Betty Jefferson v. School Board City of Norfolk

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:10-cv-00316-JBF-TEM Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998709207].. [11-1256]

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Date Filed: 10/26/2011

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1256

BETTY JEFFERSON; NORFOLK FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL
4261, affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Jerome B. Friedman, Senior
District Judge. (2:10-cv-00316-JBF-TEM)

Submitted:

September 30, 2011

Decided:

October 26, 2011

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert E. Paul, Jordan M. Kaplan, ZWERDLING, PAUL, KAHN & WOLLY,
PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Andrew R. Fox, Assistant
City Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Betty Jefferson and the Norfolk Federation of Teachers
(“NFT”) filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) action in the
district court, alleging that the School Board of the City of
Norfolk

(“the

School

Board”)

violated

Amendment right to due process.
the

School

Board

represented
motion

to

(b)(6).

by

violated

NFT.

dismiss

In

Fourteenth

The complaint also alleged that

the

rights

response,

pursuant

Jefferson’s

to

Fed.

the
R.

of

other

School
Civ.

individuals

Board

P.

filed

12(b)(1)

a

and

After Jefferson and NFT filed a response and an amended

complaint, the district court ruled that NFT lacked standing to
participate in the action and dismissed Jefferson’s claim for
failure to state a claim.
Following

the

district

court’s

dismissal,

Jefferson

and NFT filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and a
motion

for

leave

to

file

a

second

district court denied both motions.

amended

complaint.

The

Jefferson and NFT appeal

both the original judgment and the denial of the post-judgment
motions.

We affirm.
On

appeal,

Jefferson

and

NFT

raise

three

issues:

(1) the district court erred in finding that Jefferson failed to
state a claim for the deprivation of her due process rights;
(2) the

district

court

erred

in

finding

that

NFT

lacked

standing; and (3) the district court erred in refusing to amend
2

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its

Document: 24

judgment

Date Filed: 10/26/2011

to

allow

Jefferson

and

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NFT

to

file

an

amended

complaint.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d

176, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2009).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level,” with “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Atl.

Corp.

v.

Twombly,

550

U.S.

544,

555,

570

Bell

(2007).

Generally, when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a judge must
“accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

A

court is not, however, required “to accept as true allegations
that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or
unreasonable inferences” or “allegations that contradict matters
properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.”

Veney v.

Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
To establish a violation of procedural due process,
Jefferson must have alleged that (1) she had a property interest
(2)

of

which

the

process of law.

School

Board

deprived

her

(3)

without

due

Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle

Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 328 (4th Cir. 2005).
3

Public employees may

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have

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a

Date Filed: 10/26/2011

constitutionally

employment.

protected

Page: 4 of 7

property

interest

in

their

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,

542, 546 (1985); Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir.
2009).

A

employment

public
may

school

derive

from

teacher’s
“a

property

contract

which

interest
provides

in
for

continued employment, and which can be terminated only for good
cause.”

Royster v. Bd. of Trs., 774 F.2d 618, 620 (4th Cir.

1985).

The parties here do not dispute that Jefferson had a

property interest in her teaching job or that, when provided
notice of her proposed dismissal, she did not seek the hearing
to which she was statutorily entitled.
such

a

hearing

would

have

been

Jefferson alleges that

meaningless

because,

believes, the School Board had predetermined her case.

she

We find

this claim to be unsupported by any factual averment, and we
therefore affirm its dismissal by the district court.
NFT claims on appeal that, contrary to the district
court’s ruling, it did have associational standing to proceed in
the district court.

(Appellants’ Br. at 31-35).

This court

reviews de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss for
lack of standing.

Bishop v. Bartlett, 575 F.3d 419, 423 (4th

Cir. 2009).
Because NFT lacks standing to sue in its own right, as
it has suffered no injury in fact, it must attain associational
standing in order to proceed.

See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
4

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Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977) (“Even in the absence
of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as
the representative of its members.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

NFT has standing to bring suit on behalf of its

members if: “(1) its members would otherwise have standing to
sue as individuals; (2) the interests at stake are germane to
the group’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim made nor the
relief

requested

members

in

Stasko,

282

the

requires

suit.”

F.3d

315,

the

Friends
320

participation
for

(4th

Ferrell

Cir.

of

individual

Parkway,

2002).

LLC

Neither

v.

party

contests the district court’s finding that NFT satisfied the
first two prongs of the associational standing test.

Therefore,

this appeal turns on whether NFT satisfies the third prong.
review

reveals

that

the

relief

sought

for

the

Our

association’s

membership as a whole is so vague as to be meaningless, and that
the

complaint

otherwise

concerns

only

Jefferson’s

specific

See Warth v.

rights and requires her individual participation.

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1975) (holding nature of relief
sought is key to assessing associational standing).

Therefore,

the district court did not err in denying NFT standing.
Lastly,

NFT

and

Jefferson

assert

that

the

court erred in denying their post-judgment motions.
reviews

a

district

court’s

denial

complaint for abuse of discretion.
5

of

a

motion

district

This court
to

amend

a

Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d

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404, 428 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

Under Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2), after the period for amending a complaint as a matter
of course has expired “a party may amend its pleading only with
the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.”

The

court’s leave should be freely given and “should be denied only
when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party,
there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the
amendment would have been futile.”

Laber, 438 F.3d at 426-27

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court may not

grant a post-judgment motion to amend, such as the one at issue
here, “unless the judgment is vacated pursuant to [Fed. R. Civ.
P.] 59(e).”
“A

Id. at 427.
conclusion

that

the

district

court

abused

its

discretion in denying a motion to amend . . . is sufficient
grounds on which to reverse the district court’s denial of a
Rule

59(e)

motion.”

Matrix

Capital

Mgmt.

Fund,

LP

v.

BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 15(b) motion to
amend, as we agree with the district court that such amendment
would have been futile.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
legal

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions

are

adequately
6

presented

in

the

materials

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before

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the

court

Date Filed: 10/26/2011

and

argument

would

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not

aid

the

decisional

process.
AFFIRMED

7