US v. Michael Thornton

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:05-cr-00029-jct-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998421167] [10-4161]

US v. Michael Thornton

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Case: 10-4161 Document: 23

Date Filed: 09/09/2010

Page: 1

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4161 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MICHAEL RAY THORNTON, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior District Judge. (7:05-cr-00029-jct-1) Submitted: August 30, 2010 Decided: September 9, 2010

Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender for the Western District of Virginia, Fay F. Spence, First Assistant Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, R. Andrew Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Dockets.Justia.com

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PER CURIAM: Michael Ray Thornton was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006) (Count One), and possession of body armor by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 931 (2006) (Count Two). His case is before the court after a second

remand for resentencing. In our original decisions, we vacated Thornton's armed career criminal sentence, ultimately concluding that Thornton

lacked the requisite three prior convictions to qualify as an armed career criminal. 443 (4th Cir. 2009). See United States v. Thornton, 554 F.3d On the second remand, the district court

sentenced Thornton to an upward variance sentence of ninety-six months' imprisonment months on on Count One and with a concurrent term of

thirty-six

Count

Two,

concurrent

supervised

release terms of thirty-six months on Count One and one year on Count Two. Thornton timely appealed, arguing that the upward

variance sentence is unreasonable. We review Thornton's sentence "under a deferential

abuse-of-discretion standard," which first considers whether the sentence is procedurally reasonable. U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). "When Gall v. United States, 552 rendering a sentence, the

district court must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented[,] . . . apply[ing] the relevant [18 U.S.C.] 2

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§ 3553(a) [(2006)] factors to the specific circumstances of the case before it." United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The court also must "state in open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen sentence [and] set forth enough to satisfy the appellate and court has a that [it] has considered for the parties' [its] own

arguments

reasoned

basis

exercising

legal decisionmaking authority." omitted). If a sentence is

Id. (internal quotation marks

procedurally

reasonable,

we

then

consider substantive reasonableness, examining "the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range." Gall, 552 at 51. "If the district court

decides to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range, it must ensure that its justification supports the degree of the variance." United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.

2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thornton discretion and argues to that the district the court of abused the its

failed

justify

extent

upward

variance and thus imposed a sentence greater than necessary. Our review of of the sentencing leads us its transcript to conclude to and that the the five-page district that it a

Statement court

Reasons

adequately the

explained §

sentence

reflect and to

considered

relevant

3553(a) 3

factors

provide

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sufficiently

individualized

explanation

for

its

sentence,

as

required by Carter.

We also conclude that the extent of the

variance was supported by the facts of the case. Thornton also contends that the district court

unreasonably imposed conditions of supervised release applicable to sex offenders. conditions crimes. of However, district courts may impose special release to address prior unrelated

supervised

United States v. Bull, 314 F.3d 1275, 1276-78 (11th We conclude that the district court did not abuse

Cir. 2000).

its discretion by imposing the special conditions of supervised release in this case. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED

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