Joseph Kauffman v. Park Place Hospitality Group

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UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:09-cv-01399-MBS Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998805438].. [11-1482]

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Appeal: 11-1482 Document: 39 Date Filed: 03/08/2012 Page: 1 of 4 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-1482 JOSEPH KAUFFMAN, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. PARK PLACE HOSPITALITY GROUP, d/b/a Holiday Inn; RIVERVIEW HOSPITALITY LLC, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge. (2:09-cv-01399-MBS) Submitted: February 21, 2012 Decided: March 8, 2012 Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Neil A. Morris, ARCHER & GREINER, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Amanda Morgan Blundy, J. Bennett Crites, III, MCANGUS GOUDELOCK & COURIE, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Appeal: 11-1482 Document: 39 Date Filed: 03/08/2012 Page: 2 of 4 PER CURIAM: Joseph granting Kauffman Appellees’ appeals motion in the district limine and judgment on Kauffman’s negligence claim. court’s motion orders for summary Kauffman suffered a shoulder injury when he fell walking down a ramp at a Holiday Inn owned by Riverview Hospitality LLC and managed by Park Place Hospitality Group. court erred architect’s in On appeal, Kauffman argues that the district granting testimony summary judgment. Appellees’ and in motion granting to exclude an motion for Appellees’ Finding no reversible error, we affirm. We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment, inferences nonmoving viewing therefrom party. the in Bonds the v. facts light Leavitt, and drawing most 629 reasonable favorable F.3d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 398 (2011). 369, to the 380 (4th Summary judgment shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). summary judgment verdict for the unless a nonmoving A district court should grant “reasonable party” on jury the could evidence return a presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Under South Carolina law, “[a] cause of action for negligence requires: (1) the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff; (2) the failure of the 2 Appeal: 11-1482 Document: 39 defendant to Date Filed: 03/08/2012 discharge the duty; Page: 3 of 4 [and] (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s failure to perform.” S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 324, 325 (S.C. 1986). A property owner has a duty to exercise the reasonable care for safety of an invitee, who enters the property at the express or implied invitation of the owner. Sims v. Giles, 541 S.E.2d 857, 861-63 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001). Because we conclude that the 1955 International Building Code was the code applicable to the Holiday Inn at the time of Kauffman’s fall, that code did not require handrail extensions, and Kauffman did not show that Appellees otherwise had a duty to alter the ramp’s handrail, we hold that the district court did not err in finding that Appellees did not breach their duty to exercise reasonable care for Kauffman’s safety. We review a district court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2010). To be qualified as an expert pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a witness “must have specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact, and the knowledge, skill, experience, training and education that qualifies [him] on the subject of [his] testimony.” Id. at 294. Expert testimony is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact and (1) is “based on sufficient facts or data,” (2) is “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and (3) the principles and 3 Appeal: 11-1482 Document: 39 Date Filed: 03/08/2012 Page: 4 of 4 methods have been applied reliably to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702; see PBM Products, LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, qualifications 123 (4th required Cir. of 2011). expert “The competency witnesses is and a matter committed to the broad discretion of the trial judge.” Ludlow Corp. v. Textile Rubber & Chem. Co., 636 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th Cir. 1981). We conclude that Kauffman’s proffered expert did not evince specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in the application of the building codes for which Kauffman intended to introduce his testimony. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in granting Appellees’ motion in limine. We therefore affirm the district court’s orders. dispense with oral argument because the facts and We legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 4

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