Classie Curley v. Adams Creek Associate

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:08-cv-00021-H. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998512990] [10-1465]

Case: 10-1465

Document: 28

Date Filed: 01/28/2011

Page: 1

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-1465

CLASSIE REELS CURLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ADAMS CREEK ASSOCIATES; BILLIE DEAN BROWN, As General
Partner for Adams Creek Associates; GEORGE H. ELLINWOOD,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville.
Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (4:08-cv-00021-H)

Submitted:

December 6, 2010

Decided:

January 28, 2011

Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry S. Height, LAW OFFICE OF LARRY S. HEIGHT, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant.
L. Lamar Armstrong, Jr., ARMSTRONG &
ARMSTRONG, P.A., Smithfield, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Case: 10-1465

Document: 28

Date Filed: 01/28/2011

Page: 2

PER CURIAM:
Classie
order

dismissing

waterfront

Reels
her

property

Curley

claims
in

North

appeals

the

quiet

title

Carolina

and

to

district
on

a

court’s

parcel

granting

of

summary

judgment in favor of Appellee Adams Creek Associates (“Adams
Creek”) on Curley’s claim that she is the owner of the property
through

adverse

Curley’s

first

jurisdiction

and

possession.
two

claims

concluded

The
for

that

district
lack

with

of

respect

court

dismissed

subject
to

her

matter
adverse

possession claim, she had not satisfied the elements pursuant to
North Carolina law.

We affirm.

I.

Jurisdiction

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion
to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Philips v. Pitt

Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2009).
survive

a

Rule

12(b)(6)

motion,

a

complaint’s

To

“[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and have enough facts to state a claim to
relief

that

is

plausible

on

its

face.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

Bell

Atl.

Corp.

v.

Generally, when ruling on

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).
2

Erickson v.

Case: 10-1465

a

federal

litigant’s

Date Filed: 01/28/2011

Rooker-Feldman *

The
that

Document: 28

district

challenge

to

abstention

court
a

lacks

state

Page: 3

doctrine

establishes

jurisdiction

court

decision,

over

a

including

allegations that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.
See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 482-83 & n.16; Rooker, 263 U.S. at
415-16.

This

“inextricably

jurisdictional
intertwined”

bar

with

a

includes
state

claims

court

that

are

judgment

and

precludes a district court from reviewing decisions of any level
of state court.

Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d

192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The doctrine disallows a federal court from reviewing
not only claims actually presented to a state court, but also
constitutional claims that derive from the state court judgment,
“as

when

success

on

the

federal

claim

depends

upon

a

determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues
before it.”

Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, “a party losing in

state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be
appellate

review

of

the

state

judgment

in

a

United

States

district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state
judgment

itself

violates

the

*

loser’s

federal

rights.”

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

3

Case: 10-1465

Johnson v.

De

Document: 28

Grandy,

512

Date Filed: 01/28/2011

U.S.

997,

1005-06

Page: 4

(1994).

The

doctrine is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before

the

district

court

proceedings

commenced

and

inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Mobil

Corp.

v.

Saudi

Basic

Indus.

Corp.,

544

U.S.

Exxon

280,

284

(2005).
Here, Curley asked the district court to invalidate a
proceeding brought to register a parcel of disputed property
pursuant to North Carolina’s Torrens Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 43-1, et seq. (West 2009).

She claimed that both the Torrens

Act and her due process rights were violated when the court
proceeded

to

dispose

of

the

property

without

notice

to

her.

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Curley’s claims
fall squarely within the ambit of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
as she is “seeking what in substance would be appellate review
See De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1005-06.

of the state judgment.”

II.
Curley

next

Adverse Possession

claims

error

in

the

district

court’s

decision granting summary judgment to Adams Creek on her adverse
possession claim.

We review a district court’s order granting

summary judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.
4

Hooven-Lewis v.

Case: 10-1465

Document: 28

Date Filed: 01/28/2011

Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001).

Page: 5

Summary judgment

may be granted only when “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Again, we have reviewed the record and conclude the
district court committed no error.
unsubstantiated,

and

self-serving

Curley only makes vague,
allegations

that

she

has

possessed the property continuously for the prescriptive period.
The record is clear that she lives in Pennsylvania, and has done
so for many years.
disputed

property

Her claims that she attends reunions at the
and

allows

her

nephews

to

live

there

as

tenants at will lack support in the record, even if they were
legally

sufficient

to

satisfy

North

Carolina’s

elements

of

adverse possession.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because

the

facts

and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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