Angela Walton v. NC Dept Agriculture

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:09-cv-00302-FL. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998923875]. [12-1012]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1012

ANGELA D. WALTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
SERVICES; ROBERT N. BROGDEN, JR.,

AND

CONSUMER

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:09-cv-00302-FL)

Submitted:

August 17, 2012

Decided:

August 24, 2012

Before KING, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David G. Schiller, SCHILLER & SCHILLER, PLLC, Raleigh, North
Carolina; Luther D. Starling, Jr., N. Leo Daughtry, Kelly K.
Daughtry, DAUGHTRY, WOODARD, LAWRENCE & STARLING, Smithfield,
North Carolina, for Appellant. I. Faison Hicks, Anne J. Brown,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee North Carolina Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Angela D. Walton appeals the district court’s order
granting
Carolina

summary

judgment

Department

of

to

her

former

Agriculture

employer,

and

the

Consumer

North

Services

(“the Department”), on her claim for sex discrimination creating
a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012), and remanding to state court
her

claims

under

North

Carolina

law

against

supervisor, Defendant Robert N. Brogden, Jr.

her

former

On appeal, Walton

challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
Department on her claim under Title VII.

Finding no reversible

error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de

novo,

drawing

reasonable

inferences

favorable to the non-moving party.

in

the

light

most

PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead

Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011).

Summary

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under

the

governing

summary judgment.”
242, 248 (1986).

law

will

properly

preclude

the

entry

of

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
To withstand a motion for summary judgment,
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the non-moving party must produce competent evidence to reveal
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
See

Thompson

v.

Potomac

Elec.

Power

Co.,

312

F.3d

645,

649

(4th Cir. 2002) (“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the

non-moving

party’s]

case.”

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted)).
To prevail on her Title VII claim for a hostile work
environment, Walton was required to establish the following four
elements:
(3) that

(1)
was

conditions

“unwelcome

conduct,”

“sufficiently

of

(2)

based

or

and

employment

pervasive

create

to

on

severe

her
to

a

gender,

alter

hostile

the
work

environment,” and (4) some basis for imputing liability to her
employer.

Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261,

266

Cir.

(4th

2001).

The

district

court

assumed

without

deciding that Walton could establish the first three elements of
her hostile work environment claim but granted summary judgment
to

the

Department

on

the

fourth

element

in

light

Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to liability.
City

of

Boca

Raton,

524

U.S.

775

(1998);

Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
employer

to

avoid

strict

liability

of

the

Faragher v.

Burlington

Indus.,

The defense permits an
under

Title

VII

for

a

supervisor’s sexual harassment of an employee if no tangible

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employment

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action

was

taken

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against

the

employee.

Matvia,

259 F.3d at 266.
To
establish

prevail

that

it

under

the

“exercised

defense,

reasonable

the
care

employer
to

prevent

must
and

correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and . . . that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any

preventative

or

corrective

opportunities

employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”
quotation marks omitted).

provided

by

the

Id. at 266-67 (internal

An employer’s “dissemination of an

effective anti-harassment policy provides compelling proof that
[it] has exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual
harassment.”
However,

Id. at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted).

evidence

showing

that

the

employer

implemented

the

policy “in bad faith” or was “deficient in enforcing the policy
will rebut this proof.”

Id.; see Barrett v. Applied Radiant

Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that an
employee may make her rebuttal showing by establishing that her
“employer adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in
bad

faith

or

that

the

policy

was

otherwise

defective

or

dysfunctional” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Walton challenges the district court’s determination
that

the

sexually
policy

Department
harassing

was

exercised

behavior,

deficient

because

reasonable

arguing
some
4

of

that
her

care
its

to

prevent

anti-harassment

co-workers

did

not

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understand it.

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That Walton’s co-workers may not have understood

the policy, however, does not establish that Walton herself did
not understand it.
that

the

Additionally, it is clear from the record

policy

including

defined

sexual

unlawful

harassment

—

and

workplace
how

and

harassment
to

whom

—

such

harassment could be reported and that Walton attended a training
course

at

which

she

received

instruction

unlawful workplace harassment.
language
follow

in

clearer.

nor

the

policy

specifies

how

to

report

Walton neither points to any

rendering
how

on

the

it

unclear

policy

could

or

difficult

have

been

to

made

In view of this record, Walton cannot show reversible

error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
Department by claiming that other employees did not understand
the

policy.

Accordingly,

her

claim

that

the

policy

was

deficient must fail.
We

also

reject

as

meritless

Walton’s

appellate

arguments challenging the district court’s determinations that
the Department exercised reasonable care to correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior and that she unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities
provided

by

the

Department.

Her

arguments

are

premised

on

assertions that are conclusory, unexplained, and made without
record support.

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because

the

facts

and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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