Blake Van Leer, II v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:10-cv-01076-JKB Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998845424].. [11-1520]

Appeal: 11-1520

Document: 33

Date Filed: 05/02/2012

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1520

BLAKE R. VAN LEER, II,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES, INCORPORATED,
Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:10-cv-01076-JKB)

Argued:

March 21, 2012

Decided:

May 2, 2012

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Duncan and Judge Keenan joined.

ARGUED: Norman Lang Smith, Jeffrey Eric Nusinov, FISHER &
WINNER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Sanford M.
Saunders, Jr., GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Laura Metcoff Klaus, GREENBERG TRAURIG,
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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Date Filed: 05/02/2012

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DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
Blake R. Van Leer, II appeals the district court’s order
dismissing

his

complaint.

Because Van Leer’s proposed amended complaint failed

to

establish

action

any

and

denying

plausible

him

claims

leave

under

to

amend

law, 1

Maryland

his

we

conclude that any amendment to his original complaint would have
been futile and the district court did not abuse its discretion
by

denying

him

leave

to

amend.

We

accordingly

affirm

the

judgment of the district court.

I.
A.
We

accept

complaint.

as

true

the

facts

alleged

in

Van

Leer’s

See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th

Cir. 2011).
Van Leer worked in the waste-handling industry, developing
solid

waste-disposal

facilities

then

selling

to

developments,

them
the

King

in

interested
George

Maryland
firms.

County

flourished in the early 1990s.

and

Landfill

Virginia

One
in

of

and

these

Virginia,

Van Leer ultimately sold the

rights to the landfill to Waste Management, Inc., which agreed

1

The parties agree that Maryland law governs adjudication
of this action.

2

Appeal: 11-1520

to

Document: 33

pay

him

Date Filed: 05/02/2012

royalties

(“Royalty

Page: 3 of 20

Stream”)

totaling

over

$1.3

million per year for roughly forty years.
Not all of Van Leer’s projects rivaled the success of the
King George County Landfill.
next

development

agreements.

caused

As

a

bankruptcy in 1999.

Indeed, a bad investment in his

him

result,

to

Van

default
Leer

on

filed

several

for

loan

chapter

11

For the next eight years, he operated his

business as a debtor in possession and used proceeds from the
Royalty Stream to cover his expenses.
Seeking to convert the Royalty Stream into enough money to
emerge from bankruptcy, Van Leer in early 2007 decided to sell
the asset or pledge it as collateral for a loan.

His broker

contacted Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. (“Deutsche Bank”) to
gauge the firm’s interest in loaning Van Leer money secured by
the

Royalty

Stream

or

purchasing

it

outright.

After

making

progress in preliminary discussions, Van Leer and Deutsche Bank
executed a Confidentiality Agreement on April 17, 2007.
Leer

agreed

to

provide

Deutsche

Bank

“with

certain

Van

written

material containing material non-public information relating to
the

Transaction,

the

royalty

payments,

the

waste

disposal

facility and underlying transactions and participants” to permit
the firm “to evaluate the potential purchase of [the Royalty
Stream].”
the

J.A. 17.

confidential

Deutsche Bank, for its part, pledged to use
information

“for
3

the

sole

purpose

of

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determining [its] interest in participating in the Transaction.”
Id.

The Confidentiality Agreement provided that, among other

categories,

any

information

available”

or

“is

disclosure

by

known

[Van

“that

by

Leer]”

is

or

[Deutsche
is

not

becomes

Bank]

prior

considered

publicly
to

its

confidential

information and is therefore not subject to the terms of the
agreement.

Id.

Discussions continued between the parties, culminating in a
May 14 letter from Deutsche Bank to Van Leer.

Deutsche Bank

stated in the letter that, “based on [its] preliminary review of
information provided to [it] by [Van Leer], [its] understanding
of the Financing Transaction . . . and subject to satisfaction
of

all

conditions

purchasing
Id. 19.

the

outlined

Royalty

Deutsche

below,”

Stream

Bank

for

included

it

was

“interested”

approximately
a

number

of

$23

in

million.

qualifications.

First, it provided that the letter did not constitute a binding
commitment

and

any

subsequent

binding

commitment

memorialized in a separate written agreement.
Bank

subjected

conditions,

any

including

future
the

commitment
bank’s

to

would

be

Second, Deutsche
five

“completion

distinct
of,

and

satisfaction with the results of, [its] business, legal, tax,
financial, accounting, environmental and other due diligence.”
Id.

4

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After

Date Filed: 05/02/2012

sending

the

letter,

Page: 5 of 20

Deutsche

Bank

ceased

all

communication with Van Leer and did not respond to any of his
further

inquiries.

Over

a

month

later,

on

June

26,

the

Creditors’ Committee overseeing Van Leer’s bankruptcy announced
that it would auction the Royalty Stream.
from

Deutsche

Bank,

Van

Leer

was

With no commitment

unable

to

complete

transaction with a buyer to forestall the auction.

a

Deutsche

Bank submitted the high bid of $16.9 million at the auction,
obtaining
court

the

rights

confirmed

the

to

the

sale

Royalty

and

Stream.

closed

Van

The

bankruptcy

Leer’s

bankruptcy

proceedings.

B.
Almost three years after the auction of the Royalty Stream,
Van

Leer

filed

suit

against

Deutsche

complaint asserted five claims:
tortious
negligent

interference

with

misrepresentation,

Bank.

His

original

breach of contract, negligence,

prospective
and

business

opportunity,

The

of

fraud.

thrust

Van

Leer’s complaint was that Deutsche Bank shirked its obligations
to him by failing to seriously consider his application for a
loan or sale, leading him to believe that it was processing his
application
information

in
to

good
purchase

faith,
the

and

Royalty

using

his

Stream

at

lower price than the parties had negotiated.
5

confidential
auction

for

a

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Deutsche Bank responded by moving to dismiss Van Leer’s
complaint.

Finding that Van Leer’s complaint included nothing

more than conclusory allegations and baseless legal conclusions,
the district court granted Deutsche Bank’s motion and dismissed
the action.
Van Leer then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend
the judgment, seeking leave to file an amended complaint.
part

of

complaint

this

motion,

further

Van

detailing

Leer
his

attached

a

allegations

proposed
and

As

amended

striking

his

tortious-interference claim.
Van Leer alleged that Deutsche Bank breached its contract
with him by failing to “consider and process” his loan or sale
application

in

good

faith

and

by

neglecting

to

diligence in consideration” of the application.

“conduct

J.A. 199.

due
Van

Leer stated that he relied on Deutsche Bank’s promise that it
would

evaluate

transactions

his

with

application
other

parties.

and

refrained
He

further

from

pursuing

alleged

that

Deutsche Bank “breached its contractual obligations by using the
[confidential] information that it received” from him for “its
own purchase from the bankruptcy auction.”

Id. 200.

Finally,

Van Leer claimed that Deutsche Bank breached the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
On the negligence count, Van Leer alleged that Deutsche
Bank, “as the holder of a public trust . . . , had a duty to
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consider and process [his] . . . application in good faith and
with reasonable diligence” and “a duty not to compete with its
customer, and not to use its favored position to his detriment.”
Id. 201.
failing

It breached that duty, according to Van Leer, by
to

process

his

application,

using

confidential

information for its own benefit in competition with him, and
failing

to

act

Royalty Stream.

“reasonably
Id.

and

honestly”

in

purchasing

the

Van Leer alleged that Deutsche Bank’s

actions prevented him from lining up another buyer.
Van

Leer’s

similar claims.
of

care

“to

negligent-misrepresentation

count

included

He alleged that Deutsche Bank owed him a duty

ensure

that

its

representations

were

truthful

concerning its intention to consider and process [his] . . .
application in good faith and with reasonable diligence.”
203.

Id.

According to Van Leer, Deutsche Bank falsely stated that

it would consider his application, prompting him to justifiably
forgo pursuing other sale options.
On the final count, raising a fraud claim, Van Leer alleged
that Deutsche Bank falsely stated that it intended to act with
due diligence in processing his application when it knew that it
did not plan to conduct any review.
Deutsche

Bank

“had

already

launched

Instead, claimed Van Leer,
a

plan

to

purchase

the

Royalty Stream from the bankruptcy, depriving Van Leer of his
opportunity to sell the Royalty Stream himself.”
7

Id. 205.

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The district court denied Van Leer’s motion to alter or
amend the judgment.

Discerning no error in its previous ruling,

it reiterated that dismissal of Van Leer’s original complaint
was appropriate.

Turning to Van Leer’s request for leave to

amend his complaint, the court found that the proposed amended
complaint contained the same fatal deficiencies as the original
complaint.
the

court,

allegations

Van Leer’s proposed amended complaint, determined
amounted
and

to

nothing

unfounded

more

than

speculation.

further

The

conclusory

court

therefore

denied leave to amend as futile.
Van Leer appeals only the district court’s denial of his
motion for leave to amend the complaint.

II.
We review the district court’s denial of leave to amend for
abuse of discretion.

US Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Awappa, LLC,

615 F.3d 312, 320 (4th Cir. 2010).
denied

only

when

the

amendment

“[L]eave to amend should be

would

be

prejudicial

to

the

opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the
moving party, or amendment would be futile.”

Matrix Capital

Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th
Cir.

2009).

We

adjudge

amendment

futile

amended complaint fails to state a claim.

8

when

the

proposed

United States ex rel.

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Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th
Cir. 2008).
To

survive

plaintiff

dismissal
establish

must

for

failure

“facial

to

state

plausibility”

a

claim,

by

a

pleading

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference

that

alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

reviewing

the

court

defendant

must

is

“ ‘take

liable

the

facts

for

in

the

the

misconduct

light

A

most

favorable to the plaintiff,’ ” but it need not accept legal
conclusions drawn from those facts or “ ‘unwarranted inferences,
unreasonable

conclusions,

or

arguments.’

”

Giarratano

v.

Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting E. Shore
Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th
Cir. 2000)).

Indeed, a plaintiff must do more than provide

labels and conclusions--“a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A plaintiff will not successfully resist dismissal if he
provides

mere

enhancement”

“naked
or

his

assertions

devoid

allegations

of

establish

further
only

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

factual

“a

sheer

Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. at 1949 (internal quotations and alteration omitted).
“Where
with’

a
a

complaint
defendant’s

pleads

facts

liability,
9

that
it

are

‘stops

‘merely
short

of

consistent
the

line

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between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In the final analysis,

a

across

plaintiff

must

“nudge[]

line

from

abused

its

discretion by denying him leave to amend his complaint.

He

maintains

an

conceivable to plausible.”

[his]

claims

the

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

III.
Van

Leer

argues

at

the

that

the

outset

district

that

the

court

court

applied

inappropriately demanding standard when determining whether his
proposed amended complaint could survive dismissal.

Turning to

the specifics of his allegations, Van Leer asserts that he has
included facts sufficient to establish four claims to relief
that are facially plausible.
We

conclude

that

the

discretion on this issue.
overlooks

the

significant

district

court

did

not

abuse

its

In contending otherwise, Van Leer
changes

wrought by Twombly and Iqbal.

to

the

dismissal

landscape

Applying those standards to Van

Leer’s proposed amended complaint, we find that he has failed to
“nudge[]

[his]

claims

across

the

line

from

conceivable

to

plausible,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 2

2

Deutsche Bank maintains that this court lacks jurisdiction
to adjudicate Van Leer’s action, which it characterizes as a
collateral attack on the bankruptcy court’s final order. In so
(Continued)
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A.
Van

Leer

first

alleges

that

contractual

obligations

to

him

application

for

or

Deutsche

sale,

a

loan

by

Bank

breached

its

to

consider

his

perform

due

failing
neglecting

to

diligence, and using his confidential information for its own
purposes.

These allegations grossly overstate the nature of the

contractual relationship between the parties and otherwise rely
on conclusory claims, rendering dismissal appropriate.
Although Van Leer states that Deutsche Bank operated under
a

contractual

faith

and

duty

conduct

memorializing

such

to
due
an

consider

his

diligence,

loan

he

application
to

Nor

obligation.

points

no

could

in

good

provision
he.

The

Confidentiality Agreement constitutes the sole binding contract
between
Deutsche

Van

Leer

Bank

and

agreed

Deutsche
only

Bank.

that

it

Under
would

that
use

agreement,
Van

Leer’s

doing, Deutsche Bank misinterprets Van Leer’s claims. Van Leer
is not asking the district court to invalidate the sale of the
Royalty Stream.
Rather, he is requesting money damages to
compensate him for the money that he allegedly lost when
Deutsche Bank elected not to buy the Royalty Stream directly
from him and instead purchased it for a lower price at auction.
We--and the district court--may properly resolve Van Leer’s
claims without interfering with the bankruptcy’s court’s longcompleted proceedings.
Indeed, the bankruptcy court recognized
as much.
Suggesting that “Van Leer ought to take his marbles
and go home,” J.A. 149, the court nevertheless recognized that
Van Leer could initiate a later proceeding to raise his claim
for damages stemming from the sale.

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confidential information “for the sole purpose of determining
[its] interest in participating in the Transaction.”
The

document

did

not

obligate

Deutsche

Bank

Leer’s application or conduct due diligence.
out,

Deutsche

diligence.

Bank’s

May

14

letter

to

to

J.A. 17.

consider

Van

As Van Leer points
him

mentioned

due

But it did not mandate that the firm conduct due

diligence or even consider Van Leer’s application, stating only
that

any

subsequent

formal

completion of due diligence.
expressly

indicated

that

agreement

was

subject

to

the

And, in any event, Deutsche Bank
the

letter

was

not

a

binding

commitment, which comported with Maryland law on the subject.
See Paramount Brokers, Inc. v. Digital River, Inc., 126 F. Supp.
2d

939,

945

(D.

Md.

2000)

(reasoning

that

letter

generally does not constitute a binding contract).
contract

between

the

parties

demonstrates

that

of

intent

Because no

Deutsche

Bank

agreed to either review Van Leer’s application or conduct due
diligence, his allegations on this score are legally deficient.
Van Leer’s confidentiality allegation is, however, grounded
in the text of an operative agreement between the parties.

He

alleges that Deutsche Bank used confidential information for its
own benefit, violating its duty to use the disclosures “for the
sole purpose of determining [its] interest in participating in
the Transaction,” J.A. 17.

Fatal to Van Leer’s claim is his

failure to provide any gloss on these bare assertions.
12

Indeed,

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he does not indicate what confidential information he provided
to

Deutsche

Bank

or

how

the

bank

information for its own advantage.

could

have

used

that

In omitting this critical

discussion, Van Leer engages in little more than “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555.

Dismissal was therefore appropriate because the

district court was not bound to accept as true his conclusory
allegations “devoid of further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949 (internal quotations omitted).
Blending his contractual allegations into a global claim,
Van Leer alleges finally that Deutsche Bank violated its duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
Maryland
defendant

law,

requires

“act[ed]

in

a

Such a claim, though recognized by
plaintiff

such

a

to

manner

demonstrate
as

to

that

prevent

the
[the

plaintiff] from performing his obligations under the contract.”
Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 531 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992); see also E. Shore Mkts., 213 F.3d at 184 (“[T]he implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing as recognized in Maryland
requires that one party to a contract not frustrate the other
party’s performance.”).
Bank

prevented

him

Van Leer has not alleged that Deutsche

from

Confidentiality Agreement.
how

Deutsche

contravention

Bank
of

the

used

abiding

by

his

duties

under

the

And because he has failed to detail
his

confidential

Confidentiality
13

information

Agreement,

Van

Leer

in
is

Appeal: 11-1520

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unable

to

Date Filed: 05/02/2012

demonstrate

that

the

Page: 14 of 20

bank

contractual obligations in good faith.

did

not

perform

its

His proposed amended

complaint therefore fails to state a claim for a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

B.
Van Leer’s negligence claim revolves around Deutsche Bank’s
alleged breach of its duty to consider and process his loan or
sale application in good faith and with reasonable diligence.
Van Leer is unable to establish that Deutsche Bank owed him any
duty apart from its contractual obligations, and his proposed
amended complaint consequentially fails to state a claim for
negligence.
Claims of negligence under Maryland law must establish four
familiar elements:

(1) a duty owed to the plaintiff; (2) a

breach of that duty; (3) a causal relationship between breach
and harm; and (4) damages.

Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank of Md.,

515 A.2d 756, 758 (Md. 1986).
customer

generally

negligence.

do

not

Dealings between a bank and its
allow

for

claims

sounding

in

In such an instance, the relationship between the

bank and customer is contractual in nature, not giving rise to
an independent duty.

Parker, 604 A.2d at 532.

Some cases, to

be sure, present facts so unique that courts will impose an
independent duty on a bank in regard to its transactions with a
14

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customer.

Date Filed: 05/02/2012

Page: 15 of 20

See, e.g., Jacques, 515 A.2d at 759–63.

Yet this is

the exception rather than the rule.
Jacques, on which Van Leer principally relies in an effort
to establish that Deutsche Bank owed him a noncontractual duty,
involved

a

highly

irregular

court found significant.

combination

of

factors

that

the

In that case, the plaintiffs agreed to

purchase a house and applied to the defendant bank for a loan to
facilitate the transaction.

Id. at 756–57.

The bank sent them

a letter stating that the plaintiffs qualified for a $74,000
loan and that it would hold the loan’s interest rate for ninety
days.

Id.

at

757.

indicated

that

it

plaintiffs

no

more

unsatisfied

with

Shortly

had

made

than

those

thereafter,
a

mistake

$41,400.

terms,

sought

however,

and

Id.

could
The

financing

the

bank

loan

the

plaintiffs,
from

another

bank, but interest rates had skyrocketed by that time, making
the parameters of other loans unpalatable.
elected

to

accept

the

bank’s

offer

of

Id.
$41,400

They instead
and

secure

personal loans to cover the remainder of the needed financing.
Id.

The plaintiffs then filed suit against the bank, alleging

negligence.

Id.

The court began its analysis by noting that, “[w]here the
failure to exercise due care creates a risk of economic loss
only, courts have generally required an intimate nexus between
the parties as a condition to the imposition of tort liability.”
15

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Id. at 759.

Date Filed: 05/02/2012

Page: 16 of 20

Referring to the “rather extraordinary financing

provisions contained in the real estate sales contract” that
“left

the

[plaintiffs]

particularly

vulnerable

and

dependent

upon the Bank’s exercise of due care,” the court found such an
intimate nexus present in the case before it.

Id. at 762–64.

The court pointed to three elements of the relationship between
the bank and the plaintiffs that counseled imposing a tort duty
on the bank:

the requirement that the plaintiffs proceed to

loan settlement with whatever amount they could obtain at the
agreed rate of interest, the choice between accepting a loan or
forfeiting their $10,000 deposit, and the dramatic increase in
interest rates during the loan processing that precluded them
from finding another bank for financing.
The

relationship

between

Van

Id. at 762–63.

Leer

and

Deutsche

Bank

includes none of the extraordinary factors that the court found
critical to the disposition in Jacques.

We accordingly conclude

that the parties’ relationship is strictly contractual and the
district court properly found that Deutsche Bank owed no tort
duty to Van Leer.

See G&M Oil Co. v. Glenfed Fin. Corp., 782 F.

Supp. 1078, 1084 (D. Md. 1989) (finding no duty of care and
distinguishing
fairly

standard

plaintiffs
apart).

case

were

before

business
exposed

to

it,

in

which

plaintiff

sought

loan,”

from

Jacques,

in

risk

deal

extraordinary

if

“a

which
fell

Van Leer simply alleges no facts that would convert his
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Date Filed: 05/02/2012

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relationship with Deutsche Bank from the standard bank–customer
variety into something so unique as to compel a court to impose
a noncontractual duty on the bank.

Establishing no duty of care

on the part of Deutsche Bank, Van Leer fails to state a claim
for negligence. 3

C.
Turning to Van Leer’s claim of negligent misrepresentation,
we conclude that it fails for the same reason as his negligence
claim.

Under

Maryland

law,

a

plaintiff

alleging

negligent

misrepresentation must show that the defendant owed a duty of
care to the plaintiff.

Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v.

Katz, 762 A.2d 582, 588 (Md. 2000).

3

Van Leer is unable to

Van Leer also relies on an Oklahoma case, Djowharzadeh v.
City National Bank & Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Civ. App.
1982).
This case is inapposite, for at least two reasons.
First,
we
are
applying
Maryland
law,
so
Oklahoma’s
pronouncements that contradict Maryland precedent are not
relevant.
Second, the plaintiff in that case pled compelling
facts not at issue here--namely, that the plaintiff had
disclosed
confidential
information
about
a
bargain-priced
property that was not yet on the market in conjunction with his
loan application, the bank denied the loan, and the wives of two
of the bank’s executives used the plaintiff’s confidential
information and bought the property, id. at 617–18.
Here,
however,
Van
Leer
has
not
described
what
confidential
information he provided Deutsche Bank or how the bank used that
information to its advantage.
Indeed, in contrast to the
secretive deal at issue in Djowharzadeh, the public record of
the bankruptcy court revealed that the Creditors’ Committee
planned to auction the Royalty Stream.

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establish that Deutsche Bank owed him a duty of care, see supra
Section III.B, so he has failed to state a claim for negligent
misrepresentation.

D.
Van Leer alleges finally that Deutsche Bank committed fraud
by falsely stating that it was carrying out due diligence when
it actually did not intend to perform such due diligence.

Van

Leer claims that Deutsche Bank “launched a plan to purchase the
Royalty

Stream

opportunity

to

from

the

sell

bankruptcy,

the

Royalty

depriving

Stream

[him]

himself.”

of

J.A.

his
205.

Given the heightened pleading standards governing allegations of
fraud, we find that Van Leer’s proposed amended complaint fails
to state an actionable fraud claim.
Fraud under Maryland law includes five elements:

(1) the

defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff; (2) the
defendant either knew that the representation was false or made
it with reckless indifference as to its truth; (3) the defendant
made the misrepresentation for the purpose of defrauding the
plaintiff;

(4)

the

misrepresentation;

and

plaintiff
(5)

justifiably

the

relied

plaintiff

suffered

resulting from the misrepresentation.
A.2d 769, 791 (Md. 2008).
mandate

that

a

on

the

damages

Gourdine v. Crews, 955

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

plaintiff

alleging
18

fraud

“state

with

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Page: 19 of 20

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 9(b).
Van Leer’s general allegations are insufficient to satisfy
Rule

9’s

heightened

therefore

proper.

particularity

pleading

He

the

eschews

standard,
the

circumstances

and

injunction

dismissal
to

constituting

“state

fraud,”

is
with
id.,

instead asserting conclusorily that Deutsche Bank “launched a
plan to purchase the Royalty Stream from the bankruptcy,” J.A.
205.

Van

Leer’s

allegations

are

all

the

more

lacking

when

viewed with reference to the public record of the bankruptcy
proceedings,

which

revealed

that

the

Creditors’

Committee

planned to auction the Royalty Stream and that the highest bid
submitted to that point was only $11.5 million.

Van Leer puts

forth labels and conclusions in an effort to convert Deutsche
Bank’s
purchase

decision--based
the

nefarious.
factual

Royalty
But

on

Stream

these

enhancement,”

publicly
at

“naked

Iqbal,

available

auction
assertions

129

S.

Ct.

into

information--to
something

devoid
at

1949

of

more

further
(internal

quotations and alteration omitted), are not enough to counter
dismissal, particularly when viewed through the prism of Rule 9.

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Page: 20 of 20

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED

20