Solomon Stratton v. Mecklenburg County Department
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:10-cv-00137-DCN-KM. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999119390]. Mailed to: Lucas Bradley, Richard Lucy, Matthew Noller, and Solomon Stratton. [11-2131]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No.
11-2131
SOLOMON STRATTON,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
MECKLENBURG COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; US
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED WAY OF
CENTRAL CAROLINAS; FOUNDATION FOR THE CAROLINAS; COUNCIL
FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS; BRETT LOFTIS; MARTHA CURREN; DAVID
CAYER;
YVONNE
MIMS-EVANS;
ELIZABETH
MILLER-KILLEGREW;
MARGARET SHARPE; SIDNEY EAGLES; JOHN MARTIN; MARTHA GEER;
PATRICIA
TIMMONS-GOODSEN;
MECKLENBURG
COUNTY;
RICHARD
JACOBSEN; TYRONE WADE; TWYLA HOLLINGSWORTH; DONNA FAYKO;
GRETCHEN CALDWELL; SHERRI GLENN; DAVID FEE; LISA LOOBY;
SUSAN MILLER; KATHERINE DORMINEY; ROBERT ADDEN; RICHARD
LUCY; MICHAEL SCHMIDT; CAROLINAS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM,
Defendants – Appellees.
------------------------------------PETER BOWMAN RUTLEDGE,
Court-Assigned Amicus Counsel.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
David C. Norton,
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00137-DCN-KM)
Argued:
March 22, 2013
Decided:
Before KING, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
May 31, 2013
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
a separate concurring opinion.
Judge Gregory wrote
ARGUED:
Lucas D. Bradley, UGA APPELLATE LITIGATION CLINIC,
Athens, Georgia, for Court-Assigned Amicus Counsel.
Robert
Evans Harrington, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, PA, Charlotte,
North Carolina; Robert S. Adden, Jr., Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Peter B. Rutledge, Matthew V.H.
Noller, UGA APPELLATE LITIGATION CLINIC, Athens, Georgia, for
Court-Assigned Amicus Counsel. Sinead Noelle O’Doherty, Adam K.
Doerr, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, PA, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellees Council for Children's Rights and Brett
Loftis; Michael Gray Gibson, DEAN & GIBSON, LLP, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee United Way of Central Carolinas.
Grady L. Balentine, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees Martha
Curren,
David
Cayer,
Yvonne
Mims-Evans,
Elizabeth Miller-Killegrew, Margaret Sharpe, Sidney Eagles, John
Martin, Martha Geer, and Patricia Timmons-Goodsen.
Charles
Evans Johnson, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, PA, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee Carolinas Healthcare System.
Kelly
Suzanne Hughes, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, PC,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee Foundation for the
Carolinas; Cynthia L. Van Horne, POYNER SPRUILL LLP, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee Michael Schmidt; Richard Lucey,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee Richard Lucey.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
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PER CURIAM:
Solomon Stratton appeals from the district court’s Order of
September 16, 2011, which adopted the report and recommendations
of a magistrate judge and dismissed the operative complaint in
this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
See
Stratton
v.
Mecklenburg
Cnty.
Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 3:10-cv-00137 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2011),
ECF
No.
115
centuries-old
(the
“Order”). 1
international
The
child
complaint
trafficking
alleges
that
enterprise
a
had
orchestrated and caused the termination, by the state courts of
North
Carolina,
of
the
parental
rights
of
Jack
and
Kathy
Stratton (sometimes referred to as the “Strattons”) with respect
to nine of their children.
The complaint alleges eight claims
involving a total of thirty defendants, including governmental
entities, charitable organizations, and various judges and other
individuals.
As explained below, we are satisfied to affirm the
dismissal by the district court, relying on the Rooker-Feldman
and substantiality doctrines.
1
The district court’s unpublished Order is found at J.A.
475-76. (Citations herein to “J.A. ____” refer to the contents
of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.)
3
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I.
A.
On March 22, 2010, Solomon Stratton and his father, Jack
Stratton, filed their pro se complaint in the Western District
of North Carolina.
Six months later, on September 24, 2010,
they filed an amended pro se complaint, which constitutes the
operative complaint in this appeal (the “Complaint”). 2
the
plaintiffs
initially
sued
only
one
Although
defendant,
the
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services (the “County
DSS”),
the
including
Complaint
three
names
twenty-nine
additional
entities, 3
governmental
several
defendants,
charitable
organizations, 4 and more than twenty individuals, eight of them
North Carolina judges. 5
2
The Complaint is found at J.A. 96-159.
3
The governmental defendants include the United States
Department of Health and Human Resources, North Carolina’s
Mecklenburg County, and the County DSS (named only in the
initial pro se complaint).
Although the County DSS was not
specifically named as a defendant in the Complaint, it has been
treated as a party defendant in the district court and
throughout these proceedings.
4
The charitable defendants are the United Way of Central
Carolinas, the Foundation for the Carolinas, the Council for
Children’s Rights, and the Carolinas Healthcare System.
5
The individual defendants include Brett Loftis, Director
of the Council for Children’s Rights; Martha Curran, a court
clerk in Mecklenburg County; David Cayer, formerly a state judge
and now a federal magistrate judge; Yvonne Mims-Evans, a state
judge;
Elizabeth
Miller-Kelligrew,
a
former
state
judge;
Margaret Sharpe, a former state judge; Sidney Eagles, a former
(Continued)
4
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The various claims generally stem from the state courts’
termination of the parental rights of Jack and Kathy Stratton
with regard to nine of their ten children, including plaintiff
Solomon Stratton.
The Complaint consists of sixty-four pages
and more than 400 paragraphs.
Its extensive allegations relate,
inter alia, to the seizure in 2001 of the Stratton children by
the
County
rights
by
DSS,
the
the
termination
North
Carolina
of
the
courts,
Strattons’
and
the
placement of their children into foster care.
parental
court-ordered
For example, the
Complaint alleges that the “[p]laintiffs and their family are
victims
of
an
Enterprise
engaged
in
international
child
trafficking [that] seizes children for purposes of pedophilia
and
human
child
sacrifice.”
Complaint
¶ 443.
It
further
alleges that these occurrences were part of what it denominates
an
“International
Enterprise.”
Id.
Luciferian
at
5.
Child
This
Trafficking
enterprise
“Rothschild-Rockefeller-Illuminati-Federal
is
Criminal
part
Reserve-New
of
a
World
state judge; John Martin, a state judge; Martha Geer, a state
judge; Patricia Timmons-Goodsen, a former state judge; Richard
Jacobsen, former County DSS director; Tyrone Wade, deputy
Mecklenburg County attorney; Twyla Hollingsworth, County DSS
attorney; County DSS supervisors Donna Fayko, Gretchen Caldwell,
Sherri Glenn, David Fee, and Lisa Looby; County DSS social
worker Susan Miller; former County DSS supervisor Katherine
Dorminey; County DSS attorney Robert Adden; attorney Richard
Lucey; and attorney Michael Schmidt.
5
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Order
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conspiracy”
that
Pg: 6 of 44
began
with
the
establishment
of
the
Rothschild banking empire in 1744 in Frankfurt, Germany.
¶ 359.
Through
money,”
the
“Rothschild
Rothschilds
“systematically
Europe.”
the
take
Id. ¶ 51.
and
over
control
the
and
of
the
Illuminati
control
Id.
issuance
able
to
governments
the
were
of
of
These conspirators thereafter successfully
obtained control of the government of the United States, through
the establishment of the Federal Reserve system, and they now
control “every major business corporation,” as well as “[e]very
government on earth.”
Id. ¶¶ 73, 74.
As a result of the foregoing, the Complaint explains, our
entire planet is “now operating under a Luciferian (Satanic)
shadow world government.”
Complaint ¶ 74.
Complaint
“an
contends
trafficking
that
conspiracy
In addition, the
international
operates
within
Satanic
‘child
child
protective
services’ and the CIA,” with “a CIA covert child trafficking
operation”
providing
human sacrifices.”
that
same
vein,
children
“used
Id. ¶¶ 101, 107.
alleging
that
by
Satan
worshippers
for
The Complaint continues in
“there
are
approximately
four
million practicing Satan worshippers across the United States,
many
of
them
operating
States government.”
at
the
Id. ¶ 102.
highest
levels
of
the
United
In addition, “pedophile sex
orgies with high ranking federal officials” occur at the White
House and at the “Bohemian Grove,” where, for more than 120
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“world
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leaders
Satanic rituals.”
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have . . . participate[d]
in
bizarre
Id. ¶¶ 104, 109-10.
The Luciferian conspiracy allegations of the Complaint are
interwoven
into
various
descriptions
of
the
state
court
proceedings concerning the Strattons that occurred more than ten
years ago in North Carolina.
According to the Complaint, the
conspiracy procured the seizure of the Stratton children through
the fabrication of various court documents, in order to obtain
jurisdiction over the Stratton family and its members outside of
their county of residence.
It is alleged that, following the
removal and detention of their children, the Strattons were not
afforded the notices and hearings mandated under North Carolina
law. 6
The Complaint also alleges that the defendants’ actions
were motivated in part by the Strattons being Christians and
their children biracial.
It then alleges that, while in the
custody of the County DSS, plaintiff Solomon Stratton was forced
to
attend
public
school
against
6
his
will,
and
that
he
was
The Juvenile Code of North Carolina is codified at Chapter
7B of the North Carolina General Statutes. Subchapter I thereof
establishes procedures for the processing in the state courts of
juvenile cases involving abuse, neglect, and dependency.
See
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-100 to 1414.
Those procedures include,
inter alia, the appointment of counsel for indigent parents, the
appointment of guardians ad litem to represent juveniles, and
the conduct of various judicial proceedings to assess and
determine the need for custody by the state. See id. §§ 7B-506,
601, 602.
7
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subjected
to
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medical
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procedures
to
which
neither
he
nor
his
allegations,
the
parents consented.
On
the
basis
of
its
extensive
factual
Complaint identifies eight causes of action:
Claim I (42 U.S.C. § 1983):
The defendants conspired
to violate the plaintiffs’ rights under multiple
amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
Claim II (42 U.S.C. § 1985):
The defendants,
motivated by race, religion, and sex, conspired to
violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
Claim III (18 U.S.C. § 1964):
The defendants
conspired,
in
furtherance
of
the
international
criminal enterprise, to commit, inter alia, child
kidnapping, child torture, ritualistic child sexual
molestation, drugging of children, and human child
Satanic sacrifices.
Claim IV (18 U.S.C. § 1595):
The defendants violated
the Thirteenth Amendment by forcing Solomon and his
siblings into slavery and involuntary servitude.
Claim V (42 U.S.C. § 2000d): The defendants violated
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Claim VI (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1):
The Department of
Health and Human Services of the United States (the
“DHHS”)
violated
the
plaintiffs’
rights
under
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Claim VII (assault and battery):
The defendants,
except defendant Schmidt, committed the state law tort
of assault and battery by kidnapping Solomon and
subjecting him to medical examinations without his
consent or the consent of his parents.
Claim VIII (legal malpractice): Defendant Schmidt, an
attorney, committed legal malpractice against Jack
Stratton by refusing to turn over his Stratton case
file.
8
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For relief, the Complaint seeks a declaration from the federal
district court that “all orders and judgments used to kidnap and
hold [the Stratton children] are void and vacated,” plus damages
in excess of two and one-half billion dollars.
Complaint 63.
B.
1.
On December 18, 2000, the County DSS received a report that
the
children
of
Jack
and
Kathy
Stratton,
one
of
whom
was
plaintiff Solomon Stratton, were living in a home in Charlotte,
Mecklenburg
food. 7
County,
The
North
following
Carolina,
day,
with
several
inadequate
County
DSS
heat
and
employees
approached the Stratton home, where they observed the children.
Later on December 19, 2000, the Strattons and their children
moved
from
Mecklenburg
County
to
neighboring
Gaston
County.
When the County DSS employees returned to the Stratton home in
Charlotte on December 20, 2000, they found it empty, and they
inquired about the family’s absence from Jack Stratton’s mother,
Joan Stratton, who lived next door.
Joan, however, “refus[ed]
to provide the . . . whereabouts of the father and family or
where she believe[d] they might be.”
7
J.A. 200.
As a result,
Our recitation of the pertinent facts is drawn primarily
from the pleadings, the exhibits thereto, and various state and
federal court records.
The North Carolina court records
referred to herein are judicially noticed and accepted as
accurate and factual.
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the County DSS filed a petition in the state district court in
Mecklenburg
County
on
December
21,
2000,
alleging
that
Joan
Stratton was “interfering with [the County DSS’s] ability to
investigate to determine the juveniles’ condition,” and seeking
Id. 8
an order prohibiting further interference by her.
A summons was promptly issued by the state district court
directing Joan Stratton to appear the following day, December
22,
2000,
in
Charlotte,
where
a
hearing
was
conducted
by
defendant Cayer (then a North Carolina judge) on the petition. 9
Defendants Wade, Caldwell, Dorminey, and Fayko, as officials of
the
County
DSS,
were
Caldwell presented
January
26,
2001,
present
evidence
the
on
in
state
its
support
court
behalf,
and
of
petition.
the
entered
an
defendant
order
On
(the
“Juvenile Order”) containing findings regarding the conditions
of the Stratton home, the welfare of the Stratton children, and
the obstructive conduct of Joan Stratton. 10
More specifically,
the state court found that “none of the nine children had coats
and [they] appeared very dirty and unkempt.”
Juvenile Order 2.
8
The Mecklenburg County District Court is comprised of
various divisions, including a Juvenile Court Division.
For
ease of reference, we use the term “state district court” when
referring to proceedings therein.
9
Judge Cayer served several years as a North Carolina
judge, and in 2009 was appointed as a United States magistrate
judge.
10
The Juvenile Order is found at J.A. 206-10.
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One of the children “appeared to be blind or visually impaired,
[and] was leaning on his mother and appeared to need assistance
with walking due to some physical limitation or disability.”
Id.
In the kitchen of the Strattons’ Charlotte home, according
to
the
Juvenile
Order,
the
County
DSS
employees
observed
“a
large hole in the center of the ceiling with a large plastic
barrel collecting water that was dripping from the ceiling.”
Juvenile Order 2.
There was no food in the home other than a
small amount “of ground beef and Kool-Aid.”
Id.
In addition,
“[t]he bedroom had no furniture at all other than some form of
foam mat on the floor.”
Id. at 3.
Although Kathy Stratton told
the County DSS officials that “the children were being homeschooled,” the officials observed “no books, pens, tablets, or
anything
that
would
suggest
provided in the home.”
any
Id.
form
of
education
was
being
Furthermore, “at least one child
appeared to have some sort of speech impediment.”
Id.
After
finding that the Stratton home had been vacated, and that Joan
Stratton
“ha[d]
obstructed
and
interfered
with
the
investigation,” the Juvenile Order concluded that the Stratton
family
was
Stratton
authorized
“fleeing
to
the
fully
from
[the
cooperate
County
DSS
County
with
“to
11
take
its
DSS],”
ordered
investigation,
whatever
measures
Joan
and
[are]
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necessary to locate the whereabouts of [the] family in order to
ensure the needs of the juveniles are met.”
Id. at 3-4.
2.
On January 30, 2001, the County DSS filed a petition in the
state district court alleging that the ten Stratton children
were
neglected
and
dependent.
The
neglect
petition
alleged
that, when observed by the County DSS on December 19, 2000,
“[t]he children were noticed to be extremely dirty, unkempt,
[and] inappropriately dressed for the conditions.”
J.A. 220.
In
otherwise
addition,
“[o]ne
child
appeared
to
be
blind
or
physically handicapped,” and another child had diabetes.
Id.
Regarding the Stratton home, the neglect petition recited that
[t]he family was living in squalid conditions.
The
home had three small rooms and a bathroom. There were
holes in the ceiling in the kitchen and bathroom.
There was no running water or working plumbing
facilities, no bedding and only sparse furnishings in
the other room. There was little to no food observed
in the home; however, there was a large tub in the
kitchen,
containing
floating
debris,
collecting
dripping water which appeared stagnated.
Id.
As
for
the
children’s
education,
the
neglect
petition
alleged that “the children have not attended school at all,” and
that “[t]here are no records to support [that] the mother has
been licensed to home school the children.
In addition, there
was nothing in the home to indicate the children were being
educated at home.”
Id.
The neglect petition explained that the
Stratton family had “relocated to Gaston County, but have gone
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underground,” and it expressed “concerns regarding the quality
of care the children might be receiving and the environment in
which they might be living.”
Id. at 221.
Based on the conditions previously observed at the Stratton
home in Charlotte, as spelled out in the Juvenile Order, and on
the family’s move from Mecklenburg County to Gaston County, the
neglect petition requested a determination by the state district
court
of
whether
the
children
were
“in
protection, or discipline of the State.”
day,
the
state
court
entered
a
need
of
J.A. 221.
custody
order
the
care,
That very
placing
the
Stratton children in foster care, with a hearing on the neglect
petition
employees
to
of
be
the
held
within
County
DSS
seven
days. 11
travelled
to
Also
that
neighboring
day,
Gaston
County and took custody of the Stratton children.
On February 2, 2001, the state district court conducted a
hearing on the matter, and the custody order was superseded by
an
order
placing
the
children
in
foster
adjudication of the neglect petition.
11
care
pending
final
The foster care order
Judge Mims-Evans, a judge in Mecklenburg County, entered
the custody order of January 30, 2001, finding that the Stratton
children’s continuing presence in the family home was contrary
to their welfare and best interests, explaining that “the
juvenile[s] [are] exposed to a substantial risk of physical
injury . . . because the parent, guardian, or custodian has
inflicted the injury or abuse; created the conditions causing
the injury, abuse, or exposure; failed to provide, or is unable
to provide, adequate supervision of protection.” J.A. 212.
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adopted the allegations of the neglect petition as its findings
of fact, confirmed that Jack and Kathy Stratton were represented
by counsel, and noted that they had consented to the continuing
custody of their children by the State of North Carolina.
The
foster care order also authorized parental visitations with the
children, directed the Strattons to cooperate with the County
DSS, and instructed the County DSS to assist the Strattons with
efforts to procure adequate housing.
A
family
services
case
plan,
prepared
by
a
County
DSS
social worker on February 16, 2001, and filed in the federal
district court proceedings, identifies the Stratton children and
reflects that the County DSS’s permanent plan was the Stratton
family reunification.
Not long after the Stratton children were
placed in foster care, however, the County DSS ascertained that
none
of
them
had
been
properly
immunized.
Their
parents
objected to any such immunizations on religious grounds.
On
July 3, 2001, the state district court ruled that it was in the
best interests of the Stratton children to receive the necessary
immunizations.
See In re Stratton, 571 S.E.2d 234 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002) (“Stratton I”).
The
Strattons
thereafter
appealed
the
state
district
court’s immunization order and its denial of their religious
objections
with
respect
to
immunizations.
In
its
decision
rejecting that appeal, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
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characterized the Stratton home, prior to the children’s removal
therefrom,
as
being
in
“severe
disrepair,”
with
the
family
Stratton I, 571 S.E.2d at 235. 12
“living in squalid conditions.”
More specifically, the court related that
[i]n the kitchen, a large tub caught water dripping
from the ceiling.
The tub of water had debris
floating in it.
The plumbing facilities were in
disrepair.
No
beds
or
mattresses
were
found
throughout the home.
Only two working kerosene
heaters were seen in the home, despite the cold
outside temperature as evidenced by the sleet and
freezing rain earlier that day.
The [County DSS]
workers found almost no food in the home.
Although
the father-appellant told the workers that motherappellant had been home schooling the children, the
workers found no records or educational materials to
support that claim.
Appellants stated that none of
the children had ever attended public school.
Id.
The Strattons thereafter sought further judicial review in
the
Supreme
unsuccessful.
Court
of
North
Carolina,
but
were
again
See In re Stratton, 573 S.E.2d 512 (N.C. 2002)
(finding no right of appeal and denying discretionary review).
3.
On January 31, 2002, a year after the Stratton children had
been placed in the custody of the County DSS, the state district
court adjudicated the children as neglected and dependent.
Stratton then appealed that order to the court of appeals.
12
Jack
On
The court of appeals panel that rejected the Stratton I
appeal was comprised of Judges Sidney Eagles, John Martin, and
Patricia Timmons-Goodson, who are named as defendants in these
proceedings.
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October 14, 2002, while the appeal was pending, the County DSS
filed petitions in the state district court, seeking permanent
termination of the Strattons’ parental rights to nine of their
children. 13
According to these petitions, the Strattons were
unwilling to take the necessary steps to regain custody of their
children. 14
The termination petitions alleged that the Strattons
had repeatedly failed to comply with the court-ordered family
reunification plan by, inter alia, failing to obtain adequate
housing, failing to supply evidence of their employment, and
refusing to cooperate with a court-ordered parenting capacity
evaluation.
On June 10, 2003, the state district court granted
each of the petitions and terminated the parental rights of Jack
and Kathy Stratton to all their children save one.
As explained
by the court of appeals in August 2003,
[o]n 10 June 2003 . . . [defendant Sharpe] entered an
order,
following
several
months
of
hearings,
terminating the parental rights of Mr. and Mrs.
Stratton.
Based on the evidence presented at the
hearings, [Judge Sharpe] concluded that the Stratton
children were neglected . . . and that [the County
DSS] had proven by clear, cogent, and convincing
13
By late 2002, the eldest of the Stratton children was
more than eighteen years old and no longer involved in the
proceedings.
14
Defendants Hollingsworth and Adden are the attorneysignatories to the termination petitions.
Defendant Fee is a
County DSS official who reviewed the terminations of parental
rights petitions and verified their accuracy.
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evidence
that
grounds
existed
parental rights of the Strattons.
In
re
Stratton,
(“Stratton II”).
583
S.E.2d
323,
to
324
terminate
(N.C.
Ct.
the
App.
2003)
On the basis of the terminations, the court of
appeals dismissed as moot Jack Stratton’s appeal of the state
district court’s neglect and dependency rulings.
See id. 15
At least two additional orders were thereafter entered by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina that are pertinent to the
termination
courts.
of
the
Strattons’
parental
rights
by
the
state
First, on March 4, 2005, North Carolina’s high court
reversed the denial by the court of appeals of the Strattons’
request for an extension of time to prepare a record on appeal,
and it remanded for entry of an order granting the extension.
See In re I.S., 612 S.E.2d 128 (N.C. 2005). 16
2005,
the
Supreme
Court
of
North
Carolina
Second, on May 24,
entered
an
order
denying Jack Stratton’s petition for extraordinary relief, by
15
The Stratton II opinion reflects that Jack Stratton was
then represented by defendant Schmidt, and that the court of
appeals panel was comprised of defendants Geer, Eagles, and
Martin.
16
The March 4, 2005 Order of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina reflects that Jack Stratton was proceeding pro se,
defendant Wade represented the County DSS, defendant Lucey
represented the guardian ad litem, and defendant Loftis
represented the Council for Children.
In sum, it appears that
the named defendants include the judges who have so far ruled
against the Strattons, as well as most of the lawyers who
represented parties adverse to them.
17
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which
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he
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unsuccessfully
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sought
various
writs,
including
mandamus, prohibition, supersedeas, and a stay of judgment.
In re I.S., 615 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 2005).
See
Since 2005, there have
been no judicial proceedings conducted in the state courts of
North Carolina with respect to the Strattons and their children.
And there were no efforts made by the Strattons to secure relief
in the Supreme Court of the United States.
The proceedings at
bar were not commenced until 2010. 17
C.
On October 4, 2010, ten days after the Strattons filed the
Complaint, the case was assigned to a judge in the District of
South
Carolina,
with
the
related
magistrate judge of that district.
thereafter
unsuccessfully
sought
17
motions
referred
to
a
Jack and Solomon Stratton
recusal
of
the
magistrate
This litigation is not Jack Stratton’s first venture into
federal court. On October 2, 2002, he filed a federal complaint
seeking injunctive relief from an order entered in the child
custody proceedings in state district court. That complaint was
dismissed on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See Stratton v.
Miller,
3:02-cv-00420
(W.D.N.C.
2002).
Additionally,
on
December 6, 2002, two weeks after the Supreme Court of North
Carolina rejected the Strattons’ challenge to the court-ordered
immunizations of their children, Jack Stratton filed a pro se
complaint in the Western District of North Carolina seeking
relief against the immunizations. It was dismissed for failure
to prosecute.
See Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Svcs., 3:02-cv-00510 (W.D.N.C. 2002).
18
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For reasons of judicial efficiency, however, a second
magistrate judge was thereafter assigned to the case.
On August 5, 2011, the magistrate judge filed his report in
the matter, recommending dismissal of the Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal
Rules
doctrine,
and
of
Civil
and
the
Rooker-Feldman
recommending
further
Procedure
that
all
other
motions be denied as moot (the “Report”). 18
pending
In explaining its
recommendation concerning the various Claims in the Complaint,
the Report concluded that
[t]he plaintiffs’ allegations of conspiracy, criminal
RICO child trafficking, religious and racial genocide,
assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress,
malice,
constitutional
violations,
and
statutory violations are all allegations that could
and should have been raised in the state court
proceedings, which were concluded over six years prior
to the filing of this action.
Report 5.
Jack
and
Solomon
timely objections.
Stratton
responded
to
the
Report
with
Their objections, however, did not dispute
the merits of the Report’s recommendation that the Complaint
should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) and the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, but instead asserted that the Report was “a complete
fraud,” and was “VOID, criminally fraudulent, and generated for
18
The Report is found at J.A. 367-74.
19
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the express purpose of obstructing justice.”
J.A. 278.
Their
objections to the Report further asserted that
Jack and Kathy Stratton and their ten children were
never parties in any North Carolina juvenile court
proceedings and Jack and Kathy Stratton’s parental
rights were never terminated.
Jack and Kathy
Stratton’s minor children were never placed in foster
care. [The magistrate judge’s] action constitute[s] an
abuse of discretion and judicial conspiracy.
Id. at 381.
Jack Stratton, for himself only, then filed various
motions in the federal district court seeking, inter alia, the
magistrate
judge’s
“Immediate
Removal
From
the
Bench,”
and
requesting “Judicial Notice re Void ‘Juvenile Proceedings’ and
‘Appellate Decisions.’”
The
objections
to
J.A. 14.
the
Report
were
rejected
by
Order
of
September 16, 2011, when the district court adopted the Report
and dismissed the Complaint. 19
The other pending motions were
19
The Report and Order relied on, inter alia, the following
authorities:
Berry v. South Carolina Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 121
F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (affirming
dismissal of parent’s complaint challenging actions against him
for child abuse); Salvetti v. Georgia Bar Ass’n, 2007 WL 433390,
at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2007) (dismissing complaint challenging
“various custody actions throughout the past ten years in the
state courts of Georgia” on the basis of, inter alia, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Burdick v. Pritchett & Burch, PLLC,
2008 WL 7542377 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 16, 2008) (dismissing, based on
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, complaint alleging that plaintiff’s
former spouse’s lawyers and state court judges had manipulated
the legal system); Barbeau v. Gen. Ct. of Justice, 2010 WL
2812695 (E.D.N.C. June 15, 2010) (recommending dismissal, based
on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, of complaint asserting “that
parental custody of [plaintiff’s] son and his visitation rights
were determined by the state courts in a manner that resulted in
(Continued)
20
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not resolved by the district court, but were rendered moot by
the
Order’s
dismissal
of
the
Complaint
for
lack
of
subject
matter jurisdiction.
Following entry of the Order of September 16, 2011, Jack
and Solomon Stratton filed a document purporting to make further
objections to the Report.
Therein, the plaintiffs asserted that
the federal court proceedings were “void,” accused the presiding
district
judge
of
“crimes
of
false
imprisonment,
rape,
and
sodomy of little children and the disabled,” and asserted yet
again
that
Stratton
“it
and
has
their
already
ten
been
children
proven
were
that
never
Jack
parties
and
and
Kathy
[the
defendants] never had any jurisdiction over them.” J.A. 479,
483.
Those objections were not further addressed, and Jack and
Solomon Stratton filed a timely pro se notice of appeal from the
Order.
We have assigned amicus counsel to assist our handling
violations of his federal civil and Constitutional rights”).
Because the district court ruled that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it did not
address the defendants’ other alleged grounds for dismissal,
which
included,
inter alia,
the
substantiality
doctrine,
insufficient service of process, statutes of limitations, and
absolute immunity.
For example, the Report relates that five
defendants were never served with process, including the DHHS,
which was the only defendant in Claim VI.
21
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resolution
of
the
Pg: 22 of 44
appeal,
and
we
possess
jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 20
II.
We
review
de
novo
a
district
court’s
dismissal
of
a
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
508, 511 (4th Cir. 2005).
limited
to
the
grounds
See Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d
Our evaluation of an appeal is not
relied
upon
by
the
district
court,
however, and we are entitled to affirm on any basis apparent
from the record.
See United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516, 519
(4th Cir. 2005).
Although we accept the well-pleaded factual
allegations
complaint
of
a
as
true,
and
we
draw
reasonable
inferences therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor, we do not blindly
accept
“allegations
deductions
of
fact,
that
or
are
merely
conclusory,
unreasonable
inferences,”
unwarranted
nor
do
we
accept “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to
judicial notice.”
2002).
Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir.
And although we are obliged to construe liberally the
allegations of a pro se complaint, we are not required to credit
outlandish conspiracy theories simply because a plaintiff does
20
Plaintiff Jack Stratton died during the pendency of this
appeal.
There has been no motion for substitution, and he is
therefore no longer a party. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(a)(1).
22
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not have a lawyer.
Pg: 23 of 44
See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 901 F.2d
387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
III.
A.
As explained further below, we are satisfied to affirm the
district court’s dismissal of the Complaint in this case.
In
doing so, we employ jurisdictional doctrines that are rarely
relied upon in the federal courts, that is, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and the substantiality doctrine.
1.
The
federal
Rooker-Feldman
courts
judgments,
doctrine,
from
serves
as
reviewing
a
which
or
jurisdictional
prohibits
rejecting
bar
to
the
lower
state
court
federal
court
review of each of the federal claims alleged in the Complaint.
We agree with the federal district court and the Report in that
respect.
The doctrine takes its name from two decisions of the
Supreme Court — Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983).
Simply stated, those precedents bar the
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction in “cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments
rendered
before
the
district
court
proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
23
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those judgments.”
Pg: 24 of 44
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
More recently, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the propriety of applying the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to a situation where “[t]he losing party in state court
filed suit in a U.S. District Court after the state proceedings
ended,
complaining
of
an
injury
caused
by
the
state-court
judgment and seeking federal-court review and rejection of that
judgment.”
Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011). 21
Except in limited circumstances not applicable here, the
only federal court with the authority to reverse or modify the
judgments of state courts is the Supreme Court itself.
Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257).
Exxon
In this
appeal, the submissions of the amicus counsel agree that the
Rooker-Feldman
claims.
doctrine
is
largely
applicable
to
the
various
He argues, however, that the pro se allegations of the
Complaint also allege an independent Fourteenth Amendment due
process challenge, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to the procedures
used
by
Mecklenburg
County
and
21
the
state
courts
of
North
In Skinner, the Supreme Court concluded that the RookerFeldman doctrine would not, in the proper circumstances, bar a
plaintiff from asserting a claim under § 1983, cautioning that
when “a federal plaintiff presents an independent claim, it is
not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction that
the same or a related question was earlier aired between the
parties in state court.” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1297 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
24
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Carolina for removing the Stratton children from the family home
and terminating the Strattons’ parental rights.
To the extent
that any such due process claim may be derived from Claim I,
however, it fails to pass muster for a sound legal reason also
asserted
on
appeal
by
the
—
the
substantiality
Court,
the
substantiality
defendants
doctrine.
2.
As
doctrine
explained
forbids
by
the
the
Supreme
federal
district
courts
from
exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over claims that are attenuated and
insubstantial, absolutely devoid of merit, obviously frivolous,
or no longer open to discussion.
528, 536-37 (1974).
See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
The substantiality doctrine has also been
equated by the Court with a federal court’s dismissal of claims
that are “essentially fictitious.”
As
we
have
heretofore
Id. at 537.
explained,
application
of
the
substantiality doctrine “is especially important where a wholly
frivolous federal claim serves as a pretext to allow a state-law
issue, the real focus of the claim, to be litigated in the
federal system.”
Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir.
1999).
And, when faced with clearly fictitious factual claims,
other
federal
substantiality
courts
have
dismissed
doctrine.
See,
e.g.,
Newby
them
v.
under
Obama,
681
the
F.
Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing “bizarre conspiracy
25
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theory”
Filed: 05/31/2013
Pg: 26 of 44
to
government
related
“alleged
surveillance
and
harassment,” based on substantiality doctrine); Richards v. Duke
Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 232 (D.D.C. 2007) (“Claims that are
essentially fictitious . . . such as those that allege bizarre
conspiracy
theories . . . warrant
a
dismissal
under
[the
substantiality doctrine].”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 927 F. Supp. 382, 385 (D.
Ariz.
1995)
(“On
their
face,
Plaintiff’s
allegations
are
so
bizarre and delusional that they are wholly insubstantial and
cannot invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.”)
B.
As
the
lower
court
properly
determined
in
its
Order
disposing of the case, the “plaintiffs’ allegations against the
defendants — to the extent they can be deciphered — relate
directly
Carolina
to
and
courts’
are
inextricably
judicial
Stratton’s parental rights.”
intertwined
termination
of
See Report 7.
with
Jack
the
and
North
Kathy
In their federal
court filings, Jack and Solomon Stratton were unrelenting in
their demand that the court take “judicial notice” of facts and
law that contradicted the state courts’ custodial orders.
See,
e.g., J.A. 177 (requesting judicial notice that “the underlying
alleged Mecklenburg County Juvenile Court Orders are void ab
initio and legal nullities,” and that the Strattons’ “parental
rights have never been terminated according to law and their
26
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minor
children
omitted)).
that
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the
continue
Pg: 27 of 44
to
be
held
illegally”
(emphasis
Indeed, the plaintiffs recognize in the Complaint
actions
taken
by
the
County
DSS
were
directly
authorized and, in some cases, ordered, by the state courts of
North Carolina. 22
As the amicus counsel acknowledges, to the extent Solomon
Stratton seeks to vacate and enjoin the state court judgments
relating to the juvenile proceedings, the termination of the
Strattons’ parental rights, and the custody issues respecting
their children, those claims have been irrevocably resolved by
the North Carolina courts and are barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. 23
See
applicability
of
seeks
“to
Br.
of
Amicus
Rooker-Feldman
vacate
and
Curiae
doctrine
enjoin”
state
22
n.2
insofar
court
(conceding
as
Complaint
judgments).
Nevertheless, the amicus counsel has, to his credit, mined the
22
Insofar
as
Solomon
Stratton
disputes
the
legal
consequences of the various state court proceedings — for
example, the termination of the parental rights of his parents —
the records of those proceedings constitute pertinent facts in
this litigation, properly subject to judicial notice. See Veney
v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R.
Evid. 201.
23
As part of its Claim III, the Complaint reflects some
familiarity by the plaintiffs with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
alleging
that
“[d]efendants
conspire,
pre-plan,
and
execute . . . the fraudulent use of legal doctrines such as
‘Rooker-Feldman’ . . . to protect and conceal the enterprise
from being exposed in the federal courts.”
Complaint ¶ 452
(emphasis omitted).
27
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Complaint and sought to identify and marshal allegations which,
taken
together,
permit
a
good
faith
assertion
that
Claim
I
raises a § 1983 due process challenge to the adequacy of North
Carolina’s procedures for removing the Stratton children from
their parents’ custody, as well as the state’s procedures for
the termination of the Strattons’ parental rights.
For
example,
allegation
that
the
“the
amicus
emphasizes
post-deprivation
the
hearings
Complaint’s
required
[North Carolina law] do not exist in Mecklenburg County.
have
been
eliminated
through
the
extrinsic
fraud
forth [in the Complaint].”
Complaint ¶ 161.
argues
the
that,
Complaint,
as
the
part
of
paperwork
conspiracy
utilized
by
the
by
They
scheme
set
The amicus also
described
County
DSS
in
the
and
the
state courts deceives parents into waiving their due process
protections, and “[t]he Stratton parents and children have been
denied
Id.
all
pre-deprivation
¶¶ 171-75,
301.
and
Thus,
post-deprivation
even
the
due
amicus
process.”
counsel
is
constrained to rely on the bizarre conspiracy allegations to
seek
a
viable
contention.
Even
if
the
due
process
claim
proposed by the amicus counsel is acknowledged, however, it is
necessarily circumscribed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
And
any
the
such
claim
utterly
fails
substantiality doctrine.
28
to
pass
muster
under
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C.
The liberal construction which we are obliged to afford to
a pro se complaint is not without bounds.
Admittedly, pro se
complaints “represent the work of an untutored hand requiring
special judicial solicitude.”
Nevertheless, they “may present
obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts
to unravel them.”
1277
(4th
judges
Cir.
are
not
construction
never
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274,
1985).
mind
does
presented
As
have
and
the
require
them
to
them . . . [or
claims from sentence fragments.”
For
multiple
acknowledged,
readers,”
not
to
we
reasons,
“[d]istrict
principle
“conjure
to]
of
up
construct
liberal
questions
full-blown
Id. at 1278.
each
of
the
plaintiffs’
claims,
including the amicus counsel’s asserted due process claim, is
frivolous, wholly without merit, and thus insubstantial.
reasons include the following:
Those
First, not having been properly
pursued in the district court, any due process claim propounded
by the amicus counsel has been waived.
We would review such a
claim
it
is
to
seek
for
primary
plain
focus
invalidation
termination
apparent
throughout
of
error
of
only.
the
the
Second,
Complaint
state
court
of
the
Strattons’
that
the
Strattons
the
state
court
is
orders
parental
were
that
rights.
represented
proceedings,
29
clear
and
that
the
summary
underlie
Third,
by
that
the
the
it
is
counsel
their
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constitutional rights were protected.
Fourth, any claim against
the judicial defendants would certainly be subject to dismissal
based
on
the
doctrine
of
absolute
judicial
immunity.
See
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (explaining that “it is a
general
principle
of
the
highest
importance
to
the
proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising
the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions,
without
apprehension
of
personal
consequences
to
himself”); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1976)
(affirming
dismissal
immunity). 24
of
§ 1983
claim
on
basis
of
judicial
Fifth, the due process allegations relied upon by
the amicus counsel must be viewed in context, that is, they are
scattered within a bizarre sixty-page Complaint that features a
fictitious
centuries-old
international
child
trafficking
conspiracy.
And finally, it is clear that any due process claim
is a mere pretext for the real focus of the Complaint, which
challenges the validity of records and proceedings of the North
Carolina
courts
that
resulted
Strattons’ parental rights.
in
the
termination
of
the
As the district court explained,
those claims were resolved in the North Carolina courts and are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
24
Each of the eight judicial defendants asserted absolute
judicial immunity.
30
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In these circumstances, we agree with the defendants that
all
of
the
plaintiffs’
claims
are
“so
attenuated
unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.”
U.S. at 536.
and
Hagans, 415
And we readily conclude that the due process
argument asserted by amicus counsel is “a pretextual federal
issue [asserted] solely for the purpose of having [] state-law
claim[s]
[i.e.,
federal system.”
years
ago,
practice.”
parental
rights
issues]
adjudicated
Lovern, 190 F.3d at 655.
“Article
III
of
the
in
the
As we explained
Constitution
forbids
this
Id. 25
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Complaint is barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the due process claim argued by the
amicus counsel fails to pass muster under Rooker-Feldman and the
25
The two purported state law claims of the Complaint —
assault and battery (Claim VII) and legal malpractice (Claim
VIII) — must also be dismissed.
The sole basis for federal
jurisdiction over them would be the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Section 1367 only
extends the jurisdiction of a district court to claims which do
not themselves fall within any independent basis for federal
jurisdiction, but which are closely related to another claim
over which the court possesses original jurisdiction.
When a
district court dismisses federal claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, there was never a valid claim to which the
state claims could be considered supplemental, and dismissal of
the state claims is also required. Crosby v. City of Gastonia,
635 F.3d 634, 644 (4th Cir. 2011).
31
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substantiality
lacked
subject
Filed: 05/31/2013
doctrine.
matter
Pg: 32 of 44
Because
jurisdiction
the
federal
over
the
district
alleged
court
federal
claims, its dismissal of those claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
was proper, and its concurrent dismissal of the state law claims
was mandated.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court.
AFFIRMED
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GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Stratton’s complaint.
I concur with the
rationale with one exception--I would find that the due process
claim
is
substantial
and
not
barred
by
the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, but fails to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
I would thus affirm the dismissal of the due process
claim on that ground.
See Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392
F.3d 650, 660 (4th Cir. 2004).
I.
Admittedly, in the complaint, Solomon Stratton claims that
he and his family are victims of an international Luciferian
child trafficking conspiracy whose reach plausibly extends from
the
United
Mecklenburg
however,
Nations
County.
Solomon
to
child
Beyond
Stratton
protection
these
asserts
authorities
incredulous
that
he
was
in
allegations
deprived
due
process of law in the initial seizure of the Stratton children
and in the termination of the Stratton parents’ rights.
The majority recognizes that “Claim I raises a § 1983 due
process challenge to the adequacy of North Carolina’s procedures
for removing the Stratton children from their parents’ custody,
as well as the state’s procedures for the termination of the
Strattons’ parental rights.”
Ante, at 28.
33
Yet, it concludes
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that the due process claim articulated in the complaint is so
attenuated that it is insubstantial, and is merely a pretext for
having
a
state-law
claim
adjudicated
in
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
federal
court
thus
I am of a different
view.
II.
A.
First,
I
would
find
that
the
due
process
claim
is
substantial and thus jurisdiction exists to hear the merits.
The
substantiality
without
power
doctrine
to
states
entertain
claims
that
“federal
otherwise
courts
within
are
their
jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and insubstantial as to
be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, obviously
frivolous,
plainly
discussion.’”
insubstantial,
or
no
longer
open
to
Davis v. Pak, 856 F.2d 648, 650-51 (4th Cir.
1988) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)).
The
“insubstantiality
threshold
is
a
difficult
one
to
meet,” as “dismissal for insubstantiality is appropriate only
where the proffered claim is truly frivolous,” or is merely a
“pretext[]
for
the
purpose
of
having
a
state
law
claim
adjudicated in the federal system.”
Davis, 856 F.2d at 651
(emphasis
for
added).
Thus,
a
dismissal
insubstantiality
is
“appropriate in only the rarest of circumstances where . . . the
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complaint is deemed totally implausible.”
Apple v. Glenn, 183
F.3d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 1999); see Ricketts v. Midwest Nat.
Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1182 (7th Cir. 1989) (“insubstantiality
dismissals
should
be
applied
only
in
extraordinary
circumstances”).
If the “complaint raises an arguable question of law which
the court may ultimately resolve against the plaintiff,” the
more
appropriate
mechanism
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
for
dismissal
is
Federal
Rule
of
Ricketts, 874 F.2d at 1182 n.6; see
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 & n.6 (1989) (holding
that Rule 12(b)(1) insubstantiality dismissal is appropriate if
based
on
the
judge’s
disbelief
of
a
complaint’s
factual
allegations, whereas, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate
where while operating under the assumption that all or a set of
facts in the complaint are true, “without regard to whether it
is
based
on
an
outlandish
legal
theory
or
on
a
close
but
ultimately unavailing one,” it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent
with the allegations).
Applying these principles, it seems to me that we could
disregard the bizarre conspiracy alleged by Solomon Stratton and
consider whether his due process claim fails to state a claim.
The due process claim asserted here is not dependent on the
Luciferian
conspiracy;
whether
the
35
Strattons
were
denied
due
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process of law in the initial seizure of the children and in the
permanent
termination
of
parental
rights
is
a
sufficiently
substantial legal question that has not been addressed by any
court
in
the
12
years
since
this
matter
arose.
Given
the
liberal construction due to pro se litigants, and our duty to
apply the substantiality doctrine only in rare or extraordinary
circumstances, the more appropriate approach would be to proceed
to analyze whether the claim passes muster under Rule 12(b)(6).
Before turning to that question, I first address the separate
question whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the claim.
B.
The majority concludes that to the extent the due process
claim
is
acknowledged,
Rooker-Feldman.
doctrine
it
is
“necessarily
I disagree.
Ante, at 28.
essentially
holds
circumscribed”
The Rooker-Feldman
that
lower
federal
courts
by
lack
authority to “sit in direct review of state court decisions.”
Feldman,
460
U.S.
at
482
n.
16
(citation
omitted).
This
doctrine applies specifically to cases where “the loser in state
court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for
an
injury
itself.”
allegedly
Davani,
434
caused
F.3d
by
at
the
state
court’s
713.
Thus,
in
decision
applying
the
doctrine, (1) there must be a prior state court decision; and
(2) the loser in the state court must be challenging or seeking
to undo the prior state court’s decision by alleging an injury
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caused by the state court judgment itself.
The doctrine has
narrow applicability, and should not be confused or conflated
with preclusion doctrines.
Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
The Third Circuit recently considered whether a due process
claim based on custodial termination proceedings was barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
In B.S. v. Somerset County, the
plaintiff “challenge[d] the process she received with respect to
state court orders.”
state
court
orders
704 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2013).
terminated
the
mother’s
custodial
The
rights,
transferring them to the father, and denied the mother’s habeas
petition in which she argued the county violated state law by
removing her daughter from her custody without a hearing.
The
Third Circuit held that because “the injury Mother claims is
. . . traceable to the [a]ppellee’s actions, as opposed to the
state court orders those actions allegedly caused, . . . the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine
matter jurisdiction.”
Here,
the
due
[does
not]
preclude[]
federal
subject
amicus
counsel
Id. at 260.
process
claim
asserts,
as
frames it, “an unjustified seizure of [Solomon] and his siblings
by Mecklenburg County,” “an improper exercise of jurisdiction
over [Solomon] and his family,” and a lack of “fundamental due
process
in
the
County’s
Counsel’s Br. 10, 23.)
termination
procedures.”
(Amicus
These allegations are independent of,
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and do not seek to overturn, any prior state-court judgment. 1
Stratton’s relief does not depend on whether the prior state
court judgments are overturned or vacated.
Even if the order
terminating parental rights was valid, the actions taken by the
County to seize and retain custody over the children may have
been
improper.
Because
Stratton
alleges
an
independent
constitutional tort claim which is not dependent on the validity
of the orders terminating parental rights, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not bar the due process claim asserted here.
C.
Because I believe the due process claim survives both the
insubstantiality bar and the Rooker-Feldman bar, I next consider
whether the due process claim fails to state a claim.
away
the
Stratton
incredulous
asserts
conspiracy
that
the
theory,
removal
of
succinctly
the
Stripping
stated,
children
and
termination of parental rights deprived them of their right to
live
together
as
a
family
without
due
process
of
law,
in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
prohibits States from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or
1
As the majority notes, amicus counsel properly concedes
that to the extent that the prayer for relief asks the court “to
vacate and enjoin” various state-court judgments, (see J.A.
158), the request is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
38
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property, without due process of law.”
Due
Process
consists
of
both
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
substantive
and
procedural
process components, both of which are asserted here.
due
Sunrise
Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 328
(4th
Cir.
2005).
To
state
a
due
process
claim,
either
substantive or procedural, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that
they
have
been
deprived
of
“interests
encompassed
by
the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property,” Bd.
of
Regents
deprivation
v.
Roth,
did
408
not
U.S.
564,
comport
569
with
(1972);
process
and
(2)
that
the
is
constitutionally due, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484
(1972).
For a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must
also show that the state’s action is so arbitrary and egregious
that it “shocks the conscience.” 2
Cnty of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
The
Supreme
Court
has
recognized
a
“fundamental
liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child.”
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
As such, there is no doubt that now-deceased Jack Stratton had a
2
The Ninth Circuit has held that the proper test for the
deprivation
of
familial
companionship
in
violation
of
substantive due process is whether the state action amounts to
“unwarranted interference” as opposed to whether it “shocks the
conscience.”
Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 441 &
n.23 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
39
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liberty
Filed: 05/31/2013
interest
in
retaining
Pg: 40 of 44
custody
over,
caring
rearing his children as he deemed appropriate.
Jordan
v.
state’s
Jackson,
removal
constitutes
parents
an
and
15
of
a
F.3d
child
interference
thus
triggers
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
333,
342
from
with
the
(4th
a
his
procedural
and
See Jordan by
Cir.
parents
liberty
for,
1994)
(“The
indisputably
interest
of
the
protections
of
the
However, because Jack is no longer a
party to this action, the issue is whether Solomon, Jack’s son
and the remaining Appellant, has a reciprocal liberty interest
in being supervised and cared for by his parents.
Whether children “have cognizable, reciprocal interests in
the
companionship
and
supervision
of
their
parents,
and
in
maintaining the emotional bonds that develop within the unitary
family” is an open question in this Circuit and has not been
decided by the Supreme Court. 3
(citing
Michael
H.
v.
Gerald
Jordan, 15 F.3d at 343 n.10
D.,
491
U.S.
110,
130
(1989)
(plurality) (“We have never had occasion to decide whether a
child
has
a
liberty
interest,
symmetrical
with
that
of
her
parent, in maintaining her filial relationship.”); Smith v. Org.
3
In Santosky, the Supreme Court recognized that “the child
and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous
termination of their natural relationship,” 455 U.S. at 760, yet
the Court has never held that this interest amounts to a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.
40
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of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977)). 4
analysis,
I
interests
in
parents.
See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130 (assuming for the
purpose
of
assume
that
retaining
analysis
children
have
For purposes of
nurturing
that
a
child
reciprocal
relationships
has
maintaining her filial relationship).
a
liberty
liberty
with
their
interest
in
Based on this assumption,
Solomon has liberty interest in the supervision of his parents
and may assert a due process claim, even in Jack’s absence.
A
review of the complaint indicates that Solomon has sufficiently
pled
the
existence
and
deprivation
of
a
liberty
interest,
satisfying the first prong to state a due process claim.
As
to
the
second
prong,
Solomon
must
allege
that
the
deprivation did not comport with constitutionally due process.
Here, his claim fails.
4
The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that children
possess such liberty interests.
See Smith v. City of Fontana,
818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987) overruled on other grounds
by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (“The companionship and nurturing interests of parent
and child in maintaining a tight familial bond are reciprocal,
and we see no reason to accord less constitutional value to the
child-parent relationship than we accord to the parent-child
relationship.”); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d
Cir. 1977) (“[W]e are concerned with the most essential and
basic aspect of familial privacy[--]the right of the family to
remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome
power of the state.
This right to the preservation of family
integrity encompasses the reciprocal rights of both parent and
children.”).
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It is true that regardless of the state’s practices and
procedures,
“[w]hat
process
is
constitutional law, not state law.
due”
is
a
question
of
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).
When a state seeks to
deprive a child of the liberty interest in being nurtured by
their parent, it must provide procedures that are fundamentally
fair.
See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54 (holding that “[w]hen
the State moves to destroy . . . familial bonds, it must provide
parents with fundamentally fair procedures.”).
Yet,
the
complaint
fails
to
satisfy
the
second
element
because it is clear that the state court provided Stratton with
notice and adequate hearings prior to the termination of the
familial relations.
The complaint alleges numerous procedural
defects, none of which persuade otherwise, and only one is worth
addressing.
Specific to the initial seizure of the children,
the complaint alleges that the Strattons:
certain
state-mandated
summons
or
at
the
(1) never received
very
least,
the
required 7-day initial hearing, see N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7B506(a);
and
(2)
were
never
given
the
opportunity
to
present
evidence to determine whether to continue custody, see id. § 7B506(b).
These assertions bely the court records which are the
proper subject of judicial notice.
See Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d
726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that in considering whether a
claim fails to state a claim, we need not “‘accept as true
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allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial
notice
or
by
exhibit.’”
(quoting
Sprewell
v.
Golden
State
children
were
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).
On
January
30,
2001,
when
the
Stratton
removed from their parents’ home, the Strattons received summons
to appear on February 2, 2001, for the appointment of counsel
and other matters relating to the removal of the children.
On
February 2, the said hearing occurred to determine whether to
continue custody of the Stratton children.
The Stratton parents
attended.
No evidence was adduced; however, the court adopted
the
in
facts
the
petition
submitted
by
MCDSS
to
obtain
the
nonsecure custody warrant, which were the same facts as observed
by MCDSS on their first visit to the Strattons’ first residence
on
December
19,
2000.
The
matter
was
then
set
for
an
adjudicatory hearing on March 12, 2001.
Prior to the March 12 hearing, on February 16, the Stratton
parents and MCDSS entered into a plan that should have led to
reunification
of
the
parents
and
the
children.
In
the
agreement, the parties adopted the same facts as observed by
MCDSS on their first visit.
agreement.
The Stratton parents signed the
On March 12, at the adjudicatory hearing, the only
evidence presented consisted of the court reading the facts in
the mediation agreement into the record.
Stratton parents affirmed those facts.
43
At that hearing, the
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Their affirmation of the facts is where this case fails, as
it
cannot
present
be
said
evidence
that
they
where
they
were
did
denied
not
opportunity given to them to do so.
an
take
opportunity
advantage
of
to
the
Moreover, it appears that
at some later proceedings, though Jack and Kathy may not have
testified
themselves,
affidavits
parents’
of
other
positions.
Strattons
were
given
they
adduced
witnesses,
It
is
notice
testimony
which
clear
and
favored
from
an
in
this
the
the
of
Stratton
record
opportunity
form
to
that
be
the
heard.
Therefore, the complaint fails to state a procedural due process
violation.
As
asserts
to
the
numerous
substantive
bizarre
due
process
allegations
but
claim,
fails
the
to
complaint
state
any
plausible facts that meet the “shock the conscience” standard.
As such, the complaint fails to state a substantive due process
violation.
III.
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
court’s dismissal of the complaint.
44
I
would
affirm
the
district
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