Charles Smalley v. Shapiro & Burson, LLP
Filing
UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:11-cv-00906-JFM Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999087352].. [12-1266]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1266
CHARLES SMALLEY; PAMELA BALL, On behalf of themselves and
as a class,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
SHAPIRO & BURSON, LLP; JOHN S. BURSON, Esq.; WILLIAM M.
SAVAGE, Esq.; JASON MURPHY, Esq.,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
KRISTINE D. BROWN, Esq.; ERIK W. YODER, Esq.; GREGORY N.
BRITTO, Esq.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (8:11-cv-00906-JFM)
Argued:
March 22, 2013
Decided:
April 16, 2013
Before WILKINSON and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and Jackson L.
KISER, Senior United States District Judge for the Western
District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Kiser
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Davis
joined.
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ARGUED: Ian Stumpf, JR HOWELL & ASSOCIATES, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellants. Robert A. Scott, BALLARD SPAHR, LLP, Baltimore,
Maryland; William Joseph Carter, CARR MALONEY, PC, Washington,
D.C., for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Glenn A. Cline, BALLARD SPAHR,
LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Bizhan Beiramee, BIZHAN BEIRAMEE,
ESQ., P.C., McLean, Virginia, for Appellees Shapiro & Burson,
LLP, John S. Burson, Esq., and William M. Savage, Esq.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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KISER, Senior District Judge:
Appellants
action
are
ask
not
us
to
barred
hold
under
that
their
Maryland
federal
claim
causes
preclusion
of
law
because the claims could not have been asserted in the state
foreclosure proceedings.
Because we decide that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the case under
the Rooker-Feldman
question.
doctrine,
we
do
not
need
to
resolve
that
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment
and remand the case with instructions to dismiss Appellants’
actions without prejudice.
I.
Charles
Smalley
“Appellants”),
are
and
Pamela
African-American
Ball
residents
(collectively
of
Maryland.
Appellee Shapiro & Burson, LLP, is a Maryland law firm.
In
2009,
Appellee
foreclosed
on
Appellants’
homes
on
behalf
of
large
number
of
Appellants’ mortgage lenders.
Appellee
foreclosures
Shapiro
in
&
Maryland
Burson
and
conducts
other
a
jurisdictions.
Appellees
John Burson, William Savage, and Jason Murphy were all attorneys
for Appellee Shapiro & Burson. 1
Burson, Savage, and Murphy were
1
“Appellees” refers to Shapiro & Burson, LLP, John Burson,
William Savage, and Jason Murphy collectively, all of whom were
parties to the action in the district court.
3
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appointed
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as
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substitute
trustees
conducting the foreclosures at issue.
for
the
purpose
of
(J.A. 150.)
Pamela Ball
The
was
foreclosure
instituted
in
proceeding
November
of
against
Appellant
Pamela
2007.
Appellant
Ball
Ball
“never
sought an injunction to stop the sale, nor did she file any
exceptions to the sale, as she could have done pursuant to Md.
Rule
14-305[,]
auction.”
to
challenge
the
conduct
(Br. for Appellees pg. 5.)
employees
(not
the
substitute
of
the
foreclosure
When Shapiro & Burson
trustees)
filed
the
Order
to
Docket Foreclosure against Appellant Ball, the signing affiant
swore that Appellees were the note holders and that they had the
right to foreclose on the property.
Additionally, the affiant
swore that a copy of the note was attached to the Order to
Docket and that the note was a true and accurate copy of the
original.
Appellants maintain that none of those statements
were true.
(See J.A. 152.)
Appellants allege that Appellees
were never in possession of the note.
The
same
month
that
the
(Id.)
Order
to
Docket
was
filed,
Appellees sold Appellant Ball’s property, allegedly without ever
seeing or possessing the promissory note as represented.
(Id.)
In December of 2007, Appellees sent Appellant Ball an eviction
notice, ordering her to vacate her property within three days;
she complied.
(Id.)
Several months after insisting Appellant
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Ball vacate the property, Appellees informed the state court
that the Order to Docket was defective, and they filed a “Motion
to
Accept
Lost
Note
Affidavit”
at
that
Appellant Ball did not oppose the motion.
time.
(See
id.)
(See J.A. 235-41.)
Despite the defective Order and original affidavit, the state
court ratified the foreclosure.
On
December
Appellant
Ball’s
23,
2008,
home,
(J.A. 152.)
over
the
a
state
year
after
court
auditor
auditor’s report pursuant to Md. Rule 14-305.
46.)
Appellees
filed
sold
the
(J.A. 236, 245-
The report set forth, among other things, the distribution
of the proceeds from the sale, including the fees charged by
Appellee Shapiro & Burson.
(J.A. 245-46.)
Appellant Ball filed
an exception to this report by way of a “Motion for Exception to
the Audit.”
(J.A. 247-48.)
On January 12, 2009, the state
court issued a final order of ratification of the audit and
closed the case.
(J.A. 249.)
Appellant Ball subsequently appealed the order of the state
court ratifying the auditor’s report.
(See J.A. 251.)
The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that Appellant Ball’s
appeal was procedurally premature because her January 21, 2009,
Motion to Nullify the Judgment operated as a motion to alter or
amend that judgment and, because that motion had not been ruled
upon, the appeal was premature.
(See J.A. 255.)
The Court of
Special Appeals additionally held, however, that the principles
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of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Appellant Ball’s
allegations of wrongdoing related to the report of sale because
that judgment became final when the appellate court issued its
mandate dismissing the appeal.
On
remand,
following
(Id.)
a
March
4,
2011,
hearing
on
Appellant’s Ball’s outstanding motions, the state court denied
the audit motion and ratified the audit.
appeal was filed.
(J.A. 234-41.)
(See J.A. 258.)
No
Appellant Ball did file a
“Motion for Emergency Hearing,” claiming that the state court
should not have ratified the audit because it never ruled on
several motions.
She sought to re-open the case and filed an
“Amendment to the Open Motion Dated January 21, 2009.”
259-62.)
(J.A.
In that motion, Appellant Ball re-asserted allegations
related to the Lost Note Affidavit.
(See id.)
hearing, the state court denied the motion.
Following a
(See J.A. 240.)
Appellant Ball appealed, but the state court was affirmed.
(See
Br. of Appellee Addendum 1.)
Charles Smalley
On
May
Foreclosure
21,
2009,
against
Appellees
Appellant
filed
Charles
an
Order
Smalley.
to
Docket
(J.A.
159.)
Appellee Jason Murphy allegedly signed the Order, but Shapiro &
Burson employees had prepared the affidavit.
an
affidavit
that
asserted
that
the
The Order included
substitute
trustee
had
verified that the party ordering the foreclosure was “the owner
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of the Note that is the subject of this foreclosure action and
that the copy of the Note filed in this foreclosure case is a
true and accurate copy of said Note.”
(J.A. 159-60.)
Although
the affidavit certified that Barclays Capital Real Estate, Inc.,
(“Barclays”) was the noteholder, the Note itself indicated on
its
face
that
(J.A. 160.)
it
was
payable
to
Fremont
Investment
&
Loan.
Appellees did not produce any record of a transfer
of ownership of the mortgage prior to the filing of the Order to
Docket Foreclosure.
(See id.)
Appellant Smalley alleges that
Appellees did not take any steps to confirm that Barclays was
actually the noteholder.
(See id.)
The substitute trustees ultimately sold Appellant Smalley’s
property at a foreclosure sale in April 2010.
(Id.)
Prior to
the sale, Appellant Smalley did not seek an injunction to stop
the sale, nor did he move to dismiss the foreclosure action
pursuant to the applicable state rules.
(See J.A. 263-64.)
state court ratified the sale on October 21, 2010.
The
Just as in
Appellant Ball’s case, Appellees received a commission on the
sale.
In addition, the legal fees Appellees charged were passed
on to Appellants from their respective foreclosures.
On June 25, 2010, Appellant Smalley filed a “Memorandum of
Law—Bank Fraud,” in which he challenged the foreclosure.
J.A. 264.)
(See
The substitute trustees filed a Motion to Strike,
arguing that the time for filing exceptions has lapsed.
7
(See
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The state court granted the Motion to Strike on October
20, 2010.
(Id.)
foreclosure sale.
The next day, the state court ratified the
(See J.A. 264-65.)
On January 14, 2011, the
state court ratified the audit, which included the distribution
from the sale, as well as all fees charged by Appellee Shapiro &
Burson.
the
(See J.A. 269-70.)
ratification
auditor’s report.
of
the
Appellant Smalley never appealed
sale
or
the
ratification
of
the
(See J.A. 263-66.)
On January 24, 2011, Appellant Smalley filed a 15-count
declaratory judgment complaint in the state court against his
mortgage lender, Barclays, and the purchaser, 50 by 50 REO, LLC.
(See J.A. 271-89.)
among
other
Appellant
In that lawsuit, Appellant Smalley alleged,
things,
Smalley’s
that
Barclays
promissory
was
note
and
not
the
that
holder
the
of
Smalley
foreclosure action was brought by entities that had no interest
in the Smalley property, the note, or the mortgage.
(See J.A.
274.)
Barclay’s
Appellant
representation
of
Smalley
an
further
ownership
alleged
interest
as
that
a
basis
for
instituting the foreclosure, the foreclosure action itself, and
“all
of
the
representations
and
activities
undertaken
to
commence, execute, and finalize the sale” constituted unfair and
deceptive trade practices under the Maryland Consumer Protection
Act.
(See J.A. 276-77.)
The state court dismissed the action
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res
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judicata
grounds,
Appeals affirmed.
In
March
investigation
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and
the
Maryland
Court
of
Special
(See J.A. 268; Appellee’s Rule 28(j) filing.)
of
2011,
into
the
state
alleged
Appellee Shapiro & Burson.
prosecutors
launched
practices
“robo-signing”
(J.A. 156.)
an
of
In cooperation with the
criminal investigation, José Portillo, a paralegal who worked at
Shapiro
&
Burson
forward
with
from
details
April
2008
regarding
directed him to undertake.
until
February
practices
2011,
came
Appellees
allegedly
(See J.A. 44-47, 153.)
Portillo
detailed how he and other paralegals were directed to prepare
deeds and affidavits for Appellee William Savage to sign.
different
attorney
who
did
not
work
for
Shapiro
&
A
Burson,
however, routinely signed Appellee Savage’s names to trustee’s
deeds that “transferr[ed] the foreclosed property back to the
lender who purchased the property at auction.”
an
affidavit,
Portillo
included
several
(J.A. 44.)
deeds
that
In
were
purportedly signed by Appellee Savage but were not, in fact,
signed by him, as well as several deeds which actually were
signed by Appellee Savage.
(See J.A. 45, 48-102.)
Notaries,
such as Portillo, were then instructed to notarize the deeds.
None of the allegedly fraudulent documents included with the
Portillo
affidavit,
however,
foreclosure.
9
concerned
any
Appellant’s
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On April 7, 2011, shortly after Appellees’ “robo-signing”
practices
came
to
light,
Appellants
sought
to
bring
a
class
action in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland.
(See
Appellants
contended
unreasonable,
diligence
J.A.
and
and
147-182.)
that
the
pattern
in
of
the
federal
imposed
fees
inappropriate
the
In
were
light
of
unlawful,
the
complaint,
“excessive,
lack
fraudulent
of
due
conduct
[Appellees] undertook in reporting that those fees were actually
earned.”
(J.A. 157.)
Although they did not claim any aspect of
the affidavits submitted to the state court were “false,” they
alleged that Appellants’ lack of diligence in confirming the
facts to which they attested was “unfair and unconscionable” and
that
the
“rampant
signatures
forgery.”
on
(J.A.
imposition
of
excessive
submission
of
false
their
federal
the
affidavits
173-74.)
and
rights.
They
unearned
affidavits
(See,
to
were
e.g.,
state
J.A.
result
of
that
the
as
the
contended
fees,
the
the
as
well
court,
167.)
violated
Appellants
asserted claims for fraud, violations of the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act, and violations of the federal RICO statute, Fair
Debt
Collection
Rights Act.
Practices
Act,
Fair
(See J.A. 166-180.)
Housing
Act,
and
Civil
Appellees filed a motion to
dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6), arguing that Appellants’ claims were barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion.
The District Court granted the
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motion and dismissed the action.
Appellants then instituted
this appeal.
II.
The dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is reviewed under the de novo standard
of review.
(4th
Cir.
evidence
See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
1993).
in
the
In
its
light
review,
most
the
favorable
Court
to
“construes
the
the
non-movant,”
E.E.O.C. v. Seafarers Int’l Union, 394 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir.
2005), and “should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations
and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff,” Mylan Labs., 7 F.3d at 1134.
Additionally, although
Appellants bring this action on behalf of a purported class, “if
none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class
establishes
the
requisite
of
a
case
or
controversy
with
the
defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any
other member of the class.”
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
493-95 (1974).
Although the district court dismissed this action on claim
preclusion grounds, Appellees have raised a jurisdictional issue
that we are required to address before reaching the merits.
See
Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir.
1999).
Appellees argue that this case is barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, which precludes a federal court from deciding
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what is, in essence, an appeal of a state court judgment.
See
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994).
III.
This
Court
doctrine as
has
consistently
jurisdictional,
and
treated
the
“[b]ecause
Rooker-Feldman
the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is jurisdictional, we are obliged to address it before
proceeding
Dunlap,
290
further
F.3d
in
191,
our
analysis.”
195-96
(4th
Friedman’s,
Cir.
2001);
see
Inc.
also
v.
Am.
Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir.
2003); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198-99
(4th Cir. 2000); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d
192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a
“party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a
United States district court.”
Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1005-06.
This is so because Congress has vested the power to entertain an
appeal of a state court judgment only with the Supreme Court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at 198-99.
“A litigant may not circumvent these jurisdictional mandates by
instituting a federal action which, although not styled as an
appeal, ‘amounts to nothing more than an attempt to seek review
of
[the
state
court’s]
decision
by
a
lower
federal
court.’”
Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 316 (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d
728, 733 (4th Cir. 1997)).
“The controlling question in the
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Rooker-Feldman analysis is whether a party seeks the federal
district court to review a state court decision and pass upon
the merits of that state court decision, not whether the state
court judgment is presently subject to reversal or modification.
Put another way, if ‘in order to grant the federal plaintiff the
relief sought, the federal court must determine that the [state]
court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that
would
render
implicated.”
the
judgment
ineffectual,’
Rooker-Feldman
Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 202 (quoting Ernst v. Child &
Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997)).
applies
not
is
only
to
matters
directly
addressed
The doctrine
by
the
state
court, but also to “claims which are ‘inextricably intertwined’
with state court decisions.”
Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at
198 (quoting District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983)).
Although Appellants do not seek to “undo” the state court
judgment foreclosing on their homes, permitting their case to go
forward would, in essence, hold that the state court judgments
which
affirmed
the
legal
fees
and
commissions
and
held
the
allegedly false affidavits sufficient to warrant foreclosure was
in error.
This is not proper under Rooker-Feldman because their
federal causes of action are “inextricably intertwined” with the
state court foreclosure actions.
This prong of the doctrine
“bars a claim that was not actually decided by the state court
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‘success
on
the
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federal
claim
depends
upon
a
determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues
before it.’”
Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at 198 (quoting
Plyler, 129 F.3d at 731).
review
of
the
state
If Appellants are not seeking a
court’s
judgment,
their
success
on
the
merits would necessitate a finding that the state court “wrongly
decided the issues before it.”
Id.
Accord Harper v. Chase
Manhattan
130,
133
Bank,
138
F.
App’x
(11th
Cir.
2008)
(unpublished) (“Harper’s claims under the . . . FDCPA [Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act] . . . were inextricably intertwined
with the foreclosure proceeding in state court . . . .”).
Here,
the
by
state
decision
about
alleged
court
source
judgments
of
that
Appellants’
necessarily
harm
rested
is
on
shielded
a
which Appellants now complain; therefore, Appellants are limited
to whatever relief they are afforded in the state court system.
Other courts have relied on Rooker-Feldman to bar the same
or
similar
causes
of
action
Appellants
asserted
below.
See
Harper, 138 F. App’x at 132-33 (dismissing Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act claims); Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766 F. Supp.
2d 1305, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (dismissing a RICO claim under
Rooker-Feldman); Distant v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 0961460-CIV, 2010 WL 1249129, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010)
(unpublished)(“Although
plead
as
conspiracy
claims
.
.
.
,
Plaintiff is clearly asking this Court to invalidate the state
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court action by ruling that the state court foreclosure judgment
is somehow void.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, . . . this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, as Plaintiff seeks a de
facto appeal of a previously litigated state court matter.”);
Simpson v. Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank of Carmel, 20 F. Supp. 2d
630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a foreclosure judgment
was
not
subject
to
federal
review
under
Rooker-Feldman,
and
noting that “the fact that plaintiff alleges that the . . .
foreclosure judgment was procured by fraud and conspiracy [does
not] change that result.”); Smith v. Wayne Weinberger, P.C., 994
F.
Supp.
418,
“thinly-veiled
foreclosure
424
(E.D.N.Y.
effort
judgment,
to
in
1998)
(rejecting
invalidate
contravention
the
of
a
plaintiff’s
State
Court’s
Rooker-Feldman,”
by
alleging fraud).
Moreover, Appellants admit that the state court decision is
the source of their harm.
In their brief, Appellants state: “In
the present case, Plaintiffs’ causes of action under the FDCPA
[Fair Debt Collection Practices Act], MCPA [Maryland Consumer
Protection Act], FHA [Fair Housing Act], and CRA [Civil Rights
Act]
did
not
completed.”
accrue
until
the
foreclosure
(Br. for Appellants pg. 15.)
actions
were
If Appellants allege
they did not possess a cognizable legal injury until the state
court entered its judgment, it follows that they allege that the
state
court
judgment
was
the
source
15
of
their
harm,
as
no
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relevant
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conduct
occurred
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after
the
judgments
were
entered.
Thus, because Appellants allege that the state court’s judgment
caused their injury, 2 their actions are clearly barred under
Rooker-Feldman.
See Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1005-06 (“[A] party
losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance
would be an appellate review of the state judgment in a United
States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that
the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”
(emphasis added)).
In
Exxon
Mobil
Corp.
v.
Saudi
Basic
Indus.
Corp.,
the
Supreme Court sought to refocus lower courts that had extended
the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine
“far
Rooker and Feldman cases . . . .”
beyond
the
contours
of
the
544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005).
The Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is confined to
cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name:
2
We recognize that Appellants are placed in a precarious
position. They argue their claims did not exist until the state
court action was finalized, which they contend precludes a
finding that their claims could have been raised in the state
court proceedings. See Anyanwutaku v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc.,
85 F. Supp. 2d 566, 570 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that the doctrine
of res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies to “relitigation
of matters previously litigated between the parties and their
privies, as well as those claims that could have been asserted
and litigated in the original suits.”). In an effort to avoid a
ruling that their claims were precluded by res judicata because
they did not exist at the time of the state foreclosure action,
however, they have essentially admitted that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars their actions.
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cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries by
state-court
proceedings
judgments
commenced
rendered
and
before
inviting
rejection of those judgments.”
what Appellants seek here.
the
district
district
court
Id. at 284.
court
review
and
That is exactly
Their primary complaints are: the
imposition of attorneys’ fees; the award of a commission; and
the
allegedly
fraudulent,
but
not
false,
affidavits.
By
affirming the foreclosures, the Maryland state court necessarily
passed
judgment
on
the
amount
of
the
attorneys’
commissions and the content of the affidavits.
fees
and
Permitting this
action to proceed would necessarily invite the District Court to
“review and reject[] those judgments.”
Id.
Because Rooker-
Feldman prohibits this, the District Court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction.
At
oral
argument,
Appellants
pointed
us
to
two
Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals cases which they maintain establish
that their actions are not barred by Rooker-Feldman.
We are not
swayed by the facts or conclusions of Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg
& Reis Co., LPA, 434 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006), or Brown v. First
Nationwide Mortgage Corporation, 206 F. App’x 436, 437 (6th Cir.
2006) (unpublished).
We are, however, persuaded by the logic espoused by the
Southern District of Florida in Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766
F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fl. 2011), a post-Exxon Mobil decision
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addressing a foreclosed party’s attempt to hold their lender
accountable under the federal RICO statute.
Like Appellants
here, Figueroa filed a purported class action months after the
defendants foreclosed on his home.
Id. at 1310.
The defendants
moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
arguing
that
the
Rooker-Feldman.
district
court
Id. at 1315.
lacked
jurisdiction
under
After a lengthy discussion of the
doctrine and Exxon Mobil, see id. at 1315-20, the district court
concluded that the plaintiff’s action was barred because it was
“inextricably
judgment.
intertwined”
Id. at 1321-22.
with
the
state
court
foreclosure
The district court held that the
suit was barred “because Plaintiff’s claims can only succeed if
the Court implicitly or explicitly determines the Florida state
court wrongly decided the foreclosure issue. . . . The only way
Plaintiff (and putative class members) could have been ‘damaged’
by the loss . . . of their homes is if those foreclosures were
wrongful.
In fact, Figueroa concedes as much in his Opposition,
acknowledging he suffered no damages until the Florida state
court entered foreclosure judgment.”
Id. at 1323-24.
The same
is true here; Appellants explicitly argue that they were not
damaged until the state court entered its foreclosure judgments
and the Orders adopting the auditors’ reports.
Moreover, like
Appellants, “Figeuroa’s federal claims can only succeed to the
extent
the
[state]
court
erred,
18
and
the
Court
cannot
grant
Appeal: 12-1266
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Figueroa
his
Filed: 04/16/2013
requested
foreclosure judgment.
relief
Pg: 19 of 20
without
disturbing
the
[state]
It is for the state appeals court and the
U.S. Supreme Court to tell the state court it was wrong.
Court has no such role.”
Examining
This
Id. at 1324.
Appellants’
contentions,
it
is
clear
that
the
injuries they complain of, regardless of when they accrued, stem
from
the
state
court
judgments.
The
“unfair”
but
truthful
affidavits only have relevance or effect once adopted by the
state
court;
the
fees
and
commissions
were
only
imposed
on
Appellants when the state court adopted the auditors’ reports
that accepted them.
“The injur[ies] alleged by [Appellants] in
all of these allegations [are] a direct result of the judicial
order and fail[] to assert an ‘independent claim’ that would
bring the case outside the ambit of Rooker-Feldman.”
Guffee,
371
F.
App’x
590,
596
(6th
Cir.
2010)
Reguli v.
(unpublished)
(citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293).
Because we conclude that the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction, we are compelled to conclude that
the judgment of the district court must be vacated.
The court
below
judicata.
held
Appellants’
actions
were
barred
by
res
Such a decision amounts to a dismissal on the merits.
See,
e.g., Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69, 80 (4th
Cir. 1967).
The district court did not have jurisdiction to
enter a judgment on the merits, so the matter must be vacated
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Pg: 20 of 20
and remanded to the district court with instructions that it be
dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction.
Durbin
v.
Dubuque,
348
F.
App’x
294,
295
(9th
Accord
Cir.
2009)
(unpublished); Beth-El All Nations Church v. City of Chicago,
486 F.3d 286, 294 (7th Cir. 2007).
IV.
Appellants
seek
to
re-litigate
matters
that
are
“inextricably intertwined” with judgments entered by the state
court in the foreclosure actions.
Such actions are barred by
the
this
Rooker-Feldman
court
lacked
doctrine.
subject
matter
For
reason,
jurisdiction
over
the
district
Appellants’
actions, and thus lacked the authority to reach the merits of
the case and dismiss the action with prejudice.
We therefore
vacate the judgment of the district court and remand this case
with instructions that it be dismissed without prejudice for
lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
20
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