David Walsh v. William Mitchell

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:08-cv-01897-DKC Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998582472]. Mailed to: Jelich, Stephen Simms, Rogers, Amy Simms. [10-2102]

Appeal: 10-2102

Document: 27

Date Filed: 05/04/2011

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2102

DAVID WALSH,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM MITCHELL; DONNA MITCHELL; DONNA MITCHELL, d/b/a
Stat Auto Wholesales; JOHN JELICH, d/b/a Threesome Auto
Sales; WILLIAM MITCHELL, d/b/a Xtreme Automotive Group;
DONNA MITCHELL, d/b/a Xtreme Automotive Group; DENNIS
MICHAEL ROGERS; AMY SIMS,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
JOHN DOE, d/b/a Threesome Auto Sales,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:08-cv-01897-DKC)

Submitted:

April 28, 2011

Decided:

May 4, 2011

Before AGEE, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Howard W. Foster, Matthew Galin, FOSTER PC, Chicago, Illinois,
for Appellant. Marios Monopolis, J. Stephen Simms, SIMMS

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SHOWERS, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; John M.G. Murphy, LAW OFFICES
OF JOHN M.G. MURPHY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. John
Jelich, Dennis Michael Rogers, Amy Sims, Appellees pro se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
David

Walsh

appeals

the

district

court’s

order

dismissing counts one and two of his complaint for failure to
state a claim and dismissing the remaining counts pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2006).
district

court

Organizations
RICO

alleging

Act

violation,

a

(“RICO”)

and

Walsh filed a complaint in the
Racketeer

Influenced

and

violation,

conspiracy

to

claims.

The

related

state

law

court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Corrupt
commit

a

district

We affirm

This court reviews de novo the grant of a Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir.
2010), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Feb. 8,
2011)

(No.

10-1016).

“To

survive

a

motion

to

dismiss,

a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’”

Ashcroft

v.

Iqbal,

129

S.

Ct.

1937,

1949

(2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Although in most cases, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not require “that a claimant set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim . . . [the Rules] still require a
showing
relief.”

rather

than

a

blanket

assertion

of

entitlement

to

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

The showing made by the plaintiff
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must be more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action” and more than “naked assertion[s] devoid of
further

factual

enhancement.”

Iqbal,

(internal quotation marks omitted).
court’s

decision

to

grant

the

129

S.

Ct.

at

1949

In reviewing the district

motion

to

dismiss,

this

court

“must . . . accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint
as true.”

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994).

This

court must also “construe factual allegations in the light most
favorable to [Walsh].”

Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River

Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999).
After
district

review

court

was

sufficiently

allege

of

the

record,

we

in

finding

that

correct
a

pattern

of

therefore, his RICO claim failed.

conclude
Walsh

racketeering

that

the

failed

to

activity

and

Because Walsh failed to state

a claim as to the violation of § 1962(c), the district court
also correctly found that his claim of conspiracy to violate
RICO pursuant to § 1962(d) was meritless.
The district court dismissed the remaining counts in
Walsh’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2006).
district

court

enjoys

discretion

to

decline

to

A

exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissal
of all claims brought pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
U.S.C.

§

1367(c)(3)

(2006);

see

also

Hinson

v.

Norwest

28
Fin.

S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 617 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying abuse of
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discretion standard to district court’s order of remand of state
claims).

In the interest of avoiding “[n]eedless decisions of

state law,” the Supreme Court has stated that, when “federal
claims are dismissed before trial . . . state claims should be
dismissed as well.”

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383

U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

The district court did not abuse its

discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over Walsh’s
remaining state law claims.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
legal
before

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions
the

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in
aid

the
the

materials
decisional

process.
AFFIRMED

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