US v. Robert Mann

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:98-cr-00047-RAJ-TEM-12 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998613146].. [09-6376]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-6376

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ROBERT CY MANN, a/k/a B,
Defendant - Appellee.

On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
(S. Ct. No. 10-5860)

Decided on Remand:

June 16, 2011

Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Richard D. Cooke,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Jenifer Wicks,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
This case returns to us on remand after the Supreme
Court granted Robert Mann’s petition for certiorari, vacated our
judgment in United States v. Mann, 373 Fed. Appx. 350 (4th Cir.
2010), and remanded for our consideration in light of Henderson
v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. __ (2011).
We previously held that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) deprives
the

district

court

of

jurisdiction

to

grant

a

motion

to

reconsider the denial of a motion for a sentence reduction six
months after denying the original motion.

Following the Supreme

Court’s remand order, we asked the parties to file supplemental
briefs

addressing

whether

the

Court’s

holding

affects our ruling in the case at hand.

in

Henderson

After reviewing those

briefs and the Supreme Court’s opinion, we conclude that it does
not.

Accordingly, we reinstate our initial order vacating and

remanding the judgment of the district court.
We detailed the facts of this case in our original
opinion and so only briefly summarize them here.

On May 27,

2008, Mann invoked § 3582(c) and the retroactive crack cocaine
amendment to the Guidelines and moved for a reduction of his
sentence.

On

July

14,

2008,

the

district

court

denied

the

motion, finding Mann “ineligible for an adjustment of sentence,
as [his] drug weight exceeds 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base.”
See

U.S.S.G.

App.

C,

Amends.

706,
2

711,

715,

§

2D1.1(c)(1)

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(amendments not applicable to offenses involving 4.5 kilograms
or

more

of

crack).

On

July

22,

reconsideration of the July 14 order.

2008,

Mann

moved

for

After appointing counsel

for Mann, on January 26, 2009, the district court granted the
motion

for

review,”

reconsideration,

it

concluded

that

explaining
the

that

record

did

“after
not

further

explicitly

establish that Mann was responsible for 4.5 kilograms of crack
cocaine.

The Government appealed that order.
In Goodwyn v. United States, we held that § 3582(c)

divests a district court of jurisdiction to modify a sentence
except in those cases specifically authorized by statute.
F.3d

233,

exception

236

(4th

occurs

Cir.

when

the

2010).

One

Sentencing

specifically
Commission

lowers the Guidelines range for an offense.

596

authorized

retroactively

§ 3582(c)(2).

When

that happens, we held that § 3582(c) gives a district court one
--

and

only

one

--

opportunity

amendments and modify the sentence.

to

apply

the

retroactive

Id.; see also United States

v. Redd, 630 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2011).

For this reason, §

3582(c) forbids a district court from ruling on a motion to
reconsider a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction order.

If Goodwyn

remains good law, then Mann cannot prevail here.
We do not believe that Henderson disturbs our holding
in

Goodwyn.

In

Henderson,

the

Supreme

Court

held

that

a

veteran’s failure to comply with a 120-day filing deadline did
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not affect the jurisdiction of the Veterans Court.
at 1200.

131 S. Ct.

The Court concluded that the provision establishing

that filing deadline was not a jurisdictional bar because it:
(1)

did

not

speak

historically

been

Court,

(3)

and

administrative

in

jurisdictional

treated
was

review

as

part
by

terms,

jurisdictional

of

a

Article

I

(2)

by

the

nonadversarial
courts.

had

Id.

Supreme

system
at

not

of

1203-06.

None of those factors is present here.
Most

significantly,

the

provision

at

issue

here

provides that “[t]he court may not modify a term of imprisonment
once

it

has

been

imposed,”

§ 3582(c)(emphasis added).

subject

to

specific

exceptions.

Thus, the text here speaks in terms

of “the classes of cases” in which an Article III court has
“adjudicatory authority.”

Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130

S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010).

In sharp contrast, the 120-day filing

deadline in Henderson required a “person adversely affected” to
file a notice of appeal.
adjudicatory

authority

131 S. Ct. at 1204.
of

the

court

By addressing the

itself

rather

than

an

obligation of a party, § 3582(c), unlike the provision at issue
in

Henderson,

explicitly

imposes

limitations

on

the

court’s substantive authority to modify a sentence.

district

See United

States v. Smith, 438 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2006).
The context against which Congress enacted § 3582(c)
also requires us to consider it jurisdictional.
4

At common law,

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a court could not modify a final judgment in a criminal case
after the expiration of the court term at which it was entered.
United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 (1914).

After the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribed a specific window
of time during which a court could modify a criminal sentence,
the

Supreme

Court

continued

to

treat

these

time

limits

as

See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 473

jurisdictional.

n.2 (1947); United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189, 189
n.17 (1979).
Finally, this context also makes clear that Congress
has

not

shown

defendants

as

the

it

has

same

special

solicitude

for

veterans.

Unlike

for

the

criminal

process

for

review of decisions on veterans’ benefits, sentencing hearings
are

generally

adversarial.

See

Fed.

R.

Crim.

Proc.

32

(procedures for sentencing); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.
708, 720 (2008)(explaining that Rule 32 provides for “focused,
adversarial development” of record at sentencing).

Moreover,

unlike the Article I court at issue in Henderson, Article III
courts preside over sentencing hearings.
Ct.

at

1204

(distinguishing

prior

See Henderson, 131 S.
precedents

treating

a

statutory limit as jurisdictional as “cases involv[ing] review
by Article III courts”).
Accordingly, the rule we announced in Goodwyn still
stands.

When the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the
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Guidelines range, the scheme that § 3582(c) establishes provides
a district court with one -- and only one -- opportunity to
apply the amendment to the Guidelines and modify the sentence.
§ 3582(c)(2).

The district court lacked jurisdiction to grant

Mann’s motion to reconsider after its original denial of his
motion for a sentence reduction.

Accordingly, the judgment of

the district court is
VACATED AND REMANDED.

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