James Dunlap v. Todd Leff
Filing
OPINION/ORDER CERTIFYING QUESTION to state court in Virginia. Originating case number: 2:11-cv-00272-AWA-DEM Copies to all parties and district court. [999177534] [11-2327]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2327
JAMES M. DUNLAP,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COTTMAN TRANSMISSIONS SYSTEMS, LLC; TODD P. LEFF,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Arenda Wright Allen, District
Judge. (2:11-cv-00272-AWA-DEM)
Argued:
May 14, 2013
Decided:
August 21, 2013
Before Sandra Day O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired), Supreme
Court of the United States, sitting by designation, and WYNN and
DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Unpublished
Virginia.
Order
of
Certification
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
ARGUED:
Crystal M. Johnson, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA SCHOOL OF
LAW,
Appellate
Litigation
Clinic,
Athens,
Georgia,
for
Appellant. James C. Rubinger, PLAVE KOCH PLC, Reston, Virginia,
for Appellees.
ON BRIEF:
Peter B. Rutledge, Paula Briceno,
Brittany Cambre, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Appellate
Litigation Clinic, Athens, Georgia, for Appellant.
Benjamin B.
Reed, PLAVE KOCH, PLC, Reston, Virginia, for Appellees.
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PER CURIAM:
I.
Questions Certified
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
exercising the privilege afforded it by the Supreme Court of
Virginia through its Rule 5:40 to certify questions of law to
the Supreme Court of Virginia when a question of Virginia law is
determinative in a pending action and there is no controlling
Virginia
precedent
Virginia
to
on
exercise
point,
its
requests
discretion
to
the
Supreme
answer
the
Court
of
following
questions:
1.
May a plaintiff use tortious interference with contract or
tortious
interference
predicate
unlawful
act
with
for
business
expectancy
a
under
claim
the
as
the
Virginia
business conspiracy statute, Va. Code §§ 18.2-499, 18.2500?
2.
Does a two-year or five-year statute of limitations apply
to
claims
of
tortious
interference
with
contract
and
tortious interference with business expectancy under Va.
Code § 8.01-243?
We acknowledge that the Supreme Court of Virginia may restate
these questions.
See Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:40(d).
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II.
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Nature of the Controversy and Statement of Relevant Facts
AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. is a nationwide transmission and
automobile
repair
franchises.
company
This
case
that
involves
operates
a
dispute
through
between
local
an
AAMCO
franchisee named James Dunlap and various parties related to
AAMCO
and
its
recent
attempt
to
eliminate
certain
local
franchises with overlapping business areas in Virginia.
Dunlap,
the
plaintiff-appellant,
AAMCO franchises for over 30 years.
has
operated
a
pair
of
In 2006, AAMCO was acquired
by an asset-management company that already held a large share
of
Cottman
Transmission
Systems,
LLC,
an
AAMCO
competitor.
Because of the substantial overlap among the businesses – and
the potential for competition among local franchisees – the new
AAMCO owners attempted to convert Cottman franchises to AAMCO
franchises
and
then
close
some
existing
franchises.
found himself among the disfavored franchisees.
Dunlap
See J.A. 5-8,
11-14.
Dunlap fought AAMCO to stay in business, and the parties
eventually
litigated
infringement
and
agreements.
Subject
and
settled
wrongful
to
cross-disputes
termination
conditions
not
of
for
trademark
Dunlap’s
franchise
particularly
relevant
here, this settlement allowed Dunlap to continue to operate his
AAMCO franchises.
tried
to
terminate
Then, as now, Dunlap maintained that AAMCO
his
franchises
3
for
minor
or
trumped
up
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violations of their franchise agreements as a pretext to force
him out of business.
See J.A. 11-14; AAMCO Transmissions, Inc.
v. Dunlap, 2011 WL 3586225 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2011).
Because
AAMCO was the contracting party, and its duties were resolved in
the prior litigation, Dunlap’s present complaint is not directed
to AAMCO itself.
to
force
him
Instead, Dunlap now asserts that the decision
out
of
business
was
a
conspiracy
for
personal
profit among new AAMCO principal Todd Leff, Cottman Transmission
Systems, and certain of Dunlap’s local competitors who would
benefit from his exit.
J.A. 11-20.
He maintains that AAMCO’s
actions, precipitated by these other parties, caused irreparable
harm to his business by depriving him of marketing benefits that
typically
flow
from
a
franchise
arrangement.
The
present
complaint thus names Leff and Cottman as defendants in an action
for: (1) violation of Virginia’s business conspiracy statute,
(2)
tortious
interference
with
contract,
interference with business expectancy.
and
(3)
tortious
J.A. 4-5, 20-24.
The district court dismissed the business conspiracy count
for failure to allege a valid “unlawful act” as a predicate for
the conspiracy.
It relied on a recent Virginia Supreme Court
decision called Station #2, LLC v. Lynch, 280 Va. 166 (2010),
which held that “a conspiracy merely to breach a contract that
does
not
involve
an
independent
duty
arising
outside
the
contract is insufficient to establish a civil claim under [the
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Virginia
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business
conspiracy
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statute].”
Id.
at
174.
The
district court then found that “[a]ll of the duties involved in
this case arise out of and the damages flow from contractual
obligations” – namely, the franchise agreements between Dunlap
and
AAMCO.
J.A.
43-44.
Accordingly,
the
district
court
concluded that applying the business conspiracy statute in this
case
would
risk
exactly
what
the
Virginia
Supreme
Court
had
tried expressly to avoid: “turning every breach of contract into
an actionable claim for fraud.”
(citation omitted).
district
court
from
Station #2, 280 Va. at 174
In dismissing this claim, it joined another
this
Circuit
that
recently
rejected
a
tortious interference allegation as the predicate for a business
conspiracy count under the rule announced in Station #2.
See
J.A. 43 (discussing Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Turbyfill, 2010 WL
4065527 (W.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2010)).
Next, the district court dismissed both of the independent
common-law tort claims as untimely.
Virginia has a five-year
statute of limitations for injuries to property rights, see Va.
Code § 8.01-243(B), but a two-year statute of limitations for
actions
related
to
personal
injuries,
id.
§ 8.01-243(A).
Relying on Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 262 Va. 473
(2001), the district court noted that “an allegation of nothing
more than disappointed economic expectations does not amount to
an injury to property” because “the law of contracts provides
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the sole remedy for such a loss.”
Va. at 480).
J.A. 45 (quoting Willard, 262
Having already characterized the common-law tort
claims as flowing from breach of contract for purposes of the
conspiracy count, the district court again relied on Station #2
to classify them as contract (and, thus, personal injury) claims
for purposes of the two-year statute of limitations.
& n.2.
J.A. 44-45
In other words, because the injury in this case went to
Dunlap’s disappointed expectations about how AAMCO would perform
and
the
profitability
of
Dunlap’s
business
–
and
not
to
a
property injury as such – the district court applied the shorter
statute of limitations, and dismissed.
III.
Legal Discussion and Relevant Virginia Case Law
A.
Business Conspiracy Issue
The reason to certify the first issue is straightforward:
The
Virginia
signals
Supreme
obvious
Court’s
skepticism
recent
about
decision
business
in
Station
conspiracy
#2
claims
predicated on contract disputes, but we are unable to ascertain
with certainty how far that skepticism extends.
On the one hand, Station #2 clearly represents an important
change in Virginia’s business conspiracy law, and we agree with
the district court that this case raises concerns of the kind
addressed there.
least
partly
In Station #2, the Virginia Supreme Court at
rejected
its
established
case
law
making
it
actionable to “conspire[] to procure the breach of a contract.”
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See 280 Va. at 174 (rejecting Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112
(1985), and Worrie v. Boze, 198 Va. 533 (1956)).
The Court
noted that, while it had previously approved such claims, it was
now “of opinion that a conspiracy merely to breach a contract
that does not involve an independent duty arising outside the
contract
is
claim.”
insufficient
Id.
(emphasis
to
establish
added).
The
a
civil
Court
[conspiracy]
warned
against
allowing mere contract disputes to be transformed into claims of
fraud and conspiracy.
Id.
And the standard that it announced
appears to ask whether the duty that has been violated “aris[es]
outside the contract,” id. – a standard one might think unmet by
garden-variety claims of tortious interference with contract or
with the business expectations that contract law protects.
On the other hand, there are plausible reasons to limit
Station #2’s holding to actual breach of contract claims, and to
distinguish
expectancy.
tortious
interferences
with
contract
or
business
As Dunlap points out, see Appellant’s Br. 15-16,
the duty not to interfere with the agreements of others arises
as a common-law corollary of the contract, not from the contract
itself.
Indeed,
it
cannot
arise
from
the
contract
itself
because the duty is one that falls upon third parties, not the
parties to the agreement.
According to Dunlap, this distinction
is sufficient to place the violated duty “outside the contract”
for purposes of Station #2.
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Whether (and when) this is a meaningful distinction is, we
think, a question that is best posed to the Virginia Supreme
Court,
for
it
involves
interpretation
of
its
important questions of state law and policy.
duty
to
avoid
contractual
and
To begin, Station
#2 does not definitively settle the question:
the
precedents
interference
It is true that
does
not
flow
directly from a party’s contractual agreements, but it is also
true that the ultimate duty that is breached is contractual, and
the set of harms redressed flows entirely from the contract.
In
other words, Station #2 poses a question of how to conceptualize
tortious
interference
for
statute’s
unlawful
requirement,
act
the
purpose
but
of
the
does
not
conspiracy
answer
it.
Moreover, in typical cases alleging tortious interference the
challenged
conduct
will
–
as
here
–
involve
discussions
and
negotiations among one contracting party and potential business
partners about the possibility of breaching the old contract and
starting a new relationship.
Whether to view such negotiations
as “conspiratorial” is an important question of state policy:
Doing so elevates the sanctity of contract, but perhaps too far.
A state court could easily conclude that it is adequate, and
more likely to encourage efficient business decisions, to give
the
harmed
party
only
the
benefit
of
its
contractual
expectations through a simple breach of contract action against
its counter-party.
Cf. Station #2, 280 Va. at 174 (expressing
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about
“turning
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every
breach
of
contract
into
an
actionable claim for fraud”) (citation omitted).
Moreover, especially in light of these policy concerns, it
may be that the right answer involves finer distinctions of the
kind that the Virginia Supreme Court is better fit to make.
For
example, it is possible that tortious interference claims should
sometimes
constitute
“unlawful
acts”
for
purposes
of
the
business conspiracy statute, but only in exceptional cases.
Cf.
Advanced Marine Enters., Inc. v. PRC Inc., 256 Va. 106, 117-18
(1998)
(allowing
interference,
“outrageous”
conspiracy
before
conduct
Station
such
breaching employees).
claim
predicated
on
#2,
a
theft
as
in
case
of
corporate
tortious
involving
files
by
The extent to which Station #2 preserves
any such claim is unclear, however, and so we think it best to
seek a definitive answer from the Virginia Supreme Court.
B.
The
reason
to
straightforward:
Statute of Limitations Issue
certify
the
second
question
is
even
more
The question which statute of limitations to
apply to tortious interference claims is a pure legal issue that
has not been settled by the Virginia Supreme Court.
Virginia
applies a two-year statute of limitations to claims regarding
personal
injuries
and
a
five-year
statute
claims regarding injuries to property.
Va. at 478.
of
limitations
to
See, e.g., Willard, 262
But that distinction can be hard to draw, and the
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Virginia Supreme Court has previously disagreed with how this
Circuit
has
attempted
to
articulate
it.
See
id.
at
479
(rejecting the test applied in Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., 704 F.2d
1296, 1303-04 (4th Cir. 1983)).
As with the previous issue, we
believe that this question at bottom concerns an ambiguity in
the
Virginia
Supreme
Court’s
recent
precedent
that
is
best
resolved by that Court.
Indeed, the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Willard
can be read to support either side in this case.
Willard held
that
of
an
infringement
on
the
dissenters’
rights
corporate
shareholders was an injury to property interests for purposes of
the five-year statute of limitations.
it
made
clear
that
“conduct
.
.
Id. at 481.
.
directed
In so doing,
at
[another’s]
property, . . . constitutes an injury to property,” for purposes
of
the
limitation
indirect.
Id.
emphasized
that
at
periods
480
whether
(citation
“disappointed
the
injury
is
omitted).
economic
direct
But
expectations
or
it
also
do[]
not
amount to an injury to property” because “the law of contracts
provides
plausibly
property
the
sole
argues
(that
remedy
that
is,
the
his
for
such
conduct
a
loss.”
here
was
directed
The
district
franchises).
Id.
Dunlap
at
his
court,
however, plausibly viewed the injuries as flowing from Dunlap’s
disappointed expectations about those franchises’ profitability
had AAMCO continued to perform under its contracts.
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previous
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issue,
it
is
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possible
to
conceptualize
tortious
interference as being fundamentally a part of the protections
for business expectations provided by the “law of contracts,”
id.,
or
rights
as
a
that
protection
sounds
most
for
contractually
fundamentally
in
secured
the
law
property
of
torts.
Accordingly, it may be wise judicial policy to impose the same
limitations period for tortious interference as for the breach
of
contract
Especially
Virginia
that
given
Supreme
it
our
Court
ultimately
decision
on
the
addresses,
to
seek
first
or
the
issue
it
may
guidance
in
this
not.
of
the
case,
we
prefer to ask that Court to settle this related issue as well.
In sum, we find ourselves unable to predict with confidence
how
the
Virginia
discussed above.
Supreme
Court
would
rule
on
the
questions
As a result, we respectfully request that the
Virginia Supreme Court answer our certified questions.
IV.
We
Certified Questions Determine This Proceeding
also
note,
briefly,
that
determine the outcome of this case.
the
two
questions
together
If the district court’s two
holdings regarding tortious interference are correct as a matter
of Virginia law, we would affirm.
If either is incorrect, we
would reverse and remand for further proceedings because these
were
the
sole
rationales
adopted
dismissing the case.
11
by
the
district
court
in
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V.
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The Parties and Their Counsel
A.
The Plaintiff–Appellant is James Dunlap.
Counsel for the
Plaintiff–Appellant is:
Peter B. Rutledge
Paula Briceno
Brittany Cambre
Crystal M. Johnson
University of Georgia School of Law
Appellate Litigation Clinic
100 Herty Drive,
Athens, GA 30602
(706) 542-1328 (Telephone)
(706) 542-5556 (Facsimile)
B.
The
Defendants–Appellees
Transmission Systems, LLC.
are
Todd
P.
Leff
and
Cottman
Counsel for the Defendants–Appellees
is:
James C. Rubinger
Benjamin B. Reed
Plave Koch PLC
12355 Sunrise Valley Drive,
Suite 230
Reston, VA 20191
(703) 774-1200 (Telephone)
(703) 774-1201 (Facsimile)
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VI. Conclusion
Pursuant
to
the
privilege
made
available
by
Virginia
Supreme Court Rule 5:40, we respectfully:
1) Certify the questions stated in Part I of this Order of
Certification to the Supreme Court of Virginia for resolution;
2) Order the Clerk of this Court to forward to the Supreme Court
of Virginia, under the official seal of this Court, a copy of
this
Order
of
Certification,
together
with
the
original
or
copies of the record before this Court to the extent requested
by the Supreme Court of Virginia; and
3) Order that any request for all or part of the record be
fulfilled by the Clerk of this Court simply upon notification
from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
QUESTIONS CERTIFIED
FOR THE COURT
/s/ James A. Wynn, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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