Paula Felton-Miller v. Michael Astrue
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:10-cv-00005-FL. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998749056]. [11-1500]
Appeal: 11-1500
Document: 35
Date Filed: 12/21/2011
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1500
PAULA FELTON-MILLER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern.
Louise W. Flanagan,
Chief District Judge. (2:10-cv-00005-FL)
Submitted:
December 1, 2011
Decided:
December 21, 2011
Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David J. Cortes, ROBERTI, WITTENBERG, LAUFFER AND WICKER,
Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United
States Attorney, Amy C. Rigney, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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Date Filed: 12/21/2011
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PER CURIAM:
Paula Felton-Miller appeals the district court’s order
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her
application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income.
We must uphold the decision to deny benefits
if the decision is supported by substantial evidence and the
correct law was applied.
Barnhart,
434
F.3d
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); Johnson v.
650,
653
(4th Cir. 2005)
(per
curiam).
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.”
Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This
court
does
not
reweigh
evidence
or
make
credibility
determinations in evaluating whether a decision is supported by
substantial
evidence;
reasonable
decision.
minds
to
“[w]here
differ,”
conflicting
we
defer
to
evidence
the
allows
Commissioner’s
Id.
Felton-Miller “bears the burden of proving that [s]he
is
disabled
within
the
meaning
of
the
Social
Security
Act.”
English v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (2006)).
step
process
to
§§ 404.1520(a)(4),
process,
claimant:
the
evaluate
a
The Commissioner uses a fivedisability
416.920(a)(4)
Commissioner
asks,
(2011).
in
claim.
20
Pursuant
sequence,
C.F.R.
to
whether
this
the
(1) worked during the alleged period of disability;
2
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Date Filed: 12/21/2011
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(2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or
equaled the severity of a listed impairment; (4) could return to
her
past
perform
relevant
any
other
work;
work
and
in
(5) if
the
not,
national
whether
she
could
Id.
The
economy.
claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four,
but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five.
Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
See
If a decision
regarding disability can be made at any step of the process,
however, the inquiry ceases.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4).
Felton-Miller contends that the ALJ did not properly
analyze
her
subjective
complaints
of
pain.
Relying
on
our
decision in Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1996), she
argues that a claimant’s statements regarding the severity and
limiting
effects
credibility
of
once
demonstrating
pain
the
the
are
entitled
claimant
existence
has
of
to
a
produced
an
presumption
medical
impairment
of
evidence
which
could
reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged.
“[T]he determination of whether a person is disabled
by pain or other symptoms is a two-step process.”
Craig, 76
F.3d
“objective
at
594.
First,
the
claimant
must
produce
medical evidence showing the existence of a medical impairment[]
. . . which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain
. . .
alleged.”
Id.;
20
C.F.R.
3
§§ 404.1529(a),
416.929(a)
Appeal: 11-1500
Document: 35
(2011).
Date Filed: 12/21/2011
Second,
“the
intensity
Page: 4 of 10
and
persistence
of
the
claimant’s pain, and the extent to which it affects her ability
to work, must be evaluated.”
Craig, 76 F.3d at 595.
The second
step is analyzed using statements from treating and nontreating
sources
and
416.929(a).
include
evidence,
from
the
Factors
observations
of
20
in
evaluating
in
consistency
medical
claimant.
the
treatment
the
C.F.R.
the
claimant’s
claimant’s
history,
claimant.
See
§§ 404.1529(a),
statements
statements,
and
the
Social
medical
adjudicator’s
Security
Ruling
(“SSR”) 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5-*8.
Craig lends no support to Felton-Miller’s position. 1
Craig notes that step one of the pain analysis is focused solely
“on
establishing
a
determinable
underlying
impairment
statutory requirement for entitlement to benefits.”
F.3d at 594.
—
a
Craig, 76
Craig explains that, after the claimant crosses
this threshold, “the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s
pain, and the extent to which it affects her ability to work,
1
Felton-Miller identifies a host of other cases that she
contends support the existence of a “great weight rule.” These
cases recognize that subjective evidence may be entitled to
great weight, but the cases do not rely on the finding at step
one of the pain analysis.
Rather, great weight is afforded to
subjective evidence when it is either uncontradicted or
supported by substantial evidence.
See, e.g., Combs v.
Weinberger, 501 F.2d 1361, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1974) (“[W]e have
held that subjective evidence is entitled to great weight,
especially where such evidence is uncontradicted in the
record.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4
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Date Filed: 12/21/2011
must be evaluated.”
Id. at 595.
Page: 5 of 10
The claimant’s own statements
regarding her pain are not afforded any presumption; rather,
“[u]nder the regulations, . . . evaluation [of the claimant’s
pain] must take into account not only the claimant’s statements
about her pain, but also all the available evidence, including
the claimant’s medical history, medical signs, and laboratory
findings.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Felton-Miller
contends
the
ALJ’s
reasons
for
discrediting her subjective complaints at step two of the pain
analysis
were
inaccurate
and
insubstantial.
First,
the
ALJ
found that Felton-Miller’s sarcoidosis has been well controlled
with various medication regimens.
this
statement
is
at
odds
Felton-Miller asserts that
with
a
treatment
note
that
her
symptoms were not well controlled with prednisone and subsequent
notes
that
However,
we
she
stopped
conclude
that
taking
Plaquenil
substantial
and
evidence
methotrexate.
supports
the
ALJ’s conclusion because the record shows that, although FeltonMiller’s
medication
occasionally
required
adjustment,
her
symptoms were successfully controlled at various times.
Second, Felton-Miller contends that the ALJ’s reliance
on
the
absence
of
clinical
signs
of
persistent
joint
inflammation, joint deformity, or limitation of joint motion is
erroneous.
She argues that sarcoidosis is a disease that, by
definition, primarily involves a kind of inflammation, that she
5
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at times presented and was assessed with joint problems, and
that she was treated with anti-inflammatory drugs.
However,
medical conditions alone do not entitle a claimant to disability
benefits;
loss.”
“[t]here
must
be
a
showing
of
related
functional
Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986).
Accordingly,
Felton-Miller’s
sarcoidosis
diagnosis,
without
more, does not establish that she suffers from any particular
symptoms or limitations.
Miller’s
treatment
Here, the ALJ acknowledged Felton-
for
joint,
back,
and
muscle
problems.
However, the ALJ also determined that these problems were not
persistent.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Third, Felton-Miller asserts that the ALJ erroneously
relied on an irrelevant finding that her carpal tunnel syndrome
was
mild.
We
conclude
that
no
such
error
occurred.
In
evaluating symptoms, including pain, an ALJ is to “consider all
of
the
evidence
presented.”
416.929(c)(3) (2011).
20
C.F.R.
§§ 404.1529(c)(3),
Consideration of the limiting effects of
Felton-Miller’s carpal tunnel syndrome led the ALJ to a residual
functional
capacity
(“RFC”)
assessment
precluding
her
from
performing tasks requiring the constant use of her hands.
Fourth,
the
ALJ
concluded
degenerative disc disease was mild.
that
Felton-Miller’s
Felton-Miller asserts that
this finding is not supported by substantial evidence because
6
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treatment
notes
Date Filed: 12/21/2011
indicate
that
she
degenerative disc and joint disease.
Page: 7 of 10
has
a
history
of
severe
However, the ALJ reviewed
the records Felton-Miller cites in addition to evidence that
Felton-Miller
enjoyed
full
strength,
had
no
neurological
deficits indicating nerve root compression, and had normal motor
nerve
function
with
no
evidence
of
cervical
myopathy.
Additionally, contrary to Felton-Miller’s assertions, the ALJ’s
finding that Felton-Miller’s degenerative disc disorder was a
severe impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation does
not contradict the ALJ’s conclusion that the disorder’s impact
on
her
functioning
was
mild.
Step
two
of
the
sequential
evaluation is a threshold question with a de minimis severity
requirement.
See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 153-54; SSR 88-3c, 1988 WL
236022.
Fifth, Felton-Miller argues that the ALJ erroneously
rejected
her
pain
testimony
on
the
ground
that
she
has
not
required aggressive measures for pain relief such as ongoing use
of steroid medication.
Felton-Miller has waived review of this
issue by failing to raise it below.
v.
Shalala,
32
F.3d
67,
70
See Pleasant Valley Hosp.
(4th Cir. 1994)
(finding
that
appellant’s failure to raise issue during administrative hearing
and
before
district
court
operates
review).
7
as
waiver
of
appellate
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Turning to Felton-Miller’s argument that the ALJ’s RFC
finding is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ
is a layman and did not obtain an expert medical opinion, we
conclude this argument is without merit. 2
“[R]esidual functional
capacity is the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her]
limitations.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a) (2011).
It
is an administrative assessment made by the Commissioner based
on all the relevant evidence in the case record.
See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1546(c), 416.946(c) (2011) (assigning responsibility of
RFC assessment at hearing level to ALJ); SSR 96-8p (identifying
RFC finding as administrative assessment and outlining criteria
to be used).
The ALJ was not required to obtain an expert
medical opinion as to Felton-Miller’s RFC.
The ALJ properly
based his RFC finding on Felton-Miller’s subjective complaints,
the objective medical evidence, and the opinions of treating,
examining, and nonexamining physicians.
2
Felton-Miller asserts that, because “bare medical findings
are unintelligible to a lay person in terms of residual
functional capacity, the ALJ is not qualified to assess residual
functional capacity based on a bare medical record.” Gordils v.
Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 921 F.2d 327, 329 (1st Cir.
1990).
Here, however, the nerve conduction test Felton-Miller
identifies as too technical for a layman to interpret was
interpreted in functional terms by the examining physician.
Based on the test results, the doctor concluded that FeltonMiller had evidence of mild carpal tunnel syndrome but no other
disorders.
8
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Felton-Miller also argues that the ALJ did not make a
valid mental RFC assessment because he did not apply the proper
standards.
specific
In evaluating mental impairments, the ALJ employs a
technique
that
considers
essential to the ability to work:
ability
to
maintain
persistence,
and
in
functional
areas
activities of daily living;
social
pace
four
functioning;
performing
concentration,
activities;
and
deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings
(Psychiatric
Review
Technique
§§ 404.1520a, 416.920a (2011).
significant
history
and
“PRT”
findings).
20
C.F.R.
The ALJ’s decision must show the
medical
findings
considered
and
must
include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in
each
of
the
four
functional
areas.
20
C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520a(e)(4), 416.920a(e)(4) (2011).
The
ALJ
concluded
that
Felton-Miller’s
depressive
disorder was a severe impairment at step two of the sequential
process without discussion of the special technique.
At step
three, the ALJ listed the four functional areas and analyzed the
impact of Felton-Miller’s depressive disorder on these areas.
The decision discusses the medical records relevant to FeltonMiller’s treatment for depression in assessing her mental RFC.
We conclude that the ALJ assessed Felton-Miller’s mental RFC in
accordance with regulations.
9
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Based
evidence
on
supports
Date Filed: 12/21/2011
the
the
foregoing,
agency
Page: 10 of 10
we
find
decision,
judgment of the district court.
and
that
we
substantial
affirm
the
We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
10
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