Frederick Aikens v. William Ingram, Jr.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:11-cv-00371-BO. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999100181].. [12-1334]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1334

FREDERICK AIKENS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM E. INGRAM, JR., individually and in his capacity as
Adjutant General of the North Carolina Army National Guard;
PETER VON JESS, individually and in his capacity as
Lieutenant Colonel of the North Carolina National Guard,
Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:11-cv-00371-BO)

Argued:

February 1, 2013

Decided:

May 2, 2013

Before KING, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge
Thacker wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.

ARGUED:
William Woodward Webb, Sr., EDMISTEN & WEBB, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jess D. Mekeel, NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: William Woodward Webb, Jr., THE EDMISTEN, WEBB & HAWES
LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Roy Cooper,
North Carolina Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Frederick Aikens, who served for thirty-two years in the
North

Carolina

Army

National

Guard,

herein

attempts

for

the

second time to have his claims against former colleagues William
E. Ingram, Jr., and Peter von Jess heard on the merits.
protracted
granted

first

the

round

of

defendants’

proceedings,
motion

to

the

dismiss

district
for

In the
court

lack

of

jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, on the ground that Aikens was required, but had
failed, to exhaust remedies with the Army Board for Correction
of Military Records (the “ABCMR”).

See Aikens v. Ingram, No.

5:06-cv-00185 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2007) (the “First Dismissal
Order”). 1

Aikens then took this matter to the ABCMR, but, as

Aikens had predicted it would, the ABCMR deemed itself powerless
to act on his application.
Consequently,
asserting

that

he

Aikens
was

returned
entitled

to

to

the

relief

district
from

the

court,
First

Dismissal Order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as a
result of the court’s erroneous exhaustion ruling.

The court

nonetheless held a different view, that Aikens was ineligible
for Rule 60(b) relief.

See Aikens v. Ingram, No. 5:06-cv-00185

1

The district court’s First Dismissal Order is published as
Aikens v. Ingram, 513 F. Supp. 2d 586 (E.D.N.C. 2007).

3

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(E.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2008) (the “Rule 60(b) Order”). 2

On appeal, a

three-judge panel of our Court affirmed the judgment by a 2-1
vote, see Aikens v. Ingram, 612 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2010), a
decision

that

was

rehearing en banc.

subsequently

vacated

with

the

grant

of

Ultimately, however, we again affirmed the

judgment, this time by a 7-5 vote.

See Aikens v. Ingram, 652

F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Aikens I”).
Two days after we issued our en banc Aikens I decision,
Aikens initiated this second round of proceedings in the Eastern
District of North Carolina, asserting claims against Ingram and
von Jess that are identical to previously dismissed claims.
defendants

then

successfully

moved

for

dismissal

under

The
Rule

12(b)(6) — the district court having credited their contention
that the claims are now time-barred.

See Aikens v. Ingram, No.

5:11-cv-00371 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2012) (the “Second Dismissal
Order”). 3

In the appeal now before us, Aikens contests the

Second Dismissal Order, and, as explained below, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.

2

The unpublished Rule 60(b) Order is found at J.A. 91-99.
(Citations herein to “J.A. __” refer to the contents of the
Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.)
3

The unpublished Second Dismissal Order is found at J.A.

165-70.

4

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I.
A.
Aikens’s allegations against defendants Ingram and von Jess
are

described

more

thoroughly

in

Aikens

I.

It

serves

our

present purposes to note simply that Aikens last served in the
North Carolina Army National Guard with the rank of Colonel and
as

commanding

officer

of

the

139th

Rear

Operations

Center.

Aikens alleges that between April and November 2003, while he
was deployed to Kuwait in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
the defendants illegally intercepted his email and forwarded it
to his wartime commanders to substantiate allegations that he
had engaged in a hostile command environment and inappropriate
relationships with women.
conduct

led

to

several

According to Aikens, the defendants’
investigations

and

compelled

his

constructive discharge from the National Guard.
As he did in his initial complaint (the “First Complaint”),
Aikens asserts two claims against the defendants in his present
complaint (the “Second Complaint”):

a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim

for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and a claim for
invasion of privacy under North Carolina law. 4

4

It is accepted

Aikens filed the First Complaint on April 27, 2006, and
amended it on May 4, 2006.
The First Complaint differed from
the Second Complaint only in that the former alleged the state
law claim, plus a separate federal cause of action, against two
additional defendants. By the First Dismissal Order, those two
(Continued)
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that Aikens’s claims accrued on November 24, 2003, when Aikens
discovered that his email had been intercepted, and that each
claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Thus,

absent a tolling thereof, Aikens’s claims would have been barred
after November 24, 2006.

He filed his First Complaint with 212

days left in the unmodified limitations period, on April 27,
2006.
The

district

September

13,

court

2007,

issued

dismissing

its

First

without

Dismissal
prejudice

Order
the

on

First

Complaint against Ingram and von Jess “so that plaintiff may
exhaust

his

intraservice

administrative

First Dismissal Order 12.

remedies

with

ABCMR.”

The court observed that “[d]ismissing

the [First Complaint] without prejudice grants deference to the
military to handle its own affairs.”
the

court

stated

that,

“[i]f

the

Id. at 8.
ABCMR

Additionally,

does

not

have

jurisdiction, it will take no action and plaintiff may return to
federal

court.”

Id.

A

conforming

judgment

was

entered

on

September 14, 2007.

defendants were dismissed without prejudice for failure to
achieve service of process.
See First Dismissal Order 10-12.
The
First
Dismissal
Order
also
reflects
the
court’s
understanding, with respect to Ingram and von Jess, that Aikens
by then was pursuing his § 1983 claim only and was not seeking
relief under North Carolina law. See id. at 4.

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Aikens filed his application with the ABCMR less than a
month later, on October 10, 2007.

The ABCMR rejected Aikens’s

application for lack of jurisdiction on February 6, 2008, within
four months of the First Dismissal Order.
Aikens

explained

that

“it

has

been

The ABCMR’s letter to
determined

that

your

application and the remedy you seek is not within the purview of
the ABCMR.”

J.A. 44.

On

31,

March

2008,

within

two

months

of

the

ABCMR’s

decision, Aikens returned to the district court, moving under
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for relief
from

the

First

Dismissal

Order.

Aikens

specifically

cited

clause (6) of Rule 60(b), which authorizes a court to relieve a
party from a final judgment for “any other reason [not spelled
out

in

clauses

requires

(1)-(5)]

the

movant

that

justifies

to

relief,”

demonstrate

and

which

“extraordinary

circumstances,” see Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d
112, 118 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000).

In so doing, Aikens explained to

the court that Rule 60(b)(6) relief was necessary to avoid any
statute of limitations problem, and he indicated that he was
entitled to such relief because the court had erred in ordering
exhaustion of intraservice remedies and thereby jeopardizing the
timeliness

of

his

claims.

Aikens

also

invoked

the

court’s

statement in the First Dismissal Order that, if he were proved

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correct about the ABCMR’s lack of jurisdiction, he could “return
to federal court.”
The district court issued its Rule 60(b) Order more than
seven months later, on November 5, 2008.
therein

that,

in

stating

in

the

First

The court clarified
Dismissal

Order

that

Aikens could “return to federal court,” it “was not implying
that plaintiff could return to court in this action.”
60(b) Order 7.

Rule

“Rather,” the court explained, it “was making

the unremarkable observation that if the ABCMR determined that
it lacked jurisdiction, nothing in the [First Dismissal Order]
would prevent plaintiff from filing a new action against Ingram
and von Jess.”

Id.

Nevertheless, the district court also recognized that the
three-year statute of limitations on Aikens’s § 1983 claim had
“seemingly expired . . . on November 24, 2006,” more than nine
months before the court issued its First Dismissal Order.
Rule 60(b) Order 8.

See

The court found it unnecessary to “resolve

[the limitations period] issue definitively,” explaining that,
“[i]f plaintiff files a new action, and defendants assert the
statute-of-limitations defense, the court will then address the
issue.”

Id. at 8 n.1.

For purposes of resolving Aikens’s Rule

60(b) motion, the court deemed it sufficient to conclude that
Aikens was at fault for his statute of limitations predicament
and

thus

ineligible

for

Rule

60(b)(6)
8

relief.

Id.

at

8-9

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that

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should

have

attempted

to

exhaust

intraservice remedies prior to filing First Complaint, or should
have

filed

First

Complaint

earlier

in

limitations

period

in

anticipation of court’s ruling that exhaustion was required).
On November 10, 2008, Aikens promptly noted his appeal to
this Court, where the matter resided for nearly three years,
undergoing both panel and en banc consideration.

By our en banc

Aikens I decision of July 13, 2011, the seven-judge majority
“conclude[d]
discretion

that
in

the

finding

district
that

court

Aikens

did

abuse

its

not

did

not

demonstrate

the

‘extraordinary circumstances’ necessary to employ Rule 60(b)(6)
as a bypass around routinely available procedures, particularly
when his failure to use those procedures was the product of his
strategic litigation choices.”
identified

“multiple

652 F.3d at 502.

procedural

mechanisms

The majority

that

Aikens

could

have used to pursue his claim,” including an appeal in this
Court

from

the

First

Dismissal

Order,

a

request

for

a

stay

pending exhaustion of intraservice remedies, and the filing of a
new action following such exhaustion.

Id. at 502-03.

Significantly, five of the seven judges of the Aikens I
majority joined in a concurring opinion proclaiming that the
district

court

could

have

found

“extraordinary

circumstances”

meriting Rule 60(b)(6) relief, but did not abuse its discretion
in ruling to the contrary.

See 652 F.3d at 504-05 (Diaz, J.,
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concurring) (acknowledging that, “[w]ere I the district judge in
this case, I might well have reached a conclusion different from
that

below

and

granted

Aikens’s

Rule

60(b)(6)

motion”).

Meanwhile, the five dissenting judges jointly declared that the
district

court

not

“extraordinary

could,

circumstances”

Complaint.

See

simply,

abuse

the

only

id.

at

of

but

and

512-13

J.,

standard

have

found

the

reinstated

(King,

discretion

should,

First

dissenting)

of

review

(“Put

does

not

confer upon a district court carte blanche to close its doors to
a litigant who is merely following the court’s own advice.”).
With respect to the filing of a new action, the full Aikens
I

majority

conceded

noted

that

had

that,
he

“[a]t

filed

oral

a

new

argument,
action

Aikens’

instead

of

counsel
a

Rule

60(b)(6) motion, it would have been timely filed and not subject
to a statute of limitations defense.”

652 F.3d at 503.

The

majority also observed, however, that it was “not clear when
Aikens’ cause of action accrued, and Aikens’ counsel agreed that
he did not know what tolling provisions might apply or how they
might apply.”

Id.

The majority abstained from any effort to

pinpoint the beginning and end of the applicable limitations
period — which thus, in the wake of Aikens I, remained an “open
question.”
(recognizing

See
that,

id.

at

516-17

“notwithstanding

(King,

J.,

counsel’s

dissenting)

understandable

efforts to keep from conceding as stale any sort of claim his
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client may yet pursue, the precise date by which Aikens was
required to file in order to forestall a legitimate limitations
defense remains very much an open question”).
Unlike

the

seven

judges

in

the

Aikens

I

majority,

who

refrained from any assessment of whether Aikens could yet assert
timely claims, the five dissenting judges delved into the issue
and

agreed

“that

Aikens

may

yet

have

his

notwithstanding the majority’s decision today.”
(King, J., dissenting).
“[t]he

North

Carolina

day

in

court

652 F.3d at 518

The dissenters so concluded because

courts

recognize

the

general

principle

that ‘time frames may be tolled where equitable considerations
justify

their

suspension.’”

Id.

at

517

(quoting

Republic

Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Va. Pension
Fund,

718

F.2d

628,

644

(4th

Cir.

1983),

quoted

in

Fairway

Outdoor Adver. v. Edwards, 678 S.E.2d 765, 771 (N.C. Ct. App.
2009)).
B.
On July 15, 2011, when our en banc Aikens I decision was
just two days old, Colonel Aikens filed the Second Complaint in
the district court, re-asserting his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and North
Carolina invasion of privacy claims against defendants Ingram
and von Jess.

Seven months later, on February 27, 2012, the

court

its

issued

defendants’

motion

Second
to

Dismissal

dismiss

on
11

the

Order,
ground

granting
that

the

the

Second

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claims

were

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barred

by

the

applicable

three-year

statutes of limitation.
As the district court explained, because Ҥ 1983 does not
provide

for

a

statute

of

limitations,

statute of limitations is applied.”

the

analogous

state

Second Dismissal Order 3

(citing Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1161
(4th Cir. 1991)); see also Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539
(1989) (instructing that “[l]imitations periods in § 1983 suits
are

to

statute

be
of

determined

by

limitations

reference
and

the

to

the

appropriate

coordinate

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

tolling

state
rules”

“In North Carolina, the

analogous state statute of limitations is three years.”

Second

Dismissal Order 3 (citing Nat’l Adver. Co., 947 F.2d at 1162).
A North Carolina “invasion of privacy claim is also governed by
a three year statute of limitations.”

Id. (citing Losing v.

Food Lion, L.L.C., 648 S.E.2d 261, 265 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007)).
Applying those North Carolina statutes of limitation, the
district court recognized “that the date upon which Plaintiff’s
causes

of

action

accrued

is

apparent

on

the

face

of

his

complaint” — that date being November 24, 2003, when Aikens
allegedly was first informed that Ingram had used illegal means
to obtain Aikens’s email.

See Second Dismissal Order 4.

The

court then determined that, “[e]ven if neither the time during
which Plaintiff’s original district court action was pending nor
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the time during which his ABCMR proceeding was pending should be
counted against the limitations period, Plaintiff’s clock began
to run again following the adjudication of his claim by the
ABCMR.”

Id. at 4-5.

“Plaintiff’s

“Accordingly,” the court concluded that

limitations

period

more

than

expired

during

the

three years between dismissal by the ABCMR on February 6, 2008,
and Plaintiff’s filing of the instant action on July 15, 2011.”
Id. at 5.
In

ruling

thusly,

the

district

court

rejected

Aikens’s

contention that, in the circumstances of these proceedings, the
doctrine of equitable tolling further extended the limitations
period for the time that his Rule 60(b) motion was pending in
that court and on appeal.

The district court acknowledged — “as

discussed by the dissent in [Aikens I]” — that “North Carolina
courts

have

tolling.”

certainly

recognized

the

Second Dismissal Order 5.

principle

of

equitable

But the district court

perceived that North Carolina courts “have only found [equitable
tolling’s]

application

appropriate

in

circumstances

where

the

actions of the defendant have somehow caused the plaintiff to
fail to pursue his claim within the limitations period.”

Id.

(emphasis

the

omitted).

The

district

court

observed

that

defendants herein had done nothing “that might be construed as
deceitful or misleading such that Plaintiff’s cause of action
was concealed.”

Id.

Moreover, the court deemed itself obliged
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to consider “the actions or inactions of Plaintiff” discussed by
the Aikens I majority in affirming the court’s prior denial of
Rule 60(b)(6) relief.

Id. at 5-6 (citing Aikens I, 652 F.3d at

502-03).
The district court summarized that, “[b]ecause Plaintiff’s
complaint in this action was filed well-outside the three year
statutes of limitations, and the Court finds no basis upon which
to

equitably

Plaintiff’s

toll

complaint

the

applicable

must

be

limitations

dismissed.”

Second

periods,
Dismissal

Order 6.

Aikens has filed a timely notice of appeal from the

judgment

entered

on

February

29,

2012,

and

we

possess

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.
Generally, we review de novo a district court’s dismissal
of

a

complaint

12(b)(6).

pursuant

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

See Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187,

190 (4th Cir. 2010).
predicated

to

on

the

When a dismissal on limitations grounds is
denial

of

equitable

tolling,

review the court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.

however,

we

See Rouse v.

Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 247 n.6 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

In any

event, “a district court by definition abuses its discretion
when it makes an error of law.”

See Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d

802, 811 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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III.
As noted above, there were 212 days left in the three-year
limitations period when Colonel Aikens filed his First Complaint
on April 27, 2006.

Under North Carolina law, the statute of

limitations was tolled between April 27, 2006, and September 13,
2007, when the district court issued its First Dismissal Order.
See Long v. Fink, 342 S.E.2d 557, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
(explaining that “the statute of limitations is tolled when suit
is

properly

instituted,

and

it

stays

action is alive” (emphasis omitted)).

tolled

as

long

as

the

Only 200 days elapsed

between the court’s issuance of the September 13, 2007 First
Dismissal Order and Aikens’s submission of his Rule 60(b) motion
on March 31, 2008, and there was just a two-day gap between our
en banc Aikens I decision of July 13, 2011, and Aikens’s filing
of his Second Complaint on July 15, 2011.
Complaint’s

claims

are

timely

if

the

Thus, the Second

doctrine

of

equitable

tolling was operational during the three-year-plus period that
the

Rule

60(b)

motion

underwent

consideration

by

first

the

district court and then our Court.
A.
When it declined to apply equitable tolling herein, the
district
equates

court
to

evinced

equitable

an

understanding

estoppel.

Indeed,

that

such

each

of

doctrine
the

North

Carolina decisions cited in the Second Dismissal Order — Duke
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University v. Stainback, 357 S.E.2d 690 (N.C. 1987), and Nowell
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 108 S.E.2d 889 (N.C. 1959)
— involved the use of equitable estoppel to disallow statute of
limitations
delays

in

defenses
filing

defendants.

in

circumstances

claims

were

where

engendered

the
the

by

plaintiffs’
conduct

of

The Supreme Court of North Carolina explained in

those decisions that “[e]quity will deny the right to assert the
defense

of

the

statute

of

limitations

when

delay

has

been

induced by [the defendant’s] acts, representations, or conduct,
the

repudiation

faith.”

of

which

would

amount

to

a

breach

of

good

Stainback, 357 S.E.2d at 693 (paraphrasing Nowell, 108

S.E.2d at 891).
agreement

that

defendant

—

recognized,

Other state and federal courts are generally in
equitable

wrongdoing
is

absent

estoppel
that,

from

as

this

requires

wrongdoing

the

district

case.

See

court

Second

by

the

properly
Dismissal

Order 5.
Importantly, however, equitable estoppel is not necessarily
the same as equitable tolling.
Justice,

333

F.3d

273,

278-79

See Chung v. U.S. Dep’t of
(D.C.

Cir.

2003)

(describing

differences between equitable estoppel and equitable tolling);
Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir.
1990) (same); Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 785 F.2d 516, 519
(4th Cir. 1986) (same).

When distinguishing the two doctrines,

courts have generally clarified that equitable estoppel requires
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the defendant’s wrongdoing, while equitable tolling does not.
See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 927 F.2d 876, 878
(5th Cir. 1991) (“Equitable tolling focuses on the [plaintiff],
not on any possible misconduct by the [defendant].”); Williams
v. Bd. of Review, 948 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Ill. 2011) (“Unlike the
related

doctrine

of

equitable

estoppel,

equitable

tolling

requires no fault on the part of the defendant.”); Kaiser v.
Umialik

Ins.,

108

P.3d

876,

880

(Alaska

2005)

(“[E]quitable

estoppel turns on wrongdoing by the party invoking the statute
of limitations, while our equitable tolling rule looks only to
the claimant’s circumstances . . . .”).
Some courts “have used the terms ‘equitable tolling’ and
‘equitable estoppel’ interchangeably.”
F.3d 762, 767 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996).
Court

of

the

United

States

and

McAllister v. FDIC, 87

At times, both the Supreme
our

Court

have

referred

“equitable tolling” when describing “equitable estoppel.”
Irwin

v.

Dep’t

of

Veterans

(observing

that

“[w]e

situations

. . .

where

have
the

Affairs,

498

allowed
complainant

U.S.

89,

equitable
has

been

96

to
See

(1990)

tolling

in

induced

or

tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing
deadline to pass”); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th
Cir. 2000) (noting that equitable tolling has been applied where
“the plaintiffs were prevented from asserting their claims by
some kind of wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant”
17

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Doc: 31

(internal

Filed: 05/02/2013

quotation

marks

Pg: 18 of 34

omitted)).

But,

typical

of

other

courts, neither we nor the Supreme Court has limited equitable
tolling to equitable estoppel-type circumstances.
Furthermore, courts have employed equitable tolling “in a
variety of contexts and have developed differing parameters for
its application.”

See Hooper v. Ebenezer Senior Servs. & Rehab.

Ctr., 687 S.E.2d 29, 32-33 (S.C. 2009) (recognizing that “[t]he
equitable power of a court is not bound by cast-iron rules but
exists

to

do

particular
Pertinent

fairness

exigencies”
here,

for

and

is

flexible

(internal

example,

and

quotation

the

Supreme

adaptable

marks

Court

to

omitted)).

has

“allowed

equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has actively
pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading
during

the

statutory

period,”

including

where

the

timely filed his complaint in the wrong court.

plaintiff

See Irwin, 498

U.S. at 96 & n.3 (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380
U.S.

424

(1965)).

appropriate
reasoned

in

that

In

such

deeming

equitable

circumstances,

tolling

is

the

justified

tolling

Supreme

because

to

Court

the

be
has

defendant

received timely notice of the plaintiff’s claims, there was no
resulting

prejudice,

and

the

plaintiff

acted

with

diligence.

See Burnett, 380 U.S. at 429-30; cf. Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr.
v.

Brown,

tolling

466

request

U.S.

147,

where,

151-52
though
18

(1984)
there

(rejecting
was

an

equitable

“absence

of

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Pg: 19 of 34

prejudice,” plaintiff “fail[ed] to act diligently” and did not
file any complaint within applicable limitations period).
Those

three

concerns

underlie

an

equitable

tolling

test

that has been adopted by the highest courts of several states.
Under that test, as set forth by the Supreme Court of Alaska,
the doctrine of equitable tolling has been applied to
halt the running of the statute of limitations when
multiple legal remedies are available to the plaintiff
and time runs out on one remedy while the plaintiff is
pursuing another unavailing remedy.
A claim for
tolling has three elements:
(1) pursuit of the
initial
remedy
must
give
defendant
notice
of
plaintiff’s claim, (2) defendant’s ability to gather
evidence must not be prejudiced by the delay, and (3)
plaintiff must act reasonably and in good faith.
Kaiser, 108 P.3d at 881-82 (footnotes, alterations, and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., McDonald v. Antelope
Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 194 P.3d 1026, 1031-32 (Cal. 2008)
(citing Collier v. City of Pasadena, 191 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983)); Let the People Vote v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,
120 P.3d 385, 389 (Mont. 2005).

Those courts have “warn[ed]

against application of [equitable tolling] to what is at best a
garden variety claim of excusable neglect,” Weidow v. Uninsured
Emp’rs Fund, 246 P.3d 704, 709 (Mont. 2010) (internal quotation
marks

omitted),

appropriate

“where

but

have

found

equitable

a

first

action,

embarked

tolling
upon

to

be

[reasonably

and] in good faith, is found to be defective for some reason,”
McDonald, 194 P.3d at 1032.

In the latter scenario, equitable

19

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tolling

is

Filed: 05/02/2013

fair

to

both

Pg: 20 of 34

parties,

in

that

“it

secures

the

benefits of the statutes of limitation for defendants without
imposing the costs of forfeiture on plaintiffs.”
Cal.

Rptr.

at

(“[L]imitation

686;

see

periods

are

also

Weidow,

designed

Collier, 191

246

to

P.3d

ensure

at

709

justice

by

preventing surprise, but no surprise exists when defendants are
already

on

notice

of

the

substantive

claims

being

brought

against them.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
B.
For its part, North Carolina has ample precedent discussing
equitable estoppel — including Stainback and Nowell — but no
controlling decision addressing equitable tolling.

Thus, our

job is to predict how the Supreme Court of North Carolina, as
the

state’s

highest

court,

would

rule

on

the

underlying Aikens’s equitable tolling request.

legal

issues

Cf. Horace Mann

Ins. Co. v. Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co., 514 F.3d 327, 329 (4th
Cir. 2008) (“Because we are sitting in diversity, our role is to
apply the governing state law, or, if necessary, predict how the
state’s highest court would rule on an unsettled issue.”).

In

making

of

North

our

prediction,

Carolina,

“constitute

the

as

decisions

the

next

state’s

best

of

the

Court

intermediate

indicia

of

what

of

Appeals

appellate
state

law

court,
is.”

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 1153,
1156 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20

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In

Filed: 05/02/2013

Fairway

Outdoor

Pg: 21 of 34

Advertising

v.

Edwards,

the

North

Carolina court of appeals recognized that “‘[t]ime frames may be
tolled

where

suspension.’”

equitable

considerations

justify

their

678 S.E.2d 765, 771 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting

Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Va.
Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 644 (4th Cir. 1983)).

Specifically,

the doctrine of equitable tolling informed the court’s analysis
of whether the plaintiff had acted within a reasonable time to
remove

a

billboard

from

the

defendants’

termination of the relevant lease.

premises

following

In that regard, the court

explained that “[t]he question of reasonable time in this case
may be answered by applying the legal principle that diligent
prosecution of related non-frivolous litigation should be taken
into account in determining whether a party’s time for action
has passed.”
had brought

Id.
a

On the facts before it — that the plaintiff

non-frivolous,

albeit

unsuccessful,

declaratory

judgment action the day after the lease expired and attempted to
remove

the

sign

within

two

weeks

of

the

decision

in

the

defendants’ favor — the court concluded that the plaintiff had
“not yet exhausted the reasonable time allowed for removal of
the sign.”

Id.

Similarly,
non-frivolous
arbitration

in

Republic

challenge
procedures

to

Industries,
the

tolled

we

determined

constitutionality
the

21

running

of

the

of

that

a

certain
statutory

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Pg: 22 of 34

period for initiating those procedures.

See 718 F.2d at 644.

In so ruling on the premise that “time frames may be tolled
where equitable considerations justify their suspension,” id.,
we relied on Burnett, wherein the Supreme Court of the United
States

applied

Employers

equitable

Liability

Act

tolling
(“FELA”)

to

save

suit

first timely filed in the wrong court.
429-30.
in

of

the
a

second

litigant

Federal
who

had

See Burnett, 380 U.S. at

The Burnett decision has also made several appearances

opinions

of

the

North

Carolina

court

of

appeals.

See

Carlisle v. CSX Transp., Inc., 668 S.E.2d 98, 105-07 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2008) (applying Burnett’s equitable tolling principles to
FELA action pending in North Carolina state courts); Cacha v.
Montaco,

Inc.,

(explaining,

in

554

S.E.2d

course

of

388,

393

rejecting

(N.C.

Ct.

plaintiffs’

App.
claim

2001)
for

equitable tolling of statute of repose, that Burnett “sp[oke]
only to tolling of statutes of limitation”); Bruce v. Bruce, 339
S.E.2d 855, 858 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (acknowledging that the
benefit of statutes of limitation “is often outweighed ‘where
the interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff’s
rights’” (quoting Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428)). 5

5

Like many other courts, including the Supreme Court of the
United States and our Court, the North Carolina court of appeals
has used the term “equitable tolling” to describe “equitable
estoppel,”
see
Town
of
Pineville
v.
Atkinson/Dyer/Watson
Architects, P.A., 442 S.E.2d 73, 74-75 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994), but
(Continued)
22

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It

is

Filed: 05/02/2013

not

surprising

Pg: 23 of 34

that

the

North

Carolina

court

of

appeals has not only freely invoked Burnett and other equitable
tolling decisions, but also has treated them as uncontroversial.
After

all,

litigants
Irwin,

“[t]ime
are

498

Moreover,

requirements

customarily

U.S.

at

although

95

the

in

subject

to

(internal
North

lawsuits

between

equitable

quotation

Carolina

tolling[.]”

marks

supreme

private

omitted).

court

has

not

explicitly endorsed equitable tolling, that doctrine is entirely
consistent with the court’s jurisprudence.
Ins.

Co.,

957

F.2d

at

1156

(observing

that

Cf. Liberty Mut.
decisions

of

a

state’s intermediate appellate court “may be disregarded if the
federal court is convinced by other persuasive data that the
highest court of the state would decide otherwise” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
In harmony with the widely accepted purpose of equitable
tolling, the North Carolina supreme court has aptly described
time limitations as “strik[ing] a delicate balance between the
rights of the diligent plaintiff who should not be barred from
pursuing

a

protection

meritorious
from

stale

claim
claims

and

the

after

a

defendant
viable

who

deserves

defense

weakened because of dead witnesses or forgotten facts.”

may

be

Black

has also, when it needed to do so, differentiated between the
two doctrines, see Cacha, 554 S.E.2d at 393.

23

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v.

Doc: 31

Filed: 05/02/2013

Littlejohn,

court’s

325

equitable
any

intent

mislead

protecting

showing

the

469,

estoppel

essential”
to

S.E.2d

or

Pg: 24 of 34

of

476

(N.C.
—

which

decisions

“[a]ctual
—

deceive”

plaintiff

1985).

fraud,

bad

reflect

than

deem

faith,

more

punishing

Even

“not
or

concern

the

the

an
for

defendant.

Stainback, 357 S.E.2d at 692; accord Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 653
S.E.2d 400, 405 (N.C. 2007) (“There need not be actual fraud,
bad faith, or an intent to mislead or deceive for the doctrine
of equitable estoppel to apply.”).

The court has emphasized

that equitable estoppel’s “‘compulsion is one of fair play,’”
Nowell, 108 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting McNeely v. Walters, 189 S.E.
114,

115

(N.C.

1937)),

a

notion

that

comports

with

the

among

the

recognition of equitable tolling.
We

are

thus

convinced

that

North

Carolina

is

jurisdictions that embrace the mainstream view that equitable
tolling — and not just equitable estoppel — may serve to extend
a statute of limitations.

Accordingly, we conclude that the

district court abused its discretion by ruling in its Second
Dismissal

Order,

equitable

tolling

as

a

matter

applies

of

only

North
in

Carolina

equitable

law,

that

estoppel-type

circumstances.
C.
The equitable tolling test most appropriate to the facts of
Colonel Aikens’s case derives from the Burnett decision of the
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Supreme Court of the United States.

Under that test, which the

Burnett Court applied to a plaintiff who had timely filed his
first complaint in the wrong court, we must consider whether
defendants

Ingram

and

von

Jess

received

timely

notice

of

Aikens’s claims, whether the defendants have been prejudiced by
delay

of

the

diligence.
P.3d

at

litigation,

and

whether

Aikens

has

acted

with

See 380 U.S. at 429-30; see also, e.g., Kaiser, 108
881-82

(recognizing

that

a

Burnett-type

test

is

appropriate where “multiple legal remedies [were] available to
the

plaintiff

and

time

[ran]

out

on

one

remedy

while

the

plaintiff [was] pursuing another unavailing remedy”).
First of all, there is no dispute that the defendants had
timely notice of Aikens’s claims, in that he filed the First
Complaint
period,

with

and

212

days

subsequently

Second Complaint.

left

in

the

re-alleged

unmodified

the

same

limitations

claims

in

the

Furthermore, there has been no showing that

the defendants have suffered prejudice; rather, the defendants
have simply pointed to the passage of time since Aikens’s claims
accrued, without identifying any specific way in which they have
been prejudiced, such as the loss of critical evidence.
Finally, we are satisfied that Aikens acted both diligently
and reasonably in filing his Rule 60(b) motion, followed by the
Second Complaint.
diligence);

See Burnett, 380 U.S. at 429-30 (requiring

Kaiser,

108

P.3d
25

at

881-82

(necessitating

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reasonableness).

Pg: 26 of 34

As for diligence, since the district court

issued its First Dismissal Order, the longest time Aikens has
taken to pursue a next step in the pursuit of his claims is
fifty-four days (less than eight weeks) — the amount of time
that passed between the February 6, 2008 decision of the ABCMR
repudiating jurisdiction over Aikens’s claims and the filing of
his Rule 60(b) motion in the district court on March 31, 2008.
At that point, the applicable limitations period, having been
tolled during the pendency of the First Complaint, had not yet
run.

Moreover, fifty-four days of delay, weighed in the context

of six years of Aikens’s persistent and steadfast efforts to
sustain this litigation, hardly evidences a lack of diligence.
With respect to reasonableness, Aikens’s Rule 60(b) motion
cannot be called anything but reasonable.

At the time of the

motion, the defendants had taken the position — a position that
they continue to espouse — that the statutes of limitation on
Aikens’s claims had expired on November 24, 2006, more than nine
months

prior

to

the

Dismissal Order.

district

court’s

issuance

of

its

First

Meanwhile, under Aikens’s interpretation of

the First Dismissal Order, the court had assured him that he
could “return to federal court” if he were proved correct about
the ABCMR’s lack of jurisdiction.
Although
clarifying

the

court

that

it

thereafter
had

not

See First Dismissal Order 8.
denied

meant
26

to

Rule

60(b)(6)

“imply[]

that

relief,
plaintiff

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could return to court in [the same] action,” see Rule 60(b)
Order 7, five of the twelve judges of our en banc Court agreed
with Aikens’s interpretation.

See Aikens I, 652 F.3d at 509

(King, J., dissenting) (observing that, in light of the district
court’s “explicit[] assur[ance]” that Aikens “could ‘return to
federal court,’” he “understandably chose to file his Rule 60(b)
motion”).
Even

more

significantly,

ten

of

our

twelve

judges

recognized that the district court could have granted Aikens’s
Rule 60(b) motion in the exercise of its discretion.

See Aikens

I, 652 F.3d at 505 (Diaz, J., concurring) (“While the principal
dissent convincingly demonstrates that the district court could
have granted Aikens’s motion, it fails to establish that failure
to grant the motion was so beyond the pale that it constitutes
an abuse of discretion.” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 512 (King,
J.,

dissenting)

grant

Aikens’s

(“[H]ad
Rule

the

district

court

60(b)

motion,

it

discretion to do so . . . .”).

been

inclined

certainly

had

to
the

As such, Rule 60(b)(6) relief

was a feasible legal remedy that Aikens reasonably pursued. 6

6

Of course, our Aikens I majority concluded that Aikens’s
neglect in availing himself of some additional avoidance
options, such as appealing the First Dismissal Order or
requesting a stay, supported the district court’s conclusion
that Aikens had failed to demonstrate the extraordinary
circumstances necessary to reopen the First Complaint pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(6).
See 652 F.3d at 502-03; see also Second
(Continued)
27

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Because
relevant

Filed: 05/02/2013

of

the

conditions

manifest
for

Pg: 28 of 34

presence

equitable

here

tolling

—

of

each

notice,

of

the

lack

of

prejudice, and diligent and reasonable action — we conclude that
equitable

tolling

was

operational

during

the

period

that

Aikens’s Rule 60(b) motion was being considered by the district
court and our Court.

Accordingly, the § 1983 and state law

Dismissal Order 5-6 (suggesting that “the actions or inactions
of Plaintiff” discussed by the Aikens I majority must inform the
present equitable tolling analysis).
Importantly, however, the
pertinent equitable tolling test does not require that Aikens
made perfect litigation choices, only reasonable ones.
See,
e.g., Lozeau v. GEICO Indem. Co., 207 P.3d 316, 319-20 (Mont.
2009) (applying equitable tolling where plaintiff first filed in
tribal court that was later determined to lack jurisdiction);
McDonald, 194 P.3d at 1029 (same where plaintiff first
voluntarily pursued internal administrative remedy); Solomon v.
Interior Reg’l Hous. Auth., 140 P.3d 882, 884-85 (Alaska 2006)
(same where plaintiff first filed in federal court).
Some other equitable tolling tests, applicable in different
contexts, necessitate a showing of extraordinary circumstances.
See, e.g., Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (observing, with respect to habeas corpus claims, that
“[e]quitable tolling is appropriate when, but only when,
extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control
prevented him from complying with the statutory time limit”
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In any
event, because we deal here with the superficially untimely
Second Complaint, which Aikens was compelled to file as a
consequence of our en banc affirmance of the denial of Rule
60(b)(6) relief, an assessment of extraordinary circumstances
for purposes of equitable tolling would encompass new factors.
For example, we certainly would consider the fact that we
conducted
an
en
banc
proceeding,
which
was
itself
an
extraordinary event. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) (explaining that
rehearing en banc is disfavored and will not be granted except
to maintain uniformity of decisions or to resolve questions “of
exceptional importance”).

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claims alleged in his subsequent Second Complaint are not timebarred,

and

the

contrary

Second

Dismissal

Order

must

be

reversed. 7

IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the Second Dismissal
Order and remand for such other and further proceedings as may
be appropriate.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

7

Of course, as our good colleague emphasizes in her
separate opinion, another option would be to vacate and remand
for the district court to apply the pertinent equitable tolling
test in the first instance. We see such a remand as unnecessary
here, however.
There is no real dispute concerning notice,
prejudice, or diligence, leaving solely the question of whether
Aikens acted reasonably in filing his Rule 60(b) motion.
The
district court’s only sustainable answer to that question would
be “yes,” since ten of our twelve judges in Aikens I agreed that
Aikens’s Rule 60(b) motion could have been granted, thereby
rendering the motion patently reasonable.

29

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THACKER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the district
court erred, as a matter of law, in holding that North Carolina
would not recognize the doctrine of equitable tolling outside of
the equitable estoppel context.
However,

with

all

due

respect

to

my

good

colleagues,

I

cannot agree with the majority’s decision to determine, for the
first time on appeal, that the balance of the equities in this
case

warrants

point.

the

application

of

equitable

tolling

at

this

Rather, in my view, this matter should be remanded to

permit the district court to exercise its discretion as to the
application

of

equitable

tolling

to

the

facts

presented.

Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
In this case, “[t]he operative review standard in the end
will depend on what aspect of the lower court’s decision is
challenged.”

Belot v. Burge, 490 F.3d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 2007).

Specifically, to the extent the district court’s decision rested
on a conclusion of law, that aspect of the decision should be
reviewed de novo.

See Smith v. Pennington, 352 F.3d 884, 892

(4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]o the extent a challenge to the denial of
tolling is not to the existence of certain facts, but instead
rests on whether those facts demonstrate a failure to bring a
timely claim, resolution of this challenge turns on questions of

30

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law which are reviewed de novo.”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).

To the extent the district court’s decision

rested on an application of law to fact, that aspect of the
decision should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

See id.

(“[A]s to all circumstances other than where the relevant facts
are undisputed and the district court denied equitable tolling
as a matter of law, we review the denial of tolling below for
abuse of discretion.”) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Here, the district court’s opinion rested entirely on its
conclusion that, as a matter of North Carolina law, equitable
tolling

is

not

context.

cognizable

However,

majority

properly

outside

of

this

conclusion

recounts,

while

the
was

equitable
in

there

estoppel

error.

is

no

As

the

controlling

Supreme Court of North Carolina decision addressing equitable
tolling,

the

including

cases

state

lion’s

appellate

Appeal,

and

from

share
the

courts,

North

of

the

United
the

Carolina

pertinent

States

United

authority

Supreme

States

intermediate

Court,

--

other

Circuit

Courts

of

appellate

courts

--

clearly recognizes that the doctrine of equitable tolling is
more broad than the doctrine of equitable estoppel insofar as
the

latter

requires

misconduct

while the former does not.

on

the

part

of

the

defendant

As a result, I do not hesitate to

concur with the majority’s holding on this question.
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Unfortunately, the majority and I part ways at Part C. of
the

majority

opinion.

Application

of

the

law

of

equitable

tolling to the facts of a particular case is ordinarily a matter
within the district court’s discretion in the first instance.
Given that here the district court erroneously concluded that
North

Carolina

law

would

not

countenance

equitable

tolling

outside of the equitable estoppel context, the district court
has not yet had the opportunity to consider the operation of
equitable tolling to the facts of this case.

Therefore, I must

dissent from this aspect of the majority opinion: I would remand
this

case

to

permit

the

district

court

to

determine

whether

equitable tolling is, in fact, warranted on these facts.
We should be reluctant to substitute our judgment for that
of the district court, as the majority does here, because, as we
have long held, “the abuse of discretion standard requires a
reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary decisionmaker’s judgment that the court does not reverse merely because
it would have come to a different result in the first instance.”
Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315,
322 (4th Cir. 2008). 1

1

In concluding that the facts of this case support the
operation of equitable tolling, the majority opinion relies
extensively on the concurring and dissenting opinions from our
previous en banc decision in Aikens I.
See ante at 26.
However, neither the majority nor the dissent in Aikens I
(Continued)
32

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As

Filed: 05/02/2013

noted,

the

district

Pg: 33 of 34

court

has

not

yet

had

the

opportunity to apply the legal test announced in this opinion -that is, whether “defendants Ingram and von Jess received timely
notice

of

Aikens’s

claims,

whether

the

defendants

have

been

prejudiced by delay of the litigation, and whether Aikens has
acted with diligence[,]” -- to the operative facts.

See ante at

25 (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965)).
In my view, remand would allow the parties to properly brief the
issue in light of the governing legal standard announced herein
(see ante at 25) and, similarly, would permit the district court
to supplement the record if needed.

Cf. Davani v. Va. Dep’t of

Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 720 (4th Cir. 2006) (“While the district
court’s failure to address these legal arguments below does not
alone

prevent

us

from

addressing

them

on

appeal,

prudence

counsels that, because of the undeveloped state of the record,
we refrain from doing so at this time.”) (internal citations
omitted).
Finally, I note the disposition I propose finds support in
the cases of this circuit, as we have repeatedly remanded cases
to

the

district

court

after

finding

that

the

district

court

directs the ultimate outcome of this case on this issue at this
point, as Aikens I posed a separate question -- whether this
case
involves
sufficiently
extraordinary
circumstances
to
warrant Rule 60(b)(6) relief -- than the one posed here.

33

Appeal: 12-1334

Doc: 31

Filed: 05/02/2013

Pg: 34 of 34

abused its discretion by failing to adequately take into account
a recognized judicial factor or after announcing a new legal
principle on appeal.

See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Rawlins, 523

F.3d 318, 330 n.14 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Having clarified the proper
course of analysis that must govern a district courts exercise
of discretion in awarding damages, we find it prudent to allow
the

district

court

analysis

in

the

Assocs.,

1

remanding

case

F.3d
to

to

reconsider

first
225,

the

instance.”);
234

permit

(4th

the

application

Rosciszewski

Cir.

district

1993)
court

of
v.

that
Arete

(reversing
to

exercise

and
its

discretion in light of a newly announced legal principle). 2
For

these

reasons,

I

respectfully

concur

in

part

and

dissent in part.

2

Other courts have taken this approach in the specific
context of equitable tolling. See, e.g., Townsend v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 415 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2005); Daviton v. Columbia/HCA
Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001).

34