Natalie Hayes v. City of Seat Pleasant, MD
Filing
UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:08-cv-02548-DKC Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998809273].. [10-2172]
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Date Filed: 03/14/2012
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2172
NATALIE HAYES, individually;
R.D.; RICARDO DIXON,
as
the
next
best
friend
of
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
CITY OF SEAT PLEASANT, MARYLAND; PFC BURNETT, Seat Pleasant
Police Department in both his official and individual
capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:08-cv-02548-DKC)
Argued:
December 8, 2011
Decided:
March 14, 2012
Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and Richard M. GERGEL,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion.
Judge Gregory
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Gergel joined.
ARGUED: Gregory L. Lattimer, LAW OFFICES OF GREGORY L. LATTIMER,
Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
Kevin Bock Karpinski,
KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Michael B. Rynd, KARPINSKI, COLARESI &
KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Appellant-plaintiffs Ricardo Dixon and Natalie Hayes filed
an
eight-count
state
law
Pleasant,
complaint
claims
asserting
against
Maryland,
and
several
civil
defendant-appellees
officer
Tracey
their arrest on September 27, 2006.
rights
City
and
Seat
stemming
Burnett
of
from
Hayes also brought suit on
behalf of her minor daughter, R.D.
The
district
judgment
summary
court
and
including
child.
the
claim
granted
the
dismissed
brought
on
Appellees’
the
motion
Appellants’
behalf
of
the
for
lawsuit,
five-year-old
At issue on appeal is the dismissal of the Appellants’
constitutional claims for unlawful seizure and excessive force
and
state
law
tort
malicious prosecution.
claims
for
false
arrest,
battery,
and
For the reasons that follow, we vacate
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Appellees as to these claims and remand for further proceedings.
I.
On
September
27,
2006,
Hayes,
who
was
employed
as
a
lieutenant with Coastal International Security, * arrived home in
uniform at approximately 4:00 p.m. and began talking to a family
*
Coastal International
government buildings.
Security
3
provides
security
for
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friend, Antonio Sallis, who had been visiting Hayes, her husband
Dixon, and their two children.
Dixon-Hayes home.
All were standing outside of the
At approximately 5:00 p.m., Dixon prepared to
take Sallis back to his home.
Dixon placed his son in a car
seat in the rear of the vehicle, and Sallis got into the front
passenger seat.
As Dixon completed strapping his son into the
car seat, he noticed that a police cruiser, later identified as
Burnett’s, was parked directly across from his driveway.
From
his driveway, Dixon asked Burnett if Burnett could move up so
that he could back out of his driveway.
In response, Burnett
allegedly yelled in a loud voice, “What, you don’t have enough
room?”
move.
Dixon then got in his vehicle and waited for Burnett to
After a few minutes, Burnett moved up the street and made
a U-turn.
Dixon proceeded to back out of the driveway, and as
he pulled up to the nearest stop sign, Burnett activated his
emergency lights and stopped Dixon’s vehicle.
The stop sign was
at the corner of the Dixon-Hayes property.
Hayes, standing on the sidewalk near the passenger side of
the
patrol
car
with
her
daughter,
asked
Burnett
why
he
was
stopping her car and harassing her husband.
Burnett allegedly
responded, “Get the hell out of my face.”
Hayes again asked
Burnett why he was harassing her family, at which time Burnett
exited his car and came around the front of his vehicle and onto
the
sidewalk
where
Hayes
and
her
4
daughter
were
standing.
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Burnett approached Hayes on the sidewalk, pointed and shouted in
her face, “Shut the hell up, shut the hell up.”
Burnett
to
back
away
from
hysterical at this time.
her
because
her
Hayes asked
daughter
was
As Hayes consoled her daughter, she
backed up so that she was now near the rear window of her car,
which
was
located
on
Seat
Pleasant
Drive.
While
Hayes
was
attempting to calm her daughter, Burnett grabbed her arm and
pulled out his baton, which he fully extended.
The parties
agree that Burnett was physically handling Hayes as he backed
her up.
At that point, Dixon exited the car.
Dixon asked
Burnett to take his hands off of Hayes, and requested that he
call a female officer.
Dixon complied.
Burnett told Dixon to stay back, and
Nevertheless, Burnett holstered his baton and
took out his pepper spray.
Burnett sprayed Dixon and turned
around and sprayed Hayes in her face, eye, nose, and mouth as
Hayes
held
her
daughter’s
hand.
Appellants
and
witnesses
testified that at the time Burnett sprayed Dixon, he was no
closer than seven feet away, had obeyed Burnett’s orders to stay
back, and had made no further comments.
that Hayes
never
left
the
sidewalk.
They also testified
Burnett
testified
that
Hayes interfered with his traffic stop by stepping in between
his and Dixon’s vehicles.
He also testified that Dixon bumped
him when Dixon exited his vehicle.
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After
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deploying
pepper
spray
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on
the
Dixon-Hayes
Burnett then proceeded to arrest Hayes and Dixon.
family,
Hayes was
charged with obstructing and hindering, resisting arrest, and
disorderly
conduct.
Dixon
was
charged
with
second
degree
assault, obstructing and hindering, interfering with an arrest,
and disorderly conduct.
Following a jury trial on June 25,
2007, Dixon and Hayes were found not guilty of all charges.
Dixon and Hayes then filed their eight-count complaint asserting
the civil rights and state law claims against the Appellees.
The
district
court
granted
the
Appellees’
motion
for
summary judgment, finding there was probable cause for Burnett
to initiate an investigatory traffic stop and probable cause to
arrest
Dixon
and
Hayes.
The
district
court
also
found
no
evidence that Burnett acted with malice and that the force he
deployed
was
objectively
reasonable
and
did
not
amount
to
excessive force.
“We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling de
novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to . . . the
non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in her
favor.”
Doe
v.
Kidd,
501
F.3d
(citation omitted).
6
348,
353
(4th
Cir.
2007)
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II.
The actions filed against Burnett and the city depend, to
some extent, on the averment that Burnett had no probable cause
to believe that both Hayes and Dixon had committed the crime of
hindering.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Appellees was based on the court’s finding that
Burnett did have such probable cause.
According to the district
court, Hayes hindered Burnett during the investigatory traffic
stop, and Dixon then hindered Burnett as Burnett attempted to
arrest
Hayes.
Appellants
contend
that
the
district
court
incorrectly determined there was no factual dispute with respect
to probable cause to arrest Hayes and Dixon.
The probable cause
question is therefore central to much of this appeal.
A. Unlawful Seizure
This Court has articulated the probable cause standard as
“facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge [which]
would warrant the belief of a prudent person that the arrestee
had committed or was committing an offense.”
Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 376 (4th Cir. 1984).
United States v.
Thus, to determine
whether Officer Burnett had probable cause to lawfully arrest
Appellants, a reviewing court necessarily must relate the events
leading up to the arrest to the elements of the offense that
Officer Burnett believed was being or had been committed.
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That
Date Filed: 03/14/2012
analysis
requires
a
Page: 8 of 16
proper
understanding
of
the
elements of the alleged offense -- in this instance hindering.
The elements of the offense of obstructing or hindering a police
officer are
(1) A police officer engaged in the performance of a
duty;
(2) An act, or perhaps an omission, by the accused
which obstructs or hinders the officer in the
performance of that duty;
(3) Knowledge by the accused of facts comprising
element (1); and
(4) Intent to obstruct or hinder the officer by act or
omission constituting element (2).
Cover v. State, 466 A.2d 1276, 1284 (Md. 1983).
Further, the
offense comprises three categories of conduct:
(1) positive direct obstruction, in which the officer
acts directly against the defendant or the defendant’s
property and is physically resisted; (2) passive
direct obstruction, where the officer seeks to make
the defendant act directly and the defendant refuses
or fails to act as required; and (3) positive indirect
obstruction, where the police are not acting directly
against the [defendant] but are acting indirectly
against other citizens who are, or may be, about to
commit offenses against the criminal law, and the
[defendant] does an act which obstructs them in their
general duty to prevent or detect crime, intending to
frustrate the police operation.
DiPino 729 A.2d at 361-62. (internal citation omitted).
Here, the district court found that the conduct at issue
fell
into
the
third
category,
positive
indirect
obstruction.
With regard to Hayes, the district court indicated that “Officer
Burnett could have reasonably believed that Hayes was hindering
by verbally accosting him, even after he told her to move away
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from the scene.”
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With respect to Dixon, the district court
stated, “A number of facts evidence that Dixon was hindering,
such as Dixon’s behavior, his statements to Officer Burnett to
take his hands off his wife, and his movement away from the car
after the officer ordered him to stay back.”
Our review of the record in the present case reveals two
conflicting versions of what transpired between Hayes, Dixon,
and
Burnett.
contention,
Further,
these
contrary
disputed
facts
to
go
the
to
district
court’s
the
heart
whether
of
probable cause existed to arrest Hayes and Dixon for hindering,
rendering summary judgment inappropriate.
With regard to Hayes’s arrest, the deposition testimony of
Hayes and other witnesses is at odds with the district court’s
finding that “Hayes interfered with that stop, such that officer
Burnett
was
unable
to
continue,”
and
that
“given
that
Hayes
continued interfering even after Burnett ordered her to stop,
one can infer intent to impede the police.”
It is unclear that
Hayes “verbally accosted” Burnett at all or “interfered with the
stop, such that officer Burnett was unable to continue,” much
less
that
hindering
she
intended
offense.
to
do
According
so,
to
a
requisite
Hayes
and
element
witnesses,
of
a
Hayes
never left the sidewalk and was holding the hand of her fiveyear-old child during the entire exchange with Burnett.
the
sidewalk
outside
her
home
while
9
dressed
in
her
From
security
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officer’s uniform, she asked Burnett through an open passenger
window why he was stopping the vehicle -- a seemingly reasonable
inquiry based on the questionable circumstances of the traffic
stop -- to which Burnett replied, “Get the hell out of my face.”
When Hayes asked him again why he was harassing her family,
Burnett jumped out of his vehicle, came around to where Hayes
was standing on the sidewalk, and pointed and shouted in her
face, “Shut the hell up,” all while she held her five-year-old
daughter’s hand.
Hayes immediately backed away, consoled her
hysterical daughter, and cut off communication with Burnett.
It
is undisputed that Burnett then physically grabbed Hayes and
shortly thereafter deployed pepper spray in her face and placed
her
under
arrest.
Construing
the
facts
in
the
light
most
favorable to Hayes, the evidence does not reveal that Burnett
had probable cause to arrest Hayes for the crime of hindering.
The same is true for Dixon.
the
vehicle
out
of
instinct
Dixon testified that he exited
when
he
saw
“a
big
officer
manhandling [his] wife with a baton in his hand” while she was
holding their daughter’s hand.
He remained at least seven feet
from Burnett, and when ordered to stay back, he obeyed.
At no
time did he come into contact with the officer or approach any
closer.
Burnett
Apart from requesting a female officer as he watched
twist
his
wife’s
arm
while
holding
their
hysterical
child’s hand, Dixon did not attempt to stop Burnett or interfere
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with the arrest.
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According to the witnesses on the scene, no
resisting of arrest occurred, and no one gave Burnett any reason
at all to be threatened.
What
matter
transpired
of
disputed
between
fact
Burnett,
that
goes
Dixon,
directly
and
to
Hayes
the
is
heart
a
of
whether Burnett was acting within the contours of his authority
when he arrested the Appellants.
For the reasons given above,
the district court’s dismissal of the claims arising from the
alleged unlawful arrest is vacated.
B. Excessive Force
Appellants further contend that the district court erred in
concluding Burnett was entitled to summary judgment with respect
to their claim for excessive force.
that
excessive
force
claims
The Supreme Court has held
against
law
enforcement
officers
during the course of an arrest should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.
U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
attention
to
the
Graham v. Connor, 490
Reasonableness analysis requires “careful
facts
and
circumstances
of
each
particular
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or
others,
and
whether
he
is
actively
attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
resisting
Id. at 396.
arrest
or
Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties
does not support
the
conclusion
that
11
the
force
used
against
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Dixon and Hayes was objectively reasonable and did not amount to
excessive force.
This
is
especially
evident
in
light
of
this
Court’s
decision in Park v. Shiftlett, 250 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2001).
In
Park, a husband and wife mistakenly entered a convenience store
that they believed was open, triggering the alarm.
848.
250 F.3d at
After police arrived, various events led them to detain
the
husband.
handcuffed
Id.
and
When
pressed
the
against
running toward her husband.
wife
a
Id.
saw
her
building,
she
husband
being
responded
by
Police officers grabbed her,
threw her against the building, handcuffed her, and sprayed her
twice in the eyes with pepper spray at close range.
Id.
This
Court determined that this “irresponsible use of pepper spray
twice
from
difficult
to
close
range
imagine
was
the
officers or the public.”
strikingly similar to Park.
between
Burnett
and
the
indeed
unarmed
excessive.
[wife]
Id. at 852-53.
as
a
. . .
threat
It
to
is
the
The instant case is
At the very least, what transpired
Appellants
that
resulted
in
the
Appellants being pepper sprayed involves disputed facts that go
to the heart of the Graham factors and should be decided by a
jury.
C. False Arrest and Battery
With regard to Appellants’ state law causes of action for
false arrest and battery, the district court determined that
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[b]ecause the court has concluded that Officer Burnett
possessed probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for
misdemeanors committed in his presence, the court will
enter summary judgment for Defendants on count five,
the false arrest and imprisonment claim . . . .
Because the court has already determined that Officer
Burnett did not use excessive force or unlawfully
arrest Plaintiffs, the court must conclude there is no
cause of action for battery either.
As discussed above, there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to what transpired between Burnett and the Appellants
that goes directly to the question of whether probable cause
existed to arrest the Appellants for hindering and whether a
basis existed for the force that was used.
reasons,
the
district
court’s
dismissal
of
For these same
these
counts
is
vacated.
D. Malicious Prosecution
The district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment
as
to
the
malicious
prosecution
count,
because
“Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that any wrongful or
improper
motive
drove
Officer
Burnett’s
actions.”
For
the
reasons explained below, we hold that the district court erred
in reaching this conclusion.
To establish a malicious prosecution claim, Appellants must
show that (1) Burnett instituted criminal proceedings against
the
Appellants;
(2)
the
criminal
proceeding
was
resolved
in
Appellants’ favor; (3) Burnett did not have probable cause to
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institute the proceeding; and (4) Burnett acted with malice or a
primary purpose other than bringing appellants to justice.
Okwa
v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 130 (Md. 2000).
Appellees do not contest that following Appellants’ arrest
by Burnett, Hayes was charged with obstructing and hindering,
resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct, and Dixon was charged
with
second
and
hindering,
interfering with an arrest, and disorderly conduct.
It is also
uncontested
charges.
the
degree
that
assault,
Appellants
obstructing
were
found
not
guilty
of
these
Thus, facts have been pled that, if proven, satisfy
first
and
second
elements
of
the
tort.
Further,
as
discussed above, there is a triable issue as to whether Burnett
had
probable
cause
to
arrest
Appellants,
precluding
summary
judgment for a failure to satisfy the third element.
It is
therefore necessary for us to consider whether, on this record
and as a matter of law, Appellants lacked “malice, or a primary
purpose
in
instituting
the
proceeding
bringing the offender to justice.”
other
than
that
of
See Krashes v. White, 341
A.3d 798, 801 (Md. 1975).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has long held that “the
‘malice’ element of malicious prosecution may be inferred from a
lack
of
probable
citations
summary
cause.”
omitted).
judgment
on
Okwa,
Moreover,
malicious
the
757
A.2d
court
prosecution
14
at
has
133
also
claims
is
(internal
held
that
improper
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where, as here, genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether
a
defendant
plaintiff.
See
officer
id.
had
(vacating
probable
summary
cause
to
arrest
a
judgment
on
malicious
prosecution claim and explaining, “[b]ecause we have determined
Appellees may not have had probable cause to arrest Mr. Okwa,
further
analysis
of
(emphasis added).
record
as
to
[the
malice]
element
is
unnecessary.”)
Because disputed material facts exist in the
whether
Burnett
had
probable
cause
to
arrest
Appellants, and inferences of malicious conduct may be drawn
from a lack of probable cause, Appellants’ malicious prosecution
claim
is
likewise
not
amenable
to
disposition
via
summary
judgment.
III.
As a final matter, the judgments entered by the district
court
in
finding
favor
that
constitutional
of
the
Burnett
rights.
Appellees
were
did
not
The
court
based
violate
found
on
the
it
the
court’s
Appellants’
unnecessary
to
consider and rule upon any of the immunity defenses raised by
the Appellees.
Having determined there are factual matters in
dispute, rendering summary judgment inappropriate, there is no
legal issue on appeal on which we could base jurisdiction to
address these immunity defenses.
See Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d
225, 237 (4th Cir. 2008).
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IV.
The district court considered areas of factual disagreement
between
the
parties
and
rejected
the
contention
that
disputed facts were material to resolution of the issues.
was
in
error.
Appellants
have
alleged
facts
the
This
sufficient
to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hayes
hindered Burnett during the investigatory traffic stop, whether
Dixon hindered Burnett as Burnett attempted to arrest Hayes, and
whether Burnett acted reasonably in pepper spraying Dixon and
Hayes in front of their children.
Contrary to the district
court’s contention, these disputed facts go to the heart of the
Appellants’
constitutional
and
tort
law
claims
for
unlawful
seizure, excessive force, false arrest, battery, and malicious
prosecution.
As such, we vacate the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in the Appellees’ favor on those claims.
We
remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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