the crime amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).

With regard to

lack of recreation, an inmate must show specific harm resulting from the deprivation and a complete denial for an extended

period of time. (4th Cir. 1992)

Compare Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 192 (seven months standards without of out-of-cell and exercise Knight v.

violated

constitutional

decency),

Armontrout, 878 F.2d 1093, 1095-96 (8th Cir. 1989) (thirteen days without recreation Complaints violation a does about only one not rise to Eighth showers showing Amendment state that a the were

violation). constitutional deprivation is

infrequent upon to a

serious

which

defendants

deliberately indifferent. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). We review de novo a district court's order granting summary judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. (4th Cir. 2005). Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 555 judgment is appropriate when no

Summary

genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); United States Dep't of Labor v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 377 F.3d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 2004). The non-movant is entitled "to

have the credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, his 3

version of all that is in dispute accepted, [and] all internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to him." Charbonnages de To raise a

France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979).

genuine issue of material fact, Brown may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Rather, he must present evidence supporting his position through "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with . . . affidavits, if any." Catrett, 56(c)). 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting

Celotex Corp. v. Fed. R. Civ. P.

The district court relied primarily on the affidavits of a prison physician and the Defendants to show that the

Defendants contacted prison medical staff and determined that crutches were not medically required once Brown was transferred to the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"), where he remained for

sixty-five days. records stated

Specifically, the court noted that "medical that Plaintiff was able to ambulate without

assistance" and that Defendants were informed as such when they inquired. These determinations formed the basis of the district

court's decision. However, our review of the medical records reveals

that they are, in fact, ambiguous.

They do not state that

crutches or a wheelchair are medically necessary, but they also do not state that Brown can 4 ambulate without assistance.

Instead, they merely record that, in the summer prior to his stint in SHU, Brown ambulated with crutches. As such, we find

that the medical records are insufficient to show that Brown was ambulatory affidavits without and assistance. evidence been Moreover, showing to be that, Brown prior submitted to his

other he had

incarceration,

found

disabled,

requiring

crutches and/or a wheelchair; that he was unable to stand or walk without assistance; that he repeatedly complained of pain while in SHU; that he repeatedly complained of lack of

recreation and access to the shower while in SHU; that, when he was transferred during his stay in SHU, officials used crutches or a wheelchair; and that, since being released from SHU, he has been confined to a wheelchair. While Brown does not (and logically could not) dispute that officials checked on his condition and were told by medical staff that crutches were not a medical necessity, these

affidavits cannot completely shield Defendants from claims of deliberate indifference. First, Brown asserts that his

condition was blatant and obvious--he could not stand or walk without assistance and was constantly in a great deal of pain. See Brice v. Virginia Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that official cannot hide behind an excuse that he was unaware of a risk, if the risk was obvious and that official is charged with confirming 5 inferences he strongly

suspects

exist).

Second,

if

Brown's

allegations

are

true,

Defendants were obliged to further investigate his condition to determine diagnosis 1248, if was it had deteriorated See 1999) or whether v. the initial 182 F.3d find

incorrect. Cir.

McElligott (holding

Foley, jury

1258

(11th

that

could

deliberate indifference where prison staff failed to respond to deteriorating condition); Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that "dogged[] persist[ance] in a

course of treatment known to be ineffective" can violate the Eighth Amendment). While Brown did see a physician while in

SHU, Defendants do not allege that they asked this physician about Brown's condition, even after receiving Brown's grievances stating that he was unable to shower or recreate. Finally, the

fact that the crucial conversation between medical staff and the prison officials in was the not reduced records to writing seem or to otherwise militate

memorialized

medical

would

against blindly accepting its veracity, especially in light of Brown's conflicting affidavits. In short, we find that Brown has sufficiently raised a material issue of fact as to whether crutches or a wheelchair were medically necessary for him to ambulate, recreate, take a shower, ease his pain, and prevent further damage. Moreover,

Brown presented evidence showing that he could not recreate or take a shower without assistance and that Defendants refused 6

assistance in the face of his obvious need, resulting in over two months without a shower or recreation. asserts that the Defendants' failure to In addition, Brown address his obvious

needs resulted in a deteriorated condition. fact may find were that, under to all rely the on

While a trier of prison staff's

circumstances, the medical

officials

entitled

conclusions or were not aware of Brown's condition, Brown has raised questions about the credibility of Defendants' affidavits and other material issues of fact that should be resolved at trial. See Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 95 (4th Cir. 1991)

(holding that summary judgment may not be granted when there is opposing sworn testimony, even when one side's story is hard to believe). Accordingly, we vacate the district court's judgment on Brown's claims discussed above and remand for further

proceedings. affirmed. legal before

The remainder of the district court's judgment is

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and are and adequately argument presented not in aid the the materials decisional

contentions the court

would

process. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

7