Rachel Perry v. Computer Sciences Corporation

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:10-cv-00175-AJT-IDD. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998585281].. [10-2195]

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Document: 23

Date Filed: 05/09/2011

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2195

RACHEL LYNN PERRY,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION,
Defendant– Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Anthony John Trenga,
District Judge. (1:10-cv-00175-AJT-IDD)

Submitted:

April 26, 2011

Before DAVIS and
Circuit Judge.

WYNN,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

May 9, 2011

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Leizer Z. Goldsmith, THE GOLDSMITH LAW FIRM, LLC, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant.
Tyler A. Brown, JACKSON LEWIS, LLP,
Reston, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Rachel Lynn Perry appeals the district court’s order
granting

summary

Corporation

judgment

(“CSC”)

on

retaliation claims.

in

Perry’s

favor

of

Computer

employment

Sciences

discrimination

and

On appeal, Perry argues that the district

court erred when it found no genuine issue of material fact in
regards to her claims that CSC (1) chose not to promote her in
2008 based on her disability and in retaliation for internal
discrimination

complaints

she

filed,

in

violation

of

the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1210112213 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010), and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,

as

2010);

amended,

(2)

29

U.S.C.A.

terminated

her

§ 701-7961

based

on

(West

her

2008

disability

&

Supp.

and

in

retaliation for internal discrimination complaints she filed, in
violation

of

the

ADA

and

the

Rehabilitation

Act;

and

(3) terminated her in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
Disability discrimination and retaliation claims under
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are evaluated under the McDonnell
Douglas

Corp.

framework. *

v.

See

Green,

411

U.S.

792,

802

(1973),

“pretext”

Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 432 (4th Cir.

*

We employ the same substantive standards for determining
liability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
See 29
(Continued)
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2006); Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55,
57-58 (4th Cir. 1995).

Under the burden-shifting scheme, the

plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

To

establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under
either Act, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled;
(2) she was otherwise qualified for the position; and (3) she
suffered an adverse employment action solely on the basis of the
disability.

Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason

Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005).

To establish a prima

facie case of retaliation under either Act, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) she has engaged in protected conduct; (2) “she
suffered

an

adverse

action

subsequent

to

engaging

in

the

protected conduct”; and (3) “there was a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse action.”

Laber, 438 F.3d at

432.
If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

Id.

If

the defendant provides evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason
for its action, the plaintiff, who bears the ultimate burden of

U.S.C.A. § 794(d) (West 2008); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 281
(4th Cir. 1995).

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persuasion, must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the

proffered

retaliation.

reason

was

a

pretext

for

discrimination

or

See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 146-48 (2000); Laber, 438 F.3d at 432.
Perry
discrimination

failed
with

to

prove

regard

to

a

prima

CSC’s

facie

failure

of

promote

to

case

her

because she could not show that she was qualified, as she lacked
the global experience required by the position.
even

assuming

Perry

could

establish

a

prima

Additionally,
facie

case

of

retaliation, CSC met its burden of establishing a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting her, as the position
she held at the time was limited to the company’s United States
operations

and

activities.

Perry
Because

lacked
Perry

experience
did

not

with

meet

its

her

global

burden

of

establishing that CSC’s stated reason is pretextual, we hold
that the district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of CSC on this claim.
Perry’s
judgment

because,

termination
as

the

claims

did

district

not

court

survive
held,

summary
CSC

had

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination, as it
underwent

a

departmental

reorganization

available to meet its personnel needs.

and

Perry

was

not

In the face of CSC’s

evidence that it reorganized to maximize efficiency and did so
by eliminating Perry’s position in favor of more highly skilled
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positions, Perry could not satisfy her burden to show that the
reorganization was pretextual.

See E.E.O.C. v. Clay Printing

Co., 955 F.2d 936, 942 (4th Cir. 1992).

Accordingly, we hold

that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
on Perry’s termination claims.
Finally, Perry contends that the district court erred
when it held that Perry’s termination did not violate the FMLA
because, she argues, it did so in retaliation for her taking
FMLA leave.

It is unlawful for an employer “to interfere with,

restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise,
any right provided under [the FMLA].”
(2006).

Under

the

FMLA,

during

29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)

any

twelve-month

period,

an

employee is entitled to a total of twelve work weeks’ leave for
a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to
perform her job.
The

29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2006).
FMLA

also

prohibits

an

employer

from

discriminating against an employee for asserting rights under
the Act.
not

29 U.S.C. § 2165(a)(2) (2006).

consider

factor

when

an

making

employee.

FMLA

McDonnell

Douglas

prima

facie

employee’s

case

an

use

employment

retaliation

claims

burden-shifting
of

FMLA

of

Thus, an employer may

FMLA

leave

decision
are

a

a

negative

affecting

evaluated

framework.

retaliation,

as

To

under

the
the

establish

plaintiff

must

a

show

“that [she] engaged in protected activity, that the employer
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took adverse action against [her], and that the adverse action
was causally connected to the plaintiff’s protected activity.”
Yashenko v. Harrah’s N.C. Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 551
(4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144
F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Although Perry satisfies the first and second prong of
the prima facie case, she has not produced any evidence showing
a causal connection between her FMLA leave and her termination.
Thus, we hold that the district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of CSC on Perry’s FMLA retaliation claim.
For

the

foregoing

court’s judgment.
facts

and

materials

legal
before

reasons,

we

affirm

the

district

We dispense with oral argument because the
contentions

are

adequately

this

and

argument

court

presented

would

not

in

the

aid

the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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