Farrar & Farrar Dairy, Inc v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:06-cv-00160-D Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998841904].. [11-1427]
Appeal: 11-1427
Document: 31
Date Filed: 04/27/2012
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1427
FARRAR & FARRAR FARMS,
Appellant,
FARRAR & FARRAR DAIRY, INCORPORATED, on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
MILLER—ST.NAZIANZ, INCORPORATED,
Defendant – Appellee
and
HYPLAST
NV;
INCORPORATED,
KLERK’S
PLASTIC
PRODUCTS
MANUFACTURING,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:06-cv-00160-D)
Argued:
March 22, 2012
Decided:
April 27, 2012
Before Sandra Day O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired), Supreme
Court of the United States, sitting by designation, TRAXLER,
Chief Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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Date Filed: 04/27/2012
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ARGUED: Scott Crissman Harris, WHITFIELD, BRYSON & MASON, LLP,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants.
Ross Alan Anderson,
WHYTE
HIRSCHBOECK
DUDEK
S.C.,
Milwaukee,
Wisconsin,
for
Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Daniel K. Bryson, LEWIS & ROBERTS, PLLC,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants.
R. Thompson Wright,
HILL, EVANS, DUNCAN, JORDAN & BEATTY, Greensboro, North
Carolina; Karen L. Tidwall, WHYTE HIRSCHBOECK DUDEK S.C.,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
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PER CURIAM:
Farrar
&
Farrar
Dairy,
Inc.,
and
Farrar
&
Farrar
Farms
(collectively “Farrar”) appeal a district court order granting
summary judgment against them in their products liability action
against Miller-St. Nazianz, Incorporated (“Miller”).
Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
I.
Farrar
North
Carolina
corporation that owns and operates a small dairy farm.
Farrar &
Farrar
Farms
&
Farrar
is
a
Dairy,
North
farm’s land and livestock.
Inc.,
Carolina
is
a
partnership
that
owns
the
Miller is a Wisconsin corporation
that sells farm equipment and products.
In late 2004, Miller purchased the operating assets and
inventory of Ag-Bag International, Inc. (“Ag-Bag”), a company
that sold agricultural silage
After
purchasing
the
bags under the
assets,
Miller
name “Ag-Bag.” 1
decided
to
distributing silage bags under the “Ag-Bag” brand name.
1
continue
At the
Silage is green forage or fodder that has been chopped
and compacted into an anaerobic container such as a bunker or
fixed silo.
Silage storage bags are designed to provide an
alternative method of protecting such farm feed from spoilage.
While inside the bag, silage undergoes an acid fermentation
process that prevents it from spoiling.
A bagging machine
mechanically inserts the silage into the silage bag.
The bags
can be as long as 300 feet and up to 14 feet wide.
3
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time
Document: 31
of
the
Date Filed: 04/27/2012
asset
purchase,
Page: 4 of 20
Ag-Bag
had
a
contractual
relationship with Up North Plastics, Inc. (“Up North”), which
manufactured
the
Ag-Bag
bags.
Miller
terminated
that
relationship, however, and found another manufacturer, Hyplast
NV (“Hyplast”).
formula
when
it
Because Miller did not receive Ag-Bag’s plastic
purchased
Ag-Bag’s
assets,
Miller
provided
Hyplast with a bag that Up North had manufactured, and Hyplast
reverse-engineered a new formula.
Farrar purchased twelve 10-foot X 250-foot Ag-Bag silage
bags from an authorized dealer on April 18, 2005, and fourteen
more bags of varying size on August 15 of the same year.
Some
of these 26 bags had been manufactured by Up North, and others
by Hyplast.
The warranty accompanying Farrar’s Ag-Bags stated in part:
Ag-Bag® . . . guarantees our “Bonded”[] silage
bags to be free of defects in workmanship and
materials. If a properly packed bag should fail from
a defect during normal useful life, Ag-Bag® will
replace the bag without charge.
If the feed in the
damaged bag requires rebagging[,] Ag-Bag® will replace
the bag with two bags.
J.A. 1304.
titled
Additionally, each Ag-Bag box contained a document
“Flat-Folded
Bag
Installation
Instructions,”
which
included the following language:
All recommendations or suggestions of use are made
without guarantee, since conditions of use are beyond
our control[.] Ag-Bag . . . maintains no obligations
or liabilities for consequential damages arising out
of, or in connection with[,] use of this product,
4
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including but not limited to inconvenience, loss of
profit, commercial use, food loss of any type, or
costs o[f] removal, installation or reinstallation.
J.A. 239.
Shortly after purchasing the bags in April 2005, Farrar
notified
Miller
Accordingly,
that
Miller
several
contacted
of
the
Arthur
bags
had
split.
a
Miller
Schuette,
representative who lived near Farrar, to investigate.
Schuette
visited the Farrar farm soon after and visually inspected the
split bags.
He noticed some stretching that he knew, more times
than not, was the result of the bags being overpacked.
However,
he also learned that the type of crop that had been packed was
rye silage, which, in his experience, tended to “cause more bag
stretching than a lot of other crops.”
J.A. 1028.
For that
reason, Schuette “decided to give . . . Farrar the benefit of
the doubt” and submit a warranty claim to Miller on his behalf
with the recommendation that Farrar receive replacement bags.
J.A.
1028.
Miller
then
processed
the
provided Farrar with replacement bags.
replacement
bags
also
split.
The
warranty
claims
and
At least one of the
record
does
not
reflect
whether another replacement bag or bags were provided.
As a result of the bags’ splitting, Farrar incurred costs
associated
with
lost
feed,
re-bagging,
disposal
of
spoiled
silage, acquiring new bags and techniques and new silage, and a
5
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decrease in farm profitability due to the resources that it was
required to expend addressing the bag failures.
Farrar subsequently brought suit in federal district court
against
Miller,
asserting
claims
of
negligence,
breach
of
express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability,
unfair trade practices, and unjust enrichment.
In response to a
motion for summary judgment filed by Miller, Farrar abandoned
the
latter
two
claims.
The
district
court
granted
Miller’s
motion regarding the remaining three claims.
II.
Farrar
first
argues
that
the
district
court
granting summary judgment on its negligence claim.
erred
in
We disagree.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing the facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See EEOC v.
Navy
Cir.
Fed.
Summary
Credit
judgment
Union,
is
424
F.3d
appropriate
397,
when
405
“the
(4th
movant
2005).
shows
that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that]
the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Fed.
“Because we are sitting in diversity, our
role is to apply the governing state law, or, if necessary,
predict how the state’s highest court would rule on an unsettled
6
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issue.”
Date Filed: 04/27/2012
Page: 7 of 20
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. General Star Nat’l Ins. Co.,
514 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2008).
Under North Carolina law, which the parties agree applies
to
the
claims
before
us,
a
plaintiff
bringing
a
products
liability action based on negligence must “prove (1) the product
was defective at the time it left the control of the defendant,
(2) the defect was the result of defendant’s negligence, and (3)
the
defect
proximately
caused
plaintiff
damage.”
Red
Hill
Hosiery Mill, Inc. v. MagneTek, Inc., 530 S.E.2d 321, 326 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2000).
Farrar sought to prove that had Miller exercised reasonable
quality control practices with respect to the silage bags that
it purchased from Hyplast to resell under the Ag-Bag brand, it
would have discovered that they were defectively designed.
moving
for
summary
judgment
on
the
negligence
claim,
In
Miller
maintained, as is relevant here, that Farrar failed to create a
genuine dispute regarding whether the failed bags were defective
or whether the defect was the result of Miller’s negligence.
In response, Farrar pointed to evidence that Miller, aware
that other companies had experienced problems with their silage
bag manufacturers, had contemplated sending the Hyplast bags to
an
independent
evidence
that
lab
many
for
analysis.
other
of
Farrar
Miller’s
also
customers
pointed
to
experienced
problems with their bags in the summer of 2005, and that several
7
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Miller employees expressed concerns about the quality of the
plastic Hyplast used to make the bags and theories regarding why
some of the bags were failing.
Farrar further offered evidence
of a PowerPoint presentation, apparently given by Hyplast in
late 2005, stating an “[i]ntermediate conclusion” that bags it
examined split due to a combination of factors including that
the three-ply bags had a transparent middle layer, J.A. 1301, in
contrast to Up North’s bags, which had utilized a white middle
layer.
The presentation suggested that a white middle layer
better reflected the sun’s rays and therefore better protected
the bags from the effects of high temperatures.
After this
presentation, Hyplast informed Miller that “a certain ‘batch’”
of the bags Hyplast had shipped to Miller appeared to have “a
possible higher than normal failure rate” and were “possibly
defective.”
territory
J.A. 1979, 1713.
managers
and
Miller, in turn, notified its
dealers
of
that
information,
and
the
territory managers notified their dealers that “if any of the
specific lot of potentially problematic silage bags identified
by Hyplast were in their possession, they should be returned to
[Miller] and they would be exchanged for new silage bags.”
J.A.
1979.
Farrar
evidence,
maintained
it
defectiveness
had
of
that
proffered
the
bags
by
producing
both
in
8
direct
question
the
above-mentioned
evidence
and
proven
of
the
their
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defectiveness
Date Filed: 04/27/2012
by
showing
“(1)
Page: 9 of 20
[that]
the
silage
bags
malfunctioned; (2) that the silage bags were put to ordinary
use; (3) [the occurrence of] similar accidents involving the
same product; and (4) [the] elimination of other possible causes
of the accident.”
evidence
it
negligence
on
J.A. 966.
had
referenced
the
part
of
Farrar contended that the direct
gave
rise
to
an
inference
manufacturer. 2
the
It
of
further
maintained that Miller had been “on notice of potential problems
with
the
silage
bags,
and
that
a
reasonable
man
would
exercised greater care in inspecting and testing” them.
have
J.A.
972.
On reply, as is relevant here, Miller argued that much of
Farrar’s evidence would not be admissible at trial and therefore
could not be considered at the summary judgment stage.
Miller
further
direct
emphasized
that
Farrar
had
not
produced
any
evidence of a product defect that would be admissible at trial
and no direct evidence of Miller’s negligence.
asserted
regarding
that
the
Farrar
had
negligence
failed
to
element
2
create
of
its
Miller therefore
a
genuine
dispute
negligence
claim.
Farrar maintained that Miller, “as the apparent
manufacturer of the silage bags, . . . had a duty to use
reasonable care in the design and manufacture of its products.”
J.A. 969.
9
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Farrar
Date Filed: 04/27/2012
a
filed
Page: 10 of 20
which
sur-reply
in
it
defended
the
admissibility of its proffered evidence.
In granting summary judgment against Farrar on this claim,
the district court agreed with Miller that Farrar had failed to
create a genuine dispute regarding whether any defect in the
bags sold to Farrar was the result of negligence on Miller’s
part.
The
court
noted
defectiveness
of
product
evidence
negligence
and
a
that,
may
can
under
be
Carolina
established
sometimes
existence of a product defect.
North
be
by
inferred
law,
indirect
from
the
However, the court ruled that
negligence cannot be inferred from the existence of a defect if
the defect has been established entirely by indirect evidence.
Determining that Farrar had not offered direct evidence (such as
expert testimony) that the bags were defective, the court ruled
that, in order to prove Miller’s negligence, Farrar would have
to
present
would
do
“evidence
in
similar
that
suggests
what
circumstances.”
quotation marks omitted).
a
J.A.
reasonable
2610-11
person
(internal
Concluding that “the record lacks any
information as to quality control mechanisms that distributors
generally
employ
manufacturing
for
company,”
goods
J.A.
manufactured
2612,
the
by
court
an
independent
granted
summary
judgment against Farrar on the negligence claim.
Farrar advances several challenges to the court’s analysis,
which we address seriatim.
10
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Farrar
Date Filed: 04/27/2012
first
contends
Page: 11 of 20
that
the
district
court
mischaracterized North Carolina law when it concluded that when
a products liability plaintiff relies on indirect evidence to
prove that the product was defective, it cannot rely solely on
the same evidence to prove the defect was the result of the
defendant’s negligence.
Farrar is incorrect, however, as that
proposition is established both by Dewitt v. Eveready Battery
Co., 550 S.E.2d 511, 520 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d on other
grounds, 565 S.E.2d 140 (N.C. 2002), and by Red Hill Hosiery
Mill, Inc., 530 S.E.2d at 327 n.7.
See also Carlton v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 413 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588 (M.D.N.C. 2005)
(explaining
negligence
that
by
products-liability
stacking
inference
plaintiff
upon
“may
not
inference”).
prove
Farrar
insists that the principle that a products liability plaintiff
cannot
prove
negligence
simply
by
offering
circumstantial
evidence of a product defect is “inconsistent with the North
Carolina Supreme Court’s statement in DeWitt that a plaintiff
need not satisfy each of the factors explicitly stated in DeWitt
to
prove
a
Appellants’
product
brief
at
defect
24.
through
That
is
circumstantial
not
the
evidence.”
case,
however.
Rather, the principle simply reflects that “[t]o prove a product
defective is one thing,” but “to prove that the defect flowed
from
a
failure
to
exercise
11
reasonable
care
is
quite
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Red Hill Hosiery Mill, Inc., 530 S.E.2d at 326 n.5
another.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Farrar
alternatively
contends
that
it
presented
direct
evidence of a design defect in Farrar’s split bags, from which
Miller’s negligence could be reasonably inferred.
Relying on
the testimony of Miller’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Steve Pesik,
Farrar contends Miller tested plastic samples from each of the
eight
silage
bags
at
issue,
and
J.A.
1869-70).
Farrar’s
Pesik’s testimony, however.
Farrar’s
warranty
warranty
that
Pesik
did
claims
on
the
characterization
misstates
Pesik testified that Miller treated
as
viable
covered
defects
testify
not
based
See Appellants’ brief at 26
testing, that each was defective.
(citing
determined,
that
in
Miller
losses
under
material
and
tested
each
the
limited
workmanship.
bag,
and
he
certainly did not testify there was any defect in the bags’
design.
existence
judgment
In
of
any
event,
this
motion
in
because
testimony
the
required to consider it.
in
district
Farrar
did
opposing
court,
not
rely
Miller’s
the
court
on
the
summary
was
not
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
Miller also argues that Hyplast’s PowerPoint presentation
constituted direct evidence of the defectiveness of the bags’
design.
hearsay.
However, evidence of this presentation was inadmissible
See Maryland Highway Contractors Ass’n v. State of
Md., 933 F.2d 1246, 1251 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[H]earsay evidence,
12
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which is inadmissible at trial, cannot be considered on a motion
for summary judgment.”).
Farrar did not identify or depose the
author of the presentation, and no one at Hyplast was questioned
concerning
evidence
its
of
contents.
the
Farrar
presentation
argues
would
fall
conclusorily
under
the
that
business
records hearsay exception, see Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), but Farrar
fails to explain how the elements of that exception could be
established.
In any event, while the presentation does suggest
steps for Hyplast to take in an effort to improve the bags, it
does not appear to conclude that any problem with the design of
the bags rose to the level of a design defect.
In its reply brief, Farrar contends for the first time that
Miller’s negligence could be reasonably inferred not simply from
evidence of the bags’ defectiveness but from direct evidence
that
Miller
inspection
failed
of
approximately
problems.
Farrar
to
the
six
silage
months”
Appellants’
asserts
“perform
that
bags
and
reply
Miller
an
to
adequate
or
issue
warn
its
at
27.
brief
learned
investigation
of
a
a
recall
customers
In
this
problem
of
or
for
the
regard,
with
its
Hyplast-manufactured silage bags during the weeks of May 30 and
June 6, 2005.
Because Farrar did not make this argument in its opening
brief, it is waived.
231,
241
n.6
(4th
See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d
Cir.
1999)
(claim
13
not
properly
raised
in
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appellant’s opening brief is deemed abandoned); Cavallo v. Star
Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1152 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996) (argument not
raised in opening brief, but raised for first time in reply
brief, is waived).
In any event, the district court rejected
this same argument on the bases that (1) “the record lacks any
information as to quality control mechanisms that distributors
generally
employ
manufacturing
for
company”
goods
and
manufactured
(2)
neither
by
an
Miller’s
independent
awareness
of
problems other companies had experienced with their silage bag
manufacturers
nor
the
fact
that
Miller
contemplated
sending
Hyplast’s bags to an independent lab for testing is sufficient
“to show whether a reasonable person, in similar circumstances
to Miller, would have conducted such an independent lab analysis
or adopted some other quality control measure.”
J.A. 2612.
In
its reply brief, Farrar simply argues that the district court
erred in concluding that Farrar failed to create a jury issue
with this theory without addressing, or even acknowledging, the
basis for the district court’s ruling.
brief at 25-29.
reason as well.
See Appellants’ reply
Thus, Farrar’s argument is waived for this
See Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648,
653 n.7 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that conclusorily assigning
error without providing supporting argument is insufficient to
raise issue).
14
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Page: 15 of 20
III.
Farrar
next
maintains
that
the
district
court
erred
in
granting summary judgment against it on its claims for breach of
Miller’s express warranty and breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability.
We disagree.
The district court ruled that Miller owed Farrar a duty
both under its express warranty and under an implied warranty of
merchantability.
merchantability,
Under
Farrar
North
could
Carolina’s
recover
implied
“the
warranty
difference
.
of
.
.
between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted.”
2-714(2).
Additionally, “[i]n a proper case any incidental and
consequential
damages
recovered.”
N.C.
statutory
remedy
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-
law
Gen.
also
available
under
in
.
Stat.
permits
the
.
.
[§ 25-2-715]
§ 25-2-714(3).
written
event
of
may
North
also
Carolina
warranties
to
a
however,
breach;
be
limit
the
when
“circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of
its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided” in the
absence of the warranty limitations.
719(2).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-
Finally, “[c]onsequential damages may be limited or
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-719(3).
Miller’s express warranty provided that should an Ag-Bag
fail from defect, it would be replaced without charge and that
15
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Date Filed: 04/27/2012
Page: 16 of 20
should the damaged bag require the farmer to rebag the feed,
Miller would provide two replacement bags.
treated
this
remedy
and
the
remedies
The district court
granted
under
North
Carolina statutory law as consistent and therefore cumulative.
The court concluded that since Farrar chose to remedy the breach
by
accepting
additional
replacement
remedy
under
bags,
N.C.
it
Gen.
was
Stat.
not
entitled
§ 25-2-714.
to
any
As
for
Miller’s exclusion of consequential damages, the district court
noted it was valid unless it was unconscionable, which the court
concluded it was not.
Farrar offers several challenges to the
district court’s analysis, which we consider seriatim.
Farrar first maintains that the district court erred in not
recognizing
that
Miller’s
warranty
failed
of
its
essential
purpose, and therefore that Farrar was entitled to all of the
remedies listed in § 25-2-714, including consequential damages. 3
A limited, exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose when
“unanticipated circumstances preclude the seller from providing
the
buyer
agreed.”
with
the
remedy
to
which
the
parties
Computer Network, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 696 N.W.2d
3
In this regard, Farrar claims that “Farrar never
actually made the warranty claim under the express warranty.”
Appellants’ brief at 33-34.
However, Farrar, when asked at
deposition whether he ever submitted a written warranty claim,
responded that he dealt with Schuette and “[w]hatever he had me
do is what[] I did.” J.A. 2302.
16
Appeal: 11-1427
49,
Document: 31
55
(Mich.
Date Filed: 04/27/2012
Ct.
App.
2005)
Page: 17 of 20
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted); see Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 919, 926
(N.C.
Ct.
App.
1980)
(holding
that
a
warranty
fails
of
its
essential purpose when “there is a defect which is not or cannot
be
repaired
within
warranty”).
a
reasonable
period
as
required
by
the
We see no basis for concluding that Farrar showed
that it did not receive the remedy that Miller had promised.
Miller provided replacements for the defective bags within a
reasonable period of time, just as its warranty contemplated.
Although at least one of the replacement bags also ended up
splitting, Farrar offers no evidence that the replacement bag
was not also promptly replaced.
In
failed
the
of
end,
its
Farrar
seems
essential
to
purpose
suggest
that
because
the
Miller
warranty
did
not
compensate Farrar for the substantial costs it incurred “with
purchasing new feed, the labor costs of rebagging the feed, and
the
loss
in
milk
production
due
adequately feed his livestock.”
to
Farrar’s
inability
Appellants’ brief at 36.
to
Of
course, though, the fact that Farrar was not compensated for
those
losses
consequential
simply
damages.
reflected
It
is
to
Miller’s
the
disclaimer
effectiveness
of
of
that
disclaimer that we now turn.
Farrar argues that the disclaimer of consequential damages
was not effective because it was “not conspicuous as required by
17
Appeal: 11-1427
[N.C.
Document: 31
Gen.
Stat.
Date Filed: 04/27/2012
§]
25-2-316(2),
mention merchantability.”
Page: 18 of 20
and
the
warranty
Appellants’ brief at 32.
does
not
However, as
the district court correctly determined, Miller’s disclaimer did
not need to meet § 25-2-316(2)’s requirements to be effective.
That section concerns only attempts to “exclude or modify the
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it.”
Here,
what Miller limited by disclaiming consequential damages was not
the
warranty,
but
the
remedy
for
a
breach
of
the
warranty.
North Carolina Code section 25-2-316(4) plainly provides that
“[r]emedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance
with . . . [N.C. Gen. Stat. §§] 25-2-718 and 25-2-719.”
Gen. Stat. § 25-2-316(4) (emphasis added).
N.C.
Section 25-2-719, in
turn, provides that “[c]onsequential damages may be limited or
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.”
Thus, so long as the limitation is not unconscionable, it is
valid.
See Billings v. Joseph Harris Co., 220 S.E.2d 361, 366
(N.C. Ct. App. 1975).
Farrar argues that the limitation is unconscionable for two
reasons.
First,
it
contends
that
Farrar
had
choice regarding the terms of the warranty.
Farrar
contends
that
“when
a
manufacturer
is
no
meaningful
In this regard,
aware
that
its
product is inherently defective, but the buyer has ‘no notice of
[or]
ability
substantial
to
detect’
disparity
in
the
problem,
the
18
parties’
there
is
relative
perforce
a
bargaining
Appeal: 11-1427
Document: 31
Page: 19 of 20
Appellants’ brief at 37 (quoting Carlson v. General
power.”
Motors
Date Filed: 04/27/2012
Corp.,
883
F.2d
287,
296
(4th
Cir.
1989)).
Farrar
maintains that, at the time it purchased the bags in question,
Miller knew that Hyplast had changed the formula for the silage
bags, while Farrar had no way of knowing that.
certainly
not
much
help
to
Farrar,
That fact is
however.
When
Farrar
purchased bags in April 2005, Miller had no reason to believe
that Hyplast would produce defective bags.
thereafter
learned
that
that
several
summer
of
of
the
other
bags
And, it was shortly
split.
customers
who
Although
had
Miller
experienced
problems with its bags, by that point, Farrar was certainly on
notice
of
a
possible
problem
as
well.
Thus,
there
was
no
substantial disparity in bargaining power between the parties,
even regarding the August purchases.
Farrar
also
contends
that
Miller’s
consequential-damages
exclusion was unconscionable because, with the exclusion, the
terms of the purchase were unreasonably favorable to Miller.
do not agree.
We
Any disclaimer of a customer’s right to recover
consequential damages as a warranty remedy can have significant
effects,
but
in
a
transaction
between
business
entities,
a
provision disclaiming consequential damages for commercial loss
is not presumptively unconscionable.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-
2-719(3) (providing that limitation of consequential damages for
commercial
loss
is
not
prima
facie
19
unconscionable);
Stan
D.
Appeal: 11-1427
Document: 31
Date Filed: 04/27/2012
Page: 20 of 20
Bowles Distrib. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 317 S.E.2d 684, 690
(N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (“Courts rarely find limitation clauses in
transactions
between
experienced
businessmen
unconscionable.”); Billings, 220 S.E.2d at 366.
In its reply brief, Farrar argues for the first time that
the
exclusion
because
at
of
least
consequential
one
of
the
provided ended up breaking.
damages
was
replacement
unconscionable
bags
that
Miller
Because Farrar did not make this
See Edwards, 178
argument in its initial brief, it is waived.
F.3d at 241 n.6; Cavallo, 100 F.3d at 1152 n.2.
In any event,
the consequential damages exclusion became effective when the
bags were purchased.
Subsequent events have no bearing on the
issue of unconscionability.
See Weaver v. Saint Joseph of the
Pines, Inc., 652 S.E.2d 701, 712 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (“The
question of unconscionability is determined as of the date the
contract was executed.”).
For all of these reasons, we conclude as a matter of law
that the consequential damages exclusion was valid and that the
court
properly
granted
summary
judgment
on
Farrar’s
warranty
claims.
IV.
In
sum,
we
affirm
the
district
court’s
order
granting
summary judgment against Farrar.
AFFIRMED
20
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