LaMarcus Ealy v. Pinkerton Government Service

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:10-cv-00775-PJM. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999063930]. [12-1252]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1252

LAMARCUS EALY; DONALD JACKSON; GARY SIMMONS; NABIE BANGURA;
KEODRIAN BIDDLE; ANDRE BLAKE; JAMES BONDS; JERMAINE FRASER;
CHARLEY HARRIS; ELISE HURTZIG; JOHNNY JONES; SHERRI SIVELS;
RONALD WASHINGTON; CHAMIA EVON WHITFIELD; DIONTA CURTIS;
NIAARDAY TAGOE; DONALD WASHINGTON; DARRELL JOHNSON; BROCK
ASHBAUGH; ANTWINE STANLEY,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
PINKERTON GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:10-cv-00775-PJM)

Argued:

December 4, 2012

Decided:

March 14, 2013

Before MOTZ, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Robert G. Ames, VENABLE, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant.
Michael Timothy Anderson, MURPHY ANDERSON, PLLC,
Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: John F. Cooney,
VENABLE, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Thomas H. Strong, Mark D.
Maneche, VENABLE, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Mark
Hanna, Renee M. Gerni, MURPHY ANDERSON, PLLC, Washington, D.C.;

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Arthur P. Rogers, Keira M. McNett, D.C.
CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

EMPLOYMENT

JUSTICE

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
This

dispute

arises

in

the

context

of

an

action

brought by private service employees for allegedly unpaid wages
while

working

(“Pinkerton”),
Base. 1

for
a

Pinkerton

government

Government

contractor

at

Services,
Andrews

Air

Inc.
Force

The district court granted the employees’ motion for

class certification and Pinkerton filed this appeal.
seeks

review

of

the

district

court’s

grant

Pinkerton
of

class

certification as well as review of an earlier denial of its
motion

for

summary

judgment

based

on

the

federal

enclave

doctrine.
We
more

conclude

rigorous

that

analysis

as

Supreme
to

Court

whether

precedent
class

demands

a

certification

requirements listed in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have been satisfied in this case.
that

Pinkerton

has

failed

to

demonstrate

We also conclude
that

the

federal

enclave doctrine is inextricably intertwined with, or necessary
to

ensure

requirements
remand

for

meaningful
found

in

review

of,

Rule

23.

reconsideration

the

1

the

class

Accordingly,
employees’

certification
we

motion

vacate
for

and

class

Andrews Air Force Base was recently consolidated with an
adjacent military facility and renamed Joint Base Andrews. For
the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the facility as Andrews
Air Force Base.

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certification

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and

decline

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to

exercise

pendent

appellate

jurisdiction over Pinkerton’s motion for summary judgment based
on the federal enclave doctrine.

I.
A.
Pinkerton
variety

of

is

security

a

private

services.

contractor
From

that

December

provides

2007

a

through

September 2011, Pinkerton performed civilian security services
as a subcontractor to a contract between Southeast Protective
Service and Andrews Air Force Base.
federal

military

Maryland in 1942.

enclave

acquired

Andrews Air Force Base is a
by

the

United

States

from

Appellees LaMarcus Ealy, Donald Jackson, Gary

Simmons, et al. (“Appellees”) are current and former security
officers employed by Pinkerton at Andrews Air Force Base.
Two of Pinkerton's practices at Andrews Air Force Base
are at the heart of this case: Pinkerton's policies regarding
compensation for time spent (1) disarming; and (2) during meal
breaks.
1.
Disarming
The shifts worked by Pinkerton's employees at Andrews
Air Force Base consisted of alternating 30 minute periods: 30
minutes at their guard post, followed by 30 minutes on standby
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at an on-site guard shack.

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At the beginning of each shift,

Pinkerton required its security personnel employed at Andrews
Air Force Base to report to the base armory to obtain weapons
and equipment to be used during their respective shifts.

At the

conclusion of each shift, Pinkerton required its employees to
report

back

to

the

base

armory

equipment, that is, to disarm.
Pinkerton

employees

According

to

to

the

weapons

and

This process of disarming took

approximately

Appellees,

deposit

prior

15

to

minutes

November

to

complete.

2009,

Pinkerton

employees were not compensated for time spent disarming. 2
2.
Meal Breaks
Pursuant to its subcontract, Pinkerton was required to
provide all of its security personnel at Andrews Air Force Base
with

off-duty

Pinkerton

was

meal
to

breaks.

"provide

Under

shift

relief

Pinkerton's
for

contract,

employees

during

meals and scheduled breaks as required by state and local law,"
S.A. 54, and Pinkerton's security personnel were to “be relieved

2

In November 2009, Pinkerton informed Appellees that their
start time on their timesheets should be the time they begin the
arming procedure, and their end time should be the time they
complete the disarming procedure.
Appellees originally alleged
in Count I of their Complaint that they were not properly
compensated for time spent arming and disarming.
At a hearing
before the district court, however, the Appellees abandoned
their claim with respect to arming.

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to take meals off/away from posts."
2009,
meal

Pinkerton's
breaks.

increased

and

employees

After

received

November

Pinkerton's

uncompensated meal breaks.

2009,

Id. 3

Prior to November

30-minute

uncompensated

the

break

employees

meal

received

period

45-minute

Pinkerton's security personnel were

required to spend the majority of the duration of their meal
breaks

at

the

guard

shack,

armed,

and

on-call

in

case

of

emergencies.
B.
On March 29, 2010, Appellees, on behalf of themselves
and similarly situated Pinkerton employees, filed suit against
Pinkerton in the United States District Court for the District
of

Maryland.

Appellees

alleged

Pinkerton's

compensation

practices related to disarming and meal breaks violated federal
and state law under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law and the
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code Ann, Lab. &
Empl., Title 3. 4

3

Citations to the “S.A.” refer to the Supplemental Appendix
filed by the parties in this appeal.
Citations to the “J.A.”
refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
4

Appellee Jackson also brought a state law claim for
unlawful retaliation, Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl., § 3-428, but
such claim is not at issue in this appeal.

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On March 30, 2010, Appellees moved to conditionally
certify their federal claims as an FLSA opt-in collective action
under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

On August 11, 2010, the district

court certified Appellees' FLSA claims as a collective action.
On

October

8,

2010,

Pinkerton

moved

for

partial

summary judgment on Appellees' state law claims, arguing they
were barred under the federal enclave doctrine.
court

denied

subsequent
appeal.

Pinkerton's

request
Pinkerton

motion,

to

certify

did

not

and
the

petition

also

The district

denied

issue

for

this

court

Pinkerton's

interlocutory
directly

for

interlocutory review of the federal enclave doctrine issue.
On

May

30,

2011,

Appellees

moved

for

class

certification of their state law claims pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.

On December 21, 2011, after hearing

argument from the parties, the district court ruled from the
bench and granted Appellees' request for class certification.
The district court began its analysis by recognizing,
generally, that there were facts common to the entire class,
that is, that all class members were uncompensated for their
meal breaks and that any obligations that allegedly accompanied
their meal breaks were applicable to all class members. 5

5

The

“The specific claim here is that the common fact with
regard to this class is to start with . . . regard to meals.
There is no question that Pinkerton does not compensate these
(Continued)
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district court then determined that the class was sufficiently
numerous

as

it

similar

to

contained

its

approximately

commonality

members. 6

150

analysis,

the

district

Next,
court

determined the Appellees adequately protected the interests of
the class as a whole because the meal break claim was shared
among the Appellees and all class members. 7
The district court then recognized that even if some
dissimilarities

existed

among

the

class

––

because

some

individuals had, in fact, been compensated for their disarming
time –– that “[did not] change the outcome about the propriety
of

a

class

action

going

forward[,]”

J.A.

990,

because

those

class members who did not suffer the disarming injury could be
excluded
component.

from
The

any

potential

district

recovery

court

concluded

for
by

the

disarming

reiterating

its

employees for 45 minutes of time that is allotted for their
meals.” J.A. 987.
6

“[G]iven the number of potential plaintiffs in the class,
150 more or less, 152, that would be a numerous class whose
joinder would be impractical.” J.A. 988.
7

“[T]he only other issue as far as the case is concerned
under Rule 23 is whether the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interest of the class proposed.
These three proposed members all suggest that they were . . .
denied compensation during their lunch time, even though they
were required to bear weapons, have a radio, be in the curtilage
and so on and so forth. And that in the Court’s view, at least
at this stage, is strong evidence, if you will that there was a
common fact that could be finally established on the merits of
the case.” J.A. 988–89.

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determination that the Appellees could adequately protect the
interests of the class and by determining Appellees’ counsel
could adequately represent the class as a whole. 8
The district court memorialized its oral opinion in a
brief,

conclusory

three-page

written

order

dated

January

11,

2012.

The district court’s order, which did not provide any

further analysis, defined the class as “[a]ll current and/or
former employees of Pinkerton Government Services who worked at
Andrews Air Force Base and held non-exempt positions as civilian
security guards since December 2007.”

J.A. 1010.

On January 27, 2012, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure

23(f),

Pinkerton

interlocutory

review

certification

of

of

the

Appellees’

petitioned
district
state

law

this

court's

court

grant

claims. 9

On

of

for
class

appeal,

Pinkerton also requested that this court exercise its pendent
appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's earlier
decision to deny Pinkerton's motion for partial summary judgment

8

“The question about whether the representative parties
will fairly and accurately protect the interest of the class,
the plaintiffs have all been security guards and there’s no
question as to their at least truthfulness, as to their own
situation when they were with Pinkerton at Andrews Air Force
Base.” J.A. 991.
9

Pinkerton did not seek review of the district court’s
decision to certify Appellees’ federal FLSA claims as an opt-in
collective action.

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Appellees'

doctrine.

state

law

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claims

based

on

the

federal

enclave

On February 29, 2012, we granted Pinkerton's petition

for interlocutory review.

II.
We

review

a

district

court’s

Rule

23

certification decision for an abuse of discretion.

class

Brown v.

Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 2009).
We exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction at our own
discretion,

in

“limited

and

narrow”

circumstances.

Rux

v.

Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461, 475 (4th Cir. 2006).

III.
A.
Class Certification
We begin by addressing the central subject of this
appeal:

the

district

court’s

grant

of

Appellees’

motion

for

class certification.
Rule
governs
contains

the

23

of

procedures

two

the

Federal

related

provisions

that

Rules

to

of

class

actions.

the

party

Civil

Procedure
Rule

seeking

23

class

certification must satisfy in order for a class action to be
maintained: Rule 23(a); and Rule 23(b).

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Under

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Rule

23(a),

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an

individual

or

group

of

individuals may operate as a representative of a class only if:
(1) the class is so numerous
members is impracticable;

that

joinder

of

all

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and
(4)
the
representative
parties
will
fairly
adequately protect the interests of the class.

and

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
In addition, the class representative must satisfy one
of the class action requirements found in Rule 23(b).

In this

case, the district court concluded Appellees had satisfied Rule
23(b)(3), which, in relevant part, permits a class action if
the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 10
10

A class action may also be maintained under Rule 23(b) if

either:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual
class members would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual class members that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members
that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the
(Continued)
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On
satisfy

the

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Pinkerton

threshold

Rule

argues

23(a)(2)

and

Appellees

to

commonality

(3)

failed

and

typicality requirements, respectively, for their disarming and
meal break claims and failed to show, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3),
common

questions

of

law

or

fact

predominate

over

questions

affecting individual members.
1.
Commonality
Under

the

Rule

23(a)

commonality

criterion,

class

representatives must show that “there are questions of law or
fact common to the class.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).

Although

“for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) even a single common question
will do,” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556
(2011) (internal quotations and alterations omitted), not just
any common question will do.

For example, asking whether all

potential class members work for the same company, are eligible
for the same remedies, or even suffered a violation of the same

interests of the other members not parties to the individual
adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; [or]
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive
relief
or
corresponding
declaratory
relief
is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole; . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

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provision of law is insufficient.
Rather,

“[c]ommonality

requires

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
the

plaintiff

to

demonstrate

that the class members have suffered the same injury[,]” id.
(internal
injury

quotation

that

also

contention.”

Id.

marks

and

springs

citation
forth

omitted)

from

the

–-

a

same

shared
“common

“That common contention, moreover, must be of

such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution –which

means

that

determination

of

its

truth

or

falsity

will

resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of
the claims in one stroke.”

Id.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision

in Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2012), is
illustrative.

In Ross, the Seventh Circuit concluded, “the glue

holding together the Hourly and ABM classes is based on the
common question of whether an unlawful overtime policy prevented
employees

from

compensation.”

collecting

lawfully

earned

overtime

667 F.3d at 910.
2.
Typicality

Typicality
into

the

under

“representative

class . . . .”

Rule

23(a)(3)

parties’

requires

ability

to

an

inquiry

represent

a

Deiter v. Microsoft Corp., 436 F.3d 461, 466

(4th Cir. 2006).

Although a representative’s claims and the

claims of other members of the class need not be “perfectly
identical

or

perfectly

aligned,”
13

id.

at

467,

the

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pursuit

representative’s

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his

of

own

interests

“must

simultaneously tend to advance the interests of the absent class
members.”

Id. at 466.
In order to conduct a typicality analysis a court must

compare “the plaintiffs’ claims or defenses with those of the
absent

class

members.”

Id.

at

467.

That

analysis

will

necessarily entail “[1] a review of the elements of plaintiffs’
prima

facie

case[;]

.

.

.

[2]

the

facts

on

which

the

plaintiff[s] would necessarily rely to prove [those elements,]”
id.; and (3) a determination of to what extent “those facts
would also prove the claims of the absent class members.”

Id.;

accord Soutter v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 11-1564, 2012
WL 5992207 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2012).
3.
Predominance
Under
predominate

over

Rule

23(b)(3),

individual

whether

questions

is

common
a

separate

distinct from the requirements found in Rule 23(a).
Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.

questions
inquiry,
See Wal-

This balancing test of common and

individual issues is qualitative, not quantitative.

Gunnells v.

Healthplan

Cir.

Servs.,

Inc.,

348

F.3d

417,

429

(4th

2003)

(citing In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080 (6th Cir.
1996)).

Indeed,

common

issues

of

liability

may

still

predominate even when some individualized inquiry is required.
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See id.
App’x

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For example, in Stillmock v. Weis Markets, Inc., 385 F.

267

(4th

Cir.

2010),

we

considered

whether

individual

statutory damages under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction
Act

rendered

the

plaintiffs’

action

preclude class-wide treatment.
the

negative,

overarching

we

by

far

individualized

as

to

In answering that question in

recognized

issue

so

that

is

where

the

“the

liability

qualitatively
issue

of

the

defendant’s willfulness, and the purported class members were
exposed

to

the

same

risk

of

harm

every

time

the

defendant

violated the statute in the identical manner, the individual
statutory

damages

issues

are

insufficient

certification under Rule 23(b)(3).”

to

defeat

class

385 F. App’x at 273.

We have noted, “[i]n a class action brought under Rule
23(b)(3),

the

‘commonality’

‘subsumed

under,

23(b)(3)

requirement

or

requirement

superseded
that

by,

the

questions

predominate over’ other questions.”

of

Rule

more

common

23(a)(2)

stringent
to

the

is

Rule
class

Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys.,

Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 146 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Amchem
Prods.,

Inc.

Nonetheless,

v.

the

Windsor,

Rule

23(a)

521

U.S.

commonality

591,

609

requirement,

(1997)).
and

the

Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement remain separate inquiries
and the inquiries should not be “blended.”
at 2556 (alterations omitted).

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct.

However, a court may use some of

the same tools to construct the two separate inquiries.
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analyze

the

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dissimilarities

between

class

members

to

determine whether “even a single common question,” id. (internal
quotations
purposes

and
and

alterations
then

to

omitted),

determine

exists

whether

predominate for Rule 23(b)(3) purposes.

for

Rule

common

23(a)

questions

See id.

4.
Rigorous Analysis
In

Wal-Mart,

the

Supreme

Court

emphasized

that

the

Rule 23 prerequisites are not to be taken lightly and “do[] not
set

forth

Rather,

a

mere

“[a]

pleading

party

standard.”

seeking

131

class

S.

Ct.

at

certification

2551.
must

affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule –- that
is,

he

must

be

prepared

to

prove

that

there

are

in

fact

sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact,
etc.”

Id.

As a result, the trial court may find it necessary

to “probe behind the pleadings” and ultimately, will need to
conduct a “rigorous analysis” to determine whether the Rule 23
prerequisites have been satisfied.
quotation

marks

omitted);

see

also

Id. (internal citations and
Amgen

Inc.

v.

Conn.

Ret.

Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. ___, No. 11-1085, slip op. at 9
(2013)

(cautioning

that

in

a

rigorous

class

certification

analysis, “[m]erits questions may be considered to the extent ––
but only to the extent –– that they are relevant to determining
whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are
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satisfied”).
be

brought

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In the end, “[a]ctions such as this one, . . . may
only

if

representativeness,

the

numerosity,

predominance,

commonality,
superiority

and

typicality,
requirements

of both Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) are met.”

Lienhart, 255 F.3d at

146.
In

this

case,

after

reviewing

the

district

court’s

oral ruling and brief written order, we find the district court
abused

its

analysis”

discretion
sufficient

by
to

failing
enable

to

us

provide

to

a

conduct

“rigorous
meaningful

appellate review.
We first turn to commonality.

The district court did

note that there appeared to be a common question of fact among
all the class members: whether or not they were compensated for
their meal breaks.
the

factual

It is undisputed that they were not.

circumstances

of

their

meal

breaks,

a

Given
common

question of law could be whether or not the class members should
have been compensated for that time under Maryland law.
whether

those

common

questions

are

dependent

upon

a

But

“common

contention,” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551, the resolution of
which will resolve “each one of the claims in one stroke[,]”
id., is a determination for the district court to make in the
first instance.
832

(5th

Cir.

See M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d
2012)

(remanding

class

certification

allow the district court to conduct rigorous analysis).
17

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The same can be said of the typicality requirement.
The district court’s oral ruling and brief written order did not
clearly address the typicality requirement in any meaningful way
that

this

court

can

identify.

The

district

court

did

not

compare the claims of the Appellees with the class as a whole to
determine whether Appellees’ claims are typical of the class.
See e.g., Deiter, 436 F.3d at 466–67.
Finally,

the

district

court

did

not

conduct

the

required separate inquiry as to whether common questions of law
or fact predominate over those affecting only individual class
members.

Rather,

the

district

court’s

limited

oral

ruling

appeared to blend the commonality and predominance inquiries –which Wal-Mart counsels against.

The district court did appear

to acknowledge that there may be some dissimilarities between
class members and that these dissimilarities did not “change the
outcome about the propriety of a class action . . . .”
990.

J.A.

But whether this was in part, or in its entirety, the

district court’s predominance analysis is unclear, and in either
case, insufficiently rigorous.
address

whether,

method

for

alternatives.

in

fact,

resolving

The district court also did not

the

this

class

action

controversy

is

the

compared

superior
to

other

See, e.g., Stillmock, 385 F. App’x at 273–75.

Appellees

suggest

that

to

compensate

for

any

deficiency in the pleading relied on by the district court, we
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could probe behind the pleadings and look to the declarations.
However,

we

Appellees’

note

motion

that
for

during
class

the

district

certification,

their own argument in this regard.

court

hearing

Appellees

on

undercut

Appellees stated:

You have the underlying declarations.
That is what
you should read . . . . And when you read any one of
those 31 declarations, it’s not at all clear that the
description that, [“]I never worked beyond the, I
never worked beyond my scheduled shift time[”] refers
to anything but the time, but the present time period.
That is the time period after November of 2009.
In fact, many of the declarants specifically
refer to the post-2009 procedure of signing in and
signing out at the beginning and end of their shift.
You know, at –- when it’s clear that before November
of 2009, you were supposed to sign out at five o’clock
and not at 5:15, for instance, and that’s the 15
minutes we’re talking about.
So, you know, when the declarants are asked to
say whether sometimes, rarely, always, never, some of
the time they ever worked more than their scheduled
work time, the context of the declaration is clear
that they’re acting within the framework of the, of
the wage recording policies that have been in place
since November of ’09.
J.A. 975.
own

Thus, the class member declarations, by the Appellees

admission,

speak

only

to

the

commonality

of

time

worked

after November 2009, a time period, which with respect to the
disarming claim, is not even at issue in this case.
General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147 (1982), which involved allegations of employment
discrimination, is also instructive here.

19

As the Supreme Court

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reaffirmed in Wal-Mart, in Falcon, commonality and typicality
were lacking where,
[c]onceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an
individual’s claim that he has been denied a promotion
[or higher pay] on discriminatory grounds, and his
otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has
a policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a
class of persons who have suffered the same injury as
that individual, such that the individual’s claim and
the class claim will share common questions of law or
fact and that the individual’s claim will be typical
of the class claims.
131

S.

Ct.

(internal
narrow

at

2553

quotation

gap

(quoting

marks

between

(a)

Falcon,

omitted).

Appellees’

457

Here,
claim

U.S.

at

157-58)

there

is

a

more

have

been

that

they

denied pay based on Pinkerton’s employee-wide, under-inclusive
definition of time-worked, and (b) the existence of a class of
fellow employees who suffered that same injury.

But whether

that gap has, in fact, been successfully bridged, is for the
district court to determine in the first instance.
In sum, a rigorous analysis into the Rule 23(a) and
Rule 23(b)(3) requirements will clearly contain the following
elements.

First,

class

so

is

impracticable.”

a

district

numerous

court

that

must

joinder

decide
of

all

whether
members

“the
is

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

Second, a district court must determine whether even a
single question of fact or law is common to the class.

Such

questions will depend on a “common contention,” the resolution

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of which will resolve “an issue that is central to the validity
of each one of the claims in one stroke.”

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct.

at 2551; see also Ross, 667 F.3d at 908–10 (7th Cir. 2012).
Third,

a

district

court

must

determine

whether

the

claims (or defenses) of the representative parties are typical
of those of the class as a whole by comparing the claims of the
representatives with the claims of the absent class members and
determining whether they tend to advance the same interests.
See Deiter, 436 F.3d at 466–67.
Fourth, a district court must determine whether “the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.”
Finally,

if

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).

seeking

class

certification

pursuant

to

Rule 23(b)(3), a district court must determine whether common
questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions
such that a class action is the superior method for resolving
the controversy.

This separate inquiry will require a district

court to balance common questions among class members with any
dissimilarities between class members.
at 427–30.

See Gunnells, 348 F.3d

If satisfied that common questions predominate, a

district court should then also consider whether any alternative
methods

exist

for

resolving

the

controversy

class action method is in fact superior.
385 F. App’x at 273–75.
21

and

whether

the

See, e.g., Stillmock,

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We make no determination at this point as to which
path the district court should take.

Perhaps a class should be

certified, perhaps one or more subclasses should be certified,
or perhaps class certification should be denied entirely.

We

only conclude at this point, that what is required, is a more
rigorous analysis into whether, in this case, the “numerosity,
commonality,

typicality,

representativeness,

predominance,

and

superiority requirements of both Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) are met.”
Lienhart, 255 F.3d at 146.
B.
Pendent Jurisdiction
We now turn to Pinkerton’s argument in favor of our
exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction.
court

to

district

exercise
court’s

Appellees’

state

pendent

order
law

appellate

denying
claims

jurisdiction

partial

based

Pinkerton asks this

on

summary
the

over

judgment

federal

the
on

enclave

doctrine. 11

11

The federal enclave doctrine derives from Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution.
The
Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o
exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over all Places purchased
by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same
shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockYards, and other needful Buildings.”
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
cl. 17.
While the general principle of the federal enclave
doctrine is that only Congress shall have exclusive legislative
authority over federal enclaves, the Supreme Court and Circuit
Courts have recognized that certain circumstances may permit
(Continued)
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Our appellate jurisdiction is limited to final orders
from the district courts with certain limited exceptions.

Rux

v. Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461, 474 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)).

Pendent appellate jurisdiction is “a

judicially-created, discretionary exception” to the requirement
that courts of appeals can only hear appeals from final orders.
Id. at 475.

As such, “[it] is an exception of limited and

narrow application driven by considerations of need, rather than
of efficiency.”

Id. (citing Montano v. City of Chicago, 375

F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2004)).

Even if we find it permissible

to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction, its exercise remains
discretionary.
Cir.

2002)

See Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 549 n.2 (4th
(“Assuming

that

we

have

pendent

appellate

jurisdiction of the order denying summary judgment on the state
law claims, . . . the decision to exercise such jurisdiction is
purely discretionary.”) (citing DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790,
808 (4th Cir. 1995)).
We have recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision
in

Swint

v.

Chambers

County

Commission,

514

U.S.

35

(1995),

indicates pendent appellate jurisdiction is available in only

state law to apply. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,
486 U.S. 174, 180 (1988); James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309
U.S. 94, 99–100 (1940); Allison v. Boeing Laser Technical
Servs., 689 F.3d 1234, 1236–38 (10th Cir. 2012).

23

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two scenarios: “(1) when an issue is ‘inextricably intertwined’
with

a

question

that

is

the

proper

subject

of

an

immediate

appeal; or (2) when review of a jurisdictionally insufficient
issue

is

‘necessary

to

ensure

immediately appealable issue.”
Swint, 514 U.S. at 50–51.).
has held firm.

meaningful

review’

of

an

Rux, 461 F.3d at 475 (quoting
Our commitment to this dichotomy

See, e.g., Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 658

(4th Cir. 2012) (applying the Swint standard in the context of
an

immediately

appealable

issue

of

qualified

immunity

in

a

§ 1983 action); Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 427 (4th Cir.
2011) (same).
But the two potential pendent jurisdiction scenarios
set forth in Swint are not always so easily distinguished.

See

Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 553 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In
some cases, . . . the analysis of the two parts [of the Swint
standard]

will

be

substantially

the

same.”)

(citing

Rein

v.

Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 758 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
Under

the

first

pendent

jurisdiction

scenario,

the

Second Circuit in Myers explained that in order for two issues
in two separate rulings to be inextricably intertwined, “the
‘same specific question’ will ‘underl[ie] both the appealable
order and the non-appealable order,’ such that . . . resolution
of the question will necessarily resolve the appeals from both
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orders at once.”

Pg: 25 of 29

624 F.3d at 553 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen SA v.

Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567, 576 (2d Cir. 2005)).

Likewise, we

have held that a pendent issue is inextricably intertwined with
an immediately appealable interlocutory issue, and we may thus
grasp jurisdiction over the pendent issue, when resolution of
the appealable issue “necessarily decides” the pendent issue.
Rux, 461 F.3d at 476.

For example, in Altman v. City of High

Point, 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003), we found that resolution of
an

interlocutory

issue

(whether

officers

were

entitled

to

qualified immunity in a § 1983 action) “fully resolve[d]” the
pendent issue (whether the municipality could be held liable)
because

the

qualified

immunity

inquiry

revealed

the

officers

committed no federal constitutional violation which would have
been required to hold the municipality liable.
n.10

330 F.3d at 207

(considering the issues “inextricably intertwined”); cf.

Evans,

703

F.3d

at

654

n.11,

658–59

(exercising

pendent

appellate jurisdiction over municipality’s § 1983 liability when
issues

of

finding

neither

appellate
“our

qualified

immunity

Swint

rationale

jurisdiction

review

of

.

.

fully

over
.

supported

state

immunity

resolved

the

exercising

constitutional
.

.

.

issue,

did

pendent

claims

not

but

where

require

any

evaluation of the state constitutional claims”).
Under the second pendent jurisdiction scenario, review
of

a

pendent

issue

will

be

“necessary
25

to

ensure

meaningful

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review” of an immediately appealable issue if resolution of the
pendent

issue

is

necessary,

or

immediately appealable issue.

essential,

in

resolving

the

Swint, 514 U.S. at 51; see also

United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 581 n.4 (4th Cir.
1999)

(citing

Taylor

v.

Waters,

81

F.3d

429,

437

(4th

Cir.

1996)).
In other words, under Swint “[i]t is appropriate to
exercise

pendent

resolution

of

the

appellate

jurisdiction

appealable

issue

only

necessarily

where

[1]

resolves

the

nonappealable issue, or [2] where review of the nonappealable
issue is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the appealable
one.”

Berrey v. Asarco, Inc., 439 F.3d 636, 647 (10th Cir.

2006) (citing Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 930 (10th
Cir. 2006)).
Pinkerton

contends

the

issues

implicated

by

the

federal enclave doctrine in this case satisfy both Swint prongs,
that is, that they are so inextricably intertwined with, and
necessary

to

certification

ensure
of

the

meaningful
Maryland

state

warrant our review at this stage.

review

of,

law

claims,

the
that

class
they

Pinkerton argues that in

order to effectively review the district court’s grant of class
certification, we must first review whether state law is even
applicable in this case, or whether it is prohibited by the
federal enclave doctrine.

Pinkerton’s argument is unavailing.
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Pinkerton does not and cannot illustrate how the two
issues are so inextricably intertwined that resolution of the
appealable

class

certification

issue

necessarily

non-appealable federal enclave doctrine issue.

resolves

the

This is because,

in fact, the two issues are distinct legal concepts.

Whether

Appellees have satisfied the Rule 23(a) prerequisites for class
certification has no bearing on whether Appellees’ state law
claims are ultimately barred under the federal enclave doctrine.
Nor can Pinkerton illustrate how review of the federal enclave
doctrine issue is necessary in order to ensure our meaningful
review of the class certification issue.

Although analysis of

the former could ultimately foreclose the need for analysis of
the latter, resolution of the federal enclave doctrine issue is
not necessary to review the class certification issue. 12
The
economy,

which

concern
should

raised
not

by

serve

pendent appellate jurisdiction.

Pinkerton
as

the

speaks

basis

to

for

judicial

exercising

See Rux, 461 F.3d at 475 (“We

are constrained by the language of the Supreme Court as well as
12

Indeed, we have previously refused to invoke pendent
appellate jurisdiction even though a determination of the
pendent issue had the possibility to foreclose the underlying
suit.
See Ochoa Lizarbe v. Rivera Rondon, 402 F. App’x 834,
837–38 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding that although resolution of
the pendent issues in the defendant’s favor could have disposed
of the plaintiffs’ suit, they did not warrant our consideration
because “[t]he doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction is not
focused on efficiency . . . .”).

27

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our own precedent from recognizing efficiency considerations as
a basis for the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction.”).
Other

circuits

have

likewise

refused

to

exercise

pendent appellate jurisdiction over a non-appealable issue in
the context of a class certification appeal.
624

F.3d

537

(affirming

determination

but

district

refusing

to

court’s

See, e.g., Myers,
class

exercise

certification

pendent

appellate

jurisdiction over district court’s earlier denial of plaintiff’s
motion to send opt-in notice to potential class members); Poulos
v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming
district court’s class certification determination but refusing
to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over district court’s
denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the underlying action on
primary

jurisdiction,

Burford

abstention,

and

personal

jurisdiction grounds).
Accordingly, we decline to exercise pendent appellate
jurisdiction

over

the

district

court’s

denial

of

Pinkerton’s

motion for partial summary judgment on federal enclave doctrine
grounds.
IV.
We

conclude

that,

consistent

with

Wal-Mart

Stores,

Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), a more rigorous analysis
into

the

Rule

23

requirements

is

ensure meaningful appellate review.
28

necessary

in

this

case

to

Specifically, there must be

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a more rigorous analysis into whether there are common questions
of law or fact, whether Appellees’ claims are typical of the
class as a whole, and whether common questions of law or fact
predominate

over

any

questions

affecting

only

individual

members.
We

also

decline

to

jurisdiction

over

Pinkerton’s

exercise
motion

pendent

for

appellate

partial

summary

judgment to consider whether Appellees’ state law claims are
barred under the federal enclave doctrine.

We exercise pendent

appellate

own

jurisdiction

sparingly,

at

our

discretion,

as

“[it] is an exception of limited and narrow application driven
by considerations of need, rather than of efficiency.”
Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461, 475 (4th Cir. 2006).
has

not

shown

that

the

federal

enclave

doctrine

Rux v.

Pinkerton
is

either

inextricably intertwined with, or necessary to ensure meaningful
appellate review of, the Rule 23 issues of class certification
sufficient

to

Pinkerton’s

invoke

federal

enclave

pendent
doctrine

appellate
argument,

jurisdiction.
if

necessary,

should be considered in the wake of a final order.
We therefore vacate and remand the district court’s
class certification order for the required rigorous analysis and
deny Pinkerton’s request to review the district court’s denial
of its motion for partial summary judgment.
VACATED AND REMANDED
29