US v. Timothy Heggin

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:09-cr-00043-RLV-DCK-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998701450].. [10-5100]

Appeal: 10-5100

Document: 32

Date Filed: 10/17/2011

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5100

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TIMOTHY DEWAYNE HEGGINS,
Defendant -

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville.
Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:09-cr-00043-RLV-DCK-1)

Submitted:

September 30, 2011

Decided:

October 17, 2011

Before AGEE, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

John J. Cacheris, DOZIER, MILLER, POLLARD & MURPHY, LLP,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anne M. Tompkins,
United States Attorney, Richard Lee Edwards, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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Date Filed: 10/17/2011

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PER CURIAM:
Timothy
possession

of

Dewayne
firearm

a

Heggins
by

a

pled

guilty

convicted

to

felon,

unlawful
18

U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) (2006), and was sentenced to a term of eighty-seven
months

of

imprisonment.

Heggins

appeals

his

sentence,

contending that the district court erred in assigning him a base
offense

level

of

24

under

U.S.

Sentencing

Guidelines

Manual

§ 2K2.1(a)(2) (2009), and in finding that Heggins possessed the
gun

in

connection

§ 2K2.1(b)(6).
States v.

In

Simmons,

with
light

649

another
of

F.3d

our
237,

felony

recent
2011

WL

offense,

decision

in

3607266

USSG
United

(4th

Cir.

Aug. 17, 2011) (en banc), we agree with Heggins that his 2007
drug

trafficking

conviction.

conviction

does

not

qualify

as

a

felony

Accordingly, although we affirm the conviction and

the court’s determination that Heggins possessed the firearm in
connection with an armed robbery, we vacate the sentence and
remand for resentencing.
A

sentence

is

reviewed

for

abuse

of

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

discretion.
The district

court commits significant procedural error when it improperly
calculates the Guidelines range.

Id.

At sentencing, Heggins

objected to the base offense level of 24 on the ground that his
2007

drug

trafficking

conviction

did

not

expose

sentence of more than one year of imprisonment.
2

him

to

a

See § 2K2.1

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cmt. n.1 (defining felony conviction).
base

offense

level

should

be

20,

He maintained that the

pursuant

to

§ 2K2.1(a)(4).

Following United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005),
the court overruled Heggins’ objection and sentenced him within
his Guidelines range to a term of 120 months imprisonment.

Harp

has since been overruled by Simmons, which held that, under the
North Carolina structured sentencing scheme, see N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-1340.17(c)-(d)

(2009),

the

evaluation

of

whether

a

particular conviction was a felony must focus on the maximum
sentence for which a particular defendant was eligible, based on
his own criminal history, rather than the maximum sentence that
could be imposed on a defendant with the worst possible criminal
Simmons, 649 F.3d at ___, 2011 WL 3607266, at *6.

record.
Judged

by

this

standard,

qualify as a felony.
Heggins’
meritless.

The

Heggins’

2007

conviction

does

not

error

is

Resentencing is thus required.
second

4-level

claim

of

increase

sentencing

under

USSG

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)

applies if the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with
another

felony

connection

with

offense.

In

another

this

offense

context,
means

that

possessing
the

in

firearm

“facilitated or had the potential of facilitating” the other
offense.

USSG

§ 2K2.1

cmt.

n.14(A).

“This

requirement

is

satisfied if the firearm had some purpose or effect with respect
to the other offense.”

United States v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160,
3

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Date Filed: 10/17/2011

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163 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 330 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Heggins’ objection to the enhancement was based wholly
on his assertion that he did not participate in the robbery.
The district court had before it information that the victim had
identified Heggins as one of the robbers and that the victim
said one robber choked him while the other displayed a gun and
stole his money.

The court also heard Heggins’ deny, during his

videotaped interrogation, that he had any involvement in the
robbery.

The district court decided that Heggins’ denial was

not credible, and found as a fact that Heggins had participated
in

the

armed

robbery.

Once

that

fact

was

established,

the

further determination that the gun was possessed in connection
with the robbery followed without dispute.
An appellate court generally defers to the district
court’s credibility determinations.
528

F.3d

210,

232

(4th

Cir.

2008).

United States v. Abu Ali,
Given

that

the

victim

identified Heggins as one of the robbers, the district court’s
determination that he took part in the robbery was not clearly
erroneous.

United States v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 322-23 (4th

Cir. 2007).

In this appeal, Heggins contends that the court

clearly erred in finding that he took part in the robbery.
disagree,

and

conclude

that

the

applied.
4

enhancement

was

We

properly

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Because Heggins will be resentenced, his claim that
the

district

sentence
remand,

court

below
before

“[r]egardless

the

erred

within-Guidelines

failing

Guidelines

imposing
of

in

range

sentence,

whether
sentence

[it]

to
is

the

moot.

district

imposes

. . .

impose

place

an
on

a

variance

However,
court

above,

on

should,

below,
record

the

or
an

‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular facts of the
case before it.”

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330

(4th

(quoting

Cir.

2009)

Gall,

552

U.S.

at

50).

The

individualized assessment should “apply the relevant § 3553(a)
factors to the specific circumstances of the case before it.”
Carter, 564 F.3d at 328.
Accordingly, we affirm Heggins’ conviction, vacate his
sentence, and remand for resentencing consistent with Simmons.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because

the

facts

and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

5