US v. Kevin Battle

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:11-cr-00110-ELH-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998952561].. [11-5087]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5087

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEVIN BATTLE,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge.
(1:11-cr-00110-ELH-1)

Submitted:

June 22, 2012

Before TRAXLER,
Judges.

Chief

Judge,

Decided:

and

SHEDD

and

October 4, 2012

DUNCAN,

Circuit

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Martin G. Bahl, Staff
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Kevin
possession

of

922(g)(1).

Battle
a

pleaded

firearm

and

guilty

to

being

a

See

18

ammunition.

felon

in

U.S.C.

§

The district court concluded that Battle’s prior

convictions required him to be sentenced under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”), see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and the court
sentenced

Battle

to

180

months’

imprisonment,

sentence permissible under the Act.

the

minimum

Battle appeals, challenging

his designation as an armed career criminal.
A
armed

career

defendant
criminal

who
if

violates
he

has

§

922(g)

three

prior

violent felonies or serious drug offenses.

qualifies

as

convictions

an
for

See id. § 924(e)(1).

The district court held that Battle had two prior convictions
that

qualified

as

serious

drug

offenses

under

the

Act,

Battle does not challenge that conclusion on appeal.

and

Instead,

Battle argues that the district court erred by concluding that
his 1991 Maryland conviction for assault with intent to murder
categorically qualifies as a violent felony.

We disagree.

A violent felony is one that “has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another,” id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), or “is burglary,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves

conduct

that

presents

a

serious

potential

physical injury to another,” id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2

risk

of

As used in

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§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i), “physical force means violent force -- that
is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another
person.”
(2010).

Johnson

v.

United

States,

130

S.

Ct.

1265,

1271

Whether a prior conviction constitutes a violent felony

generally

is

statutory

definitions

particular

determined

facts

categorically,

of

the

underlying

prior
those

“looking

offenses,

only

convictions.”

the

not

and

to
to

the

Taylor

v.

United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990).
At

the

time

of

Battle’s

conviction,

assault

with

intent to commit murder required proof of an assault coupled
with a specific intent to kill.

See Abernathy v. State, 675

A.2d 115, 120 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).

Common-law assault

under Maryland law is an attempted battery or the intentional
placing of a victim in reasonable apprehension of an imminent
battery, while battery “‘is any unlawful application of force,
direct or indirect, to the body of the victim.’” 1

United States

v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (quoting
Lamb v. State, 613 A.2d 402, 413 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)).
Thus, under Maryland law, an assault conviction may be based on
a wide range of conduct, including conduct involving only slight
1

In 1996, the Maryland General Assembly enacted assault
statutes that “subsum[ed] and combin[ed] all statutory offenses
of assault then existent as well as all common law forms of
assault and battery into a single and comprehensive statutory
scheme.” Robinson v. State, 728 A.2d 698, 703-04 (Md. 1999).

3

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force and conduct involving “indirect applications of force such
as directing a dog to attack or exposing a helpless person to
the inclemency of the weather.”
F.3d

120,

125

(4th

Cir.

United States v. Kirksey, 138

1998)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
Because

assault

as

defined

by

Maryland

law

thus

“encompasses several distinct crimes, some of which qualify as
violent felonies and others of which do not,” United States v.
Alston,

611

repeatedly

F.3d
held

219,
that

223
a

(4th

Maryland

Cir.

2010),

assault

this

court

conviction

is

has
not

categorically a violent felony, see, e.g., id. at 222-23; United
States v. Harcum, 587 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2009); Coleman,
158 F.3d at 204.

The district court in this case, however,

concluded that although common-law assault is not categorically
a violent felony, assault with intent to murder is a violent
felony

under

Taylor’s

categorical

approach,

because

“Maryland

courts consistently require evidence of the use or threat of
deadly force by the defendant comparable to the violent felony
defined in Johnson.”

J.A. 79.

Battle challenges that ruling on appeal, arguing that
assault

with

intent

to

murder

does

not

violent force, as required by Johnson.

require

the

use

of

Battle contends that

assault with intent to murder can be committed without the use
of violent force – for example, by “tak[ing] hold of a victim’s
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arm

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and

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lead[ing]

him

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outside

in

below-freezing

with the intent that he freeze to death.”
14.

Battle

thus

argues

that

the

use

temperatures

Brief of Appellant at
or

threatened

use

of

violent force is not an element of assault with intent to murder
and that the district court therefore erred by concluding that
his Maryland conviction was categorically a crime of violence.
There is no need for us resolve that issue in this
case.

After concluding that assault with intent to murder was a

violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), the district
court also concluded that the offense was a violent felony under
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), the ACCA’s residual clause:
Even if assault with intent to murder does not include
as an element the use or attempted use of violent
force, it plainly involves great potential risk [of]
physical injury to a victim, because the perpetrator,
by definition, must intend to kill or at least
seriously injure the victim and must assault the
victim with that intention.
J.A. 83.
Battle does not dispute the court’s conclusion that
assault with intent to murder “involves conduct that presents a
serious
required

potential
by

§

risk

of

physical

924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

injury

Instead,

to

another,”

Battle

argues

as
on

appeal that because the residual clause itself is unclear and
the cases struggling to define its scope are “fatally flawed and
hopelessly confused,” Brief of Appellant at 28, the residual
clause must be struck down as unconstitutionally vague.
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The

Supreme

Court,

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however,

challenges to the residual clause.

has

rejected

vagueness

See James v. United States,

550 U.S. 192, 210 n.6 (2007) (“While ACCA requires judges to
make

sometimes

difficult

evaluations

of

the

risks

posed

by

different offenses, we are not persuaded by Justice Scalia’s
suggestion

.

.

.

that

the

residual

provision

is

unconstitutionally vague.”); accord Sykes v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 2267, 2277 (2011) (Although the “general and qualitative”
approach of the residual clause “may at times be . . . difficult
for

courts

intelligible

to

implement,”

principle

and

the

residual

provides

clause

guidance

“states

that

allows

an
a

person to conform his or her conduct to the law.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Supreme

Court’s

And while Battle contends that the

pronouncements

on

the

dicta, this court has held otherwise.

issue

are

non-binding

See United States v.

Mobley, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2012 WL 2866678, at *6 n.7 (4th Cir.
July 13, 2012) 2 (rejecting vagueness challenge to residual clause
of

U.S.S.G.

§

4B1.2

because

“the

Supreme

Court

has

already

determined that the residual clause falls ‘within congressional

2

“The
ACCA
defines
‘violent
felony’
in
a
manner
substantively identical to the definition of a ‘crime of
violence’ in § 4B1.2.
We have therefore held that precedents
evaluating the ACCA apply with equal force to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.”
United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 231 n.* (4th Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted).

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enact’

and

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constitutes

‘an

intelligible

principle

[that] provides guidance that allows a person to ‘conform his or
her conduct to the law.’” (quoting Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2277));
United States v. Hudson, 673 F.3d 263, 268-69 (4th Cir. 2012)
(rejecting vagueness challenge because it was not raised in the
defendant’s opening brief and because “the Supreme Court has
consistently

declined

to

find

the

residual

clause

void

for

vagueness”).
Because the residual clause is not unconstitutionally
vague, the district court committed no error by concluding that
Battle’s conviction for assault with intent to murder amounted
to a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), and
we affirm Battle’s sentence.

We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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