US v. Nathaniel Bailey

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:09-cr-00152-RJC-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998791019].. [10-5244]

Appeal: 10-5244

Document: 43

Date Filed: 02/17/2012

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5244

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
NATHANIEL DEVON BAILEY,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00152-RJC-1)

Submitted:

February 13, 2012

Decided:

February 17, 2012

Before GREGORY, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Angela Parrot, Acting Executive Director, Ross H. Richardson,
Assistant Federal Defender, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 10-5244

Document: 43

Date Filed: 02/17/2012

Page: 2 of 6

PER CURIAM:
A

federal

jury

convicted

Nathaniel

Devon

Bailey

of

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006);
two counts of possession with intent to distribute crack, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006); possession of a firearm
after sustaining a conviction for an offense punishable by a
term

of

U.S.C.

imprisonment
§

922(g)(1)

exceeding

furtherance

of

a

(2006);

drug

one

and

in

possession

trafficking

U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).

year,

crime,

violation
of

in

a

of

18

firearm

in

violation

of

18

The district court sentenced Bailey to

a total of 135 months of imprisonment and he now appeals.

For

the

but

reasons

that

follow,

we

affirm

Bailey’s

conviction

vacate the portion of the sentence pertaining to reimbursement
of attorney’s fees, and remand for resentencing.
Bailey first argues that the district court violated
his

Fifth

and

Sixth

Amendment

rights

in

refusing

to

admit

evidence of his coconspirator’s guilty plea to possession of
some of the crack in state court.
for abuse of discretion.
436 (4th Cir. 2007).
“the

[district]

United States v. Kelly, 520 F.3d 433,

An abuse of discretion occurs only when

court

admitting evidence.”

We review evidentiary rulings

acted

arbitrarily

or

irrationally

in

United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724,

2

Appeal: 10-5244

732

Document: 43

(4th

Cir.

Date Filed: 02/17/2012

2006)

(internal

Page: 3 of 6

quotation

marks

and

citation

omitted).
“Whether grounded in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee
of

compulsory

process,

or

the

more

general

Fifth

Amendment

guarantee of due process, the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants
defense.”

a

meaningful

opportunity

to

present

a

complete

United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 358 (4th Cir.

2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 451 (2011) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

While this guarantee includes the

right to present evidence to the jury that might influence the
determination of guilt, the “right to present a defense is not
absolute[,

and]

criminal

defendants

do

not

have

a

right

to

present evidence that the district court, in its discretion,
deems irrelevant or immaterial.”
and citations omitted).
and

conclude

discretion

that

in

the

refusing

Id. (internal quotation marks

We have thoroughly reviewed the record
district
to

court

admit

did

evidence

not

abuse

of

its

Bailey’s

coconspirator’s state guilty plea.
Bailey next argues that the district court erred in
denying

his

suppression

motion

based

on

the

vehicle and deficiencies in the arrest warrant.

search

of

his

“In considering

a ruling on a motion to suppress, we review conclusions of law
de

novo

and

underlying

factual

findings

for

clear

error.”

United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 553 (4th Cir. 2007)
3

Appeal: 10-5244

Document: 43

(citation

Date Filed: 02/17/2012

omitted).

When

the

Page: 4 of 6

district

court

has

denied

a

defendant’s suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the
light

most

Grossman,

favorable

400

F.3d

to

212,

the

government.

216

(4th

Cir.

United

2005).

States

“It

is

v.

well

established that officers who have probable cause can search a
vehicle without a warrant.”

United States v. White, 549 F.3d

946, 949 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

District courts

must “assess whether officers had probable cause by examining
all of the facts known to officers leading up to the arrest, and
then

asking

whether

these

historical

facts,

viewed

from

the

standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount
to probable cause.”

Id. at 950 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).
In addition, if a warrant is found to be defective,
the

evidence

obtained

from

the

defective

warrant

may

nevertheless be admitted under the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.
922-23 (1984).
will

not

be

See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,

Evidence seized pursuant to a defective warrant
suppressed

unless:

(1)

the

affidavit

contains

knowing or reckless falsity; (2) the magistrate acts as a rubber
stamp for the police; (3) the affidavit does not provide the
magistrate

with

a

substantial

basis

for

determining

the

existence of probable cause; or (4) the warrant is so facially
deficient

that

an

officer

could
4

not

reasonably

rely

on

it.

Appeal: 10-5244

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Date Filed: 02/17/2012

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United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121-22 (4th Cir. 1996).
We

conclude

that

the

district

court

did

not

err

in

denying

Bailey’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of
his vehicle.
Finally, Bailey argues that the district court erred
in ordering that he partially reimburse the United States for
the

costs

of

court-appointed

counsel.

“In

reviewing

the

district court’s application of the factual findings, as in the
reimbursement
standard.”

order

here,

we

apply

an

abuse

of

discretion

United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, ___, 2012 WL

208041, *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2012).

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3006A(c) (2006), “[i]f at any time after appointment of counsel
the . . . [district] court finds that the person is financially
able

to

obtain

counsel

or

to

make

partial

payment

for

the

representation, it may . . . authorize payment as provided in
subsection

(f).”

court-appointed

Before
counsel

the

fees,

court

orders

however,

it

reimbursement
must

“find[]

of

that

funds are available for payment from or on behalf of a person
furnished representation.”

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) (2006).

We have recently held that in making this finding, the
district court “must base the reimbursement order on a finding
that there are specific funds, assets, or asset streams (or the
fixed right to those funds, assets or asset streams) that are
(1) identified by the court and (2) available to the defendant
5

Appeal: 10-5244

for

Document: 43

the

repayment

Date Filed: 02/17/2012

of

the

court-appointed

Moore, 2010 WL 208041 at *6.
findings.

Page: 6 of 6

attorney’s

fees.”

Here, the court made no such

As in Moore, the facts contained in the presentence

report, that Bailey had a high school degree and a history of
employment, do not support a finding of Bailey’s present ability
to make payments in light of the report’s findings that Bailey
had no significant assets and no present ability to pay criminal
penalties.

Moreover, the district court also found that Bailey

did not have the ability to pay fines and interest in this case.
See id. at *8.

We conclude, therefore, that the district court

erred in determining that Bailey had the present ability to pay
the costs of court-appointed counsel based on the findings in
the presentence report.
Accordingly, we affirm Bailey’s conviction but vacate
the

sentence

attorney’s

as

fees

resentencing.

to
and

the

order

remand

to

directing
the

reimbursement

district

court

of
for

We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before

the

court

and

argument

would

not

aid

the

decisional

process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

6