Spencer Jones, III v. Sternheimer Brothers, Inc.

Filing 920100422

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-2375

SPENCER E. JONES, III, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. STERNHEIMER BROTHERS, INC., Defendant ­ Appellee, and ROSS STERNHEIMER, CEO, Everything Casual, incorporated f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; PAT MONEY, Assistant CEO, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; ADDRIANE LATHAN, Head of Human Resources, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; JAMES BAILEY, Warehouse Manager, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; ANGELA CRAWLEY, Dock Supervisor, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; HAROLD ELLIOTT, Dock Manager; GLORIA CRAWLEY, Clothes Supervisor; MARK STERNHEIMER, Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:08-cv-00187-REP)

Submitted:

March 30, 2010

Decided:

April 22, 2010

Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Spencer E. Jones, III, Appellant Pro Se. Christopher E. Gatewood, HIRSCHLER FLEISCHER, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM: Spencer E. Jones, III appeals the district court's

order granting summary judgment as to Jones's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) in favor of Everything Casual, Inc., and several employees of the corporation. Everything Casual, Inc.,

a corporation formerly known as Sternheimer Bros, Inc., operated the now-defunct A & N stores in Virginia. Jones contended that during his In his complaint, he was denied

employment,

training due to his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). The On and

district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants. appeal, Jones reasserts the merits of his claims,

additionally contends that Defendants Angela Crawley and James Bailey perjured themselves in their affidavits regarding the

dates Jones was offered training.

We affirm.

We review a district court's order granting summary judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008). See Nader v. Blair, 549

Summary judgment may be granted

only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). allegations do not However, "[c]onclusory or speculative nor does a mere scintilla of

suffice,

evidence in support of his case." 3

Thompson v. Potomac Elec.

Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). unless a reasonable party on jury Summary judgment will be granted could return a verdict See for the v.

nonmoving

the

evidence

presented.

Anderson

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). a district court's judgment on any ground

We may affirm by the

supported

record. 2006).

Suter v. United States, 441 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir.

Under

the

ADEA,

it

is

illegal

for

an

employer

to 29

discriminate against an employee due to the employee's age. U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). action for employees who

The ADEA provides a civil cause of are discriminated against by their An

employers because of their age.

See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2006).

employee may establish an ADEA discrimination claim "through two alternative methods of proof: requiring employer's evidence adverse that the (1) a mixed-motive framework, employee's or (2) a age motivated the

decision,

pretext

framework

identical to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis used in Title VII cases." E.E.O.C. v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co.,

Inc., 364 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2004); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In his pleadings below, Jones asserted that the

Defendants refused to offer adequate training due to his age. However, Jones entirely failed 4 to provide any "evidence of

conduct

or

statements

that

reflect

directly

the

alleged

discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision." Id. Therefore, he failed to establish

age discrimination under the mixed-motive framework. In McDonnell order to establish Jones an ADEA claim under the a

Douglas

framework,

must

first

demonstrate

prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2004).

In order to demonstrate a prima facie case of discriminatory denial of training, Jones must show: protected class; (2) the "(1) [he] is a member of a provided training to

defendant[s]

[their] employees; (3) [Jones] was eligible for the training; and (4) [Jones] was not provided training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." F.3d at 649-50 (setting out McDonnell Douglas Thompson, 312 framework for

discriminatory denial of training based on race).

If Jones is

successful in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendants for "to their articulate failure a to

legitimate,

non-discriminatory

reason"

adequately train Jones. then prove that Id. the

Mereish, 359 F.3d at 334. proffered

Jones must was

defendants'

justification

pretextual.

"This final burden . . . merges with the

ultimate burden of persuading the court that [Jones] ha[s] been the victim[] of intentional discrimination." 5 Id.

After reviewing the record, we find that Jones failed to meet his burden in establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas doctrine. We

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal

contentions are adequately expressed in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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