Joseph Kauffman v. Park Place Hospitality Group
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:09-cv-01399-MBS Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998805438].. [11-1482]
Appeal: 11-1482
Document: 39
Date Filed: 03/08/2012
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1482
JOSEPH KAUFFMAN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
PARK PLACE HOSPITALITY GROUP, d/b/a Holiday Inn; RIVERVIEW
HOSPITALITY LLC,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston.
Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (2:09-cv-01399-MBS)
Submitted:
February 21, 2012
Decided:
March 8, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Neil
A.
Morris,
ARCHER
&
GREINER,
P.C.,
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Amanda Morgan Blundy, J. Bennett
Crites, III, MCANGUS GOUDELOCK & COURIE, LLC, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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Date Filed: 03/08/2012
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PER CURIAM:
Joseph
granting
Kauffman
Appellees’
appeals
motion
in
the
district
limine
and
judgment on Kauffman’s negligence claim.
court’s
motion
orders
for
summary
Kauffman suffered a
shoulder injury when he fell walking down a ramp at a Holiday
Inn owned by Riverview Hospitality LLC and managed by Park Place
Hospitality Group.
court
erred
architect’s
in
On appeal, Kauffman argues that the district
granting
testimony
summary judgment.
Appellees’
and
in
motion
granting
to
exclude
an
motion
for
Appellees’
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary
judgment,
inferences
nonmoving
viewing
therefrom
party.
the
in
Bonds
the
v.
facts
light
Leavitt,
and
drawing
most
629
reasonable
favorable
F.3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 398 (2011).
369,
to
the
380
(4th
Summary judgment
shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
summary
judgment
verdict
for
the
unless
a
nonmoving
A district court should grant
“reasonable
party”
on
jury
the
could
evidence
return
a
presented.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Under South Carolina law, “[a] cause of action for
negligence requires: (1) the existence of a duty on the part of
the defendant to protect the plaintiff; (2) the failure of the
2
Appeal: 11-1482
Document: 39
defendant
to
Date Filed: 03/08/2012
discharge
the
duty;
Page: 3 of 4
[and]
(3)
injury
to
the
plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s failure to perform.”
S.C.
State
Ports
Auth.
v.
Booz-Allen
&
Hamilton,
Inc.,
346
S.E.2d 324, 325 (S.C. 1986).
A property owner has a duty to
exercise
the
reasonable
care
for
safety
of
an
invitee,
who
enters the property at the express or implied invitation of the
owner.
Sims v. Giles, 541 S.E.2d 857, 861-63 (S.C. Ct. App.
2001).
Because we conclude that the 1955 International Building
Code was the code applicable to the Holiday Inn at the time of
Kauffman’s fall, that code did not require handrail extensions,
and Kauffman did not show that Appellees otherwise had a duty to
alter the ramp’s handrail, we hold that the district court did
not err in finding that Appellees did not breach their duty to
exercise reasonable care for Kauffman’s safety.
We review a district court’s evidentiary decisions for
abuse of discretion.
United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286,
292 (4th Cir. 2010).
To be qualified as an expert pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a witness “must have specialized
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact, and the knowledge,
skill, experience, training and education that qualifies [him]
on
the
subject
of
[his]
testimony.”
Id.
at
294.
Expert
testimony is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact and
(1) is “based on sufficient facts or data,” (2) is “the product
of reliable principles and methods,” and (3) the principles and
3
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methods have been applied reliably to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702; see PBM Products, LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
639
F.3d
111,
qualifications
123
(4th
required
Cir.
of
2011).
expert
“The
competency
witnesses
is
and
a
matter
committed to the broad discretion of the trial judge.”
Ludlow
Corp. v. Textile Rubber & Chem. Co., 636 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th
Cir. 1981).
We conclude that Kauffman’s proffered expert did not
evince
specialized
knowledge,
skill,
experience,
training,
or
education in the application of the building codes for which
Kauffman intended to introduce his testimony.
Accordingly, we
hold that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion
in granting Appellees’ motion in limine.
We therefore affirm the district court’s orders.
dispense
with
oral
argument
because
the
facts
and
We
legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4
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