Ivan Teleguz v. Loretta Kelly

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:10-cv-00254-JPJ. Copies to all parties and the district court. [998907846]. [11-9]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-9

IVAN TELEGUZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
EDDIE L. PEARSON, Warden, Sussex I State Prison,
Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
James P. Jones, District
Judge. (7:10-cv-00254-JPJ)

Argued:

May 16, 2012

Decided:

August 2, 2012

Before MOTZ, DAVIS and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated in part and remanded by published opinion.
Judge Wynn
wrote the opinion in which Judge Motz and Judge Davis concurred.

ARGUED: Matthew Carey Stiegler, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for
Appellant.
Katherine Baldwin Burnett, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON
BRIEF: Elizabeth J. Peiffer, VIRGINIA CAPITAL REPRESENTATION
RESOURCE CENTER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant.
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General of Virginia,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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WYNN, Circuit Judge:
Ivan
sentenced

Teleguz,

to

death

in

convicted
Virginia,

of

capital

appeals

murder

from

the

and

district

court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas
corpus relief.

We granted a certificate of appealability to

determine whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying Teleguz’s request for an evidentiary hearing to develop
his claim of actual innocence, which, under Schlup v. Delo, 513
U.S.

298

(1995),

would

allow

the

district

court

to

Teleguz’s procedurally defaulted constitutional claims.
that

the

conduct

district
a

sound

court
and

abused

thorough

its

discretion

analysis

of

in

address
We hold

failing

Teleguz’s

to

Schlup

gateway innocence claim as required by our decision in Wolfe v.
Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 163 (4th Cir. 2009), and we remand for
further proceedings.

I.
On

February

9,

2006,

a

jury

convicted

Teleguz

of

capital murder for hire after his former girlfriend, Stephanie
Sipe, was found dead in the apartment she shared with Teleguz’s
infant son.

Although DNA evidence linked Michael Hetrick to the

murder, Hetrick testified at Teleguz’s trial that Teleguz had
hired

him

to

corroborated

commit
by

two

the

crime.

additional
2

Hetrick’s
witnesses:

allegations
Edwin

Gilkes

were
and

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Aleksey Safanov.

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Gilkes testified that he had been present at a

birthday party where Teleguz hired Hetrick to commit the murder.
Gilkes

also

apartment

testified

and

waited

that

he

outside

accompanied
for

Hetrick

Hetrick
during

to

the

Sipe’s
murder.

Gilkes further claimed that he was afraid of Teleguz because he
had heard rumors that Teleguz was a member of the Russian mafia,
as well as a specific account of a murder committed by Teleguz
in Ephrata, Pennsylvania.

According to Gilkes, Teleguz had shot

a Russian criminal in the street outside the Ephrata Recreation
Center.
Safanov testified that Teleguz attempted to hire him
to murder Sipe so that Teleguz would no longer be required to
pay

child

support.

Safanov

also

testified

that

Teleguz

had

spoken to him after the murder, complaining that “the black man”
he had hired to kill Sipe had left blood at the scene, and
offering Safanov money if he would “eliminate [the] killer.”
J.A. 325.

Although other evidence was presented at trial, the

Supreme Court of Virginia explained that, “in order to return a
guilty

verdict,

the

jury

had

to

believe

the

testimony

of

Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 643

Safanov, Gilkes, and Hetrick.”

S.E.2d 708, 728 (Va. 2007) (“Teleguz I”).
On February 14, 2006, the jury recommended a death
sentence after finding that two statutory aggravating factors
were

present:

vileness

and

future
3

dangerousness.

Following

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Teleguz’s appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his
conviction and sentence.

Teleguz I, 643 S.E.2d at 732.

He then

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court, which
Teleguz v. Warden of

the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed.

Sussex I State Prison, 688 S.E.2d 865, 879 (Va. 2010).

On

November 12, 2010, Teleguz filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus

in

District

the
of

United

States

Virginia,

District

asserting

Court

the

Western

grounds

for

relief.

various

for

Some of Teleguz’s claims had been adjudicated on the merits by
the

Supreme

Court

of

procedurally defaulted.

Virginia,

while

others

had

been

Teleguz argued that, pursuant to the

Supreme Court’s decision in Schlup, 513 U.S. 298, the district
court should consider the merits of his procedurally defaulted
claims because new and reliable evidence established that he was
actually innocent of Sipe’s murder (“Schlup gateway innocence
claim”).
In
Teleguz

support

offered

of

several

his

Schlup

categories

gateway
of

innocence

evidence.

claim,

First,

he

presented affidavits of third-party witnesses who claimed that
Teleguz did not attend the birthday party during which he was
alleged to have hired Hetrick to kill Sipe.
police

reports

and

affidavits

to

Second, he offered

establish

that

no

murder

occurred outside the Ephrata Recreation Center, that no murder
that

occurred

in

Ephrata

prior
4

to

Teleguz’s

trial

remains

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unsolved, and that the only murder involving a Russian victim
occurred

at

a

private

residence.

Third,

Teleguz

presented

affidavits in which Gilkes and Safanov recanted the testimony
they offered at Teleguz’s trial.

Gilkes now claims that he was

coerced into testifying against Teleguz by the prosecutor, who
“made clear that if [he] did not, [he] would have been the one
on death row today, not Teleguz.”

J.A. 1281.

affidavits

denying

in

both

2008

Hetrick to kill Sipe.
but

was

contacted

and

2010

Gilkes executed

that

Teleguz

hired

Safanov currently resides in Kazakhstan,

by

lawyers

from

Teleguz’s

defense

team.

According to their affidavits, Safanov now insists that he never
discussed
during

Sipe’s

Teleguz’s

murder
trial

with
only

Teleguz
because

and
he

agreed

believed

to
that

testify
if

he

cooperated with the prosecutor, he would be eligible for a visa
allowing

him

to

stay

in

the

United

States

despite

pending

federal gun charges.
On

August

1,

2011,

the

district

court

opinion and order denying Teleguz habeas relief.

issued

an

Teleguz v.

Kelly, 824 F. Supp. 2d 672, 723 (W.D. Va. 2011) (“Teleguz II”).
We granted a certificate of appealability to determine whether
the district court abused its discretion in denying Teleguz’s

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request for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298. 1

II.
We review a district court’s denial of habeas relief
de novo and its decision not to grant an evidentiary hearing for
Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 160.

abuse of discretion.

When a court

bases its decision on an error of law, it necessarily abuses its
Id.

discretion.

A.
“In

disposing

of

a

§

2254

habeas

corpus

petition”

federal courts are “substantially constrain[ed]” in their review
of state court convictions by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).

Id. at 159.

The AEDPA was

“designed to further the principles of comity, finality, and
federalism” by limiting federal habeas proceedings.
Bell,

593

F.3d

372,

379

omitted).

Accordingly,

petitioner’s

claims

on

the

(4th
if

Cir.

a

state

merits,

a

1

2010)

Sharpe v.

(quotation

court
federal

marks

adjudicates
court

may

a

only

We also granted a certificate of appealability on
Teleguz’s guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Because this claim may be more fully developed on remand, we
have not addressed that claim and will, accordingly, reserve
judgment.
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award habeas relief if the resulting state court decision “[i]s
contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of federal
law”

or

“[i]s

based

on

an

unreasonable

determination

facts in light of the evidence” that was before it.
2254(d).

of

the

28 U.S.C. §

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly

established federal law only if it is ‘substantially different’
from

the

relevant

unreasonable

Supreme

application

of’

Court

precedent;

it

established

federal

clearly

is

‘an
law

Wolfe, 565 F.3d at

only if it is ‘objectively unreasonable.’”

159 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 409 (2000)).
Further, a federal court ordinarily may not consider
claims that a petitioner failed to raise at the time and in the
manner

required

demonstrates
asserted

under

cause

error.”

state

for

the

House

v.

law

default
Bell,

unless
and

547

“the

prejudice

U.S.

518,

prisoner
from

536

the

(2006).

However, in Schlup, 513 U.S. 298, the Supreme Court recognized
that

in

certain

exceptional

cases,

a

compelling

showing

of

actual innocence would enable a federal court to consider the
merits of a petitioner’s otherwise defaulted claims.

In these

cases,

about

new

evidence

“establish[es]

sufficient

doubt

[a

petitioner’s] guilt to justify the conclusion that his execution
would be a miscarriage of justice unless his conviction was the
product of a fair trial.”

Id. at 316 (emphasis in original).

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Courts

have

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consistently

emphasized

that

actual

innocence for the purposes of Schlup is a procedural mechanism
rather than a substantive claim.

See, e.g., Sibley v. Culliver,

377 F.3d 1196, 1207 n.9 (11th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing between
a

“substantive

claim

for

relief

upon

which

the

petition

for

habeas corpus is based” and a Schlup “gateway through which a
habeas

petitioner

must

heard on the merits). 2

pass”

to

have

his

substantive

claims

In other words, although a petitioner

claims actual innocence for the purposes of asserting a Schlup
claim, this innocence claim “does not by itself provide a basis
for relief.

Instead, his claim for relief relies critically on

the validity” of his procedurally defaulted claims.
Hardy,

628

F.3d

314,

318

(7th

Cir.

2010)

Coleman v.

(quotation

marks

gateway

actual

omitted).
When
innocence

a

claim,

petitioner
it

must

raises
be

2

a

Schlup

supported

by

“new

reliable

A petitioner may also raise a freestanding innocence claim
in a federal habeas petition, alleging that, irrespective of any
procedural errors, petitioner is innocent, and that “the
execution of an innocent person would violate the Eighth
Amendment.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314. The Supreme Court has not
articulated the standard under which these claims should be
evaluated, but has made clear that the “threshold for any
hypothetical freestanding innocence claim [is] ‘extraordinarily
high.’” House, 547 U.S. at 555 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 417 (1993)).
A petitioner seeking to address
procedurally defaulted claims under Schlup must meet “a lessstringent—though
nevertheless
rigorous”
standard
than
a
petitioner who seeks relief on the basis of innocence alone.
Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 164.
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evidence.”

513

Schlup,

Pg: 9 of 18

U.S.

at

324.

However,

in

its

consideration of a petitioner’s Schlup gateway actual innocence
claim, the district court “must consider ‘all the evidence’ old
and

new,

whether

incriminating

it

would

and

exculpatory,

necessarily

be

without

regard

to

under

‘rules

of

admitted

admissibility that would govern at trial.’”
537

(quoting

(quotation

Schlup,

marks

513

U.S.

omitted).

at

In

House, 547 U.S. at

327-28)

light

of

(emphasis

this

added)

evidence,

the

district court must determine whether “it is more likely than
not that no reasonable juror would have found [the] petitioner
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.

the

“more

district

reasonable

court

juror

finds

would

that,

have

likely

reasonable

than

doubt”

If

not

any

to

the

as

petitioner’s guilt, then the petitioner has satisfied the Schlup
standard, and the district court must review the petitioner’s
procedurally defaulted claims.

House, 547 U.S. at 538.

B.
Here,

Teleguz’s

habeas

petition

asserted

a

Schlup

gateway innocence claim to allow the district court to consider
the merits of his procedurally defaulted claims.

Teleguz argues

that he met the Schlup standard with an extraordinary showing of
actual

innocence

because

“two

of

the

prosecution’s

three

critical witnesses hav[e] admitted that their trial testimony
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was false, [and] it is [therefore] . . . more likely than not
that any reasonable juror presented with all the evidence, old
and new, incriminating and exculpatory, would have a reasonable
doubt about Teleguz’s guilt.”
marks omitted).

Although we appreciate that the district court

“attentively

managed

reviewed

extensive

the

Appellant’s Br. 29 (quotation

complex

proceedings”

record”

that

was

and

before

“carefully
it

in

this

case, House, 547 U.S. at 540, we are unable to conclude, based
on the district court’s opinion, that Teleguz’s Schlup gateway
innocence

claim

was

properly

analyzed

and

resolved

by

the

district court.
The

district

court

correctly

set

out

standard in its explanation of the relevant law. 3
explained

in

Wolfe,

“a

sound

analysis

of

the

the

Schlup

However, as we
Schlup

is essential to properly resolve these § 2254 proceedings.”
F.3d at 163 (emphasis added).
in

addressing

Teleguz’s

issue
565

Notwithstanding this requirement,

procedurally

defaulted

claims,

the

district court simply stated that “Teleguz has not shown cause
and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse

3

There was one error in the district court’s explanation.
Compare Teleguz II, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 685 (“In assessing a
petitioner’s claim of actual innocence, the court may consider
all relevant evidence . . . .” (emphasis added)), with House,
547 U.S. at 538 (“Schlup makes plain that the habeas court must
consider ‘all the evidence.’” (emphasis added) (quotation marks
omitted)).
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the default.”

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Teleguz II, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 698; see also id.

at 695 (“Teleguz has failed to show cause for the default and .
. . has not shown a fundamental miscarriage of justice that
would

excuse

failed

to

the

show

default.”);
cause

and

id.

at

708,

prejudice

or

709
a

(“Teleguz

has

miscarriage

of

justice.”); id. at 696 (“[T]here is no fundamental miscarriage
of justice to excuse that default.”).
the

district

court

more

Nowhere in its order does

thoroughly

or

Teleguz’s Schlup gateway innocence claim. 4

directly

consider

Consequently, this

Court is left with the district court’s conclusory explanations,
which do not provide sufficient analysis to enable us to review
the reasons for, or scope of, the district court’s denial of
Teleguz’s Schlup gateway innocence claim.
Further, that the district court addressed the cause
and prejudice standard and the miscarriage of justice standard
in the same sentences indicates that the district court likely
based its analysis on a mistake of law, by applying its Schlup
analysis

to

individual

procedurally

defaulted

claims.

See,

e.g., Teleguz II, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 698 (“Teleguz has not shown

4

In evaluating Teleguz’s freestanding innocence claim, the
district court laid out the relevant evidence, and determined
whether it was sufficient to meet the “extraordinarily high”
Herrera standard.
See Teleguz II, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 713-16.
However, this analysis is insufficient to dispose of Teleguz’s
Schlup gateway innocence claim due to the difference in the
governing legal standards. See supra note 2.
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cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to
excuse

the

standard

default.”).

and

While

Schlup’s

both

the

fundamental

cause

and

miscarriage

of

prejudice
justice

standard excuse a procedural default and allow a federal court
to review defaulted claims on the merits, a petitioner must meet
the

cause

claim.
1996)

and

prejudice

standard

with

respect

to

each

McCleese v. United States, 75 F.3d 1174, 1179 (7th Cir.
(“Claims

determining

are

whether

reviewed
they

individually

overcome

a

for

procedural

purposes
default;

of
each

claim must meet the cause and prejudice test.”).
By contrast, a petitioner’s satisfaction of the Schlup
standard

does

miscarriage
defaulted

of

not

require

justice

claim.

caused

Rather,

to

a

showing
or

that

underlies

satisfy

the

a

fundamental

each

procedurally

Schlup

standard,

a

petitioner must instead demonstrate that the totality of the
evidence would prevent any reasonable juror from finding him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, such that his incarceration is
a miscarriage of justice.

See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.

If a

petitioner passes through the Schlup gateway by satisfying this
standard, the district court then considers, and reaches the
merits

of,

all

of

the

petitioner’s

procedurally

defaulted

claims.
Other portions of the district court’s opinion also
support our determination that the district court erroneously
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applied its Schlup analysis individually to each procedurally
defaulted

claim

evidence.

See, e.g., Teleguz II, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12

(examining

a

concluding,
excuse

“I

do

not

find

court

Teleguz

particular
]

of

the

the

claim

issue

Schlup
not

Schlup,”

on

would
and

the

The

inquiry

or

in

merits
enough

in

its

Schlup

under

the

and
to

Commonwealth

discussed

qualify

claiming

of

significant

engage

identified

claim

totality

default”).

need

“never

defaulted

standard[

this

procedural

the

to

defaulted

mischaracterizes

that

because

than

procedurally

Teleguz’s

similarly
arguing

rather

brief,

analysis
how

any

gateway

that

instead

the

Teleguz

“simply contended that he was innocent, that he had defaulted
claims,

and

that

he

Appellee’s Br. 25.
“federal
[a

habeas

Schlup

connected

a

was

entitled

to

relief.”

We reject the Commonwealth’s contention that
courts

gateway]
to

therefore

may

not

innocence

defaulted

Appellee’s Br. 21.

entertain

[claim]

claim

of

that

any
is

argument
not

constitutional

of

causally
error.”

We find no jurisprudential support for a

requirement

that

a

petitioner’s

evidence

procedurally

defaulted

causal
of

relationship

actual

claims.

innocence
In

exist
and

House,

a
for

between

a

petitioner’s
example,

a

petitioner convicted of capital murder claimed that DNA evidence
proved he had not committed the crime, and that his counsel’s
ineffectiveness had resulted in his conviction.
13

547 U.S. at

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533,

Filed: 08/02/2012

540.

The

Supreme

Pg: 14 of 18

Court

examined

the

DNA

evidence

and

witness testimony that House offered in support of his actual
innocence of the crime, and held that he had met the Schlup
gateway

innocence

standard

without

counsel’s performance at trial.
satisfied
proceed

the

on

gateway

remand

discussion

of

his

See id. at 555 (“House has

standard

with

any

set

procedurally

forth

in

defaulted

Schlup

and

may

constitutional

claims.”). 5
Thus, a district court’s inquiry into a Schlup gateway
innocence claim requires an examination of all of the evidence
and a threshold determination about the petitioner’s claim of
innocence that is separate from its inquiry into the fairness of
his

trial.

“standard

See
is

innocence”).

Schlup,

intended
The

513
to

district

U.S.
focus
court

5

at

327

the
must

(noting

inquiry
make

that
on

a

the

actual
holistic

Further, the Commonwealth’s reliance on Calderon v.
Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998), is misplaced.
In Calderon, a
petitioner offered new evidence that merely undermined the
credibility of the witnesses who testified against him by
showing that they were generally dishonest and had more prior
convictions than they had admitted to at trial.
The Supreme
Court characterized this evidence as “a step removed from
evidence pertaining to the crime itself.”
Id. at 563.
Critically, the petitioner in Calderon made “no appreciable
effort to assert his innocence of [the] murder.”
Id. at 560.
Here, by contrast, Teleguz has presented evidence of two of his
three accusers’ recantations, calling into question the only
direct evidence linking him to Sipe’s murder.
And this new
evidence is closely linked to Teleguz’s assertion of actual
innocence.
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determination of how a reasonable juror would perceive all of
the

evidence

in

the

record.

Only

if

the

district

court

determines that a reasonable juror would more than likely have a
reasonable

doubt

procedurally

does

defaulted

it

then

consider

claims.

Because

the
we

petitioner’s

are

unable

to

conclude that the district court engaged in the rigorous Schlup
analysis required by Wolfe, we vacate and remand on this issue.

III.
Because
Teleguz’s

Schlup

we

remand

gateway

for

innocence

further

claim,

the

analysis
district

of
court

will again be faced with the issue of whether to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to allow Teleguz to develop this innocence
claim.

We therefore turn next to this issue.
In its detailed opinion, the district court did not

explain its decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing on
Teleguz’s

Schlup

gateway

innocence

claim.

On

remand,

the

district court should address whether Teleguz should be granted
an evidentiary hearing. 6

The district court should consider the

6

Our sister circuits considering whether the limitation on
evidentiary hearings in § 2254(e)(2) applies to Schlup claims
have overwhelmingly found that it does not.
See Cristin v.
Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 417 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that Congress
did not intend § 2254(e)(2) restrictions on evidentiary hearings
to apply to “hearings on excuses to procedural defaults”);
accord Sibley, 377 F.3d at 1207 n.9; McSwain v. Davis, 287 F.
(Continued)
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particular
actual

Filed: 08/02/2012

facts

raised

innocence

claim

hearing is warranted.

by
in

Pg: 16 of 18

the

petitioner

determining

in

support

whether

an

of

his

evidentiary

Compare Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404,

417 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s decision to
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if petitioner met the
threshold of actual innocence), with Thomas v. Taylor, 170 F.3d
466, 475 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court’s denial
of

evidentiary

hearing

on

actual

innocence

when

petitioner’s

requested discovery could not establish his actual innocence).
This

Court

has

counseled

that,

when

a

witness

providing the “only direct evidence implicating [a petitioner]
in

the

murder-for-hire

scheme”

recants

his

testimony,

this

recantation “strongly suggests that an evidentiary hearing may
be warranted.”
evidentiary
recantations
surrounding

Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 170.

hearing
are
the

may

credible,

be

necessary
or

recantation[s]

whether
suggest

We explained that an
to

assess

“‘the
[that

whether

circumstances
they

are]

the

App’x 450, 462 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); Vineyard v.
Dretke, 125 F. App’x 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); see
also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 861 (explaining that a Schlup “claim of
actual innocence is not itself a constitutional claim but
instead a gateway” to the review of other constitutional
claims). Cf. Coleman, 628 F.3d at 319-20 n.2 (holding that not
§ 2254(e)(2)(A), but rather § 2254(e)(2)(B) applies); Williams
v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing
an evidentiary hearing “to present new evidence to support
[petitioner’s] primary claim” and “an evidentiary hearing for
purposes of establishing cause and prejudice”).
16

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Doc: 43

result

Filed: 08/02/2012

of

coercion,

Pg: 17 of 18

bribery

or

misdealing.’”

at

Id.

169

(quoting United States v. Johnson, 487 F.2d 1278, 1279 (4th Cir.
1973)).
for

This

Schlup

record.

of

credibility

analysis,

Cf.

evidentiary

type

may

be

Coleman,

628

F.3d

hearing

to

determination,

more
at

“evaluate

difficult

320-21
the

required

on

a

(remanding

reliability”

cold

for
of

an
the

recantation of a codefendant whose “reputation for honesty is
weak”).

The district court should also consider the “heightened

need for fairness in the administration of death[,] . . . born
of the appreciation that death truly is different from all other
punishments a society inflicts upon its citizens.”

Callins v.

Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1149 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
The Commonwealth correctly notes in its brief that a
district

court’s

ability

to

make

factual

determinations

is

constrained by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which provides that any
“determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be
presumed to be correct.”
factual
issue,

determination
the

petitioner

Thus, when a state court has made a

bearing
bears

on
the

the

resolution

burden

of

of

a

rebutting

presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.”

Schlup
this

Sharpe, 593

F.3d at 378.
Here, however, the Supreme Court of Virginia has not
assessed the credibility of Teleguz’s recantations.
17

It is well

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Pg: 18 of 18

established that the district court is permitted under Schlup to
“make some credibility assessments” when, as here, a state court
has

not

presented

evaluated
evidence

the

reliability

[that]

may

of

indeed

a

petitioner’s

call

into

question

credibility of the witnesses presented at trial.”
U.S.

at

330.

Accordingly,

the

district

“newly
the

Schlup, 513

court

may

make

determinations about “the probative force of relevant evidence
that was either excluded or unavailable at trial,” id. at 32728,

and

“assess

how

reasonable

jurors

would

react

to

the

overall, newly supplemented record,” House, 547 U.S. at 538, but
the district court may not reject the factual findings of a
state court absent clear error.

Sharpe, 593 F.3d at 379.

IV.
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

we

vacate

the

district

court’s decision in part and remand for further proceedings.

VACATED IN PART
AND REMANDED

18