US v. Lonnie Smith
Filing
UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:09-cr-00027-FPS-JES-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998732291].. [10-4503, 10-4504]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4503
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LONNIE ANTHONY SMITH, a/k/a Timmy,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-4504
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LONNIE ANTHONY SMITH, a/k/a Timmy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.
Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge.
(5:09-cr-00027-FPS-JES-1; 5:09-cr00007-FPS-JES-1)
Argued:
October 27, 2011
Decided:
November 30, 2011
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished opinion.
Judge Gregory wrote the
opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Keenan joined.
ARGUED: Jeffrey Michael Brandt, ROBINSON & BRANDT, PSC,
Covington, Kentucky, for Appellant.
Randolph John Bernard,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia,
for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Stephen D. Herndon, Wheeling, West
Virginia, for Appellant.
William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, John C. Parr, Assistant United States Attorney,
Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
This consolidated case comes on appeal from the conviction
and
sentencing
conspiracy
to
of
appellant
possess
with
Lonnie
intent
Anthony
to
Smith
distribute
for:
(1)
heroin,
(2)
causing a person to travel in interstate commerce to promote the
distribution of heroin, (3) the use of a telephone to facilitate
the distribution of heroin, and (4) conspiracy to escape.
In
his appeal, Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for
the conspiracy and interstate travel convictions.
contends
that
the
failure
of
the
Government
to
Smith also
recommend
a
sentence at the bottom end of the Guidelines range as promised
in
Smith’s
reasons
plea
that
agreement
follow,
we
constitutes
find
that
plain
Smith’s
error.
For
the
arguments
have
no
merit.
I.
On February 3, 2009, a grand jury issued an indictment in
the Northern District of West Virginia charging Smith with the
violation of a number of federal statutes, and on April 7, 2009,
a
superseding
offenses.
indictment
was
returned
charging
the
instant
While awaiting trial, Smith plotted to escape from
the Northern Regional Jail in Moundsville, West Virginia, and he
pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy to escape.
3
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At
Smith’s
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bench
trial,
a
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number
testified according to plea agreements.
of
co-conspirators
The testimony showed
that Smith was a participant in and distributor for a heroin
ring.
Smith would frequently meet his customers at hotel rooms
rented
for
him
by
his
distributees
in
the
Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, area, where he would sell heroin multiple times
each
day,
knowing
that
the
heroin
would
be
resold
in
the
Northern District of West Virginia, among other places.
On January 29, 2010, the district court found Smith guilty
of all three counts.
Smith was sentenced to 262 months for his
conspiracy count, 60 months for his violation of the Travel Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006), 48 months for the use of a telephone to
distribute heroin, and 60 months for his escape conviction.
district
court
concurrently.
Smith
counts:
ordered
Smith
to
serve
all
The
sentences
Smith then filed his notice of appeal.
appeals
the
sufficiency
of
the
evidence
of
two
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute one kilogram of heroin, and aiding and abetting the
interstate travel of a person with the intent to carry on heroin
distribution.
conviction.
Smith also appeals the sentence on his escape
Because
of
the
fact-intensive
nature
of
this
appeal, we address the salient factual details of the heroin
conspiracy in the analysis on the merits of Smith’s appeal.
4
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II.
Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his
conspiracy and Travel Act convictions.
This Court must uphold a
verdict
evidence”
where
reasonable
there
finder
is
of
“substantial
fact
could
accept
as
such
that
adequate
“a
and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862
(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1151 (1997).
In doing so, this Court must look at the evidence as a “complete
picture, viewed in context and in the light most favorable to
the Government.”
Id.
We treat each challenge in turn, finding
that neither has merit.
A.
To prove conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute,
the government must show that (1) an agreement to possess heroin
with intent to distribute existed between two or more persons;
(2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant
knowingly
and
voluntarily
became
a
part
of
the
conspiracy.
Burgos, 94 F.3d at 857.
Whether there is a single conspiracy or multiple
conspiracies depends upon the overlap of key actors,
methods, and goals. However, one may be a member of a
conspiracy without knowing its full scope, or all its
members, and without taking part in the full range of
its activities or over the whole period of its
existence.
Also, it is not necessary that the
conspiracy
have
a
discrete,
identifiable
organizational
structure.
Often,
the
single
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conspiracy is comprised of a loosely-knit association
of members linked only by their mutual interest in
sustaining the overall enterprise of catering to the
ultimate demands of a particular drug consumption
market.
United
States
(internal
v.
Nunez,
citations
and
432
F.3d
573,
quotation
578
marks
(4th
Cir.
omitted).
2005)
Once
a
conspiracy has been established, the government need only show a
slight
connection
between
the
Burgos, 94 F.3d at 861.
defendant
and
the
conspiracy.
Furthermore, competition in the drug
market among some conspirators does not preclude a finding of a
United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 568
single conspiracy.
(4th Cir. 2009).
As is frequently the case in drug distribution trials, most
of the salient evidence came from co-conspirator testimony.
district
court
gave
testifying
under
nonetheless
the
concluded
credible.
plea
testimony
agreements
that
the
of
those
“greater
The
co-conspirators
scrutiny”
co-conspirators’
testimony
and
was
United States v. Smith, No. 5:09CR7-01, slip op. at
33 (N.D. W. Va. January 28, 2010).
Precedent and the facts are squarely on the side of the
Government.
The district court made extensive findings of fact,
detailing the operation of the conspiracy.
conspiracy
had
distribution
Virginia;
of
they
a
financial
heroin
shared
in
the
interest
the
goal
6
Northern
of
All members of the
in
the
District
“sustaining
the
continued
of
West
overall
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enterprise of catering to the ultimate demands of a particular
drug consumption market.”
Nunez, 432 F.3d at 578.
market was the area around Weirton, West Virginia.
That drug
See Smith,
at 28 (“It was in the mutual interest of defendant Smith and
various members of the conspiracy to promote and continue heroin
drug trafficking in the Northern District of West Virginia and
elsewhere.”).
All
of
the
members
of
the
conspiracy
knew
of
the
significant quantity of heroin that Smith kept on hand, which
implies a distribution scheme.
Furthermore, the repetitive drug
transactions
rented
at
hotel
rooms
for
Smith
by
the
co-
conspirators establish the regular and continuing nature of a
drug-distribution
(“Additionally,
Cf.
Jeffers,
showed
that
conspiracy.
the
evidence
570
the
F.3d
at
multiple
568
drug
dealers at Shriver’s Motel engaged in ‘a consistent series of
smaller
transactions,’
which
comprised
a
single
conspiracy.”)
(quoting United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir.
1993)).
The testimony of Kenneth Salters, Smith’s childhood friend
and co-conspirator, establishes the conspiracy and corroborates
the
incriminating
testimony
of
the
other
witnesses
and
co-
conspirators.
Salters saw Smith sell heroin to customers on a
daily
including
basis,
some
of
the
co-conspirators.
A
reasonable inference from Salters’s testimony is that Smith knew
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that at least some of his co-conspirators were redistributing
heroin in West Virginia.
And Smith even helped Salters start
selling heroin by giving Salters a customer list that included
buyers from the Northern District of West Virginia, and the two
began a referral system for heroin demand that they individually
could not meet.
Likewise, Salters corroborated testimony that
Smith paid heroin to co-conspirators who would rent motel rooms
and cars for Smith to further his drug activity and to hide
their
identities
if
the
police
investigated.
Salters
also
testified that the phone numbers discussed by other witnesses
were ones used to deal heroin.
United States v. Banks is instructive.
Banks involved,
like this case, a loose organization of drug distributors and
suppliers
charged
in
a
single
conspiracy
in
which
not
all
participants knew the identities of the others participating,
but nevertheless were engaged with a common enterprise whose aim
Banks, 10 F.3d at
was to supply drugs to a discrete region.
1053-54.
The
Court
affirmed
the
convictions,
rejecting
the
defendant’s view that the government had proved numerous small
conspiracies but not a large overarching conspiracy.
1050-56.
Id. at
The evidence supporting such a finding “essentially
consist[ed] of testimony about a great number of discrete buysell
transactions
conspirators,
and
between
various
ones
nothing
either
directly
8
of
the
or
alleged
co-
inferentially
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probative of any discernible hierarchical organization in which
they were linked.”
Id. at 1053.
The prosecution put on evidence sufficient for a reasonable
trier
of
fact
to
conclude
that
Smith
agreed
with
his
co-
conspirators to distribute heroin in the Weirton area of West
Virginia.
In addition to Salters’s testimony, co-conspirator
Grimes testified that Smith knew she was redistributing heroin
in West Virginia because she had told Smith about the sales and
that she told him that she was charging her customers twice what
she
paid
Smith.
Grimes
also
testified
that
she
saw
Smith
possess large amounts of cash and heroin and sell heroin to
other customers.
She told the court that Smith said that he was
worried because some of his customers were being indicted in
West Virginia.
Satathite,
another
West
Virginia
dealer,
testified
that
Smith knew Satathite was redistributing heroin and that one time
Smith
remarked
pretty quick.”
that
Satathite
must
be
“moving
[the
heroin]
Additionally, Satathite testified that Smith met
him in West Virginia in the parking lot of the Weirton Medical
Center in June 2008 and sold him three bricks of heroin, further
establishing Smith’s ties to the redistribution of heroin in
West Virginia.
Additional circumstantial evidence that Smith knew that his
customers were coming from West Virginia includes the area code
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the
phone
transactions
Date Filed: 11/30/2011
numbers
and
the
used
to
license
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call
plates
Smith
of
to
arrange
vehicles
used
drug
by
co-
heroin
to
conspirators to pick up drugs.
Furthermore,
Smith
once
McLaughlin, a co-conspirator.
resale.
offered
to
front
Fronting drugs shows knowledge of
See Nunez, 432 F.3d at 578 (citing the fact that drugs
were fronted as evidence of a conspiracy to distribute).
Many
co-conspirators
testified
to
the
same
few
meeting
locations for deals with Smith, and many rented hotel rooms and
cars in exchange for heroin.
phones
showed
frequent
conspirators.
Pen registers for Smith’s cell
phone
calls
to
a
number
of
the
co-
Many co-conspirators also testified as to the
presence of trademark bag markings indicating different brands
of
heroin
distributed
demonstrate
the
similar
by
Smith.
methods
and
All
means
of
the
used
foregoing
by
the
co-
conspirators and Smith to conduct the conspiracy.
The evidence here is at least as strong as that presented
in Banks.
We therefore affirm the conspiracy conviction.
B.
A conviction under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006),
must have three elements:
(1) interstate travel, (2) an intent
to promote an unlawful activity (a business enterprise), and (3)
performance or attempted performance of an unlawful act.
States v. Gallo, 782 F.2d 1191, 1194 (4th Cir. 1986).
10
United
Section
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1952(b) defines “unlawful activity” as “any business enterprise
involving . . . narcotics or controlled substances (as defined
in
section
102(6)
of
the
Controlled
Substance
Act)
violation of the laws . . . of the United States.”
§ 1952(b) (2006).
U.S.C.
§ 2’s
. . .
in
18 U.S.C.
Smith’s liability for this violation is 18
prohibition
against
“causing”
or
aiding
and
abetting a violation of federal law.
Elements (2) and (3) above are clearly established by the
facts discussed above in connection with the sufficiency of the
conspiracy charge.
The question is whether Smith did aid, abet,
and cause Bryan Cottrill, a confidential informant, to travel
interstate.
The
illegal
inducement
September 26, 2008.
of
interstate
travel
occurred
on
On that day, Cottrill, cooperating with
police, called Smith from West Virginia in order to arrange a
buy
in
Pennsylvania.
The
call
was
recorded.
Since
2003,
Cottrill had bought heroin from Smith three or four times per
week.
The usual pattern, followed in this instance, is that
Smith would tell Cottrill to “come up” to the “Robinson, Green
Tree”
area
of
Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania;
Cottrill
would
call
Smith once he arrived in the area, and Smith would tell him the
meeting location -- in this case, the Robinson Mall.
On this
particular call, Cottrill told Smith that he was “about to leave
the shop” and “jump on the highway,” but that he wanted to make
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sure that it was “all good.”
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Cottrill went on to describe the
details of the purchase at the Robinson Mall.
Admittedly, there was no direct evidence produced during
the Cottrill direct examination that Smith knew where Cottrill
lived, that a phone with a West Virginia area code was used, or
that a car with West Virginia plates was used.
sufficient
evidence
beyond
reasonable
a
occasion,
violated
for
a
reasonable
doubt
the
that
trier
Travel
Smith,
Act.
Yet there is
of
on
fact
this
The
to
find
particular
district
court
reasonably concluded that Smith violated the Travel Act based on
(1) the history of the relationship between Smith and Cottrill,
(2) the imputed knowledge of Smith that many of his purchasers
came
from
West
Virginia,
(3)
the
timing
of
the
phone
calls
suggesting the distance traveled by Cottrill, and (4) the use of
the phrases “come up” and “jump on the highway” suggesting that
Smith knew Cottrill was coming from West Virginia, and (5) the
fact that that Smith encouraged Cottrill to do so in order to
sell Cottrill heroin.
Court
precedent
bolsters
this
conclusion.
Smith
argues
that Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971), controls.
In
that case, a mere customer did not facilitate the business he
patronized.
The
Supreme
Court
agreed
that
“intent
to
. . .
facilitate” requires more than a mere “desire to patronize the
illegal activity.”
Id. at 811.
12
The evidence here, however,
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established that Cottrill frequently distributed heroin in West
Virginia purchased from Smith.
Cottrill had more than a mere
patronage relationship with Smith.
In any case, the Rewis Court cites approvingly to a number
of circuit court cases “in which federal courts have correctly
applied § 1952 to those individuals whose agents or employees
cross state lines in furtherance of illegal activity.”
401 U.S. at 813.
Rewis,
As this Circuit noted in United States v.
Baker, 611 F.2d 961, 963 (4th Cir. 1979), one such case cited,
United States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 1964), held
the
proprietor
of
a
gambling
operation
liable
despite
his
contention that he did not travel interstate and did not even
know of the interstate travel of his employees.
The Zizzo court
said it was “clear that the gambling business . . . caused the
interstate travel by the three employees,” and that a jury could
properly
infer
that
the
proprietor
employees lived out-of-state.
knew
that
some
of
Zizzo, 338 F.2d at 580.
his
This
Circuit in Baker found its facts -- an interstate trip made by a
prostitute at the direction of her boss -- were “analogous to
the employee-agent cases approved in Rewis [sic],” and upheld
the Travel Act conviction.
We
affirm
the
Baker, 611 F.2d at 963.
Travel
Act
conviction
because
of
the
reasonable inference from the record that Smith knew Cottrill
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was coming from West Virginia and because of the overwhelming
evidence of the purpose of the call.
III.
Appellant next argues that he should be allowed to withdraw
his guilty plea because of the Government’s failure to move for
a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range for his escape
conviction.
The plain error standard governs here because Smith did not
raise this claim below.
To prove plain error, “the appealing
party must show that an error (1) was made, (2) is plain . . . ,
and (3) affects substantial rights.”
F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010).
“affected
the
outcome
of
United States v. Lynn, 592
The third prong means the error
the
district
court
proceedings,”
Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009).
“Fourth
and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court
of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error -- discretion
which
ought
affect[s]
to
the
be
exercised
fairness,
judicial proceedings.”
only
integrity
if
or
the
error
public
seriously
reputation
of
Id. (citations ommitted).
Smith argues on appeal that the government breached its
contract -- Smith’s plea agreement for his escape charge -- when
the government failed to recommend a sentence at the low end of
the
Guidelines
range
for
that
14
offense.
Surely,
Smith
has
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established
that
Date Filed: 11/30/2011
the
error
was
Page: 15 of 15
made
and
that
it
was
plain.
However, Smith cannot demonstrate it “affected his substantial
rights” because the outcome was not affected by the error.
Smith was sentenced according to the grouping requirements
of
U.S.S.G.
§ 3D1.2(c),
which
combines
conduct
for
charges into a single tally for sentencing purposes.
multiple
The court
sentenced Smith to 262 months for the conspiracy charge, which
was at the lowest end of the Guidelines range for the grouped
offense, and he was ordered to serve time for all of his counts
concurrently.
escape
because
charge,
he
So while Smith was sentenced to 60 months for his
a
lower
sentence
would
still
be
would
serving
the
sentence for his conspiracy conviction.
not
have
helped
concurrent
him
262-month
It therefore cannot be
said that the error violated Smith’s substantial rights.
Because Smith has not shown that the error affected his
substantial
rights,
we
affirm
the
sentence
of
the
district
court.
AFFIRMED
15
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