James McLean v. Ronald Ray

Filing

UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:10-cv-00456-LO-TCB Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998896416].. [11-1544]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1544

JAMES L. MCLEAN; EDITH L. MCLEAN,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
RONALD A. RAY, Esquire; ECONOMOU, FORRESTER & RAY,
Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:10-cv-00456-LO-TCB)

Argued:

May 16, 2012

Before AGEE and
Circuit Judge.

DIAZ,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

July 17, 2012

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Agee and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.

ARGUED:
Allen
Huberth
Sachsel,
Fairfax,
Virginia,
for
Appellants.
David John Gogal, BLANKINGSHIP & KEITH, PC,
Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael L. Chang,
BLANKINGSHIP & KEITH, PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
Edith and James McLean sued Ronald Ray, an attorney, and
his

law

firm,

Economou,

Forrester

&

Ray,

alleging

that

Ray

violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act in the course
of seeking to collect a debt the McLeans owed to his client.
Finding

the

McLeans’

granted

Ray’s

motion

claims
for

meritless,

summary

the

judgment

McLeans’ cross motion for summary judgment.
appealed.

district
and

court

denied

the

The McLeans timely

We affirm.

I.
A.
Edith McLean is a ninety-six-year-old widow.

Edith’s son,

James McLean, manages her affairs and finances under general and
medical

powers

facility

in

of

attorney.

Maryland,

Edith

Currently
twice

at

resided

nursing home facility in Arlington, Virginia.

a
at

medical

care

ManorCare,

a

Edith was first

admitted to ManorCare on July 30, 2006 and was discharged on
September 7, 2006.

Upon Edith’s first admission to ManorCare,

James signed a contract with the facility providing that the
McLeans would be liable for all costs (to include attorney’s
fees)

incurred

account.
upon

by

ManorCare

in

collecting

payment

on

the

The contract also provided that it would terminate

Edith’s

date

of

discharge;
2

however,

if

Edith

were

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readmitted within fifteen days of discharge, the contract would
continue in effect as of the date of readmission.
In

November

2007,

Ray

sued

Edith

in

Arlington

County

General District Court on behalf of ManorCare, to collect a debt
allegedly owed to ManorCare for services it rendered to Edith
during her first stay.

The parties resolved the matter and

ManorCare nonsuited the case.
Approximately twenty months after her first stay, Edith was
readmitted to ManorCare without signing a new contract.
disputes

again

arose

between

the

McLeans

and

Payment

ManorCare,

and

ManorCare again engaged Ray to attempt to collect the amounts it
claimed it was owed.

On March 25, 2009, while Edith was still a

resident at ManorCare, Ray mailed Edith a letter claiming that
she

owed

ManorCare

$15,814.44,

attorney’s fees, and costs.

plus

interest,

reasonable

Two days later, Ray sued Edith in

the Arlington County Circuit Court (the “Arlington Complaint”)
alleging that she failed to pay ManorCare for services rendered.
In
standard

preparing
collection

agreement,

and

an

the

Arlington

referral
itemized

form,

Complaint,

Ray

Edith’s

earlier

statement

pertaining

reviewed

to

a

residence
Edith’s

account, all of which he had received from ManorCare consistent

3

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with his normal practice before filing debt collection actions. 1
The

referral

sheet

stated

that

Edith

had

been

admitted

ManorCare on July 30, 2006 and remained in the facility.

to
Ray

noticed that the amount sought on the referral sheet did not
match the figures ManorCare provided on the itemized statement.
After consulting with ManorCare, Ray revised the draft complaint
to

state

a

reduced

amount

owed.

The

Arlington

Complaint,

however, also asserted--incorrectly it turns out--that Edith had
resided continuously at ManorCare since her initial admission in
July 2006, and therefore alleged a breach of the contract James
signed in connection with that admission.
Before Ray filed suit, his secretary called his attention
to the 2007 lawsuit that the parties had resolved.

Ray admitted

that he reviewed the file pertaining to the earlier matter in a
cursory fashion, concluding that the dated information was not
1

Ray admitted that he also customarily received a sworn
affidavit from his clients attesting to the amount sought, but
that he did not receive one from ManorCare in this instance.
Ray explained that he typically requests an affidavit to
facilitate the entry of a default judgment pursuant to Virginia
state court procedures. In this case, Ray explained that--given
the adversarial nature of the proceedings from an early stage-he had no reason to expect that the McLeans would default and
thus no practical need for the affidavit.
Moreover, the
district court found it undisputed that Ray “decided not to use
a supporting affidavit in the McLean matter because Ms. McLean
continued to reside at the facility, and Mr. Ray assumed that he
would need to amend the complaint prior to the entry of a final
judgment order to include claims for additional services.” J.A.
994-95.

4

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useful and that he had no reason to otherwise question the facts
provided by ManorCare with respect to the 2009 claim.
Edith

left

ManorCare

on

May

8,

2009.

In

the

months

following her departure, Ray exchanged several emails and phone
calls with the McLeans’ attorneys.

It was not until the end of

September, however, that the McLeans first asserted that the
2006 contract was no longer valid because of the twenty-month
lapse

between

Edith’s

discharge

readmission in April 2008.

in

September

2006

and

Ray responded that he would look

into the matter and “clean up” the lawsuit if he confirmed that
the 2006 contract no longer applied.
Ray

requested

Edith’s

file

from

his

ManorCare some time to retrieve it.
an

amended

complaint

(the

J.A. 561.
client,

To that end,
but

it

took

In the interim, Ray filed

“Arlington

Amended

Complaint”)

on

October 29, 2009 without striking the claim for attorney’s fees.
The Arlington Amended Complaint increased the ad damnum to
$70,147.67

to

encompass

services

rendered

to

Edith

from

the

filing of the initial Arlington Complaint until her discharge.
The Arlington Amended Complaint further alleged that Edith, by
accepting the benefit of the services ManorCare rendered to her,
implicitly obligated herself to pay ManorCare in quantum meruit
for their reasonable value.

The Arlington Amended Complaint

also continued to seek interest, and attorney’s fees and costs
based

on

the

2006

contract.

The
5

next

day,

Edith’s

counsel

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served

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and

an

filed

Answer

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and

Counterclaim,

pleading

as

a

defense that there was no written contract between the parties
and

providing

specific

dates

of

Edith’s

discharge

and

readmission to ManorCare.
By November 2009, Ray was able to confirm that Edith had
not

continuously

resided

at

ManorCare,

and

conceded

that

no

written contract existed to support a claim for attorney’s fees.
In

January

dismissing

2010,
the

the

parties

written

presented

contract

claim

and

an

agreed

granting

amend the suit to include an oral contract claim.

order

leave

to

Ray filed a

Second Amended Complaint, asserting claims for breach of an oral
contract

and

attorney’s

an

implied

fees,

and

contract,

seeking

dropping

judgment

in

the

claim

for

the

amount

of

$65,809.50.
B.
In the course of litigating the debt collection proceeding,
the

McLeans

requested

a

information.
request,

sought
list

discovery.
of

ManorCare

ManorCare

listing

the

Among

prepared

national

other

employees
a

list

headquarters

and

documents,
their

responsive
address

they

contact
to

and

the
phone

number as the contact information for several employees, and
submitted it to Ray.
contact

information

Ray noticed that the list was missing
for

two

ManorCare

6

employees,

which

he

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inserted

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before

forwarding

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the

discovery

response

to

the

McLeans.
While the debt collection action was pending, Ray filed a
separate

action

for

the

conservator for Edith.
warranted

by

James’s

including

his

appointment

of

a

guardian

and

Ray contended that this proceeding was
history

purported

of

failure

neglect

of

to

for

pay

Edith’s
her

needs,

care

and

residence at another nursing home, which ultimately resulted in
the termination of Edith’s residence agreement at that facility.
Ray admitted that recovering the debt owed to ManorCare was one
purpose for filing the guardianship proceeding, but that his
legitimate
actions.

concerns

for

Edith’s

welfare

also

motivated

his

Ray prosecuted the guardianship proceeding against the

McLeans for nearly three months after Edith left ManorCare, but
then nonsuited the action.
C.
The McLeans sued Ray and his law firm in federal district
court for violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act
(“FDCPA”).

They

twice

amended

their

complaint;

the

second

amended complaint, the operative complaint before the district
court, initially contained twenty-four counts, twelve counts for
James and twelve for Edith, alleging the same violations of the
FDCPA

for

dismissed

each

plaintiff.

several

counts,

However,
including
7

the

McLeans

twelve

voluntarily

claims

that

the

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district court indicated were likely time-barred by the FDCPA’s
statute of limitations. 2
two

other

counts

The McLeans also voluntarily dismissed

alleging

that

Ray

violated

the

FDCPA

by

“instituting and/or continuing and prosecuting” the guardianship
proceeding, id. 27, which they argued Ray initiated “to bring
pressure on James, using the proceeding as a ‘club’ to induce or
threaten James to pay a claimed, but disputed, debt,” id. 23-24.
The district court thus had before it ten remaining counts
alleging that Ray violated the FDCPA by (1) seeking incorrect
amounts, seeking attorney’s fees, and failing to determine the
accuracy of ManorCare’s claim prior to signing and filing the
Arlington Amended Complaint, (2) falsely making a quantum meruit
claim “with no basis in fact,” (3) falsely representing that he
would not assert the 2006 contract as a basis for recovery when
amending

the

complaint,

and

(4)

providing

cross-moved

for

summary

a

false

discovery

response.
The

parties

district court granted in favor of Ray.
appealed,

challenging

the

award

of

judgment,

which

the

The McLeans timely

summary

judgment

and

a

discovery ruling by the magistrate judge.

2

On appeal, Ray argues that all of the claims are barred by
the FDCPA’s statute of limitations.
Because we conclude that
the McLeans’ claims fail on the merits, we need not address this
separate argument.

8

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II.
We review de novo a grant or denial of summary judgment,
applying

the

same

standard

applied

by

the

district

court.

Overstreet v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 931, 938 (4th
Cir.

1991).

Summary

judgment

is

appropriate

only

when

the

record shows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A district court considering a motion

for summary judgment “must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party,” Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103,
115 (4th Cir. 2009), and draw all inferences in favor of the
nonmovant,

Williams

v.

Griffin,

952

F.2d

820,

823

(4th

Cir.

1991).
III.
The

FDCPA

is

a

strict

liability

statute

that

prohibits

false or deceptive representations in collecting a debt, as well
as certain abusive debt collection practices. 3

3

Attorneys seeking

The prohibited practices include “any false deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the
collection
of
any
debt”;
15
U.S.C.
§
1692e,
“false
representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any
debt;” id. § 1692e(2)(A); “use of any false representation or
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to
obtain information concerning a consumer;” id. § 1692e(10); “use
[of] unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to
collect any debt;” id. § 1692f, and “collection of any amount
(including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to
the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly
(Continued)
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the

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repayment

of

a

debt

on

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behalf

of

a

collectors within the ambit of the FDCPA.
514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995).
litigation

constitute

client

are

debt

Heintz v. Jenkins,

False statements in the course of

violations

of

the

act.

See

Sayyed

v.

Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 229 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting
the argument that an attorney debt collector was entitled to
immunity for his litigating activities).
contains

a

“bona

fide

error”

defense

The FDCPA, however,
that

absolves

a

debt

collector from liability for a violation if he can show by a
preponderance

of

the

evidence

that

“the

violation

was

not

intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding
the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any
such error.”

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
A.

The McLeans assert that Ray’s claims as to the amounts due
to ManorCare violated the FDCPA in several respects.

First,

they contend that Ray misrepresented the debt owed by improperly
requesting attorney’s fees despite the fact that the break in
Edith’s

stay

at

ManorCare

rendered

ManorCare to such fees inapplicable.

the

contract

entitling

On this point, the McLeans

argue first that Ray’s review of his own files--specifically,

authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by
law;” id. § 1692f(1).

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the file pertaining to the 2007 lawsuit--should have alerted him
to the break in stay, and further that he was alerted to it by
the McLeans’ counsel.

Next, they contend that Ray violated the

FDCPA

payment

by

seeking

the

of

prejudgment

interest

in

the

complaint.
The McLeans further argue that the bona fide error defense
does not shield Ray because he knew the amounts claimed were
erroneous and did not maintain adequate procedural safeguards to
avoid such errors.

On the latter point, the McLeans argue that

Ray’s

of

dereliction

his

own

protocol--of

requesting

and

receiving a sworn affidavit from his clients attesting to the
amount of the claimed debt--establishes his failure to comply
with procedures for avoiding error.
In granting summary judgment in favor of Ray, the district
court--relying on our decision in Amond v. Brincefield, Hartnett
& Assocs., P.C., 175 F.3d 1013, 1999 WL 152555 (4th Cir. Mar.
22, 1999) (unpublished table decision)--determined that the bona
fide

error

defense

applied

to

absolve

Ray

of

liability.

Although by unpublished decision, this court in Amond affirmed
the district court’s finding that debt collector lawyers had no
reason to question the amount of debt they were attempting to
collect for their clients, stating that lawyers “cannot be held
liable for what appears to be an honest dispute regarding the
amount of the debt, so long as there exists a colorable factual
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basis for the higher amount claimed by their client.”
(quoting

the

district

court).

This

court

also

Id. at *2

rejected

the

Amond plaintiff’s argument that the FDCPA created a heightened
duty

of

investigation

collection activity.

for

lawyers

engaged

in

ordinary

debt

Id. at *3.

Noting that ManorCare had provided Ray a referral form, a
residence agreement, and an itemized bill for services, which
Ray

reviewed

concluded
claim.

(and

that

challenged),

there

was

a

the

district

colorable

basis

court
for

correctly

ManorCare’s

Addressing the McLeans’ argument that Ray would have

been alerted to the fact that Edith did not reside continuously
at ManorCare had he more carefully reviewed his own files, the
district court also correctly concluded that Amond permitted Ray
to rely on his client’s word. 4
As for the McLeans’ separate argument that Ray deliberately
asserted a false claim for attorney’s fees despite having been
put on notice by the McLeans’ attorneys that there was a break
in Edith’s stay at ManorCare, the district court found (and we
agree) that Ray was diligent in investigating the matter.

4

From

Like the district court, we credit Ray’s explanation for
why he did not insist on receiving a sworn affidavit from
ManorCare for the amount owed.
At bottom, our inquiry focuses
on whether the procedures Ray employed were reasonably adapted
to avoid error.
We are satisfied that they were, and that Ray
is thus entitled to the benefit of the bona fide error defense.

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the moment Ray was alerted to the contention that there was a
break

in

Edith’s

stay

that

rendered

the

attorney’s

fees

provision of the initial contract inapplicable, he diligently
investigated to confirm the truth of the assertion.

We also

agree with the district court that Ray amended the complaint to
remove the claim for attorney’s fees as soon as he was able to
confirm that the 2006 contract no longer applied.
The

district

court

also

correctly

rejected

the

McLeans’

allegation that Ray violated the FDCPA by seeking prejudgment
interest.

As the district court noted, Virginia law permits

plaintiffs to seek prejudgment interest, which is awarded at the
discretion of the trier of fact.

See, e.g., Upper Occoquan

Sewage Auth. v. Blake Constr. Co., 655 S.E.2d 10, 23 (Va. 2008)
(citing Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-382).
protest

that

purportedly

Ray

owed

sought

by

the

The McLeans nevertheless

prejudgment

McLeans

that

payable, as they had not yet been billed.

interest
were

not

on
yet

amounts
due

and

However, the district

court determined that “the complaint is fairly read as seeking
only pre-judgment interest on the amounts past due at the time
of judgment.”

J.A. 1001.

this score, as well.

We agree with the district court on

Further, any risk that ManorCare would

have been able to recover damages to which it was not entitled-i.e., prejudgment interest on amounts that were not yet due and
payable--is mitigated by the fact that a decision to award such
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interest in the first instance is determined at the discretion
of a presumably competent and reasonable trier of fact.
B.
The

McLeans

next

assert

that

the

quantum

meruit

claims

lacked a factual basis, and that the amount asserted therefore
violates the FDCPA.
McLeans’

In support, they cite Ray’s response to the

interrogatory

that

sought

the

basis

for

ManorCare’s

allegation that each charge represented the reasonable value of
the item or service ManorCare provided Edith.
explained

that

the

charges

were

“determined

Ray’s response
based

upon

the

reasonable value of the time or service charged, the charges for
such items by other facilities in the market and a cost basis
evaluation as determined by ManorCare in setting prices based on
its overall operating income and expenses.”

Id.

The McLeans contend that the FDCPA requires--at the time a
debt collector asserts a debt--an accounting of how the amount
was calculated.
to

constitute

According to the McLeans, Ray’s response fails
a

good

faith,

pre-suit

rationale

of

a

claimed

debt, because it is merely “a list of factors that will be
considered to support a later rationalization,” Appellants’ Br.
47, which they claim does not satisfy the requirements of the
FDCPA.
The McLeans’ position is unpersuasive, as they fail to cite
any authority for this proposition.
14

We agree with the district

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Doc: 35

that

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Ray’s

response

Pg: 15 of 18

clearly

stated

the

basis

for

the

quantum meruit figure: “a reasonable value of the services, as
determined by the market, plus costs.”

J.A. 1001.

Further, we

agree with the district court that the McLeans have done no more
than suggest that the numbers “smell fishy,” id. 1002, which
does not satisfy their burden in opposing summary judgment.
C.
The McLeans also allege that Ray violated the FDCPA when he
falsely represented that he would not assert the 2006 contract
(the contract signed upon Edith’s first admission to ManorCare)
as a basis for recovery and for attorney’s fees when amending
the Arlington Complaint.

This allegation stems from a statement

Ray made in a sworn affidavit he submitted to the district court
that, before amending the complaint the first time, he “would
inquire with [ManorCare] regarding the applicability of the 2006
contract and . . . would clean up the lawsuit if [he] confirmed
that there was a problem with that part of the claim.”

Id. 561.

The McLeans interpret Ray’s statement as an unconditional
vow

to

amend

the

initial

complaint

to

remove

the

breach

written contract claim and the claim for attorney’s fees.

of
The

district court, however, correctly interpreted Ray’s statement
with the qualifier in context:

that Ray would “clean up the

lawsuit” if and when he confirmed the applicability of the 2006
contract,

and

not

that

he

made
15

an

unconditional

promise

to

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remove

the

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claim

for

Pg: 16 of 18

attorneys’

fees.

Several

obstacles--

including the fact that ManorCare had misplaced Edith’s file-prevented Ray from confirming the facts any sooner.

The record

shows that Ray amended the complaint to remove the claim for
attorney’s fees as soon as he was able to determine that the
2006

contract

did

not

support

it.

We

thus

agree

with

the

FDCPA

by

district court that this claim lacks merit.
D.
The

McLeans

also

allege

that

Ray

providing a false discovery response.

violated

the

According to the McLeans,

Ray falsely provided the ManorCare national headquarters address
and

phone

number

as

the

contact

information

for

several

ManorCare employees, when he knew that those employees were not
in fact based at the company’s Ohio headquarters.
As to this claim, the district court correctly noted that
there was neither factual nor legal support for the notion that
Ray made a “false statement” or “misrepresentation” within the
meaning of the FDCPA when he forwarded the list of employees
from

ManorCare

to

the

McLeans.

Assuming

that

Ray’s

action

constituted a “representation” or “means of collecting a debt,”
the district court nevertheless concluded that it was not false,
deceptive, or misleading, let alone “unfair or unconscionable”
as prohibited by the act.

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Again,

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contention

the
on

McLeans

appeal

legally incorrect.
court

that

that

that

no

the

authority

district

to

support

court’s

their

reasoning

is

To the contrary, we agree with the district

there

specifying

cite

Pg: 17 of 18

was

nothing

certain

wrong

ManorCare

or

dishonest

employees

could

about
be

Ray

reached

through the company’s headquarters.
E.
Finally,
entered

by

the
the

McLeans

seek

magistrate

to

judge

appeal
in

a

this

discovery

case.

In

order
their

complaint, the McLeans asserted two separate FDCPA violations
premised on the view that Ray abused the separate guardianship
proceeding as a coercive debt collection tool.
In

support

discovery
McLean,
Edith

of

directing

at

L.

all

Ray

times

McLean’s

propounded

their

claims,

to

admit

hereto

that

relevant,

affairs.”

interrogatories

the

Id.

and

McLeans

propounded

“Plaintiff
was

211.

requests

James

properly
In

L.

managing
Ray

production

for

response,

of

documents seeking information relating to James’s management of
Edith’s financial affairs.

When the McLeans refused to provide

the information, the magistrate judge granted Ray’s motion to
compel.
opted

to

Rather than comply with the order, however, the McLeans
dismiss

the

two

claims.

At

the

same

time,

they

objected to the magistrate judge’s order, contending that it was
an abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
17

The district

Appeal: 11-1544

court

Doc: 35

Filed: 07/17/2012

overruled

the

Pg: 18 of 18

objection,

finding

that

“the

information

sought by Defendants is plainly relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims .
. . [and] Defendants are entitled to develop their response to
Plaintiffs’

allegations

documents.”

through

discovery

of

all

relevant

Id. 388.

On appeal, the McLeans argue that the magistrate judge and
the district court erred in ordering the McLeans to disclose
Edith’s assets.

They ask us to reverse the district court’s

order and to remand the case with instructions to reinstate the
two counts alleging violations of the FDCPA pertaining to the
guardianship claims.
We conclude, however, that this assignment of error is now
moot,

given

that

the

McLeans

elected

rather than comply with the order.

to

dismiss

the

claims

In any event, we discern no

error, as we agree with the district court that the discovery
was plainly relevant to the issues in the case.

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.

18