Capital Environmental Services v. North River Insurance Company

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UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:10-cv-00792-TSE-TCB Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998884786].. [11-1326]

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Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 1 of 12 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-1326 CAPITOL ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior District Judge. (1:10-cv-00792-TSE-TCB) Argued: May 17, 2012 Before NIEMEYER and Senior Circuit Judge. Decided: GREGORY, Circuit Judges, Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer joined. June 28, 2012 and Gregory HAMILTON, 1 wrote the ARGUED: Stephen Anthony Horvath, BANCROFT, MCGAVIN, HORVATH & JUDKINS, PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Margaret F. Catalano, CARROLL, MCNULTY & KULL, LLC, Basking Ridge, New Jersey, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Melissa H. Katz, Wesley D. Allen, BANCROFT, MCGAVIN, HORVATH & JUDKINS, PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Heather E. Simpson, CARROLL, MCNULTY & 1 Because Senior Judge Hamilton did not participate in oral argument due to illness, this decision is filed by a quorum of the panel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 2 of 12 KULL, LLC, Basking Ridge, New Jersey; Craig J. Franco, ODIN, FELDMAN & PITTLEMAN, PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 3 of 12 GREGORY, Circuit Judge: Capitol Environmental Services, Inc. (“Capitol”) argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of The North River Insurance Company (“North River”) because the settlement agreement between Capitol and Earth Tech, Inc. (“Earth Tech”) included the contractual dismissed as moot by the Florida state courts. indemnity claim We disagree. We hold that because Capitol could never be held liable for any damages to Earth Tech on a theory of contractual indemnity after Earth Tech was made whole on its breach of contract claim, North River has no duty to indemnify Capitol for the damages covered by the settlement agreement. I. Capitol is a waste-disposal company that had been hired as a contractor by St. Marks Refinery for waste disposal. Capitol in provide turn hired Earth Tech as a subcontractor to hazardous-waste transportation and disposal services. Capitol also subcontracted with Freehold Cartage, Inc. (“FCI”) to pick up and transport waste from St. Marks Refinery to the disposal facility. On September 25, 2002, as FCI employee Peter Blash was backing a semi-tractor-trailer into the St. Marks Refinery, his tractor-trailer lay across Virginia State Road 363, and Annette 3 Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 4 of 12 Carey collided into the tractor-trailer, resulting in injuries to her and her husband. center line of the The tractor-trailer was angled over the road so that its headlights pointed in Carey’s lane, which caused a glare that distracted her from the trailer ahead providing in her lane. Earth Tech was responsible flagmen to direct traffic at the site. for Several witnesses testified that an Earth Tech flagman “jumped” in front of her vehicle, causing her to swerve and hit the tractor- trailer. Carey filed suit in state court in Florida against Peter Blash, FCI, and Earth Tech for her injuries and her husband’s loss of consortium. Earth Tech and FCI each paid $250,000 in 2006 to extinguish their respective liabilities in the action. Earth Tech filed a third-party complaint against Capitol, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, contractual indemnity, and common-law indemnity. On March 29, 2007, the Second Judicial Circuit for Wakulla County, Florida, granted Earth Tech’s motion for partial summary judgment against Capitol, holding that Capitol breached the subcontract because it failed to purchase adequate insurance to cover Earth Tech’s subcontract work. The court subsequently granted Capitol’s motion for summary judgment on the common-law indemnity charge but denied it as to the contractual indemnity claim. The trial court sua sponte 4 severed the contractual Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 5 of 12 indemnity claim, and the breach of contract claim went to a jury to determine damages. The jury awarded $585,525 to Earth Tech on February 6, 2008, for the breach of contract claim. On July 13, 2007, Capitol filed a declaratory judgment action against North River in the United States District Court for the Eastern indemnification Capitol. District according of Virginia to North seeking River’s defense policy and held by The district court found that it would be premature to award summary judgment on the indemnification claim because the record was “insufficiently developed” because Florida courts had “not yet ruled on whether Capitol breached its duty to indemnify Earth Tech.” Capitol Envt’l Servs., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645-46 (E.D. Va. 2008). The court noted, “North River has a duty to indemnify Capitol in the Earth Tech action only if Capitol demonstrates that it was found liable to Earth Tech for bodily injury actually covered by the North River policy.” Id. at 645. Accordingly, the court said, if Capitol’s liability arose out of Earth Tech’s negligence, that would give rise to Capitol’s liability to Earth Tech only under a breach of contract theory, which in turn would not be covered by North River’s policy. Id. The parties agreed in a joint stipulation that the Florida court was the appropriate forum to resolve the remaining contractual indemnity claim between Earth Tech and Capitol, but 5 Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 6 of 12 that in the event that the Florida court did not consider the indemnity claim, the parties would return to Virginia federal court to resolve the issue. Capitol sought indemnity claim denied. The in a the court trial for Florida dismissed the court, the severed which the contractual contractual trial court indemnification claim as moot, finding that any damages that would be awarded to Earth Tech on this claim would be duplicative of the damages awarded for breach of contract. On May 28, 2008, the Circuit Court of Wakulla County, Florida, entered final judgment on the breach of contract claim in favor of Earth district court judgment, but Tech, of and appeal added Capitol in appealed Florida, prejudgment to which interest the first affirmed to the bringing the total final judgment to $889,152.72. the damages, On November 30, 2009, the first district court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision that the contractual indemnity claim was moot. Neither Capitol nor Earth Tech sought appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. In August 2010, Capitol and Earth Tech entered a settlement agreement, in which Capitol agreed to pay $769,087,68 to Earth Tech according to a payment schedule in satisfaction of the judgment and “all claims and counterclaims asserted, or which could have been asserted.” 6 Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 On Filed: 06/28/2012 July 16, 2010, Pg: 7 of 12 Capitol filed a second declaratory judgment action against North River in the eastern district of Virginia, which action forms the basis for the instant appeal. The district court denied Capitol’s motion for summary judgment and granted North River’s on March 15, 2011, holding that North River has no duty to indemnify Capitol. The court found that the dismissal of the contractual indemnity claim on mootness grounds constituted an adjudication on the merits under Florida law and that litigating legally Earth the Tech issue obligated is precluded again. to pay As by Earth such, Tech res judicata Capitol under never the from became contractual indemnity theory, and accordingly North River had no duty of indemnification. settlement The agreement court between further Capitol determined and Earth that Tech did the not encompass the contractual indemnity claim because that claim had already been extinguished according to a final decision of the Florida state courts. Capitol filed a notice of appeal to this Court. II. On between appeal, Capitol Capitol and argues Earth that Tech the settlement includes the agreement dismissed contractual indemnity claim and that North River must indemnify Capitol for this claim according 7 to its insurance policy. Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 8 of 12 Reviewing de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment for North River, see Higgins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988), we affirm. North River’s policy covers “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’” includes a carve out: J.A. 243. The . . . also North River is not obligated to pay for damages assumed in a contract or agreement. exception policy to the exception: [t]hat the insured contract or agreement.” there would is have J.A. 243. But there is an coverage in the for absence “damages of the The settlement agreement between Capitol and Earth Tech is an assumption of liability by Capitol, absence and of Capitol). Capitol the would agreement have (due to had that the liability court judgment in the against The parties agree that the judgment against Capitol for breach of contract is not covered by the North River policy. The only question that remains agreement between Capitol and is whether Earth Tech the settlement included the contractual indemnity claim, which could be covered by the North River policy. Capitol argues that because the settlement agreement covers “all claims and counterclaims asserted, or which could have been asserted” in the Earth Tech and Capitol law suit, the agreement necessarily covers the claim for contractual indemnity despite 8 Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 9 of 12 the fact that the state appeals court had ordered judgment for $889,152.72 on the breach of contract claim. Capitol’s argument is unconvincing. First, the judgment for $889,152.72 made Earth Tech whole for its injury. Even if judgment were somehow awarded against Capitol under the contractual indemnity theory, Capitol would owe no amount of money under such a theory because Earth Tech has already recovered the full amount of its injury. At the time legally of the obligated agreement, pay to settlement Tech Earth Capitol damages was under not the contractual indemnity theory. Capitol is not now -- nor will it ever be -- legally to obligated pay damages to Earth Tech under the contractual indemnity theory. In any case, there has never been a under judgment against Capitol the contractual court decision indemnity theory. Second, the Florida state that the contractual indemnity claim was moot was a final judgment on the merits, and therefore the claim could not be reasserted against Capitol. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b) states that any involuntary dismissal “other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication on the merits.” One Florida appellate court has observed that “[t]he reluctance of the Florida courts to decide 9 moot questions is based on Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 10 of 12 policy reasons, not lack of jurisdiction.” Merkle v. Jacoby, 912 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2005) (citing Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002). Under Florida law, even if a case would otherwise be moot, a court may nonetheless consider the exceptions applies: merits when one of three policy “(i) when questions raised are of great public importance, (ii) when the questions raised are likely to recur, or affect (iii) the rights determined.” v. State, when of the collateral a party legal consequences from the flow issue that to be J.A. 445 (district court opinion) (citing Godwin 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992)). The Florida appellate court in Merkle reasoned that because the mootness rule in Florida is policy-based, dismissal on mootness grounds is not jurisdictional for purposes of Rule 1.420(b). See also Semtek Intern. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 513 U.S. 497, 501503 (2001) (discussing the history of the federal counterpart, Rule 41(b)); Allie v. Ionata, 503 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. 1987) (same) (holding that “[a] judgment on the merits precluding the relitigation of the same cause of action is one based on the legal rights and liabilities of the parties, as distinguished from one based contentions, procedure.”). or on on technical mere matters Therefore, under 10 or dilatory of form Florida or objections of law practice the or or mootness Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 11 of 12 judgment was a valid and final decision on the merits at the time of the settlement agreement between Capitol and Earth Tech. No court has ever held that Capitol is liable to Earth Tech for damages under a theory of contractual indemnity. Because the indemnity claim against Capitol had been dismissed as moot and the settlement agreement did not resurrect it, Capitol was not legally obligated to pay Earth Tech damages for indemnity. The North River policy covers “legally obligated to pay.” only claims which Capitol is Therefore, North River does not have a duty to indemnify Capitol under the insurance policy. The district court was correct to conclude that “the settlement, which purported Capitol, cannot to settle be said all to claims have between encompassed Earth Tech and the breach of contractual indemnity claim because, at the time the settlement was consummated, that covered claim was already extinguished.” 2 J.A. 446-47. 2 Capitol also argues that the district court erred in concluding that res judicata barred it from considering whether Capitol was liable to Earth Tech under the contractual indemnity claim. But neither res judicata nor claim preclusion can apply under Florida law when, as here, the parties to the prior and subsequent proceedings are not the same. E.C. v. Katz, 731 So.2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 1999) (deciding that there is no doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel in Florida, contrary to federal law). “[U]nless both parties are bound by the prior judgment, neither may use it in a subsequent action.” Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917, 919 (Fla. 1995); Massey v. David, 831 So. 2d 226, 233 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 2002). Nor does Florida’s privity exception apply on these facts. See Sentry Ins. v. FCCI (Continued) 11 Appeal: 11-1326 Doc: 31 Filed: 06/28/2012 Pg: 12 of 12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for North River. AFFIRMED Mut. Life Ins. Co., 745 So.2d 349, 350 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. (1999)) (applying res judicata where parties are not identical because the insurance company’s and the insured’s “interests were not antagonistic”). Therefore, the Florida state court decision that Earth Tech’s contractual indemnity claim was moot does not bind Capitol in its instant litigation for indemnity by North River. Nevertheless, this is a pyrrhic victory for Capitol because, as already stated, under no circumstances can Capitol be liable for damages to Earth Tech under the theory of contractual indemnification after Earth Tech was made whole by the award of damages on the breach of contract claim. 12

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