Lynette Harris v. Mayor and City Council of Balt
Filing
UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:06-cv-02415-SKG Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998584274].. [09-1446]
Appeal: 09-1446
Document: 52
Date Filed: 05/06/2011
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1446
LYNETTE HARRIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MAYOR
AND
CITY
Corporation,
COUNCIL
OF
BALTIMORE,
A
Municipal
Defendant - Appellee,
and
CITY OF BALTIMORE, Department of Public Works, Bureau of
Water and Waste Water,
Defendant.
----------------------------------UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION;
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN; AMERICAN JEWISH
CONGRESS; CALIFORNIA WOMEN’S LAW CENTER; ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE; COALITION OF LABOR WOMEN; ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE
CENTER; EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES; DC EMPLOYMENT JUSTICE
CENTER; NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN; LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW; WOMEN EMPLOYED; MEXICAN AMERICAN
LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND; NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR
PARTNERSHIPS IN EQUITY; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GIRLS AND
WOMEN IN SPORT; NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT; NATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR
WOMEN AND FAMILIES; NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER; SARGENT
SHRIVER NATIONAL CENTER ON POVERTY LAW; SOUTHWEST WOMEN’S
LAW CENTER; UNION FOR REFORM JUDAISM; WASHINGTON LAWYERS’
COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
Amici Supporting Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Susan K. Gauvey, Magistrate Judge.
(1:06-cv-02415-SKG)
Argued:
January 28, 2010
Decided:
May 6, 2011
Before MICHAEL 1 and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and R. Bryan HARWELL,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by unpublished
opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Harwell
joined.
ARGUED: Joyce E. Smithey, RIFKIN, LIVINGSTON, LEVITAN & SILVER,
LLC, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant.
William Rowe Phelan,
Jr., Justin Sperance Conroy, BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: George A. Nilson,
City Solicitor, Cheryl Simpson-Parker, Assistant Solicitor,
BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Loretta King, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Dennis J. Dimsey, Linda F. Thome, Civil Rights Division, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for the United
States, Amicus Supporting Appellant.
Jocelyn Samuels, Lara S.
Kaufmann,
Dina
R.
Lassow,
NATIONAL
WOMEN’S
LAW
CENTER,
Washington, D.C., for American Civil Liberties Union, American
Jewish Congress, Anti-Defamation League, Asian American Justice
Center, DC Employment Justice Center, Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law, Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, National Alliance for Partnerships in Equity,
National Association for Girls and Women in Sport, National
Employment
Law
Project,
National
Employment
Lawyers’
Association, Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law,
Southwest Women’s Law Center, Union for Reform Judaism, and
Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban
Affairs, Amici Supporting Appellant. Judith L. Lichtman, Sharyn
1
Judge Michael heard oral argument in this case but passed
away before the decision was filed.
The opinion is filed by a
quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
2
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A. Tejani, Erin Hustings, NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN &
FAMILIES,
Washington,
D.C.,
for
American
Association
of
University Women, California Women’s Law Center, Coalition of
Labor Women, Equal Rights Advocates, National Council Of Jewish
Women, and Women Employed, Amici Supporting Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3
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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Lynette Harris (“Harris”) challenges the district
court’s
grant
employer,
of
summary
Appellee
(collectively,
the
judgment
on
her
Mayor
and
City
“City”),
for
hostile
claims
Council
work
against
of
her
Baltimore
environment
and
failure to promote under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; deprivation of constitutional
equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and state law negligent
supervision and retention. 2
reverse
the
grant
of
For the reasons stated below, we
summary
judgment
on
the
hostile
work
environment claim and its attendant § 1983 claim, and affirm the
grant of summary judgment on Harris’s other claims.
I.
Lynette Harris has worked for the City as an electrician
since 1988.
Beginning as an apprentice, she was twice promoted,
rising to the level of Maintenance Technician III Electrical in
1994.
She
received
occupy that position.
no
further
promotions
and
continued
to
During the time period relevant to this
case, Harris worked for the City’s Department of Public Works at
2
Harris also alleged a state law claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, but she has abandoned that
claim on appeal.
4
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the Patapsco and Back River plants.
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Women constituted a small
minority of the overall work force at these plants.
A.
In 2003 and again in 2004, Harris applied and interviewed
for a promotion to Supervisor Electrical I.
A male co-worker of
Harris’s, Edwin Moye, was chosen over her in 2003, and the City
ultimately declined to fill the position in 2004 after two other
male co-workers of Harris’s, Keith Raynor and Kevin Lee, turned
down offers.
In
both
2003
and
2004,
the
candidates
chosen
for
the
supervisor position received higher interview scores than Harris
even though she had greater experience.
Each candidate’s score
was
questions,
based
equally
on
answers
weighted
and
to
the
asked
interview
of
each
candidate.
which
were
Although
the
record does not contain any of the exact interview questions,
the majority of questions related to technical matters, and at
least one dealt with the candidate’s seniority and experience.
Following her second unsuccessful promotion application, in
December 2004, Harris was assigned to the electrical motor shop 3
supervised by James Gernhart. 4
The environment of that shop and
3
In this context, “shops” are both organizational units and
the physical locations that contain offices for supervisors and
common areas for technicians.
4
The exact timeline of events is not clear from the record.
Several times in her deposition testimony, Harris says that she
5
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the conduct of the employees that worked within it form the main
basis for Harris’s hostile work environment allegations.
While
in
the
shop,
Harris
was
profane, sexually explicit language.
repeatedly
subjected
to
Harris was referred to as
a “bitch” by her coworkers in the presence of her supervisor.
J.A. 554.
women
as
Harris also overheard male employees refer to other
“bitches”
on
a
daily
basis.
5
J.A.
615.
confirmed the frequent use of such offensive language.
Coleman,
a
supervisor
at
the
Back
River
plant
where
Others
Judy
Harris
worked, heard male technicians refer to women using the “B word”
worked in Gernhart’s shop from December 2005 to April 2006.
Without acknowledging any previous error, she later says that
she worked there from December 2004 to April 2005. Because the
2004-2005 timeline is consistent with several documents and
Harris’s answers to the City’s interrogatories, and because it
is the timeline most favorable to Harris as the non-movant, we
adopt it rather than the 2005-2006 timeline.
5
We draw upon Harris’s Supplemental Declaration for the
frequency of her exposure to the language. The City incorrectly
states in its brief that these affirmations are “self-serving”
and therefore “insufficient as a matter of law to defeat a
properly supported Motion for Summary Judgment.”
Br. of
Appellee at 23.
There is, however, no rule against “selfserving” affidavits.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)
requires only that affidavits “be made on personal knowledge,
set out facts admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant
is competent to testify on the matters stated.”
Additionally,
there is no genuine issue of fact if the only evidence offered
by the plaintiff in opposition to summary judgment is an
affidavit contradicting his or her own deposition testimony.
Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984).
Harris’s affidavit fully conforms to these requirements, as it
sets forth her own admissible testimony, based on personal
knowledge and consistent with her deposition.
Accordingly, it
is properly considered here.
6
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and the “C word.”
Date Filed: 05/06/2011
J.A. 386-88.
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Kevin Lee, another co-worker,
confirmed that male employees referred to women as “bitches” and
that there was “a [w]hole lot of that going on.”
Male
employees
also
referred
to
women,
including
“troublemakers” who “didn’t belong in those jobs.”
405,
616.
According
to
Coleman,
the
J.A. 442.
use
of
Harris,
as
J.A. 389-90,
such
language
increased when females came within earshot.
Conversations between male employees that Harris could not
have avoided overhearing discussed “what they ha[d] done the
night before with women” and visits to “gentlemen’s clubs” or
“titty bar[s].”
J.A. 436, 633.
Harris overheard one co-worker
ask another if he had “got any pussy” over the weekend.
634.
J.A.
On another occasion, she heard a co-worker remark that “if
his wife’s pussy got wet you would hear it sloshing.”
J.A. 634.
Harris reported that conversations about sexual activity with
women and discussions of “women’s anatomy in a sexual manner”
occurred frequently and in the presence of supervisors.
617-18.
J.A.
Two of Harris’s co-workers, Edwin Moye and Kevin Lee,
confirmed that language of this nature was used daily in the
shop.
In
addition
to
profane
language
and
conversations
sexualizing women, a number of “provocative[] pictures of women”
were displayed in the shops.
J.A. 366.
The pictures featured
women who were “scantily clad,” wearing bathing suits, or simply
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“naked.”
Date Filed: 05/06/2011
J.A. 366-67, 402, 429.
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While male employees attended
so-called safety meetings in Gernhart’s office for an hour every
day, Harris, who was excluded from the meetings, sat at a table
in
the
shop
glass.”
with
“provocative
J.A. 616.
photographs
placed
under
the
Coleman observed in her deposition that
these pictures were in “all the shop areas,” J.A. 401, and Edwin
Moye, disclosed that these pictures were “[i]n the shop area and
[on] the hall bulletin board.”
J.A. 429.
On several occasions, Harris complained to her supervisors
about
her
working
Gernhart’s
Harris’s
shop.
union
conditions,
Based
on
including
these
representative,
her
complaints,
called
a
assignment
Ron
to
Williams,
meeting
with
her
supervisors Rick Slayton and Gernhart, as well as with her coworker
Ron
meeting,
Sutton,
Sutton
J.A. 554, 619.
to
address
repeatedly
the
referred
situation.
to
Harris
During
as
a
the
“bitch.”
At one point Williams objected to this language
and Sutton responded by asking Slayton whether there was any
policy prohibiting him from using the word “bitch.”
replied that there was not, and Sutton continued.
Slayton
At the end of
the meeting, Gernhart agreed to speak to his employees about
using
“bad
language”
reassign her.
around
J.A. 554.
Harris,
but
Slayton
refused
to
Gernhart stressed that he did not want
Harris in his shop, but that he was “being forced to take her.”
J.A. 554.
Commenting on the meeting, Williams later wrote that
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management’s
Date Filed: 05/06/2011
actions
demonstrated
Page: 9 of 25
“a
clear
prejudice practiced in the electrical shops.”
message
of
the
J.A. 554.
On January 11, 2005, Harris again requested--this time by
letter to an employee of the City’s personnel department--that
she be “removed from the supervision of James Gernhart Jr. and
placed
under
[her]
supervisor
Mr.
because nothing has changed.”
J.A. 556.
The letter catalogued
Harris’s
and
previous
inappropriate
previous
complaints
practices
in
what
she
Gernhart’s
Sandy
Altadonna
considered
shop,
to
including
“provocative pictures of women in the motor shop area.”
555-56.
be
the
J.A.
The letter led the personnel department, along with a
representative from the City’s Equal Employment Office (“EEO”),
to investigate the shop in February 2005.
The investigation found “evidence of provocative pictures
being displayed on tables, walls, workstations and two offices.”
J.A. 557.
These pictures were deemed “less than appropriate for
the shop for males or females” and ordered removed.
J.A. 611.
A few weeks later, one of Harris’s supervisors was suspended by
the EEO for failing to “remove offensive material in a timely
manner from the work site.”
J.A. 558.
Harris
request
once
again
Gernhart’s shop.
made
a
to
Following the EEO visit,
be
transferred
Her request was granted in April 2005.
9
out
of
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B.
Harris filed this action against the City on September 18,
2006.
Her
amended
complaint
contained
four
counts:
(1)
violation of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article
24
of
the
Maryland
intentional
negligent
Declaration
infliction
of
supervision
of
emotional
and
Rights;
(2)
distress;
retention;
(3)
and
common
law
common
law
(4)
sex-based
discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
The Title
VII count encompassed her hostile work environment claim and two
failure
to
promote
claims
arising
out
of
the
2003
and
2004
promotion cycle
After discovery, the City moved for summary judgment on all
counts.
On
September
30,
2008,
the
district
court
granted
summary judgment on all claims except for Harris’s failure to
promote claim to the extent it concerned the City’s refusal to
select
her
for
the
supervisor
position
in
2004.
After
additional discovery, the City filed a second motion for summary
judgment on the remaining claim.
on March 24, 2009.
The court granted that motion
This appeal followed.
II.
We first address Harris’s Title VII discrimination claims
of a hostile work environment and a failure to promote.
contends
that
the
City
was
not
10
entitled
to
summary
Harris
judgment
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because triable issues of material fact remain regarding her
claims.
We
review
a
district
judgment motion de novo.
(4th Cir. 2011).
and
the
court’s
grant
of
a
summary
Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380
In conducting our review, we view “the facts
reasonable
inferences
therefrom
Id.
favorable to the nonmoving party.”
in
the
light
most
We will affirm summary
judgment for the City only if the record reveals the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact and it is plain that the City
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A.
An
employee
“may
establish
a
violation
of
Title
VII
by
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile
or abusive work environment.”
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477
To
U.S.
57,
66
(1986).
establish
her
hostile
work
environment claim, Harris “must show that the offending conduct
(1)
was
unwelcome,
(2)
was
because
of
her
sex,
(3)
was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her
employment and create an abusive working environment, and (4)
Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, No.
was imputable to her employer.”
09-2024, slip op. at 12 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 2011) (quoting Bonds,
629 F.3d at 385).
for
summary
The district court granted the City’s motion
judgment
based
on
Harris’s
failure
to
adduce
sufficient evidence to support elements two and three of her
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hostile environment claim, and these are the only two elements
at issue in this appeal.
1.
We first consider whether the record contains sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the
hostile work environment that Harris experienced was because of
See EEOC v. Central Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167,
her sex.
175 (4th Cir. 2009).
“An employee is harassed or otherwise
discriminated against ‘because of’ his or her gender if, ‘but
for’ the employee’s gender, he or she would not have been the
victim
of
the
discrimination.”
See
Hoyle,
slip
op.
at
13
(quoting Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242 (4th
Cir. 2000)).
To
satisfy
this
element,
Harris
points
to
the
use
of
profane, sexually explicit language by her co-workers, as well
as the pictures of nude or scantily clad women throughout the
shop.
We recently clarified that “[a] juror could reasonably
find that sexualizing the work environment by placing photos of
nude women or women in sexually provocative dress and poses in
common areas is detrimental to female employees and satisfies
the ‘because of sex’ requirement.”
v.
Univ.
of
N.C.,
482
F.3d
Id. at 13; see also Jennings
686,
695-96
(4th
Cir.
2007)
(considering “[a] coach’s sexually charged comments in a team
setting, even if not directed specifically to the plaintiff,
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[as] relevant to determining whether the plaintiff was subjected
to sex-based harassment”).
We recognized that “the critical
inquiry is whether the plaintiff’s environment was hostile . . .
‘because of’ her sex” and not solely on whether the conduct was
directed
at
the
plaintiff.
6
Hoyle,
slip
op.
at
13;
see
also Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 332 (4th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that conduct in the work place,
including conversations between male co-workers, satisfied the
“because of” requirement since it “was particularly offensive to
women and was intended to provoke [the claimant’s] reaction as a
woman”); Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 222 (2d Cir.
2004) (“The fact that much of this offensive material was not
directed specifically at [the claimant] . . . does not, as a
matter of law, preclude a jury from finding that the conduct
subjected [the claimant] to a hostile work environment based on
her sex.”).
In Hoyle, we deemed this requirement satisfied based on
several factors, including “photos of scantily-clad women in Gstrings taped to the lid of a company-issued toolbox” on the
factory floor, Hoyle, slip op. at 4; calendars depicting “women
in sexually suggestive positions in bathing suits” located in a
6
We therefore find unavailing one of the City’s primary
arguments that speech or conduct is actionable under Title VII
as sexual harassment only if it is directed at the claimant.
See Br. of Appellee at 16.
13
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company’s
picture
break
of
a
Date Filed: 05/06/2011
room
woman
and
Page: 14 of 25
id.
cafeteria,
appear[ing]
as
the
at
5;
and
[company]
“a
nude
computer’s
screen saver,” id.
Similarly here, we are persuaded that a reasonable juror
could
find
on
this
record
that
the
“provocative
pictures”
throughout the shop areas sexualized Harris’s work place and
satisfied the “because of” gender requirement.
As in Hoyle, the
pictures here featured “scantily clad” women or women who were
simply
“naked.”
investigation
workstations
J.A.
found
and
366-67,
such
two
images
402,
429.
“displayed
offices.”
J.A.
The
on
557.
City’s
tables,
The
EEO
walls,
images
were
commonly visible “[i]n the shop area and in the hall bulletin
board.”
J.A. 429.
Harris also viewed “provocative photographs”
that were “placed under the glass” of the break room table,
where she sat every day while her co-workers conducted “safety
meetings” without her.
J.A. 616.
Furthermore, Harris’s work environment was also laced with
the repeated, daily use of demeaning words, such as “bitch,”
“cunt,”
and
“troublemaker,”
to
refer
to
women.
We
have
previously concluded that a co-worker’s use of the word “b***h
on
a
daily
satisfying
basis
the
when
referring
“because
of
to
gender”
women”
was
relevant
requirement.
to
Central
Wholesalers, 573 F.3d at 175; see also Reeves v. C.H. Robinson
Worldwide,
Inc.,
594
F.3d
798,
14
811-12
(11th
Cir.
2010)
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(characterizing the use of terms “whore,” “bitch,” and “cunt” as
being “targeted at [a woman’s] gender”).
Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to Harris, we find that a jury could reasonably conclude that
the hostility of the environment was based on her gender.
2.
We
now
consider
conclusion
that
severe
pervasive
or
the
whether
the
hostility
Harris
alter
the
could
faced
was
conditions
support
the
“sufficiently
of
[Harris’s]
employment and create an abusive work environment.”
Ocheltree,
335 F.3d at 331. 7
to
record
To establish this element, Harris must show
not only that she subjectively found her work environment to be
“hostile or abusive” but also that an “objectively reasonable”
person would have found it to be so.
This
requirement
is
“crucial”
to
Hoyle, slip op. at 16.
ensure
that
“ordinary
socializing in the workplace--such as male-on-male horseplay or
intersexual
flirtation”--does
discriminatory.
come
to
be
regarded
as
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
surrounding
not
circumstances.
Our inquiry must consider all the
Central
7
Wholesalers,
573
F.3d
at
In the City’s brief, the element was described in the
conjunctive--“severe and pervasive.” See Br. of Appellee at 20.
Our precedent makes clear, however, that the element is properly
viewed in the disjunctive, requiring only that a plaintiff prove
the harassment was severe or pervasive. See Ocheltree, 335 F.3d
at 331.
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176; see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82 (instructing courts to
consider
the
“constellation
of
surrounding
circumstances,
expectations, and relationships” beyond the “simple recitation
of the words used or the physical acts performed”).
of
a
general
atmosphere
of
hostility
toward
those
“Evidence
of
the
plaintiff’s gender is considered in the examination of all the
circumstances.”
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 696.
As to the subjective inquiry, we believe that there are
sufficient facts in the record for a reasonable jury to conclude
that Harris personally found her work environment to be hostile
and this affected her performance.
Harris complained to her
union representative and to the City that the language used by
her co-workers and the explicit pictures posted throughout the
workplace
created
a
hostile
environment.
See
Central
Wholesalers, 573 F.3d at 176 (finding the subjective element met
when a female employee “complained about . . . [the] harassment
and stated that she found such harassment objectionable”).
record
also
psychiatrist
contains
who
the
diagnosed
expert
her
with
testimony
a
of
depressive
The
Harris’s
disorder
affiliated with her work experiences, and the testimony of a coworker who reported seeing Harris frequently crying at work.
To
affirm summary judgment for the City on this record, we would
have to weigh the credibility of Harris’s evidence, which is
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Hoyle, slip op. at
“plainly not permitted on summary judgment.”
17.
We
also
conclude
that
a
reasonable
jury
could
find
the
harassment in Harris’s workplace to be objectively severe or
pervasive.
As described more fully above, sexually explicit
pictures of scantily clad or naked women were located throughout
the shop, including the common areas.
Harris could not help but
view these images on a daily basis.
And even after instructed
by
the
City’s
EEO
to
remove
the
offending
pictures,
a
shop
supervisor did not comply and was suspended.
Furthermore, the language used by Harris’s co-workers also
supports
a
finding
pervasiveness.
examine
whether
of
objective
severity
or,
at
least,
When the harassment is exposure to language, we
“a
jury
could
find
.
.
.
[the
words
used]
particularly offensive to women,” Ocheltree, 335 F.3d at 332, as
well as whether the context in which they were spoken “make[s]
it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to
the presence of women in the workplace,” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
A reasonable jury, looking at the entirety of the circumstances,
could find that the shop area was an environment where hostility
towards female employees pervaded the attitudes and conduct of
co-workers and supervisors.
“bitches,”
Harris’s
“cunts,”
union
and
Women were regularly referred to as
“troublemakers.”
representative,
17
a
male
In
a
meeting
co-worker
with
repeatedly
Appeal: 09-1446
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Page: 18 of 25
referred to Harris as a “bitch” without condemnation by Harris’s
supervisor,
who
was
also
present.
Discussions
between
co-
workers about “women’s anatomy in a sexual manner” and sexual
activity
with
women
occurred
regularly.
J.A.
618-19.
We
believe that a reasonable jury could find this type of profane
Ocheltree, 378 F.3d
language “particularly offensive to women.”
at 332.
Ultimately, after examining all circumstances in the
light most favorable to Harris, there is sufficient evidence in
the record “to create a triable issue on whether the genderbased harassment was objectively severe or pervasive.”
Central
Wholesalers, 573 F.3d at 176.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred when
it
granted
the
City’s
motion
for
summary
judgment
based
on
Harris’s failure to raise a genuine issue of fact with regard to
elements two and three of her hostile work environment claim.
B.
Harris also appeals from the grant of summary judgment to
the
City
on
her
Title
VII
failure
to
promote
claims.
Specifically, Harris argues that her applications for promotion
to supervisor in 2003 and 2004 were denied because of her sex.
Although
Harris
has
made
out
a
prima
facie
case
of
discrimination, we conclude that she has failed to prove that
18
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the
Document: 52
City’s
Date Filed: 05/06/2011
legitimate
reason
for
Page: 19 of 25
denying
her
promotion
was
pretextual. 8
In
accordance
with
the
burden-shifting
framework
established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), Harris bears the initial burden of establishing that:
(1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she applied for
the
position
in
question;
(3)
she
was
qualified
for
that
position; (4) she was rejected; and (5) the position remained
open or was filled by similarly qualified applicants outside the
protected class.
See id. at 802; see also Page v. Bolger, 645
F.2d 227, 229-30 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying the McDonnell Douglas
framework in a failure to promote case).
If Harris establishes
a prima facie case of discrimination, “the burden shifts to the
[City] to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the
adverse
employment
action.”
Hill
v.
Lockheed
Martin
Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004).
If
the City offers such a reason, the burden reverts to Harris “to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence” that the City’s reason
8
There is some dispute over which promotion applications
are properly before the court.
Harris notes that she was also
denied promotion in 1999, 2000, 2006, and 2007.
However,
because she presents no evidence concerning the employment
decisions in these years, we do not consider them.
In its
brief, the City argues that Harris’s 2004 application should not
be considered because it was not alleged in her complaint.
However, since we conclude that Harris did not satisfy her
burden of showing pretext, and affirm summary judgment for the
City, we need not address the City’s alternative argument.
19
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was merely “a pretext for discrimination.”
the
burden
to
demonstrate
pretext
merges
Id.
“At this point,
with
the
ultimate
burden of persuading the court that [Harris] has been the victim
of
intentional
discrimination.”
Id.
(internal
quotations).
While anecdotal evidence of disparate treatment is relevant to
proving
create
pretext,
an
issue
general
of
hostility
fact
for
a
itself
is
particular
insufficient
decision
not
to
to
promote.
On
this
record,
Harris
failure to promote case.
class.
has
established
a
prima
facie
Harris is a member of a protected
She applied both times for the promotion and at least
one member of the promotion board, Patricia Odle, admitted that
Harris
possessed
supervisor.
the
necessary
qualifications
to
be
a
Finally, in 2003 the City filled the position with
a male candidate and in 2004 left it vacant.
With the burden upon it, the City argues that Harris was
not
promoted
qualified.
because
other
applicants
were
simply
The City presented evidence that in 2003 and 2004 it
selected applicants based on their higher interview scores.
agree
with
more
the
nondiscriminatory
City
that
reason”
this
for
constitutes
not
promoting
“a
We
legitimate,
Harris.
See
Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 270
(4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim of pretext where “the deciding
factor in the promotion decision was the rating for core and
20
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functional competencies that each applicant who was interviewed
received” and the promotion went to the highest scorer whereas
the complainant received the “second-lowest score”).
Harris
evidence
makes
that
she
two
had
arguments
more
in
response:
experience
than
(1)
that
those
the
selected
demonstrates pretext; and (2) that the City failed to carry its
burden
because
sufficiently
the
proffered
specific.
nondiscriminatory
Neither
of
these
reason
is
not
arguments
is
persuasive.
Harris’s first argument fails because it is undisputed that
experience
is
not
the
only
factor
in
the
City’s
promotion
decisions.
Roughly seven questions were asked in each of the
interviews.
Only one of them concerned general experience; the
others
primarily
were
technical.
Each
question
was
equally
weighted and scored by the interviewers to calculate a total.
Because answers to the six technical questions together weighed
significantly more than the one for experience, Harris’s greater
experience is not, by itself, sufficient to raise a reasonable
inference of pretext. 9
See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident
Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 319 (4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting an attempt to
show pretext in an employer’s decision not to promote because
9
Harris’s lower scores might also have resulted from the
fact that she “didn’t prepare for” her promotion interviews and
simply “went on the knowledge that . . . [she] already had.”
J.A. 356.
21
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Page: 22 of 25
“while management experience was a factor to be considered in
awarding
the
promotion,
it
clearly
was
not
intended
to
be
dispositive”).
Turning to Harris’s second argument, we are not persuaded
by
her
claim
specific.
that
the
City’s
response
was
not
sufficiently
Harris relies heavily on Alvarado v. Texas Rangers,
492 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2007), where the Fifth Circuit held that
the defendant-employer had not satisfied its burden to proffer a
nondiscriminatory reason because it had provided no explanation
for
how
the
question.
as
interviewers
arrived
at
the
scores
for
each
The Alvarado court noted that each score “is at least
consistent
with
discriminatory
intent
as
it
is
with
nondiscriminatory intent because [the plaintiff] may well have
received the relatively low interview score on account of her
sex.”
Id. at 617 (internal quotations omitted).
Unlike
Alvarado,
however,
the
City
provided
additional
information concerning the interview questions asked: six tested
technical expertise and one related to general experience.
The
City’s nondiscriminatory reason for the lower scores is simply
that, despite her greater experience, Harris did not have the
technical expertise that the other candidates had.
the
bulk
of
the
promotion
criteria
related
to
Given that
technical
expertise, Harris’s overall score would naturally suffer.
In
response, Harris does not challenge the City’s characterization
22
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of what the questions were designed to evaluate, nor does she
suggest that the individuals who scored higher than her were
undeserving.
See Diamond, 416 F.3d at 320 (rejecting claim of
pretext when the complainant “d[id] not suggest any flaw in the
rating system or that [the evaluators] failed to conduct fair
evaluations” or “contest the results of those evaluations”).
Thus, we conclude that Harris has not carried her burden to
show
the
City’s
reason
for
failing
to
promote
her
was
pretextual.
III.
Harris’s remaining claims are dispensed with more readily.
Because
the
City
is
clearly
a
state
actor,
Harris’s
claims rise and fall with her Title VII claims.
482 F.3d at 701.
§ 1983
See Jennings,
Accordingly, we find error only to the extent
that the City was awarded summary judgment on the § 1983 claim
based on allegations of a hostile work environment.
With regard
to Harris’s claim under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights, because Harris has presented no argument regarding
this issue on appeal, we consider the claim abandoned and do not
address it.
Finally,
supervision
with
and
regard
retention,
to
Harris’s
her
claim
allegations
for
and
negligent
supporting
evidence are insufficient to survive summary judgment.
23
Harris
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Page: 24 of 25
alleges that the city breached its duty to her “by not taking
action once it knew that the work environment was hostile and
abusive toward” her.
undisputed
that,
department
of
Appellant’s Br. at 54.
when
the
Harris
informed
situation,
the
the
City
However, it is
City’s
personnel
initiated
an
EEO
investigation, which led to a disciplinary action against one of
her supervisors, and which resulted in the grant of Harris’s
transfer request.
Harris does not explain why this response
amounted to negligence.
In responding to the City’s motion for summary judgment, it
is Harris’s obligation to support her assertion that an issue of
fact is genuinely disputed by “citing to particular parts of
materials in the record.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Maryland’s
cause of action for negligent supervision and retention is not
identical to a claim for discrimination under Title VII.
must
inter
show,
alia,
that
the
City
failed
to
Harris
exercise
“reasonable care and caution” in supervising its employees and
that
its
failure
to
satisfy
this
duty
proximately
caused
Harris’s injury.
Horridge v. St. Mary’s Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs.,
1232,
854
A.2d
1237
(Md.
2004)
(quoting
Norfolk
Western R.R. Co. v. Hoover, 29 A. 994, 995 (Md. 1894)).
&
Thus,
Harris cannot merely assert that the same set of facts giving
rise to a Title VII claim gives rise to a negligence claim.
24
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Page: 25 of 25
Because conclusory assertions are all that Harris has offered,
we affirm the dismissal of this claim.
IV.
For
the
reasons
stated
above,
we
reverse
the
grant
of
summary judgment to the City with regard to Harris’s hostile
work
environment
remand
both
claims
claims
for
under
Title
further
VII
and
proceedings.
§
1983,
We
and
affirm
we
the
remainder of the judgments below in favor of the City.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
25
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