Eun Kim v. Parcel K- Tudor Hall Farm LLC

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:09-cv-01572-AW. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999003646].. [11-2274, 11-2298]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-2274
EUN O. KIM; AMY HSIANG−CHI TONG; CHIN KIM; DANIEL I. KIM;
GOOM Y. PARK; GYEASOOK KIM; KAP J. CHUNG; HONG S. CHUNG;
LENA KIM; MI YOUNG KIM; MYONG HO NAM; YOUN HWAN KIM; YOUNG
JOO KANG; ALAN YOUNG CHENG; SHUI QUI ZHANG; EVA YIHUA TU;
HELENA LEE; KI N. LEE; SUN H. LEE; KWANG BAG LEE; KWANG JON
KIM; NAM DOLL HUH,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
PARCEL K− TUDOR HALL FARM LLC,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
DOUGLAS A. NYCE; NYCE AND CO., INC.,
Defendants.

No. 11-2298
EUN O. KIM; AMY HSIANG−CHI TONG; CHIN KIM; DANIEL I. KIM;
GOOM Y. PARK; GYEASOOK KIM; KAP J. CHUNG; HONG S. CHUNG;
LENA KIM; MI YOUNG KIM; MYONG HO NAM; YOUN HWAN KIM; YOUNG
JOO KANG; ALAN YOUNG CHENG; SHUI QUI ZHANG; EVA YIHUA TU;
HELENA LEE; KI N. LEE; SUN H. LEE; KWANG BAG LEE; KWANG JON
KIM; NAM DOLL HUH,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.

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PARCEL K− TUDOR HALL FARM LLC,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
DOUGLAS A. NYCE; NYCE AND CO., INC.,
Defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:09-cv-01572-AW)

Argued:

October 25, 2012

Decided:

December 17, 2012

Before KING and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and R. Bryan HARWELL,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

ARGUED:
James
P.
Koch,
Baltimore,
Maryland,
for
Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Stephen Ari Metz, SHULMAN, ROGERS,
GANDAL,
PORDY
&
ECKER,
PA,
Potomac,
Maryland,
for
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
ON BRIEF: Morton A. Faller, SHULMAN,
ROGERS, GANDAL, PORDY & ECKER, PA, Potomac, Maryland, for
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
In 2004, Sunchase Capital Partners XI, LLC, purchased 141
acres of real property from Tudor Hall Farm, Inc.

This property

included

Appellee

a

parcel

Cross-Appellant
title.

To

known

Parcel

raise

as

K–Tudor

funding

individuals—including

Parcel

Eun

Hall

for
O.

K,

to

which

Farm,

the

LLC,

purchase,

Kim

and

the

(PK-THF)
Sunchase

other

and
took

asked

twenty-one

appellants and cross-appellees (collectively “the Investors”)—to
invest

in

the

bankruptcy.
Tudor

Hall

project.

Sunchase

ultimately

filed

for

Under its Chapter 11 plan, Sunchase sold all of the
Farm

property

except

Parcel

K,

and

the

Investors

received nothing.
The Investors brought a cause of action against PK-THF,
seeking

to

according

impose
to

a

the

constructive

Investors,

PK-THF

Sunchase’s fraudulent behavior.
Investors’

motion

for

trust

on

came

Parcel
to

own

K
it

because,
due

to

The district court granted the

summary

judgment

constructive trust in the amount of $50,640.

and

imposed

a

The Investors now

appeal, challenging the method the district court used to value
the constructive trust, and PK-THF cross-appeals the district
court’s decision to impose the trust.

For the reasons set forth

in the district court’s opinion, we affirm the district court’s
imposition

of

a

constructive

trust

and

its

“proportionality approach” to value the trust.
3

adoption

of

the

See Kim v. Nyce,

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807 F. Supp. 2d 442 (D. Md. 2011).

However, because we find

that

its

the

district

proportionality

court

erred

approach,

we

in

vacate

application

in

part

and

an

Agreement

of

the

remand

for

further proceedings.
I.
A.
In

April

2004,

Sunchase

signed

of

Sale

to

purchase property from Tudor Hall Farm, Inc., for $15 million.
The

Agreement

concerned

141

acres

of

real

property

Parcels A, B, C, E, F, G, H, I, J, and K.

known

as

Pursuant to the

Agreement, PK-THF obtained title to Parcel K, which consisted of
7.88 acres, and Sunchase took title to the remaining parcels.
Both Sunchase and Tudor Hall Farm possessed initial membership
stakes

in

PK-THF,

with

Sunchase

taking

an

eighty-percent

membership interest and Tudor Hall Farm taking the remaining
twenty-percent

stake.

Nyce

&

Co.,

Inc.—a

company

owned

by

Douglas A. Nyce—was a Class B member of Sunchase and had the
sole authority to make all decisions with respect to Sunchase’s
management and operations.
To
property,

raise

the

Sunchase

$15

million

offered

100

necessary
Class

A

to

purchase

membership

units

the
in

Sunchase for $150,000 each.

The Investors purchased these Class

A

Confidential

units.

Pursuant

to

the

Summary

of

Offering,

which described the investment plan, the “Minimum Offering” was
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fifty Class A units or $7.5 million.

The Confidential Summary

also specified that, if Sunchase did not raise $15 million by
selling 100 Class A units—the “Maximum Offering”—and could not
obtain alternate funding, it would not purchase the property.
As part of their transaction with Sunchase, each investor signed
a Subscription Agreement that required Sunchase to terminate the
offer and return each investor’s payment “if subscription[s] for
at

least

50

Units

[were]

not

received

and

Company on or prior to April 29, 2005.”

accepted

by

the

Each investor also

signed an Operating Agreement, which obligated Nyce to “act at
all

times

in

a

fiduciary

manner

toward

the

Company

and

the

Members.”
Sunchase closed on the Tudor Hall Farm property on May 2,
2005, despite its failure to raise the $15 million required in
the Confidential Summary.

As of the closing date, Sunchase had

made

selling

$3.125

million

by

Class

A

membership

units.

Sunchase sold an additional $3.972 million in Class A membership
units over the next three months, bringing its total to $7.097
million, $3.120 million of which came from the Investors.

This

total fell $403,000 short of the Minimum Offering and $7.903
million

short

of

the

Maximum

Offering.

In

light

of

this

shortfall, Sunchase negotiated a modification of the Agreement
of

Sale,

which

installments

allowed

under

the

Sunchase
terms

of
5

to
a

pay

Tudor

Purchase

Hall

Farm

in

Money

Note

in

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exchange for a $500,000 increase in the purchase price of the
property.

A first deed of trust on the property secured the

Purchase Money Note.
When Sunchase experienced difficulties making payments on
the Purchase Money Note, Nyce asked William D. Pleasants to make
a $5.25 million investment in Sunchase.

Via the 2003 Trust of

the Descendants of William D. Pleasants, Jr. (Pleasants Trust),
Pleasants

made

exchange

for

a
a

$5.315
Class
a

million

A

investment

membership

in

Sunchase

interest,

twenty-five-percent

Class

in

leaving
A

the

Investors

with

membership

interest. 1

The Pleasants Trust created Tudor Hall Funding, Inc.,

to oversee the investment, and Tudor Hall Funding ultimately
purchased

the

Purchase

Sunchase

eventually

initiate

foreclosure

property.

Parcel

Money

Note

defaulted,

causing

proceedings
K

was

from

Tudor

Tudor
the

included

not

against

in

Hall

Farm.

Hall

Funding

Tudor

Hall

the

to

Farm

foreclosure

proceedings.
On

September

10,

2007,

Sunchase

filed

a

Chapter

11

bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for

1

We arrive at this figure by adding the Investors’ $3.12
million contribution, the non-litigant Class A investors’ $3.977
million
contribution,
and
the
Pleasants
Trust’s
$5.315
investment, creating a sum of $12.412 million.
The Investors’
$3.12 million contribution is approximately twenty-five percent
of $12.412 million.

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the

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District

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of

Maryland.

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Sunchase

and

Tudor

Hall

Funding

proposed a Chapter 11 plan that required Sunchase to sell the
property to Tudor Hall Funding free of any liens, claims, and
encumbrances to satisfy Sunchase’s obligation under the Purchase
Money Note.

The sale did not affect Parcel K, which PK-THF

continued to own.

Under the plan, Sunchase’s Class A members—

including the Investors—received nothing, their equity interests
were eliminated, and they were prohibited from bringing certain
claims against Tudor Hall Funding.

The plan allowed Sunchase to

assign its eighty-percent membership interest in PK-THF to Tudor
Hall Funding.

In a separate transaction, Tudor Hall Funding

acquired Tudor Hall Farm’s twenty-percent interest in PK-THF,
making

Tudor

Hall

Funding

interests in PK-THF.

the

sole

owner

of

all

membership

On March 13, 2009, the bankruptcy court

confirmed the proposed plan.

B.
The Investors allege that Nyce created a constructive trust
in Parcel K when he used fraudulent methods to sell Sunchase’s
Class A membership units and purchase the property.

Although

PK-THF obtained title to Parcel K, the Investors contend that
their funding is traceable to the purchase of that property,
giving them an equitable claim to Parcel K.

On October 1, 2009,

the district court entered default judgments against Nyce and
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Nyce

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&

Co.

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in

the

amount

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of

$3.12

million,

which

left

the

Investors’ constructive trust cause of action against PK-THF as
their only remaining claim.
The

district

court

granted

the

Investors’

motion

for

summary judgment on the constructive trust issue on September 2,
2011, holding in relevant part that (1) Sunchase had used the
Investors’ funds to purchase Parcel K, (2) Nyce had obtained
those

funds

through

fraud

or

other

improper

conduct,

(3)

it

would be unjust for PK-THF to retain the benefit of this fraud,
and (4) Sunchase’s Chapter 11 plan did not enjoin the Investors’
claims.

To

determine

the

appropriate

valuation

for

the

constructive trust, the district court invited both parties to
submit memoranda regarding which portion of the Investors’ $3.12
million contribution Sunchase used to purchase Parcel K.
On

November

2,

2011,

the

district

court

found

that

the

Investors were entitled to a constructive trust on Parcel K in
the amount of $50,640. 2

The Investors argued that the court

2

The district court referred to this amount as the
“constructive trust lien.”
The Investors suggest that this
terminology is “internally inconsistent” because a party cannot
have the “unlimited ownership interest” that a constructive
trust provides and have a lien valued at less than that amount.
The district court was presumably determining the value of the
constructive trust, which at least one other court has allowed.
See generally Pike v. Commodore Motel Corp., Civ. A No. 940,
1989 WL 57026 (Del. Ch. May 25, 1989).
To mirror the
terminology that other courts have employed, we refer to the
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should take a “commingled funds approach” and impose a trust
equivalent in value to the Investors’ total investment:
million.

$3.12

Instead, the district court arrived at the $50,640

figure by adopting PK-THF’s proposed “proportionality approach.”
Because the Investors contributed $3.12 million—or approximately
twenty percent of the total purchase price for the Tudor Hall
Farm property—the district court found that the trust should
equal twenty percent of the purchase price of Parcel K.

The

court

any

acknowledged

that

the

parties

had

not

introduced

“direct proof as to what dollar amount of the acquisition went
toward Parcel K” and decided to use the consideration recited in
the

deed—$253,200—as

trust’s value.
amount

stems

the

purchase

price

when

calculating

See Kim, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 455, 457.

from

Maryland’s

tax

assessment

of

Parcel

the
This

K

and

contradicts the value included in the Operating Agreement, which
sets Parcel K’s value at $1 million “for all purposes.”
In

this

appeal,

the

Investors

challenge

the

district

court’s decision to employ a proportionality approach, and PKTHF cross-appeals the court’s finding that a constructive trust
was appropriate.
impose

a

We affirm the district court’s decision to

constructive

trust

and

its

adoption

of

the

“value” or “amount” of the trust rather than a “constructive
trust lien.”

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proportionality

approach

to

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calculate

the

trust’s

value.

However, we vacate in part the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and remand for further consideration of (1) whether
$253,200

is

the

appropriate

purchase

price

to

use

when

calculating the trust’s value and (2) whether the trust should
equal twenty percent of the purchase price of Parcel K.

II.
Having had the benefit of oral argument and after carefully
reviewing the briefs, record, and controlling legal authorities,
we agree with the district court’s analysis with respect to its
decision that the facts of this case warrant the imposition of a
constructive trust.
Specifically,

we

See Kim, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49, 451-52.
agree

that

(1)

the

Investors’

funds

are

traceable to Parcel K, (2) Nyce and Nyce & Co. obtained those
funds through fraud, (3) it would be unjust for PK-THF to retain
the benefit of this wrongful conduct, and (4) Sunchase’s Chapter
11 plan does not enjoin the Investors’ claims.

Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s decision to impose a constructive
trust on the reasoning of the district court.

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III.
A.
We also agree that the district court correctly adopted PKTHF’s

proposed

“proportionality

approach”

rather

Investors’ suggested “commingled funds approach.”
F. Supp. 2d at 456-58.

than

the

See Kim, 807

We therefore affirm the district court’s

decision to use the proportionality approach on the reasoning of
the district court.
the

district

court

However, as discussed below, we find that
erred

in

its

application

of

the

proportionality approach.

B.
Summary

judgment

is

appropriate

only

genuine dispute as to any material fact.”
56(a).

if

“there

is

no

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Under this standard, “[o]nly disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A court

considering a summary judgment motion must view the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.

United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam).
this

case

concerns

cross-motions

for

summary

Because

judgment,

we

consider “each motion . . . individually, and [view] the facts
relevant to each . . . in the light most favorable to the non11

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movant.”

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Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 363 (4th Cir. 2003).

We review de novo both the district court’s decision to grant
the Investors’ motion for summary judgment and its conclusions
of law.

Moore Bros. Co. v. Brown & Root, Inc., 207 F.3d 717,

724 (4th Cir. 2000); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.
1994).
The

Investors

claim

that

the

district

court

erred

in

determining the value of Parcel K, which resulted in the court
incorrectly computing the amount of the constructive trust.

The

Investors make two arguments regarding why the district court
erred when it set Parcel K’s value at $253,200.
Investors

contend

that

the

district

decided this issue on summary judgment.

court

should

First, the
not

have

Although the district

court concluded without discussion that the value recited in the
Parcel K deed—$253,200—constituted the “best evidence” of Parcel
K’s purchase price, the record contains additional evidence of
Parcel K’s value that the district court did not acknowledge:
the $1 million figure that appears in the Operating Agreement.
The Investors contend that the existence of two estimates of
Parcel K’s value created a genuine dispute of material fact, so
the district court should not have resolved the issue on summary
judgment.

We agree.

Second, the Investors argue that the district court erred
when it used the value recited in the Parcel K deed as the
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purchase

Filed: 12/17/2012

price

because

this

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figure

was

Maryland’s tax assessment of Parcel K.

drawn

directly

from

In E.L. Gardner, Inc. v.

Bowie Joint Venture, the Maryland Court of Appeals explained
that “generally, in and of itself, assessed valuation is not
admissible

as

evidence

of

valuation

for

purposes

other

than

taxation.”

494 A.2d 988, 991 (Md. 1985) (quoting C.C. Marvel,

Annotation,

Valuation

for

Show

for

Purposes,

Value

Other

Taxation
39

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Purposes

as

Admissible

A.L.R.2d

209,

§ 2

to

(1955))

The primary rationale for

this rule is that the tax assessment value typically does not
mirror

the

fair

A.L.R.2d at § 2.

market

value

of

the

property.

Marvel,

39

The district court did not consider the deed

value’s connection to the Maryland tax assessment figure in its
opinion.
In their brief, the Investors illustrate the applicability
of the rationale behind not using tax assessment values in nontax contexts in this case.

The Investors explain that using the

tax assessment as the purchase price yields a price per acre of
$32,132 3 for Parcel K, which is drastically different from the

3

The Investors calculated the price per acre to be $32,106
because they rounded the deed price to $253,000.
Our figure
differs because we did not round the deed price.

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$108,924 per acre 4 that Sunchase paid for the other Tudor Hall
Farm parcels.

By contrast, using the Operating Agreement’s $1

million figure as the purchase price produces a price per acre
of

$126,904,

which

is

more

consistent

with

the

price

that

Sunchase actually paid for the other parcels.

The rule against

using

and

tax

assessments
with

alignment

for

rationale

illustrates

that

the
the

non-tax

district

purposes

behind

court

this

that
have

may

rule
erred

case’s
further
when

it

assumed that the Parcel K deed was the “best evidence” of the
property’s
value

will

qualifies

value.
affect
as

an

Because
the
issue

the

outcome
of

dispute
of

material

this

regarding
lawsuit

fact,

the

Parcel

and

K’s

therefore

district

court

should not have resolved the matter on summary judgment.

C.
In addition to contending that the district court erred in
determining Parcel K’s value on summary judgment, the Investors
also argue that the district court erred in calculating which

4

We arrived at this amount by subtracting the Parcel K
value recited in the Operating Agreement ($1 million) from the
total purchase price ($15.5 million) to determine the purchase
price of the other parcels. We then divided this figure ($14.5
million) by the acreage of the other parcels (133.12 acres).
Using the $253,200 value recited in the deed as Parcel K’s
purchase price yields a price per acre of $114,534, which is an
even starker contrast.

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percentage of Parcel K’s worth to allocate to the constructive
trust.

The district court decided to value the constructive

trust at twenty percent of Parcel K’s purchase price because the
Investors’ $3.12 million investment represented twenty percent
of

the

$15.5

property.

million

purchase

price

of

Kim, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 457.

contribution

also

represented

a

the

Tudor

Hall

Farm

However, the Investors’

twenty-five-percent

Class

A

membership interest in Sunchase, and Class A membership sales
financed Sunchase’s purchase of the Tudor Hall Farm property.
This

discrepancy—which

the

district

court

failed

to

address—

creates a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the
Investors contributed twenty or twenty-five percent of Parcel
K’s

purchase

price.

The

district

court

therefore

erred

in

resolving this issue on summary judgment.

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in
part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
K’s

value

On remand, the district court should determine Parcel
and

consider

what

percentage

of

the

contribution financed the purchase of Parcel K.

Investors’

It should then

adjust the value of the constructive trust accordingly.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
15