US v. Michael Steven

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:09-cr-00222-11 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998731057].. [11-4019]

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Date Filed: 11/29/2011

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4019

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL LLOYD STEVENS,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00222-11)

Submitted:

November 21, 2011

Decided:

November 29, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jacqueline A. Hallinan, HALLINAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellant.
R. Booth Goodwin, II, United
States Attorney, Steven I. Loew, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Michael Lloyd Stevens appeals his conviction following
a jury trial on one count of conspiracy to retaliate against a
person

cooperating

with

law

enforcement,

in

violation

18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(b)(2), (f) (West Supp. 2011).

of

He argues on

appeal that the district court erred in allowing the Government
to introduce as evidence in its case-in-chief a stipulation of
facts establishing that he and his confederates believed the
intended

victim

of

their

planned

retaliation

with federal law enforcement officials.

was

cooperating

We affirm.

Following his indictment, Stevens entered into a plea
agreement

with

the

Government,

guilty to the conspiracy charge.

in

which

he

agreed

to

plead

Attached to the plea agreement

was a stipulation of facts indicating that Stevens had conspired
with

others

cooperation

to

retaliate

with

federal

against

an

intended

authorities

victim

concerning

a

for

his

federal

offense by assaulting him.
The plea agreement also contains a provision waiving
Stevens’ rights under Fed. R. Evid. 410.

Specifically, Stevens

agreed that if he withdrew from the plea agreement or proceeded
to trial on the conspiracy charge, the Government was permitted
to use the stipulation of facts as evidence in its case-inchief.

Stevens ultimately proceeded to a jury trial.

In turn,

the Government introduced the stipulation of facts as evidence
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against

Stevens

Date Filed: 11/29/2011

in

its

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case-in-chief

at

trial.

On

appeal,

Stevens argues that the district court erred in allowing such
admission.
Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides
that any statements made by a defendant in the course of plea
discussions that do not result in a guilty plea are thereafter
not admissible against him.

Fed. R. Evid. 410.

Because Rule

410 is an exception to the general principle that all relevant
evidence

is

admissible

construed narrowly.

at

trial,

its

limitations

are

to

be

United States v. Roberts, ___ F.3d ___,

No. 10–1230–cr, 2011 WL 4489813, at *5 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2011).
Moreover,

its

protections

are

waivable.

United

States

v.

Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 195, 205 (1995) (holding that Rule 410, in
effect, creates “a privilege of the defendant, and, like other
evidentiary privileges, this one may be waived or varied at the
defendant’s
omitted));

request”
accord

(internal

United

quotation

States

v.

marks

Mitchell,

and
633

citation
F.3d

997,

1001-06 (10th Cir. 2011) (upholding validity of Rule 410 waiver
and allowing defendant’s plea statements into evidence as part
of the Government’s case-in-chief); United States v. Sylvester,
583 F.3d 285, 289-91 (5th Cir. 2009) (same and citing decisions
from the Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits supporting the
proposition that statements made during plea negotiations can be

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waived

for

use

Date Filed: 11/29/2011

as

affirmative

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evidence

of

the

defendant’s

guilt).
Whether

a

valid

waiver

of

rights

occurred

is

a

United States v. Young, 223

question of law reviewed de novo.

F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2000) (addressing a waiver under Rule
410); accord United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.3
(4th Cir. 1997) (stating that waiver of the right to counsel is
a question of law reviewed de novo).
court’s

evidentiary

ruling

for abuse of discretion.
350

(4th Cir.

2009).

admitting

We review the district
statements

into

evidence

United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331,
A

district

court

does

not

abuse

its

discretion unless its decision to admit evidence is arbitrary or
irrational.

United

States

v.

Weaver,

282

F.3d

302,

313

(4th Cir. 2002).
Absent fraud, coercion, or some affirmative indication
that

the

agreement

was

entered

into

unknowingly

or

involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions
of Rule 410 is valid and enforceable.
210.

Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at

On appeal, Stevens does not suggest the presence of any

fraud or coercion and makes no claim that he entered into the
plea

agreement

involuntarily.

Rather,

he

suggests

that

his

agreement to waive Rule 410 was not made knowingly because he
did not know at the time he entered into the plea agreement that
the

Government

would

be

required
4

to

prove

that

the

law

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enforcement

Date Filed: 11/29/2011

officials

with

whom

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the

victim

cooperated

were

federal officials.
We reject this argument because Stevens utterly fails
to explain how any such lack of knowledge affected his ability
to enter into the plea agreement in a knowing fashion.
further

reject

information

as

about

without
the

merit

federal

Stevens’

character

assertion

of

the

We
that

victim’s

cooperation was unknown to him at the time he entered into the
plea agreement.
Because

the

waiver

was

valid

and

enforceable,

the

district court properly allowed to Government to introduce the
stipulation

of

facts

as

evidence

in

its

case-in-chief.

Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1001-06; Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 289-91.
We reject Stevens’ assertion that the stipulation served “no
fact finding purpose,” as it was relevant to and probative of
Stevens’

criminal

culpability

on

the

conspiracy

charge.

As

such, its admission into evidence enhanced the reliability of
the fact-finding process.
anything,

to

ignore

See Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 294 (“If

relevant

evidence

of

culpability

simply

because that evidence was discovered during the course of plea
negotiations would arguably undermine the truth-seeking function
of our criminal justice system.”).
Stevens also asserts that the stipulation “improperly
prejudiced the jury” against him.
5

Insofar as Stevens is making

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an argument under Fed. R. Evid. 403, it, too, is without merit.
“Rule 403 only requires suppression of evidence that results in
unfair

prejudice

—

prejudice

that

damages

an

opponent

for

reasons other than its probative value, for instance, an appeal
to emotion, and only when that unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value of the evidence.”

United States

v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 619-20 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added)
(internal

quotation

marks,

emphasis,

and

alteration

omitted).

Stevens, however, fails to point to anything in the record to
support the conclusion that the admission of the stipulation of
facts was unfairly prejudicial.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because

the

facts

and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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