US v. Seth Thoma
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:10-cr-00016-jct-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998901866].. [11-4398]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4398
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SETH LINKOUS THOMAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
James C. Turk, Senior
District Judge. (7:10-cr-00016-jct-1)
Argued:
March 21, 2012
Decided:
July 25, 2012
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated
remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
in
part,
and
ARGUED: Paul Graham Beers, GLENN, FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE,
Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant.
Thomas Ernest Booth, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Donald R.
Wolthuis, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia; Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant
Attorney General, Greg D. Andres, Acting Deputy Assistant
Attorney
General,
UNITED
STATES
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Seth
Thomas
appeals
his
convictions
and
sentence
for
multiple drug-related counts, raising several different issues.
We affirm one conviction, reverse two others, vacate Thomas’s
sentence, and remand for resentencing.
I.
In
2006
and
Christiansburg,
distribution.
2007,
Virginia,
the
Smokey
were
a
Ridge
hotbed
of
Apartments
illegal
in
drug
Thomas did not live there, but he worked close by
and spent a lot of time there feeding his drug habit.
One of the main suppliers in the complex during that period
was Aaron Thompson.
daily.
month. 1
Thompson sold painkillers and pills almost
He sold fentanyl patches less frequently, about once per
Thomas
also
sold
painkillers
and
pills
to
various
individuals in the apartment complex.
Thompson and Jennie Grissom were the primary drug suppliers
to Jimmy Clark, Clark’s girlfriend Whitney Branscom, and Clark’s
1
Fentanyl is a very powerful pain-relieving drug, about 50
to 100 times stronger than morphine, often prescribed to cancer
patients.
Fentanyl comes in various forms, including gel
patches that are placed on the skin so that the medicine can
enter the bloodstream gradually over three days.
Addicts,
however, sometimes remove the gel from the patch and eat it,
causing three days’ worth of the powerful medicine to enter the
body at once. The result can be respiratory depression, central
nervous system depression, and death.
3
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neighbor
Kenneth
however,
was
more
Ponder.
social.
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Clark’s
relationship
with
would
Clark
Thomas
daily, often sharing drugs with him.
visit
Thomas,
almost
Thomas also sold drugs to
Clark a few times.
On the morning of November 28, 2007, Thomas asked Joseph
Haley, a friend and co-worker, for a ride to the apartments the
next morning because Thomas wanted to trade some percocet and
methadone pills for fentanyl patches.
When Thomas arrived, he
went to Ponder’s apartment, which was a place where transactions
were regularly made.
Thompson had acquired a batch of fentanyl
patches and brought them to the apartment.
Thompson sold one
patch to Ponder and multiple patches to Thomas.
Leaving
Ponder’s
apartment
together,
Thomas
and
Thompson
walked several doors down toward Clark, who was sitting outside
his apartment. Thompson showed Clark 3-4 fentanyl patches, and
Thomas also displayed at least one patch.
Clark, however, told
the men that he did not have any money.
Thompson nevertheless
decided to sell Clark a patch on credit because Thompson knew
Clark’s girlfriend had a job and could pay him later.
Clark
injected
mixed
the
the
mixture
contents
of
intravenously
the
patch
through
promptly went into respiratory distress.
a
with
alcohol,
syringe,
and
Thomas called 9-1-1
and an ambulance came and transported Clark to the hospital,
where he was treated for a fentanyl overdose.
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Shortly after the ambulance arrived, Thomas called Haley to
ask for another ride, this time from Ponder’s apartment to the
home
of
Barry
overdosed,
and
Duncan.
when
Thomas
Haley
picked
told
Haley
up
Thomas,
trying to hide his patches in Haley’s car.
take them, however.
that
Clark
Thomas
had
started
Haley refused to
Haley dropped Thomas off at Duncan’s house
in the late afternoon that same day.
Duncan, his fiancée Traci McDougal, and Amber Dalton were
at Duncan’s residence when Thomas arrived.
heard about Clark’s fentanyl overdose.
They had already
Thomas showed them his
remaining patches and told them he needed to get rid of them.
Although Duncan had no money, Thomas sold him one for $30 on
credit.
McDougal then saw Thomas and Duncan enter the bathroom,
and she heard Thomas tell Duncan to lift his shirt so Thomas
could stick the patch on Duncan’s back.
According to McDougal,
Thomas told Duncan he could cut the patch and eat the gel if the
patch did not stick.
McDougal, Dalton, and Thomas then drove to
Dalton’s house while Duncan went with his father to a Lowe’s and
later to his parents’ house to have dinner.
When
McDougal
and
Thomas
arrived
to
pick
up
Duncan
and
bring him back to Dalton’s house, Duncan was having difficulty
walking and talking.
Duncan revealed that he had eaten some of
the
patch
gel
because
the
would
not
stick.
Dalton’s residence, Duncan could not stay awake.
5
Then,
back
at
McDougal was
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concerned and started to call 9-1-1, but Thomas grabbed her cell
phone and told her there was no need to call—that Duncan would
be fine.
night,
Eventually, McDougal put Duncan to bed.
Duncan
died
of
a
fentanyl
overdose.
During the
When
McDougal
discovered his condition the next morning, Dalton called 9-1-1.
While
EMS
personnel
attempted
Dalton not to say anything.
to
revive
Duncan,
Thomas
told
Thomas also asked McDougal for the
money Duncan owed him for the patch.
A federal grand jury for the Western District of Virginia
subsequently returned an indictment charging Thomas with four
counts:
conspiring with Thompson (from an unknown time until
November 29, 2007) to distribute fentanyl, resulting in death or
serious bodily injury (“Count One”); distributing or aiding and
abetting
which
the
distribution
resulted
in
of
serious
fentanyl
bodily
on
November
injury
28,
(“Count
2007,
Two”);
distributing or aiding and abetting the distribution of fentanyl
on November 28, 2007, resulting in death (“Count Three”); and
distributing morphine on March 5, 2010 (“Count Four”).
U.S.C.A.
§§
846,
841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(C)
2012); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2000).
(West
1999
See 21
&
Supp.
Thomas pled guilty to
Count 4 and proceeded to trial on the remaining counts.
At
the
close
of
the
government’s
case
in
chief,
Thomas
moved unsuccessfully for judgment of acquittal with regard to
each of the three counts.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.
6
Thomas also
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renewed his motion when the government put on rebuttal evidence.
The jury eventually returned a verdict of guilty on each count.
In
calculating
his
advisory
sentencing
range
under
the
Guidelines, the district court grouped the three offenses, see
U.S.
Sentencing
Guidelines
Manual
employed a base offense level of 38.
the
court
justice.
added
a
two-point
§ 3D1.2(d)
and
Over a defense objection,
enhancement
See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
(2010),
for
obstruction
of
With a total offense level of
40 and a criminal history category of III, Thomas’s advisory
guidelines range was 360 months to life.
Ultimately, the court
sentenced
Thomas
to
300
months,
stating
that
it
sentenced
Thomas
to
240
months
but
the
obstruction-of-
for
would
have
justice enhancement.
II.
Thomas
first
argues
that
the
district
court
erred
in
denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count One.
We
agree.
We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal.
See United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply
Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1401-02 (4th Cir. 1993).
When addressing
a
must
sufficiency-of-the-evidence
evidence
inquire
in
the
whether
light
any
challenge,
most
favorable
rational
trier
7
of
“[w]e
to
the
fact
view
the
government
and
could
find
the
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essential
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elements
of
the
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crime
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt.”
United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997).
In order to prove a conspiracy to distribute narcotics, the
government must establish that “(1) an agreement to possess with
intent to distribute [narcotics] existed between two or more
persons; (2) [the defendant] knew of the conspiracy; and (3)
[the defendant] knowingly and voluntarily became part of the
conspiracy.”
2008).
United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir.
The government may prove a conspiracy by circumstantial
evidence,
including
evidence
of
a
“tacit
or
understanding” between the defendant and his accomplice.
mutual
United
States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 922 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Evidence
showing
a
buyer-seller
relationship is not sufficient by itself to establish a drugdistribution conspiracy.
480,
485
(4th
Cir.
See United States v. Mills, 995 F.2d
1993).
However,
“evidence
of
any
understanding reached as part of the buy-sell transaction that
either party will engage in or assist in further distribution is
sufficient to prove . . . a conspiracy.”
Edmonds,
2012
WL
1592978,
at
*5
(4th
United States v.
Cir.
May
8,
2012).
Additionally, we have held that evidence of a continuing buyerseller relationship coupled with evidence of large quantities of
drugs, or “continuing relationships and repeated transactions”
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can create a reasonable inference of an agreement.
Reid, 523
F.3d at 317.
We agree with Thomas that the evidence in this case shows
only a buyer-seller relationship between Thomas and Thompson.
The government showed only that Thomas made one small purchase
of fentanyl patches from Thompson.
It offered no evidence of an
ongoing
two.
purchase,
relationship
the
only
between
the
evidence
linking
Besides
Thomas
the
and
single
Thompson
concerned their proximity to one another during the one day when
the sales at issue in this case were made:
After Thomas and
Ponder obtained their patches from Thompson, both Thomas and
Thompson walked straight toward Clark and offered to sell him
fentanyl patches.
The government contends that the evidence that Thomas may
have bartered with Thompson for fentanyl with Thomas’s own pills
as opposed to simply paying cash is evidence of a conspiratorial
relationship.
However, we do not see how this fact is evidence
of a conspiracy.
See United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893,
897 (7th Cir. 2009) (“An agreement to exchange drugs for money
(or something else of value) – the crux of the buyer-seller
transaction – is insufficient to prove a conspiracy.” (emphasis
added)).
The
government
also
maintains
that
Thomas’s
attempts
to
find fentanyl buyers in Smokey Ridge and the fact that “Thomas
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and Thompson jointly approached Clark and offered patches for
sale” is evidence of a conspiracy.
However, there
was
no
basis
for
Appellee’s brief at 14.
a
reasonable
inference
that
Thomas’s attempts to identify people interested in purchasing
patches were for any purpose other than to sell the patches that
Thomas, himself, had purchased.
That Thomas and Thompson may
have shopped their respective wares to Clark at the same time
does
not
give
rise
to
a
reasonable
inference
reached any agreement, tacit or otherwise.
that
they
had
The district court
therefore erred in denying Thomas’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal on the conspiracy count.
III.
Thomas
next
maintains
that
the
district
court
erred
in
denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count Two, in
which
the
government
sought
to
prove
that
Thomas
aided
and
abetted Thompson’s distribution of a fentanyl patch to Clark.
We agree.
“To prove the crime of aiding and abetting the government
must show that the defendant knowingly associated himself with
and participated in the criminal venture.”
Winstead,
708
defendant’s
insufficient.
F.2d
mere
925,
927
presence
(4th
at
the
Cir.
United States v.
1983).
scene
of
Showing
a
the
crime
is
See United States v. Spoone, 741 F.2d 680, 686
10
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(4th
Doc: 38
Cir.
Filed: 07/25/2012
1984).
affirmative
Rather,
participation
Pg: 11 of 18
the
which
government
at
must
principal offender to commit the offense.”
some
encourages
least
“show
the
United States v.
Kelly, 552 F.3d 824, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The
government
maintains
that
Thomas
assisted
Thompson’s
distribution of fentanyl to Clark by purchasing fentanyl from
Thompson, offering to sell to Branscom, and approaching Clark
jointly with Thompson.
Count
One,
however,
As we have explained with regard to
there
is
no
basis
in
the
record
for
a
reasonable inference that Thomas’s actions were for any purpose
other than to facilitate his own sale of his own patches.
does
it
even
appear
that
Thomas’s
actions
regarding
Nor
Clark
assisted Thompson in any way in making the sale.
IV.
Thomas next maintains that the district court abused its
discretion
in
refusing
his
requested
aiding
and
abetting
instruction on Count Three, which pertained to the sale of a
fentanyl patch to Duncan.
The
defense
theory
We disagree.
at
trial
was
that
Duncan
bought
the
patch that killed him from Thompson at Smokey Ridge rather than
from
Thomas
testimony
at
from
Duncan’s
Amber
house.
Dalton
that
11
This
Thomas
theory
and
was
Duncan
based
on
left
the
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for
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minutes
before
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returning
and
going
into
bathroom together to stick the patch on Duncan’s back.
the
Based on
this theory, the defense argued that Thompson’s distribution of
the patch to Duncan would have completed the crime and that one
cannot aid and abet an already-completed crime.
requested
that
the
court
instruct
the
jury
Thus, Thomas
that
“[a]
person
cannot be guilty of aiding or abetting a completed crime.”
563.
J.A.
The district court did not include this specific language
in its charge.
However, the court instructed the jury:
In order to be found guilty of aiding and
abetting the . . . crimes charged in Counts Two and
Three . . . , the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant:
One, knew that the crimes charged
committed or were being committed;
were
to
be
Two, knowingly did some act for the purpose of
aiding the commission of that crime;
And, three, acted with the intention of causing
the crimes charged to be committed.
J.A. 472.
Because the court’s instruction explained that in order to
convict, the jury would need to find that Thomas “knew that the
crimes charged were to be committed or were being committed,”
the charge did not permit the jury to find that Thomas aided and
abetted
after
the
completion
of
the
crime.
Thus,
Thomas’s
request was effectively covered by the court’s instructions.
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V.
Thomas next contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to exclude evidence that he
distributed
drugs
other
than
fentanyl
and
“ripped
off”
drug
purchasers.
Thomas moved unsuccessfully under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) to exclude any evidence that he had distributed drugs
other than fentanyl, such as morphine.
However, the district
court overruled Thomas’s objections and allowed the admission of
such
evidence.
Thomas
For
supplied
example,
him
with
co-worker
pain
Haley
pills
in
testified
that
exchange
for
transportation from time to time, and Steven West, a neighbor
who
helped
Clark
after
he
overdosed
on
the
fentanyl
patch,
testified that Thomas sold him pain drugs 10-15 times in the six
months prior to the overdose.
Thomas also moved unsuccessfully
to exclude evidence that he was a dishonest drug dealer.
testified
that
he
stopped
buying
drugs
from
Thomas
West
because
Thomas “ripped [him and others] off on several occasions.”
J.A.
118.
Even assuming arguendo that such evidence was erroneously
admitted, its admission was harmless as to Count Three.
United
States
(explaining
v.
that
Forrest,
the
429
improper
F.3d
73,
81
admission
(4th
of
Cir.
evidence
See
2005)
“is
harmless, if viewing the record as a whole, it is clear beyond a
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reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of
guilty
absent
quotation
the
marks
[improperly
omitted)).
admitted
McDougal
evidence]”
testified
(internal
that
she
saw
Thomas agree to give Duncan the fentanyl patch on credit; she
then saw the two proceed into the bathroom; and she heard Thomas
in
the
bathroom
explaining
placed it on Duncan’s back.
to
Duncan
about
the
patch
as
he
Ponder also testified that Thomas
admitted to him that Thomas gave the patch to Duncan.
Unlike
Thomas
McDougal,
agree
to
sell
Dalton
Duncan
did
a
not
testify
patch,
and,
that
she
during
heard
closing
arguments, defense counsel made much of the fact that Dalton
testified that Thomas and Duncan left the house for 15 minutes
before returning and going into the bathroom together.
Counsel
urged the jury to credit Dalton’s testimony and infer that in
that 15 minutes, Thomas drove with Duncan to Smokey Ridge, less
than a mile away, so that Duncan could purchase a patch from
Thompson.
This theory of course begged the question of why
Thomas would not have simply sold Duncan one of the patches he
had shown to McDougal, Dalton, and Duncan.
The defense argued
that those patches were for Thomas’s own use and that he would
not have wanted to part with them.
That theory, however, was at
odds with another part of Dalton’s testimony in which she stated
that Thomas had been nervous because of Clark’s overdose and
that he had displayed his patches and said that he “needed to
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get rid of them.” 2
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J.A. 222.
In the absence of any viable
defense theory regarding Count Three, we conclude that Thomas
was
not
prejudiced
by
any
error
in
the
admission
of
the
complained-of evidence.
VI.
Thomas finally argues that the district court erroneously
enhanced his sentencing guidelines offense level for attempted
obstruction
of
justice.
In
light
of
our
holding
that
the
district court erred in failing to grant Thomas’s motion for a
judgment of acquittal on Counts One and Two, we vacate Thomas’s
sentence and remand for resentencing.
Nevertheless, for the
sake of judicial economy, we will address the obstruction-ofjustice issue.
We review a district court’s application of an obstructionof-justice enhancement for clear error.
See United States v.
Blauvelt, 638 F.3d 281, 293 (4th Cir. 2011).
the
district
court
did
not
clearly
err
We conclude that
in
applying
the
enhancement.
Evidence
jailed
prior
presented
at
to
with
trial
sentencing
an
2
inmate
showed
named
that
Sean
Thomas
was
Robertson;
Indeed, Dalton testified that she assumed that Thomas and
Duncan were making some sort of drug deal when they went into
the bathroom together.
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Robertson learned that his girlfriend Shameke Moore was on the
jury panel as a potential juror in Thomas’s case and revealed
this
information
to
Thomas;
and
Thomas
then
suggested
that
Robertson contact Moore and gave him suggestions to convince
Moore to adopt Thomas’s view of the case.
Robertson later called Moore, summarized the case against
Thomas, and explained why Moore should vote not guilty.
He even
suggested that there might be some money in it for Moore.
Moore
told Robertson that she was “onboard” and would vote in Thomas’s
favor.
Robertson
J.A.
to
634.
see
Thomas
whether
subsequently
Moore
would
followed
vote
with
acquit
to
up
him.
Robertson told him that Moore had said that she would.
During jury selection, Moore did not reveal to the court
that
she
had
discussed
the
case
before
or
that
she
had
a
personal interest in it even when specifically asked whether she
had read or talked to anyone about the case.
Moore ended up not
being selected to serve on Thomas’s jury, however.
Under
United
States
Sentencing
Guidelines
§ 3C1.1,
the
court must enhance the defendant’s offense level by two if it
finds that the defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice
with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of
the
instant
offense
of
conviction.”
Application
Note
4(A)
specifically states that “unlawfully influencing a . . . juror,
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directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so” is conduct that
qualifies for an obstruction enhancement.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt.
n.4(A).
Thomas argues that since any attempt by him to influence
Moore was oral, rather than written, it was not unlawful because
it was not prohibited by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1504 (West 2000).
government
responds
correctly,
however,
that
regardless
The
of
whether it was unlawful under § 1504, it clearly was unlawful
under
18
U.S.C.A.
§ 1503(a)
(West
2000),
which
proscribes
“corruptly . . . endeavor[ing] to influence . . . any . . .
petit juror . . . in the discharge of his duty.”
Thomas suggests that the district court clearly erred in
finding that any attempt by him to influence Moore was corrupt.
Certainly, however, the evidence supported the conclusion that
Thomas attempted to use Robertson to persuade Moore to vote for
Thomas’s acquittal.
Moore
sense.
would
conceal
That Thomas’s plan included the fact that
Robertson’s
overtures
is
simple
common
Without such concealment, after all, Moore clearly could
never be seated on the jury.
The district court was thus on
firm ground in applying the enhancement.
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VII.
In
sum,
convictions
for
on
the
Counts
foregoing
One
and
reasons,
Two,
we
affirm
reverse
his
Thomas’s
conviction
on
Count Three, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.
AFFIRMED
REVERSED
VACATED
AND
18
IN PART,
IN PART,
IN PART,
REMANDED
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