SunTrust Mortgage Incorporated v. Donald Busby, Jr.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:09-cv-00003-MR-DLH Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998812466].. [11-1469]

Appeal: 11-1469

Document: 48

Date Filed: 03/19/2012

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1469

SUNTRUST MORTGAGE INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DONALD D. BUSBY, JR.; ROBERT G. RONK; KENNARD DAVIS,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
LORI A. NASSIDA; KELLY M. BAKER; MICHAEL T. BAKER; ROBERT
JOHN CUPELLI; LEIGH K. CUPELLI; DEANNA DAVIS; DEAN R.
CUMMINGS; JEFFREY A. SYKES; GUY BARMOHA; GREGORY M.
SCHUETZ; NATALIE BOUTROS; PAUL MULA,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Bryson City.
Martin K.
Reidinger, District Judge. (2:09-cv-00003-MR-DLH)

Submitted:

January 30, 2012

Decided:

March 19, 2012

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael G. Wimer, WIMER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellants. Robert D. Perrow, J.B. McGuire Boyd,
WILLIAMS MULLEN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; Elizabeth C. Stone,

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WILLIAMS MULLEN, P.C., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Defendants-Appellants Donald D. Busby, Robert G. Ronk,
and Kennard Davis (hereinafter “Appellants”) appeal the district
court’s

order

granting

Plaintiff-Appellee
“SunTrust”)

in

summary

SunTrust

SunTrust’s

judgment

Mortgage,
action

to

in

Inc.
recover

favor

of

(hereinafter
a

deficiency

judgment on promissory notes following foreclosure by power of
sale on Appellants’ properties.
Appellants

claim

Finding no error, we affirm.

that

the

district

court

erred

in

finding Appellants’ equitable defenses barred by res judicata
because they were not raised in a proceeding under N.C. Gen.
Stat.

§ 45-21.34

(2006).

The

district

court

held

that

Appellants’ defenses challenged the validity of the debt and
default,

which

a

North

Carolina

superior

court

had

already

determined to be valid during a hearing to confirm the power of
sale foreclosure pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16 (2006).
The court further held that, while Appellants could not have
raised these equitable defenses in the hearing under § 45-21.16,
they could have raised their equitable defenses in a proceeding
to

enjoin

(2006).
resulted

the
The
in

foreclosure
court

the

under

concluded

rights

of

N.C.

that

the

Gen.

their

parties

Stat.
failure

to

the

§ 45-21.34
to

do

so

foreclosure

becoming “fixed” and therefore barred Appellants from raising
such an equitable challenge in a later proceeding in a different
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forum.

Date Filed: 03/19/2012

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The court also noted that its holding was in accord with

cases from the Eastern and Middle Districts of North Carolina.
See

Merrill

Lynch

Bus.

Fin.

Servs.,

Inc. v.

Cobb,

No.

5:07-cv-129D, 2008 WL 6155804, at *3-4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2008);
Brumby, Jr. v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 1:09CV144,
2010

WL

3219353

magistrate

judge’s

(M.D.N.C.
report

and

Aug. 13,

2010)

recommendation,

(adopting
2010

WL

the

617368

(M.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2010)).
We

find

persuasive.

the

district

court’s

reasoning

to

be

The doctrine of res judicata applies “not only to

the points upon which the court was required by the parties to
form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point
which properly belonged to the subject in litigation and which
the

parties,

brought

[e]xercising

forward

at

the

reasonable

time

and

diligence,

determined

might

have

respecting

it.”

Painter v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 217 S.E.2d 650, 655 (N.C.
1975).

Both § 45-21.16 and § 45-21.34 are parts of a coherent

statutory framework intended to preserve the limited rights of a
mortgagor subject to a power of sale foreclosure.

See, e.g., In

re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust by Goforth Props., Inc., 432
S.E.2d 855, 858-59 (N.C. 1995); In re Helms, 284 S.E.2d 553, 555
(N.C. Ct. App. 1981); see also Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp.
1250,

1258

(W.D.N.C.

1975).

To

permit

challenges

to

the

validity of the default outside this framework would defeat the
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legislative intent behind the North Carolina statutory scheme.
Despite the unique timing of this case, we are not persuaded
that Appellants were effectively barred from filing an action
pursuant

to

§ 45-21.34.

district

court

did

not

Accordingly,
err

in

we

finding

conclude

that

Appellants’

the

defenses

barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Because we find Appellants’ equitable arguments to be
properly barred by res judicata, we find no merit in Appellants’
contention that a genuine issue of material fact existed with
respect to Appellants’ “quasi-estoppel” argument.
find

that

the

district

court

did

not

err

We further

in

holding

that

Appellants’ challenge to the materiality of the default should
have been raised in the § 45-21.16 proceeding and therefore also
is barred by res judicata.
Appellants also argue that the district court erred in
finding that they had not forecast competent evidence to support
a claim to offset SunTrust’s deficiency judgment.
cited by Appellants are distinguishable.

Both cases

See First Citizens

Bank & Trust Co. v. Cannon, 530 S.E.2d 581, 583 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000); Queen v. Queen, No. COA07-1207, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 638,
at *5-6 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2008).

Thus, we find that the

district court did not err in determining that tax valuations do
not,

by

themselves,

provide

establish market value.

competent

evidence

sufficient

to

See Star Mfg. v. Atl. Coast Line R.
5

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Date Filed: 03/19/2012

Co., 23 S.E.2d 32, 36 (N.C. 1942).

Page: 6 of 6

We also conclude that the

district court did not err in determining that the county tax
assessor’s testimony did not provide additional support for the
tax valuation evidence and that his testimony as to valuation
was therefore inadmissible.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
legal
before

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions
the

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in
aid

the
the

materials
decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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