US v. Alfred Cagle, Jr.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:01-cr-00350-NCT-2. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998576809] [10-4888]

Appeal: 10-4888

Document: 26

Date Filed: 04/27/2011

Page: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4888

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALFRED CAGLE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:01-cr-00350-NCT-2)

Submitted:

April 6, 2011

Decided:

April 27, 2011

Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark E. Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Sandra
J.
Hairston,
Assistant
United
States
Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Alfred Cagle, Jr., appeals the eighteen-month sentence
imposed by the district court upon revocation of his supervised
release.

Cagle does not dispute that he violated the conditions

of his release, but instead challenges the reasonableness of the
sentence.

We affirm.
“This court reviews whether or not sentences imposed

upon revocation of supervised release are within the prescribed
statutory range and are not ‘plainly unreasonable.’”

United

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted).

The first step in this review is to determine whether

the sentence imposed is unreasonable.

Id.

In this initial

inquiry, we take “a more deferential posture concerning issues
of fact and the exercise of discretion” than we do when applying
the

reasonableness

sentences.

review

to

post-conviction

Guidelines

United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th

Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
revocation

sentence

is

whether it is plainly so.

unreasonable,

we

must

then

If the
determine

Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547.

The advisory ranges for revocation sentences set forth
in Chapter Seven of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual are
non-binding policy statements.

“Though a district court must

consider the Chapter Seven policy statements and other statutory
provisions

applicable

to

revocation
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sentences,

the

court

has

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broad discretion to impose a particular sentence.”
595 F.3d at 547.

Thompson,

Despite this discretion, a district court must

sufficiently explain its rationale behind the sentence imposed:
A district court commits significant procedural error
where it fails to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.
This requirement applies regardless of
whether the district court imposes an above, below, or
within-Guidelines sentence.
A court need not be as
detailed or specific when imposing a revocation
sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction
sentence, but it still must provide a statement of
reasons for the sentence imposed.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Cagle’s

statutory

maximum

term

of

imprisonment

upon

revocation of supervised release was three years under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3).
by

the

The term of eighteen months’ imprisonment imposed

district

court

was

within

the

statutory

maximum.

Although the district court was initially mistaken about the
proper advisory range, it is clear that this error was corrected
and

the

district

court

considered

imposing Cagle’s sentence.
it

was

varying

month range.

upward

from

the

correct

range

before

The court specifically stated that
the

advisory

eight-

to

fourteen-

The court sufficiently explained its rationale for

imposing the sentence, repeatedly stressing the danger to the
public inherent in Cagle’s violation conduct.
Accordingly, we affirm the eighteen-month revocation
sentence imposed by the district court.

We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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