Paula Felton-Miller v. Michael Astrue

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:10-cv-00005-FL. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998749056]. [11-1500]

Appeal: 11-1500

Document: 35

Date Filed: 12/21/2011

Page: 1 of 10

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1500

PAULA FELTON-MILLER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern.
Louise W. Flanagan,
Chief District Judge. (2:10-cv-00005-FL)

Submitted:

December 1, 2011

Decided:

December 21, 2011

Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David J. Cortes, ROBERTI, WITTENBERG, LAUFFER AND WICKER,
Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United
States Attorney, Amy C. Rigney, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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Document: 35

Date Filed: 12/21/2011

Page: 2 of 10

PER CURIAM:
Paula Felton-Miller appeals the district court’s order
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her
application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income.

We must uphold the decision to deny benefits

if the decision is supported by substantial evidence and the
correct law was applied.
Barnhart,

434

F.3d

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); Johnson v.

650,

653

(4th Cir. 2005)

(per

curiam).

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind

might

accept

as

adequate

to

support

a

conclusion.”

Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This

court

does

not

reweigh

evidence

or

make

credibility

determinations in evaluating whether a decision is supported by
substantial

evidence;

reasonable
decision.

minds

to

“[w]here

differ,”

conflicting

we

defer

to

evidence
the

allows

Commissioner’s

Id.
Felton-Miller “bears the burden of proving that [s]he

is

disabled

within

the

meaning

of

the

Social

Security

Act.”

English v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (2006)).
step

process

to

§§ 404.1520(a)(4),
process,
claimant:

the

evaluate

a

The Commissioner uses a fivedisability

416.920(a)(4)

Commissioner

asks,

(2011).
in

claim.

20

Pursuant

sequence,

C.F.R.

to

whether

this
the

(1) worked during the alleged period of disability;
2

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Date Filed: 12/21/2011

Page: 3 of 10

(2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or
equaled the severity of a listed impairment; (4) could return to
her

past

perform

relevant

any

other

work;
work

and
in

(5) if

the

not,

national

whether

she

could

Id.

The

economy.

claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four,
but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five.
Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).

See

If a decision

regarding disability can be made at any step of the process,
however, the inquiry ceases.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),

416.920(a)(4).
Felton-Miller contends that the ALJ did not properly
analyze

her

subjective

complaints

of

pain.

Relying

on

our

decision in Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1996), she
argues that a claimant’s statements regarding the severity and
limiting

effects

credibility

of

once

demonstrating

pain

the

the

are

entitled

claimant

existence

has
of

to

a

produced

an

presumption

medical

impairment

of

evidence

which

could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged.
“[T]he determination of whether a person is disabled
by pain or other symptoms is a two-step process.”

Craig, 76

F.3d

“objective

at

594.

First,

the

claimant

must

produce

medical evidence showing the existence of a medical impairment[]
. . . which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain
. . .

alleged.”

Id.;

20

C.F.R.
3

§§ 404.1529(a),

416.929(a)

Appeal: 11-1500

Document: 35

(2011).

Date Filed: 12/21/2011

Second,

“the

intensity

Page: 4 of 10

and

persistence

of

the

claimant’s pain, and the extent to which it affects her ability
to work, must be evaluated.”

Craig, 76 F.3d at 595.

The second

step is analyzed using statements from treating and nontreating
sources

and

416.929(a).
include
evidence,

from

the

Factors

observations

of

20

in

evaluating

in

consistency
medical

claimant.

the

treatment

the

C.F.R.

the

claimant’s

claimant’s
history,

claimant.

See

§§ 404.1529(a),
statements

statements,

and

the

Social

medical

adjudicator’s

Security

Ruling

(“SSR”) 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5-*8.
Craig lends no support to Felton-Miller’s position. 1
Craig notes that step one of the pain analysis is focused solely
“on

establishing

a

determinable

underlying

impairment

statutory requirement for entitlement to benefits.”
F.3d at 594.

—

a

Craig, 76

Craig explains that, after the claimant crosses

this threshold, “the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s
pain, and the extent to which it affects her ability to work,
1

Felton-Miller identifies a host of other cases that she
contends support the existence of a “great weight rule.” These
cases recognize that subjective evidence may be entitled to
great weight, but the cases do not rely on the finding at step
one of the pain analysis.
Rather, great weight is afforded to
subjective evidence when it is either uncontradicted or
supported by substantial evidence.
See, e.g., Combs v.
Weinberger, 501 F.2d 1361, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1974) (“[W]e have
held that subjective evidence is entitled to great weight,
especially where such evidence is uncontradicted in the
record.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

4

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Date Filed: 12/21/2011

must be evaluated.”

Id. at 595.

Page: 5 of 10

The claimant’s own statements

regarding her pain are not afforded any presumption; rather,
“[u]nder the regulations, . . . evaluation [of the claimant’s
pain] must take into account not only the claimant’s statements
about her pain, but also all the available evidence, including
the claimant’s medical history, medical signs, and laboratory
findings.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Felton-Miller

contends

the

ALJ’s

reasons

for

discrediting her subjective complaints at step two of the pain
analysis

were

inaccurate

and

insubstantial.

First,

the

ALJ

found that Felton-Miller’s sarcoidosis has been well controlled
with various medication regimens.
this

statement

is

at

odds

Felton-Miller asserts that

with

a

treatment

note

that

her

symptoms were not well controlled with prednisone and subsequent
notes

that

However,

we

she

stopped

conclude

that

taking

Plaquenil

substantial

and

evidence

methotrexate.
supports

the

ALJ’s conclusion because the record shows that, although FeltonMiller’s

medication

occasionally

required

adjustment,

her

symptoms were successfully controlled at various times.
Second, Felton-Miller contends that the ALJ’s reliance
on

the

absence

of

clinical

signs

of

persistent

joint

inflammation, joint deformity, or limitation of joint motion is
erroneous.

She argues that sarcoidosis is a disease that, by

definition, primarily involves a kind of inflammation, that she
5

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at times presented and was assessed with joint problems, and
that she was treated with anti-inflammatory drugs.

However,

medical conditions alone do not entitle a claimant to disability
benefits;
loss.”

“[t]here

must

be

a

showing

of

related

functional

Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986).

Accordingly,

Felton-Miller’s

sarcoidosis

diagnosis,

without

more, does not establish that she suffers from any particular
symptoms or limitations.
Miller’s

treatment

Here, the ALJ acknowledged Felton-

for

joint,

back,

and

muscle

problems.

However, the ALJ also determined that these problems were not
persistent.

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that

the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Third, Felton-Miller asserts that the ALJ erroneously
relied on an irrelevant finding that her carpal tunnel syndrome
was

mild.

We

conclude

that

no

such

error

occurred.

In

evaluating symptoms, including pain, an ALJ is to “consider all
of

the

evidence

presented.”

416.929(c)(3) (2011).

20

C.F.R.

§§ 404.1529(c)(3),

Consideration of the limiting effects of

Felton-Miller’s carpal tunnel syndrome led the ALJ to a residual
functional

capacity

(“RFC”)

assessment

precluding

her

from

performing tasks requiring the constant use of her hands.
Fourth,

the

ALJ

concluded

degenerative disc disease was mild.

that

Felton-Miller’s

Felton-Miller asserts that

this finding is not supported by substantial evidence because
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treatment

notes

Date Filed: 12/21/2011

indicate

that

she

degenerative disc and joint disease.

Page: 7 of 10

has

a

history

of

severe

However, the ALJ reviewed

the records Felton-Miller cites in addition to evidence that
Felton-Miller

enjoyed

full

strength,

had

no

neurological

deficits indicating nerve root compression, and had normal motor
nerve

function

with

no

evidence

of

cervical

myopathy.

Additionally, contrary to Felton-Miller’s assertions, the ALJ’s
finding that Felton-Miller’s degenerative disc disorder was a
severe impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation does
not contradict the ALJ’s conclusion that the disorder’s impact
on

her

functioning

was

mild.

Step

two

of

the

sequential

evaluation is a threshold question with a de minimis severity
requirement.

See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 153-54; SSR 88-3c, 1988 WL

236022.
Fifth, Felton-Miller argues that the ALJ erroneously
rejected

her

pain

testimony

on

the

ground

that

she

has

not

required aggressive measures for pain relief such as ongoing use
of steroid medication.

Felton-Miller has waived review of this

issue by failing to raise it below.
v.

Shalala,

32

F.3d

67,

70

See Pleasant Valley Hosp.

(4th Cir. 1994)

(finding

that

appellant’s failure to raise issue during administrative hearing
and

before

district

court

operates

review).

7

as

waiver

of

appellate

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Turning to Felton-Miller’s argument that the ALJ’s RFC
finding is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ
is a layman and did not obtain an expert medical opinion, we
conclude this argument is without merit. 2

“[R]esidual functional

capacity is the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her]
limitations.”

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a) (2011).

It

is an administrative assessment made by the Commissioner based
on all the relevant evidence in the case record.

See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1546(c), 416.946(c) (2011) (assigning responsibility of
RFC assessment at hearing level to ALJ); SSR 96-8p (identifying
RFC finding as administrative assessment and outlining criteria
to be used).

The ALJ was not required to obtain an expert

medical opinion as to Felton-Miller’s RFC.

The ALJ properly

based his RFC finding on Felton-Miller’s subjective complaints,
the objective medical evidence, and the opinions of treating,
examining, and nonexamining physicians.

2

Felton-Miller asserts that, because “bare medical findings
are unintelligible to a lay person in terms of residual
functional capacity, the ALJ is not qualified to assess residual
functional capacity based on a bare medical record.” Gordils v.
Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 921 F.2d 327, 329 (1st Cir.
1990).
Here, however, the nerve conduction test Felton-Miller
identifies as too technical for a layman to interpret was
interpreted in functional terms by the examining physician.
Based on the test results, the doctor concluded that FeltonMiller had evidence of mild carpal tunnel syndrome but no other
disorders.

8

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Felton-Miller also argues that the ALJ did not make a
valid mental RFC assessment because he did not apply the proper
standards.
specific

In evaluating mental impairments, the ALJ employs a
technique

that

considers

essential to the ability to work:
ability

to

maintain

persistence,

and

in

functional

areas

activities of daily living;

social

pace

four

functioning;
performing

concentration,

activities;

and

deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings
(Psychiatric

Review

Technique

§§ 404.1520a, 416.920a (2011).
significant

history

and

“PRT”

findings).

20

C.F.R.

The ALJ’s decision must show the

medical

findings

considered

and

must

include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in
each

of

the

four

functional

areas.

20

C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520a(e)(4), 416.920a(e)(4) (2011).
The

ALJ

concluded

that

Felton-Miller’s

depressive

disorder was a severe impairment at step two of the sequential
process without discussion of the special technique.

At step

three, the ALJ listed the four functional areas and analyzed the
impact of Felton-Miller’s depressive disorder on these areas.
The decision discusses the medical records relevant to FeltonMiller’s treatment for depression in assessing her mental RFC.
We conclude that the ALJ assessed Felton-Miller’s mental RFC in
accordance with regulations.

9

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Based
evidence

on

supports

Date Filed: 12/21/2011

the
the

foregoing,
agency

Page: 10 of 10

we

find

decision,

judgment of the district court.

and

that
we

substantial
affirm

the

We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

10