US v. Anthony Brown
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:99-cr-70105-jlk-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998630866].. [09-4092]
Appeal: 09-4092
Document: 52
Date Filed: 07/13/2011
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4092
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY CHARLES BROWN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Danville.
Jackson L. Kiser, Senior
District Judge. (4:99-cr-70105-jlk-1)
Submitted:
June 21, 2011
Decided:
July 13, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Fay F. Spence, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellant.
Julia C. Dudley, United States Attorney, Craig J.
Jacobsen, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
On July 27, 1999, Anthony Charles Brown was charged in
state court in Danville, Virginia with transporting one ounce or
more of cocaine into Virginia with the intent to distribute.
After his release on $50,000 bond, Brown failed to appear for a
hearing on September 14, 1999, and a warrant was issued for his
arrest.
On November 18, 1999, a federal grand jury sitting in
Roanoke, Virginia, indicted Brown on one count of knowingly and
intentionally
five
grams
possessing
of
cocaine
§ 841(a)(1) (2006).
with
intent
base,
in
to
distribute
violation
of
more
21
than
U.S.C.
An arrest warrant for Brown was issued the
next day, and remained in effect until Brown was apprehended in
New York over eight years later, on March 5, 2008.
Following Brown’s apprehension, the federal grand jury
issued a superseding indictment charging him with knowingly and
intentionally
fifty
grams
possessing
of
cocaine
with
intent
base,
in
to
distribute
violation
of
more
21
than
U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011). Brown moved
to dismiss the superseding indictment, arguing that it
the
five-year
federal
§ 3282(a) (2006).
statute
of
limitations,
see
court denied both motions.
superseding
18
U.S.C.
Brown also moved to suppress evidence found
in a 1999 search of his bags at a train station.
the
violated
indictment
The district
Brown pleaded guilty to Count One in
without
2
the
benefit
of
a
plea
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agreement. At sentencing, the district court declined to grant
Brown a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility
and
added
a
two-level
increase
for
obstruction
sentencing Brown to 188 months’ imprisonment.
of
justice,
Brown noted a
timely appeal.
On appeal, Brown raises four arguments.
First, he
agues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the indictment as time-barred.
This court reviews de
novo a motion to dismiss an indictment as time-barred when the
motion is based upon a question of law, rather than on the
existence
of
the
facts
contained
in
the
indictment.
United
States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390,
1398 (4th Cir. 1993).
The statute of limitations for non-capital crimes is
five years.
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
Brown’s offense occurred in
1999, and the superseding indictment against him was filed in
2008,
more
remand,
the
than
five
district
years
after
the
court
determined
offense.
that
after
However,
the
on
arrest
warrant was issued, Brown fled with the intent to avoid arrest. *
Brown’s fugitive status thus tolled the limitations period under
*
We previously remanded the appeal to the district court
for the limited purposes of resolving this factual issue.
United States v. Brown, 374 F. App’x 450 (4th Cir. 2010) (No.
09-4092).
3
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18
Document: 52
U.S.C.
§
Date Filed: 07/13/2011
3290
(2006),
which
Page: 4 of 5
provides,
“[n]o
statute
of
limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice.”
Accordingly, Brown’s first argument is without merit.
Next, Brown argues that the district court erred in
denying
Brown’s
motion
to
suppress.
We
review
the
factual
findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear
error
and
States v.
evidence
the
court’s
Branch,
is
537
legal
F.3d
construed
prevailing party below.
in
conclusions
328,
de
novo.
United
(4th
Cir.
light
the
337
2008).
most
favorable
to
The
the
United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243,
246 (4th Cir. 2011).
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches
and seizures, merely those found to be unreasonable.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
generally
is
“per
se
Florida v.
Although a warrantless search
unreasonable,”
one
of
the
established
exceptions to this rule is a “search that is conducted pursuant
to
consent.”
(1973).
Schneckloth
v.
Bustamonte,
412
U.S.
218,
219
In determining the scope of the consent, the court uses
an objective reasonableness standard.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.
In other words, the court considers what “the typical reasonable
person
officer
[would]
and
the
have
understood
suspect.”
Id.
by
the
“The
exchange
scope
generally defined by its expressed object.”
4
of
Id.
between
a
search
the
is
A suspect may
Appeal: 09-4092
also
Document: 52
impose
consents.
Date Filed: 07/13/2011
limits
on
the
scope
of
Page: 5 of 5
the
search
to
which
he
Id.
Here, a reasonable person would have understood that
Brown consented to the search of his bags.
Accordingly, the
district court did not clearly err in so determining.
We
appeal.
also
reject
Brown’s
remaining
two
grounds
for
Brown argues that the court erred in both adopting the
presentence
report’s
recommendation
denying
a
three-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility and in imposing a
two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.
This court
reviews the district court’s decision for clear error.
United
States v. Kise, 369 F.3d 766, 771 (4th Cir. 2004) (acceptance of
responsibility); United States v. Kiulin, 360 F.3d 456, 460 (4th
Cir. 2004) (obstruction of justice).
Given Brown’s fugitive
status and inconsistent testimony, the district court did not
clearly err in denying Brown the acceptance of responsibility
reduction or in imposing a two-level enhancement for obstruction
of justice.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
legal
before
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions
the
court
are
adequately
and
argument
presented
would
not
in
aid
the
the
materials
decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
5
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