Patrick Watson v. K. Brown

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion--denying Motion for transcript at government expense [998590297-2] Originating case number: 1:09-cv-00731-AJT-JFA Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998680245]. Mailed to: Patrick Watson. [11-6523]

Appeal: 11-6523

Document: 13

Date Filed: 09/19/2011

Page: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6523

PATRICK STEPHEN WATSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
K. BROWN; BHAGIRATH, Sgt.,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
UNKNOWN, Defendant No. 3; UNKNOWN, Defendant No. 4,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Anthony John Trenga,
District Judge. (1:09-cv-00731-AJT-JFA)

Submitted:

September 13, 2011

Decided:

September 19, 2011

Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Patrick Stephen Watson, Appellant Pro Se. Jeff W. Rosen, PENDER
& COWARD, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 11-6523

Document: 13

Date Filed: 09/19/2011

Page: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:
Patrick
order

granting

Stephen

summary

Watson

judgment

U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint.

appeals
to

the

the

district

Defendants

on

court’s
his

42

For the reasons that follow, we

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary

judgment,

viewing

the

facts

and

drawing

reasonable

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011).

Summary judgment may be granted only when “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.”

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

56(a);

see

“[T]here is

no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986).

For a non-movant to present a genuine issue of material

fact, “[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice,
nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the nonmoving party’s] case.”

Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312

F.3d

Cir.

645,

649

(4th

Watson,

a

2002)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
former

pre-trial

detainee,

premises

claim against Brown on the excessive use of force.
2

his

He claims

Appeal: 11-6523

Document: 13

Brown

Date Filed: 09/19/2011

deliberately

closed

a

Page: 3 of 5

prison

door

on

him

and

thus

aggravated his already-broken shoulder.

The Eighth Amendment

prohibits

unusual

the

infliction

of

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
excessive

sentences

treatment

and

“cruel

and

punishments.”

This prohibition “not only outlaws

but

also

conditions

protects

while

inmates

from

Williams

imprisoned.”

Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).

inhumane
v.

“Eighth Amendment

analysis necessitates inquiry as to whether the prison official
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective
component)
inflicted

and
on

component).”

whether

the

the

inmate

deprivation

was

suffered

sufficiently

serious

or

injury

(objective

Id.

To meet the subjective component of an excessive force
claim, the claimant must show that the prison official applied
force

“maliciously

and

sadistically

for

the

very

purpose

of

causing harm” rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline.
(1986)

(internal

objective

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21

quotation

component,

marks

“[w]hen

omitted).

prison

But,

officials

as

to

the

maliciously

and

sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of
decency

always

are

violated.

This

significant injury is evident.”

is

beaten

by

whether

or

not

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 9 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
gratuitously

true

guards

does
3

not

“An inmate who is
lose

his

ability

to

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Date Filed: 09/19/2011

Page: 4 of 5

pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good
fortune to escape without serious injury.”

Wilkins v. Gaddy,

130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010) (per curiam).
Brown’s

and

Watson’s

factual

assertions

effectively

boiled down to a swearing contest backed chiefly by the parties’
own affidavits.

Crediting Watson’s version of events as we must

on summary judgment review, Brown deliberately shut the door on
him and told him as much.

Watson did not perceive the door was

closing until he was pinned against the doorway.

The district

court therefore erred when it made a dispositive credibility
determination

on

the

basis

of

the

competing

affidavits.

We

vacate the district court’s summary judgment in Brown’s favor
and remand for consideration of Brown’s alternative grounds for
summary judgment.
Watson

claims

deliberate

medical need against Bhagirath.

indifference

to

a

serious

For a claimant to prevail on

such a claim, “the need must be both apparent and serious, and
the

denial

of

attention

must

be

both

legitimate penological objective.”
692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999).

deliberate

and

without

Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d

“Deliberate indifference is a very

high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”
Id.

at

695.

Instead,

a

prison

guard

evinces

deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need by intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering
4

Appeal: 11-6523

Document: 13

Date Filed: 09/19/2011

with the treatment once prescribed.
97,

104-05

(1976).

Watson

failed

Page: 5 of 5

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
to

show

a

serious

injury

sufficient to avoid summary judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on Watson’s claim against Bhagirath.

We vacate

the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Brown and
remand so that the district court may consider in the first
instance

the

alternative

grounds

raised

by

Brown’s

summary

judgment motion.

We deny Watson’s request for transcripts at

the

expense.

Government’s

We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

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