US v. Joel Ramirez-Montanez

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:11-cr-00118-JRS-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998866997].. [11-5115]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5115

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOEL
RAMIREZ-MONTANEZ,
Herbert Ramirez,

a/k/a

Gilberto

Ramirez,

a/k/a

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:11-cr-00118-JRS-1)

Submitted:

May 30, 2012

Decided:

June 4, 2012

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Elizabeth W.
Hanes, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Richard D.
Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Joel

Ramirez-Montanez

(“Ramirez”)

pled

guilty,

pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of illegally
reentering the United States after having been removed following
conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a),

(b)(2)

(2006).

In

the

plea

agreement,

Ramirez

reserved the right to challenge the district court’s denial of
his

motion

following

a

passenger.

to

suppress

stop

of

the

evidence
pickup

of

his

truck

identity

in

which

obtained
he

was

a

Ramirez argues on appeal that he was unreasonably

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by officers with
Immigration

and

Customs

Enforcement

(“ICE”)

and

that

the

evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal
seizure.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We

review

for

clear

error

the

factual

findings

underlying a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress and
the court’s legal conclusions de novo.
634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011).

United States v. Foster,

When evaluating the denial

of a suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Government, the party prevailing below.
Id.
Consistent
enforcement

officer

with
“may

the
conduct

Fourth
a

brief

Amendment,

a

law

investigatory

stop

where the officer has reasonable suspicion [but not probable
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believe]

that

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criminal

activity

may

be

afoot.”

United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004).
To satisfy

the

Fourth

Amendment,

a

temporary

stop

must

be

“justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.”

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).

Officers may

stop a suspect when they can “point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”

Id. at 21.

Courts

are to judge those facts “against an objective standard: would
the

facts

available

to

the

officer

at

the

moment

of

the

seizure . . . warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate?”

Id. at 21-22

(internal quotation marks omitted).
A Terry or investigative stop may become a full-scale
arrest

requiring

probable

cause

under

certain

circumstances.

“The test for determining whether an individual is in custody or
under

arrest

is

whether,

under

the

totality

of

the

circumstances, the suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a
degree
250 F.3d

associated
843,

850

with

formal

(4th

Cir.

arrest.”

2001)

Park

(internal

v.

Shiflett,

quotation

marks

omitted); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)
(explaining that, instead of being distinguished by the absence
of any restriction of liberty, Terry stops differ from custodial
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interrogation in that they must last no longer than necessary to
verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court correctly determined that the
initial stop of the pickup truck was a Terry stop supported by
reasonable suspicion.

We find no merit to Ramirez’ assertion

that the stop of the truck was transformed into a full-scale
arrest requiring probable cause by the ICE officers’ attire,
alleged armaments, and positioning of their vehicles relative to
the

truck.

(4th Cir.

United
1995).

States
We

v.

further

Leshuk,

65

conclude

F.3d

that

the

1105,

1109

officers’

confirmation of Ramirez’ identity during the stop provided the
probable

cause

necessary

to

support

his

subsequent

arrest.

United States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because

the

facts

and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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