US v. Rashad Muhammad

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:08-cr-01237-PMD-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998992312].. [11-4742]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4742

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RASHAD SALEEM MUHAMMAD,
Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston.
Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:08-cr-01237-PMD-1)

Argued:

September 21, 2012

Decided:

November 30, 2012

Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Russell Warren Mace, III, THE MACE FIRM, Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina, for Appellant.
Robert Nicholas Bianchi, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: William N. Nettles, United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, Nathan S. Williams, Assistant United
States
Attorney,
OFFICE
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
ATTORNEY,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
During

Rashad

Saleem

Muhammad’s

criminal

trial,

the

government produced for the first time a statement made by codefendant Damon Milford in March 2010 that tended to exculpate
Muhammad. Relying on the parties’ agreement that the statement
created a problem under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968), the district court granted a mistrial without Muhammad’s
consent. The court later denied Muhammad’s motion to dismiss the
indictment

on

double

jeopardy

grounds,

reasoning

that

the

mistrial was manifestly necessary because there were no viable
alternatives. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982)
(manifest

necessity

determination

when

standard
mistrial

applies
was

to

declared

double

jeopardy

without

consent).

Muhammad now appeals the denial of the motion to dismiss.
In Bruton, the Court “held that, in certain circumstances,
admission
inculpates

of

a

the

non-testifying
defendant

co-defendant’s

violates

the

confession

Sixth

that

Amendment’s

Confrontation Clause because the defendant has no opportunity
for cross-examination.” United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321,
376

(4th

Cir.

2010)

(emphasis

added).

Thus,

“[u]nless

the

prosecutor wishes to hold separate trials or to use separate
juries or to abandon use of the confession, he must redact the
confession to reduce significantly or to eliminate the special

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prejudice that the Bruton Court found.” Gray v. Maryland, 523
U.S. 185, 192 (1998).
At

trial,

discuss Bruton
first

party

the
in

to

parties
detail.

raise

and

the

Muhammad

Bruton,

see

district

appears
J.A.

court

493,

not

have

to

did
been

the

and

he

clearly

asserted Bruton as his basis for seeking a dismissal of the
indictment

with

prejudice,

government

acknowledged

see

that

J.A.

506.

Milford’s

For

March

its

part,

2010

the

statement

“certainly creates implications about Bruton,” J.A. 513-14, and
for this reason it conceded that a mistrial was appropriate and
consented to a mistrial, J.A. 515-16. In the order denying the
motion

to

dismiss,

the

court

stated:

“The

government

and

Defendants agreed that the statement allegedly made by Defendant
Damon Milford and summarized in the documents produced once the
trial

had

begun

created

a

constitutional

problem

based

upon

Bruton.” J.A. 592.
A

district

court

has

broad

discretion

in

determining

whether manifest necessity requires declaration of a mistrial,
and we review that court’s invocation of the manifest necessity
doctrine

and

concomitant

denial

of

a

motion

to

dismiss

an

indictment for abuse of this discretion. United States v. Sloan,
36 F.3d 386, 393 (4th Cir. 1994). Unquestionably, the district
court’s

mistrial

declaration

was

prompted

by

the

parties’

arguments that Milford’s March 2010 statement creates a Bruton
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problem. However, because Milford’s March 2010 statement tends
to exculpate, rather than inculpate, Muhammad, it actually does
not create a Bruton problem. Despite their contrary arguments
below, the parties agreed with this assessment at oral argument. 1
In

light

of

the

parties’

changed

positions

concerning

Bruton, we believe the prudent course is to remand this case to
the district court for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss.
See generally In re Matthews, 395 F.3d 477, 483 (4th Cir. 2005)
(remanding case for district court consideration of issue first
raised

on

reevaluate

appeal).
whether

On

remand,

manifest

the

necessity

district
existed

court
to

should

declare

the

mistrial, bearing in mind that the government “must shoulder the
[heavy] burden of justifying the mistrial . . . to avoid the
double jeopardy bar.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505
(1978). 2
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED
1

When trial began, Muhammad knew that Milford had given a
statement to law enforcement on August 21, 2008. Milford’s
August 2008 statement is contrary to his March 2010 statement in
that it tends to inculpate Muhammad. Although not addressed
below, the August 2008 statement may lead to a Bruton problem if
the government attempted to introduce it at trial. That
potential problem, if it exists at all, is independent of the
government’s untimely disclosure of the March 2010 statement.
2

On appeal, Muhammad challenges the district court’s finding
that the government did not commit intentional misconduct. We
discern no clear error in this finding. Therefore, we affirm the
court’s order denying the motion to dismiss to this extent.

4