US v. Gary Hood

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:08-cr-00257-FDW-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998825450].. [11-4515]

Appeal: 11-4515

Document: 33

Date Filed: 04/04/2012

Page: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4515

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARY NIEL HOOD,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00257-FDW-1)

Submitted:

March 21, 2012

Decided:

April 4, 2012

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Angela G. Parrott, Director, Erin K. Taylor, Ross H. Richardson,
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Gary Niel Hood pled guilty to carjacking, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (2006); using a firearm in commission of a carjacking, 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006); and possessing a firearm after having
been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
appeal,

he

argues

that

the

district

conditions of supervised release.

court

imposed

On

improper

We affirm.

The contested conditions of supervised release include
psycho-sexual evaluations, psychological testing, possible sexoffender

treatment,

pornography

and

and

a

simulated

ban

against

child

possessing

pornography.

child
Because

“[d]istrict courts have broad latitude to impose conditions on
supervised release,” we review such conditions only for abuse of
discretion.
2009).

United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir.

The sentencing court may impose any condition that is

reasonably related to the relevant statutory sentencing factors.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); Armel, 585 F.3d at 186.
In

light

of

the

broad

discretion

afforded

district

courts in the imposition of supervised release conditions and in
light of Hood’s particular criminal history, we find that the
district

court

did

not

abuse

its

discretion

in

imposing

the

challenged conditions of supervised release.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument
2

because

the

facts

and

legal

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Date Filed: 04/04/2012

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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

3