Cindy Hunt v. Branch Banking & Trust Company
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:09-cv-02151-JMC Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998855392]. Mailed to: Cindy B. Hunt. [11-2388]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2388
CINDY B. HUNT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST COMPANY; DANNY FOGLE; CATHY LAMBERT;
JUDY TEAL; KACI SANSBERRY; MARK BOOZ; DAVID CRAVEN,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence.
J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (4:09-cv-02151-JMC)
Submitted:
April 24, 2012
Before WYNN and
Circuit Judge.
DIAZ,
Circuit
Decided:
Judges,
and
May 16, 2012
HAMILTON,
Senior
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cindy B. Hunt, Appellant Pro Se.
South Carolina, for Appellees.
Steven Barry Licata, Columbia,
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Cindy B. Hunt filed suit against the Branch Banking &
Trust Company (“Bank”) and individual Bank employees, alleging
false entry in a bank statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (2002),
computer fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008), and violation of
privacy under 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2010), as well as numerous
state law claims.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion
to dismiss Hunt’s Second Amended Complaint, and denied Hunt’s
subsequent
appeals.
error.
motion
to
alter
or
amend
its
judgment.
Hunt
now
We have reviewed the record and find no reversible
Accordingly, we affirm.
Hunt first challenges the district court’s denial of
her motion to alter or amend its judgment.
We review the denial
of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend a judgment for
abuse of discretion.
Sloas v. CSX Transp., Inc., 616 F.3d 380,
388 (4th Cir. 2010).
The district court “necessarily abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law.”
Id.
v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 160 (4th Cir. 2009)).
three
grounds
for
amending
an
earlier
(citing Wolfe
“[T]here are
judgment:
(1)
to
accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to
account
for
new
evidence
not
available
at
trial;
or
(3)
to
correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403
(4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
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appeal,
Hunt
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fails
to
highlight
a
change
in
controlling law, present new evidence, or identify a clear error
of law.
Although Hunt contends that the district court erred in
failing to analyze her Rule 59(e) motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) based upon excusable neglect
and fraud on the court, we find that Hunt would not have been
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) or 60(d).
Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hunt’s
motion to alter or amend judgment.
Hunt next asserts that the district court erroneously
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Hunt’s state
law claim for violation of privacy under S.C. Code Ann. §§ 3720-110
which
to
it
37-20-200
had
(2008)
original
after
dismissing
jurisdiction.
We
all
review
claims
a
over
district
court’s decision declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over
state
law
claims
for
abuse
of
discretion.
Jordahl
v.
Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 1997); see
also
Shanaghan
v.
Cahill,
58
F.3d
106,
110
(4th
Cir.
1995)
(“[T]rial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or
not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when federal claims
have been extinguished.”).
jurisdiction
over
a
civil
If a district court has original
action,
it
shall
also
have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that form part
of the same case or controversy.
3
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
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However, the district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim if the court has dismissed all claims
over
which
it
had
original
jurisdiction.
28
U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3).
In the interest of avoiding “[n]eedless decisions of
state law,” the Supreme Court has stated that, when “federal
claims are dismissed before trial . . . state claims should be
dismissed as well.”
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Accordingly, we find that the district
court did not abuse its considerable discretion in declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Hunt’s state law claim
for violation of privacy.
Hunt also challenges the district court’s denial of
her Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(h) motions for sanctions.
We review the
denial of a motion for sanctions for an abuse of discretion.
Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 855 (4th Cir. 1990).
Hunt
fails
conclusory
to
present
statement
factual
that
the
allegations
district
discretion in declining to impose sanctions.
On appeal,
to
support
her
court
abused
its
We therefore find
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Hunt’s motions for sanctions.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the
district
facts
court.
and
legal
We
dispense
contentions
with
are
4
oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
the
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materials
before
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the
court
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and
argument
would
not
aid
the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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