Gina Masterson v. Butler Grant

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:10-cv-00445-LMB-JFA. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998794391].. [11-1437]

Appeal: 11-1437

Document: 41

Date Filed: 02/23/2012

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1437

GINA CROCENZI MASTERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
JOHN HILLIARD MASTERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BUTLER L. GRANT,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
CHARLIE RAY FOX, JR., Fauquier County Sheriff; CHRISTOPHER
IHARA, Virginia State Police; CHRISTOPHER BURKES, Virginia
State Police,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:10-cv-00445-LMB-JFA)

Submitted:

January 31, 2012

Decided:

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

February 23, 2012

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Richard
E.
Gardiner,
Fairfax,
Virginia,
for
Appellant.
Alexander Francuzenko, Lee B. Warren, COOK, KITTS & FRANCUZENKO,
PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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Date Filed: 02/23/2012

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PER CURIAM:
Gina

Crocenzi

Masterson

filed

suit

against

Fauquier

County Deputy Sheriff Butler L. Grant, alleging that Grant used
unreasonable force when he arrested her.

The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of Grant after concluding that
he

was

entitled

to

qualified

immunity.

In

this

appeal,

Masterson contends that the district court’s conclusion rests on
an impermissible credibility determination.

We affirm.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. *

Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2011).

Facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.
Witt v. W. Va. State Police, 633 F.3d 272, 277 (4th Cir. 2011).
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).
*

Grant argues that our review should be limited to an
abuse-of-discretion
standard
because
the
jurisdictional
statement of Masterson’s brief indicates she is appealing only
the district court’s denial of her Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion
to alter or amend the judgment. However, Masterson’s notice of
appeal indicated she was appealing both the underlying order and
the court’s denial of her Rule 59(e) motion.
See Fed. R. App.
P. 3(c)(1)(B).
Moreover, her brief addresses the underlying
order.
Accordingly, we are not limited to reviewing only the
denial of the Rule 59(e) motion. See Lolavar v. De Santibanes,
430 F.3d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 2005).

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Date Filed: 02/23/2012

Masterson
evidence

she

immunity

because

argues

advances,
“a

that,

Grant

assuming

was

reasonable

Page: 4 of 6

not

the

truth

entitled

officer

would

to
not

of

the

qualified
have

even

attempted to use physical force to detain her because she had
complied with [Grant’s] order by going back to the passenger
side door” of her vehicle, as Grant had instructed her to do.
“Qualified
performing

discretionary

liability
conduct

immunity

for

civil

does

not

shields

functions

damages

violate

under

government
from

§ 1983,

clearly

officials

personal-capacity
insofar

established

as

their

statutory

or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”

Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d

292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“A

claim that a police officer used . . . excessive force during an
arrest

is

standard.”

analyzed

under

an

‘objective

reasonableness’

Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 600 (4th Cir. 2006).

For the purposes of an excessive force claim, the nature of the
intrusion

is

measured

by

the

amount

of

force

employed

and,

accordingly, “[t]he extent of the plaintiff’s injuries is also a
relevant consideration.”
506

(4th Cir. 2011)

Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503,

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

“Several factors are considered in assessing the governmental
interests
issue,

at

stake,

whether

the

including
suspect

the

posed
4

severity
an

of

immediate

the

crime

threat

to

at
the

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safety of the officer[] or others, and whether he . . . actively
resisted arrest or . . . attempted to evade arrest by flight.”
Turmon v. Jordan, 405 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Viewing

the

facts

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

Masterson, she exited her vehicle to determine why Grant had
stopped the

vehicle,

which

was

being

driven

by

her

husband.

Masterson stated her husband did not “habitually break the law,”
and she wanted to do know what he had done wrong.

Responding to

Grant, she stated that she did not want to be arrested, and she
began to return to the vehicle after Grant instructed her to do
so.

At

this

point,

Grant

initiated

an

arrest.

Masterson

contends she did not know Grant was a law enforcement officer
and

did

not

know

she

offered resistance.
with

Masterson

driving

away

was

being

but

concedes

she

After a few seconds, the scuffle concluded

sustaining

in

arrested,

her

SUV

minor
while

bruises

Grant

and

was

left

scratches
lying

and

on

the

judgment

was

ground.
The
appropriate.
minor

district

court’s

Considering

injuries,

the

grant

together,

short

of

summary

as

we

duration

of

must,
the

Masterson’s

scuffle,

and

Masterson’s ultimate escape, it is clear that the force Grant
employed in attempting to arrest Masterson was reasonable.

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Masterson points to comments the district court made
during the hearing in which it denied her motion to reconsider,
and she argues these statements demonstrate that the district
court’s

ruling

determination.

rested

on

an

impermissible

credibility

Even if we were to agree, we may affirm “on any

grounds apparent from the record.”
F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Smith, 395

As discussed above, even when

the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Masterson,
Grant is entitled to qualified immunity.
We
dispense

affirm

with

oral

the

judgment

argument

of

the

because

district

the

facts

court.
and

We
legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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