Randy Atkins v. Kenneth Lassiter
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:06-cv-00372-MR Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998976548].. [12-1]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1
RANDY LYNN ATKINS,
Petitioner – Appellant,
v.
KENNETH E. LASSITER, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North
Carolina,
Respondent – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:06-cv-00372-MR)
Argued:
September 19, 2012
Decided:
November 7, 2012
Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Timothy M. CAIN,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Jonathan Lee Megerian, Asheboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant.
Sandra Wallace-Smith, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul
M. Green, OFFICE OF THE APPELLATE DEFENDER OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Roy Cooper, Attorney
General of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
On November 18, 1993, in the Superior Court of Buncombe
County, North Carolina, Randy Lynn Atkins pled guilty to firstdegree
murder
James
in
Atkins.
the
On
death
of
December
his
8,
eight-month-old
1993,
following
son,
a
Lyle
capital
sentencing hearing, a jury unanimously recommended that Atkins
be
sentenced
to
death.
The
presiding
judge
imposed
the
recommended sentence.
On direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld
Atkins’s sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied
Atkins’s
petition
unsuccessfully
for
sought
a
writ
state
of
certiorari.
post-conviction
Thereafter,
relief.
He
he
then
filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, in the Western District of North Carolina.
On August
16, 2011, the district court denied Atkins’s petition, and we
subsequently granted a certificate of appealability.
We now
address Atkins’s claims that he received ineffective assistance
of
counsel
and
that
the
State
failed
to
disclose
materially
favorable evidence.
I.
A.
The facts underlying Atkins’s conviction are as follows:
The State presented evidence at the sentencing
proceeding tending to show that, on 16 March 1993,
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defendant inflicted fatal injuries to his son, Lyle.
Defendant,
Lyle,
and
Lyle’s
mother
were
living
together at the time at the Lazywood Mobile Home Park
in Buncombe County.
Lyle’s mother, Ms. Colleen Shank, testified that
on the morning of 16 March 1993, she asked defendant
to watch Lyle while she washed some clothes.
Ms.
Shank stated that she heard a “bang.”
Following the
“bang,” Ms. Shank heard Lyle begin to cry, and she
rushed to the living room.
Ms. Shank testified that
she then observed defendant hitting Lyle’s head
against the trailer wall a “few times.” She testified
further that she saw defendant “swing him [Lyle] very
strong” and that “Lyle hit the wall very hard.”
Ms.
Shank tried to comfort Lyle and attempted to lay the
child down to rest. However, Lyle soon began to cry,
and Ms. Shank noted that he was turning blue.
The
mother administered CPR and requested that defendant
go to a neighbor’s home to call 911 for emergency
assistance.
Defendant then went to the home of a neighbor and
called 911. The 911 operator testified that defendant
responded to her questions concerning medical history
related
to
Lyle’s
emergency
by
replying[,]
“it . . . may have been sick two or three days, but no
other.”
Lyle’s mother testified that while waiting
for emergency personnel to arrive, defendant told her,
“Don’t say anything, because I will hurt you too.”
Following
the
arrival
of
emergency
medical
personnel, Lyle was transported by helicopter to
Mission
Memorial
Hospital
in
Asheville.
Upon
admission to the hospital, Lyle was noted to be limp,
not moving, and exhibiting a slow heart rate.
The
admitting physician noted numerous injuries to the
small child, including bruising on both sides of his
head, an older bruise on his left elbow, bruising on
his right wrist and right hand, a deformation of his
pelvis, and an improperly healed fracture of his right
lower leg.
A detective from the Woodfin Police Department
questioned defendant and Ms. Shank in the waiting room
of the hospital. Defendant initially told the officer
that Lyle had stopped breathing “because of the Ker–O–
Sun heater.”
Defendant responded to the officer’s
further inquiry by adding that “a couple of days ago I
was holding him, and he slipped and fell, and he hurt
his arm.”
The officer subsequently arrested both
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defendant and Ms. Shank and transported them to the
Buncombe County jail. Later that day, while in police
custody, defendant issued a written statement in which
he admitted the following:
Today Lyle was crying as I was holding
him, and my temper and patience snapped
again, as he was crying and crying no matter
how soothing and gentle I was. He just kept
crying, and I couldn’t handle him any more,
and I started hitting him on the side of his
head and trying to get him to stop crying,
and he wouldn’t. I kept telling him to stop
it, and he wouldn’t, and I kept on hitting
him with my hand on his head.
Despite aggressive medical efforts to save Lyle’s
life, he died at Asheville’s Mission Memorial Hospital
on 18 March 1993.
State v. Atkins, 505 S.E.2d 97, 105 (N.C. 1998).
B.
The State indicted Atkins for first-degree murder and for
first-degree sexual assault.
As a condition of his guilty plea
for murder, the State dismissed the sexual assault charge and
agreed
not
to
reference
that
charge
or
other
alleged
sexual
assaults during the sentencing hearing.
At
the
sentencing
hearing,
the
State
presented
evidence
supporting one statutory aggravating circumstance—namely, that
the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”
Gen.
Stat.
§
15A–2000(e)(9).
radiologist testified that
3
An
experienced
N.C.
pediatric
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the eight-month-old infant exhibited the following
injuries upon admission to Mission Memorial Hospital
on 16 March 1993: healing fracture of the right
clavicle, healing bone along the midshaft of the right
upper arm, extensive injury of the left upper arm,
dislocation of the left elbow, healing bone indicative
of a fracture of the right hip, skull fractures and
bruising on both the left and right sides, and a
compression fracture of the spine.
Further testimony
indicated that the injuries occurred in at least two
episodes of injury to Lyle. The pediatric radiologist
estimated that the time of the origin of injuries
ranged from four weeks prior to the hospital admission
up to within a day of the admission. Several treating
physicians also testified at the sentencing proceeding
that Lyle exhibited symptoms of “battered child
syndrome.”
. . . Dr. Cynthia Brown, a pediatrician,
. . . defined a “battered child” as a “child that
presents with multiple purposely inflicted injuries
that are of varying ages.”
Atkins, 505 S.E.2d at 106.
Atkins
responded
circumstances
and
circumstance,
presented
with
see
a
N.C.
mitigating
twenty-five
statutory
Gen.
evidence
Stat.
via
potential
mitigating
“catchall”
§
mitigating
15A–2000(f)(9).
testimony
from
He
psychologist
Dr. Joseph Horacek, social worker Audrey Bryant, former employer
Jesse
Carr,
and
an
investigator
from
the
public
defender’s
office, David Waites.
After weighing the mitigation against the aggravation, the
jury
found
heinous,
as
aggravation
atrocious
or
that
cruel,”
the
see
murder
N.C.
was
Gen.
“especially
Stat.
§
15A-
2000(e)(9), and as mitigation that (1) Atkins “qualifie[d] as
having a learning disability due to his IQ variations,” and (2)
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Atkins
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“was
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diagnosed . . . in
personality
disorder
disturbance
of
and
emotions
April
adjustment
and
of
1993
disorder
conduct.”
as
having
with
Ultimately,
a
a
mixed
the
jury
unanimously recommended a death sentence, and the court followed
the jury’s recommendation.
II.
A.
On direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld
Atkins’s capital sentence, Atkins, 505 S.E.2d at 131, and the
United States Supreme Court denied Atkins’s petition for a writ
of certiorari, Atkins v. North Carolina, 526 U.S. 1147 (1999).
B.
Atkins next filed several motions for appropriate relief
(MAR) in the Superior Court of Buncombe County.
After summary
denial of many of Atkins’s claims, Judge Winner of the Superior
Court granted an evidentiary hearing on two issues:
Atkins
was
“denied
his
right
to
the
effective
(1) whether
assistance
of
counsel by counsel’s failure to adequately investigate or to
present sentencing phase [mitigating] testimony regarding [his]
childhood
history
of
neglect,
abuse[,]
and
trauma,”
and
(2)
whether the prosecution withheld materially favorable evidence
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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On January 12, 2001, the State moved for summary denial of
Atkins’s ineffectiveness claim.
On April 2, 2001, Judge Guice
of the Superior Court conducted a motions hearing, ultimately
denying
Atkins
an
evidentiary
hearing
on
his
ineffectiveness
claim and granting the State’s motion for summary denial.
denying
Judge
an
evidentiary
Guice
noted
hearing
that,
at
on
the
the
time
ineffectiveness
Judge
Winner
In
claim,
initially
granted such a hearing, the State had not yet filed a response
to the claim.
On December 1, 2005, Judge Winner conducted an evidentiary
hearing on Atkins’s Brady claim and denied relief.
The North
Carolina Supreme Court then denied Atkins’s petition for a writ
of certiorari to appeal the denial of his MAR claims.
State v.
Atkins, 636 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. 2006).
C.
Atkins next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to § 2254(d) in the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina.
Atkins sought relief on
the following grounds:
(1) that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in the capital sentencing proceeding (Claim
I); (2) that the [S]tate failed to disclose evidence
materially favorable to him with respect to capital
sentencing (Claim II); (3) that he was denied a full
and fair opportunity to impeach his co-defendant’s
testimony by the [S]tate’s failure to disclose its
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deal with her and by the trial court’s limitation of
counsel’s cross-examination of her (Claim III); (4)
that he was shackled without cause during the capital
sentencing hearing (Claim IV); and (5) that he was
tried at the capital sentencing hearing without
adequate measures to compensate for his hearing
impairment (Claim V).
Atkins v. Polk, No. 1:06cv372, 2011 WL 3608234, at *6 (W.D.N.C.
Aug. 16, 2011).
On August 16, 2011, the district court denied
Atkins’s request for an evidentiary hearing, granted the State’s
motion for summary judgment, and declined to issue a certificate
of appealability.
Id. at *38.
Atkins then filed a motion to
alter or amend the judgment purusant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 59(c).
On January 17, 2012, the district court denied
Atkins’s motion to alter or amend the judgment.
Atkins filed a
notice of appeal on February 12, 2012, and on May 31, 2012, we
granted a certificate of appealability.
III.
Atkins
received
raises
two
ineffective
issues
on
assistance
of
appeal:
counsel
(1)
in
whether
his
he
capital
sentencing hearing and (2) whether the State failed to disclose
materially
sentencing.
favorable
evidence
with
respect
to
his
capital
We review de novo a district court’s denial of
habeas corpus relief.
Deyton v. Keller, 682 F.3d 340, 343 (4th
Cir. 2012).
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A.
We
analyze
Atkins’s
ineffectiveness
claim
under
the
framework outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). 1
To succeed under Strickland, Atkins must demonstrate
(1) that his counsel rendered deficient performance and (2) that
such deficiency was prejudicial.
We
adopt
a
deferential
Id. at 687.
posture
defense counsel’s performance.
Ct.
770,
788
(2011)
(“An
in
our
examination
of
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.
ineffective-assistance
claim
can
function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and
raise
issues
not
presented
at
trial,
and
so
the
Strickland
standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest ‘intrusive
1
We acknowledge that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)), limits the federal review of
habeas claims adjudicated on the merits in state court,
Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012).
Moreover, we are aware of this Court’s recent discussion of
whether
a
state
court
proceeding
constituted
a
merits
adjudication.
See Winston v. Pearson (Winston II), 683 F.3d
489, 496–97 (4th Cir. 2012); Winston v. Kelly (Winston I), 592
F.3d 535, 555–56 (4th Cir. 2010).
Here, the parties offer conflicting views regarding whether
the state court conducted a merits adjudication of Atkins’s
ineffectiveness claim.
If it did, then we would give AEDPA
deference to the state court’s application of Strickland.
See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). But, if not, then we are to conduct a de
novo review of the claim under Strickland.
See Cone v. Bell,
556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009).
We need not make a determination on
this point, however.
As discussed below, even under a de novo
review, which here is more advantageous to Atkins, Strickland
does not accord Atkins relief.
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post-trial inquiry’ threaten the integrity of the very adversary
process
the
Strickland,
right
466
to
counsel
U.S.
at
is
meant
to
689-90)).
serve.”
Indeed,
we
(quoting
consider
representation effective unless it “fall[s] below an objective
standard of reasonableness,” id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688) (internal quotation marks omitted), asking simply
“whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence
under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated
from best practices or most common custom,” id. at 788 (quoting
Strickland,
466
U.S.
at
690).
In
sum,
we
are
concerned
primarily with whether “counsel made errors so serious that [it]
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.”
Id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A
defendant
is
prejudiced
by
ineffective
representation
when “a reasonable probability [exists] that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”
694)
(internal
Id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
quotation
marks
omitted).
“A
reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.”
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, merely identifying
“some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding” is
insufficient.
Id.
(quoting
Strickland,
9
466
U.S.
at
693)
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(internal quotation marks omitted).
Simply put, a defendant
must
a
show
that
“[t]he
likelihood
of
substantial, not just conceivable.”
different
result
[is]
Id. at 792.
Notably, when applying Strickland, we “need not determine
whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies.”
“[t]he
object
counsel’s
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
of
an
ineffectiveness
performance[,]
ineffectiveness
claim
[i]f
on
prejudice,” we should do so.
it
the
is
ground
Rather, because
claim
is
easier
to
of
lack
not
to
dispose
of
grade
of
an
sufficient
Id.
1.
Here, Atkins alleges that his defense counsel failed to
adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence regarding
his background and that such failure resulted in his counsel’s
reliance on an alternate, futile defense.
Before examining the
evidence Atkins maintains his counsel should have investigated
and presented, we chronicle the mitigating evidence that his
counsel did present.
a.
Dr. David Horacek
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Psychologist Dr. David Horacek testified that he evaluated
Atkins for approximately twenty-two hours between July 1993 and
November 1993 and that he gave Atkins a primary diagnosis of
disassociative
identity
personality disorder.
disorder,
also
known
as
multiple
Horacek indicated that Atkins may also
suffer from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.
Horacek
explained
that
the
main
feature
of
multiple
personality disorder is “an impairment in the normal ability to
integrate
memory,
personality.”
identity
Individuals
and
perceptions
suffering
from
this
into
disorder
one
have
several personalities that “endure over time, and at various
points of time the alter[nate] personality will assume control
of
the
avowed
[individual’s]
that
during
consciousness
his
evaluation
and
of
behavior.”
Atkins,
Horacek
two
alternate
personalities were evident.
Horacek
further
stated
that
development
of
a
multiple
personality disorder can arise from severe physical or sexual
abuse that occurs for a length of time or from painful trauma
that
occurs
develops
when
alternate
an
individual
personalities
is
a
as
child.
creating distance from the experiences.
a
means
An
of
individual
coping
and
Horacek attested that,
while evaluating Atkins, he learned that Atkins was sexually
abused at least three times as a child by his older half-brother
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Butch and other boys in the neighborhood.
He briefly testified
that victims of child abuse often become abusers themselves.
Horacek also averred that he believed Atkins had killed his
son while one of Atkins’s alternate personalities was in control
and that Atkins was mentally or emotionally disturbed during the
crime’s commission.
both
Atkins’s
Such disturbance, Horacek opined, impaired
ability
to
conform
his
conduct
to
the
law’s
requirements and his ability to appreciate the criminal nature
of his conduct.
Audrey Bryant
Social worker Audrey Bryant interviewed Atkins in jail and
affirmed that (1) Atkins admitted he had inflicted the bruises
his son received, (2) Atkins had his head in his hands during
most of the interview, and (3) Atkins wished he could tell the
mother of the child that he was sorry.
Jesse Carr
Atkins worked full-time for Jesse Carr at Minico Cleaners
and Laundry for approximately a year and worked intermittently
on
a
part-time
basis
for
an
additional
six
months.
Carr
indicated that Atkins was a good worker and that he left the
cleaners to find employment with higher pay.
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David Waites
David
Waites,
an
investigator
for
the
public
defender’s
office, testified regarding Atkins’s childhood, parents, and Air
Force service.
He stated that, although Atkins’s parents were
in fragile heath and unable to attend the sentencing hearing,
they had provided two letters for presentation at the hearing.
The
letters
indicated
that
Atkins
suffered
from
childhood
illnesses that caused a loss of hearing in his right ear.
letters
also
indicated
that
Atkins
joined
the
Air
The
Force
at
seventeen.
Additionally,
Waites
newspaper clippings:
Atkins,
(2)
received
an
a
several
photographs
and
(1) a high school graduation photograph of
newspaper
Air
presented
Force
clipping
recruiting
indicating
that
award,
a
(3)
Atkins
had
photograph
of
Atkins in his Air Force uniform, (4) three newspaper clippings
noting that Atkins provided music for a veterans’ party, (5) a
newspaper
clipping
signifying
that
Atkins
was
a
Military
Security Specialist in an Air Force squadron serving in England,
and (6) a newspaper clipping showing that Atkins was the winner
of a Cub Scout Pack derby.
Finally, Waites averred that Atkins was involved in three
alcohol-related incidents during his time in the Air Force, that
he received an honorable discharge from the Air Force due to his
“apparent
inability
to
comprehend
13
his
misconduct,”
and
that
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twelve days prior to Lyle’s admission to the hospital due to
Atkins’s abuse, Atkins had been the victim of an armed robbery.
As
noted
above,
the
jury
ultimately
mitigating circumstances to Atkins:
credited
only
two
(1) that he suffered from a
learning disability and (2) that he suffered from “a personality
and adjustment disorder with a mixed disturbance of emotions and
conduct.”
b.
Atkins contends that he received ineffective representation
because
his
counsel
focused
on
Dr.
Horacek’s
testimony
and
belief that Atkins committed the murder while under the control
of
another
personality.
Atkins
argues
that
the
“‘multiple
personality’ sentencing defense was a disaster [because] [i]t
was based on inaccurate, unreliable statements made by Atkins
while he was under the influence of sodium amytal, and was not
backed
up
with
any
independent
documentary
or
testimonial
evidence.”
Further, Atkins maintains that by focusing on Dr. Horacek’s
opinions regarding the reasons he murdered his son, his counsel
failed to adequately investigate his childhood.
an
adequate
investigation
would
have
He argues that
revealed
the
“abject
circumstances of [his] childhood” and would have resulted in a
decision
to
present
“credible
expert
14
mental
health
testimony
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explaining the relationship between such a personal history and
[Atkins’s] capital offense.”
Specifically, Atkins asserts in his opening brief to this
Court
that
his
counsel
could
have
investigated
and
possibly
half-brother
Butch,
presented the following evidence:
•
Testimony
from
corroborating
affidavit
parents.
Atkins’s
and
that
elaborating
indicated
on
severe
details
abuse
by
from
an
Atkins’s
The affidavit notes that, when the defendant
was born, he became the favored child and his parents
began
to
physically
and
another brother, Ronald.
mentally
abuse
Butch
and
Such abuse included beatings
and the requirement that they live in an outhouse and
eat outside.
Butch and Ronald also suffered sexual
abuse
hands
at
the
of
another
half-brother,
Floyd.
The abuse eventually led to the removal of Butch and
Ronald from the Atkins’ home.
•
Testimony
Deane
from
Passmore
Atkins’s
school
that
physical
the
guidance
counselor
circumstances
he
observed when he visited Atkins’s home in 1968 were
“among the very worst that [he] ha[d] seen in [his] 35
years
as
[g]uidance
circumstances
“must
[c]ounselor”
have
[Atkins].”
15
[had]
a
and
severe
that
such
impact
on
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•
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Pennsylvania
family
severe
occurring
abuse
court
in
records
the
documenting
home
of
the
the
Atkins
family and the permanent removal of Ronald and Butch
from the home due to such abuse.
•
Pennsylvania
criminal
court
records
showing
that
Atkins’s mother was arrested for forging prescriptions
for a type of methamphetamine.
•
Proffered
witness
statements
showing
that
Atkins’s
mother was addicted to prescription medication.
•
Testimony
from
Atkins’s
schoolmates
that
he
was
a
social outcast and was subjected to regular emotional
and physical abuse.
•
Testimony from Atkins’s shop teacher Bob Carlson that
Atkins
suffered
“extraordinary
cruelty
and
humiliation” at school.
•
Testimony
Senior
from
Center
Ann
in
Blair,
Sheffield,
former
director
Pennsylvania,
of
the
that
she
witnessed Atkins’s father “using [Atkins] ‘as bait’ to
elicit
sympathy
and
handouts
from
the
elderly
residents at the Senior Center” and that she believed
Atkins’s father used him “to help con other vulnerable
people and shoplift from stores.”
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Testimony from social worker Joan Podkul, who “could
have conducted an adequate sentencing investigation,
provided its results to trial counsel, and testified
to Atkins’[s] social history, drawing together all of
the available information for a coherent presentation
to the jury.”
•
Testimony
from
forensic
Halleck
that
a
between
Atkins’[s]
psychiatrist
“significant
dismal
Dr.
relationship
social
history
Seymour
[existed]
and
his
mental state and behavior at the time of the offense,”
that
Atkins’s
multiple
mental
state
personality
was
not
disorder,
attributable
and
that
to
multiple
personality disorder is viewed with skepticism and not
supported by the evidence in this case.
2.
Nevertheless,
rendered
deficient
regardless
of
performance,
we
whether
are
Atkins’s
unconvinced
counsel
that
his
counsel’s failure to uncover or present the evidence outlined
above prejudiced him.
evidence
mitigating
in
“In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the
aggravation
evidence,”
against
Wiggins
v.
the
totality
Smith,
539
of
U.S.
available
510,
534
(2003), asking whether “there is a reasonable probability that,
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but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,” the jury would have
recommended a different sentence, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
a.
First, we are unconvinced that the evidence Atkins offers
would have provided further mitigation.
Testimony from Atkins’s
half-brother Butch and from his guidance counselor would have
detailed the horrific physical conditions of the home of the
Atkins family.
Nevertheless, contrary to the implications that
Atkins makes in his brief, these sources focus on the conditions
and
abuse
that
treatment
that
indicates
that
Ronald
Ronald.
did
Butch
and
Atkins
Atkins
because
Ronald
received.
did
his
not
suffered,
Indeed,
suffer
parents
the
favored
not
on
Butch’s
abuse
Atkins
damaging
affidavit
that
over
he
and
him
and
Further, although the additional testimony indicates
that Atkins was sexually abused, the jury was already aware, via
Dr. Horacek’s testimony, that Atkins had been sexually abused by
his half-brother and neighborhood boys.
Atkins’s contention that the investigation and presentation
of details of his childhood would have allowed for “credible
expert
mental
health
testimony
explaining
the
relationship
between such a personal history and [Atkins’s] capital offense”
also lacks merit.
and
affidavits,
We have reviewed Halleck’s actual testimony
noting
that
he
18
testified
that
Atkins
was
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severely neglected and abused as a child and that children who
have experienced such treatment often suffer from depression and
personality
intermittent
otherwise
disorders.
Moreover,
explosive
specified;
disorder;
antisocial,
he
diagnosed
borderline,
traits; and a substance abuse disorder.
“significant
relationship
[existed]
and
with
disorder
personality
Atkins
not
narcissistic
He declared that a
between
Atkins’[s]
dismal
social history and his mental state and behavior at the time of
the offense” but that his mental state was not attributable to
multiple personality disorder.
Most notably, however, Halleck did not explain how Atkins’s
childhood circumstances would have caused him to abuse his own
son.
Consequently,
enlightened
the
jury
are
although
regarding
unconvinced
his
testimony
Atkins’s
that
it
might
have
background
would
have
and
tendencies,
we
proved
mitigating.
Indeed, as the district court recognized, Halleck’s
lack of explanation regarding the connection between Atkins’s
exposure to abuse and the murder of his son may have actually
proved detrimental-At best, [Dr. Halleck] would have left the impression
that [Atkins’s] mental state was impaired because he
was abused as a child, which would have invited
obvious, but not necessarily beneficial, comparisons
to the level of abuse that Butch had suffered and to
the relatively positive course that Butch’s life
ultimately had taken.
Atkins, 2011 WL 3608234, at *17.
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b.
Second,
additional
there
is
mitigation
no
reasonable
provided
by
the
probability
evidence
that
Atkins
any
cites
would have overcome the aggravating circumstances of the murder
and altered the jury’s recommended sentence.
The jury found
that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”
Indeed, evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing revealed that
Atkins
hit
Lyle’s
multiple times.
head
against
the
wall
of
his
mobile
home
Medical exams revealed that Atkins physically
abused Lyle so severely that nearly every extremity of his body
evidenced
either
a
fracture
or
other
notable
injury.
Lyle
exhibited
[a] healing fracture [on] the right clavicle, [a]
healing bone along the midshaft of the right upper
arm,
extensive
injury
of
the
left
upper
arm,
dislocation of the left elbow, [a] healing bone
indicative of a fracture of the right hip, skull
fractures and bruising on both the left and right
sides [of the skull], and a compression fracture of
the spine.
The
pediatric
radiologist
that
examined
Lyle
testified
that
“[i]n the twenty-two years that [he] ha[d] been doing pediatric
radiology and in the nine years that [he] practiced pediatrics
before becoming a pediatric radiologist, [he] ha[d] never seen
as
extensive
bone
injuries
as
[Lyle]
had.”
Furthermore,
testimony from several witnesses indicated that Lyle did not
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immediately lose consciousness and that he would have felt and
suffered from the pain associated with his injuries.
Given these atrocities, we cannot conclude that there is
any
reasonable
probability
a
jury
would
have
recommended
a
different sentence if presented with the additional mitigating
evidence Atkins offers.
failure
to
Accordingly, we hold that his counsel’s
investigate
and
present
such
evidence
did
not
prejudice him, and thus, we affirm the district court’s award of
summary judgment on this claim.
B.
Atkins
also
alleges
that
the
State
violated
Brady
by
withholding a statement that his former sister-in-law made to
law
enforcement
childhood
brothers.
home
regarding
and
the
the
abuse
physical
his
conditions
mother
inflicted
of
his
on
his
Because the state court adjudicated Atkins's Brady
claim on the merits, we review his allegations “through the dual
lens of the AEDPA standard and the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in Brady.”
144
(4th
Cir.
2012).
Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128,
Per
AEDPA,
once
a
state
court
has
adjudicated the merits of a claim, a federal court may not grant
a writ of habeas corpus on that claim unless the state court’s
adjudication:
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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the
evidence
presented
in
the
[s]tate
court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Under Brady, the prosecution deprives a criminal defendant
of
due
process
when
it
suppresses
evidence
that
is
both
favorable to the defendant and “material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of” whether it suppressed the evidence
in good faith.
373 U.S. at 87.
Evidence qualifies as material
“if there is a reasonable probability that the proceeding would
have
resulted
in
a
different
disclosed to the defense.”
outcome
had
the
evidence
been
Richardson, 668 F.3d at 145; see
also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).
Thus, the
key question is whether “the favorable evidence could reasonably
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.”
Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
1.
Here,
failing
to
Atkins
contends
disclose
the
that
the
following
State
violated
statement
that
Brady
his
sister-in-law, Katherine Whipple, made to law enforcement:
22
by
former
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She stated that [Atkins] appeared to be a nice kid but
had a lot of family problems.
Two other brothers[,]
Butch and another brother[,] ran away from home when
they were teenagers.
She believes that this was due
to Floyd’s mother having Floyd beat them and then
making them sleep in the outside to[ilet].
To her
knowledge the [Atkins] still don’t have a[n] indoor
to[ilet].
Atkins avers that, had Whipple’s statement been disclosed, “it
would have alerted defense counsel to the critical importance of
thoroughly
investigating
Atkins’[s]
childhood
family
circumstances and provided contact information for two witnesses
with useful information and further investigative leads.”
2.
Employing
AEDPA,
we
consider
whether
the
state
court
“unreasonabl[y]” applied clearly established federal law when it
concluded that Atkins failed to prove that “any of the evidence
[he]
might
have
developed
if
[he]
had
known
of
[Katherine
Whipple’s statement]” would have with any reasonable probability
resulted in a different sentence.
We conclude that the state
court’s determination was both reasonable and correct.
Simply
statement
induced
put,
is
Atkins
material.
defense
counsel
childhood,
such
additional
mitigating
has
failed
Even
if
to
investigation
evidence
to
its
further
would
that
23
show
disclosure
Whipple’s
would
investigate
have
we
that
disclosed
have
already
have
Atkins’s
only
the
examined
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under Atkins’s ineffectiveness claim.
reasonable
evidence
probability
would
have
exists
altered
that
the
As we concluded above, no
the
jury’s
presentation
recommended
of
such
sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the State on this claim.
IV.
We
have
reviewed
the
district
court
proceedings
on
the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo and concluded
that Atkins has failed to prove that he suffered prejudice from
that
alleged
ineffective
assistance.
Upon
our
review
of
Atkins’s Brady claim under the standard imposed by AEDPA, we
conclude
that
Atkins’s
claim
is
meritless.
Accordingly,
we
affirm the district court’s denial of his § 2254 petition.
AFFIRMED
24
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