Jerrell Johnson v. Stephen Rankin

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:11-cv-00415-RBS-TEM Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999249434].. [12-1414]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1414

JERRELL R. JOHNSON, Administrator of the Estate of Kirill
Denyakin, Deceased,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
STEPHEN D. RANKIN, Individually and in his Official Capacity
as a Police Officer for the City of Portsmouth, Virginia,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Rebecca Beach Smith, Chief
United States District Judge. (2:11-cv-00415-RBS-TEM)

Argued:

September 18, 2013

Decided:

December 2, 2013

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Fletcher C. Alford, DENTONS US LLP, San Francisco,
California, for Appellant.
Richard J. Cromwell, MCGUIREWOODS
LLP, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
James R.
Reilly, GORDON & REES, LLP, San Francisco, California, for
Appellant.
Kenneth W. Abrams, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jerrell R. Johnson, the administrator of Kirill Denyakin’s
estate, brought this action against City of Portsmouth Police
Officer Stephen D. Rankin, alleging that Rankin was liable for
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and battery and gross negligence under Virginia
law.

A jury ruled in favor of Rankin on all counts.

Johnson

now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in making
certain

evidentiary

determinations.

For

the

reasons

that

follow, we affirm.

I.
On the night of April 23, 2011, Rankin received a “Priority
One” emergency call from City of Portsmouth, Virginia, Dispatch
reporting a “burglary in progress” at an apartment building.
Priority One calls are reserved for situations in which someone
is in physical danger.

Rankin testified that the dispatcher

told him that a man was trying to break down a door.

According

to Rankin, when he arrived, he saw a man matching the suspect’s
description violently banging on a glass door with both hands
over

his

head,

apparently

trying

to

gain

entry

into

the

building.
Rankin testified that he positioned himself about thirtyfive

feet

away

from

the

suspect—Denyakin,
2

an

immigrant

from

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Kazakhstan.

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Rankin stated that he drew his weapon, identified

himself as a police officer, and repeatedly told Denyakin to
stop, show his hands, and get down on the ground.

According to

Rankin, Denyakin stopped banging on the door when Rankin issued
his commands.

Denyakin then lowered his hands to his sides and

shoved his right hand in his pants, a place where Rankin knew
that suspects can hide weapons.

Rankin testified that Denyakin

appeared to be “digging for an object.”

At this time, Rankin

called “clear the air” into his radio, which is a signal that
lets

other

unfolding.

officers

know

that

an

emergency

situation

is

Rankin testified that Denyakin then charged at him

and did not stop when Rankin ordered him to do so.
Rankin further testified that, although he did not see a
weapon, Denyakin’s behavior led him to believe that he was in
serious physical danger.
the

course

of

about

Denyakin, killing him.
two

shots

as

Denyakin

He fired his weapon eleven times over
three

seconds,

and

each

shot

struck

Rankin may have fired the last one or
fell

to

the

ground.

Although

Rankin

testified that Denyakin had his right hand inside his pants when
he started the charge, he is unsure when Denyakin removed his
hand because his focus shifted to Denyakin’s “center mass” when
he began charging.

A search later revealed that Denyakin was

not carrying a weapon.

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Johnson

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brought

this

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action

against

Rankin,

both

individually and in his official capacity, alleging a claim of
excessive

force

in

violation

of

the

Fourth

Amendment

under

§ 1983 and state law claims for battery and gross negligence. 1
jury trial commenced on February 28, 2012.

A

This appeal concerns

three evidentiary determinations that the district court made.
First, Johnson challenges the district court’s decision to allow
“prior bad act” evidence regarding Denyakin’s alcoholism and his
behavior during an earlier encounter with police.

At trial,

Johnson contended that Denyakin could not have charged at Rankin
due to his high blood alcohol content (BAC)—0.28%—at the time of
the incident.
witness

In support of this theory, Johnson presented lay

testimony

about

Denyakin’s

heavy

inappropriate behavior the day of the shooting.
the

expert

testimony

of

toxicologist

drinking

and

He also offered

Alphonse

Polkis,

who

believed that Denyakin was too drunk to charge at Rankin.

In

response, Rankin presented lay witness testimony that Denyakin
appeared

coherent

and

coordinated

before

his

encounter

with

Rankin and that he smoked a cigarette, walked along the street,
and

went

up

and

down

steps.

Rankin

1

also

offered

expert

Johnson also alleged cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment under § 1983.
Johnson
consented to the dismissal of this count on August 30, 2011, and
it is not at issue on appeal.

4

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testimony

that

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Denyakin

was

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a

chronic

alcoholic

who

had

developed a tolerance for alcohol and could charge at Rankin
despite his high BAC.

Finally, Rankin presented lay and expert

testimony regarding a confrontation Denyakin had with police on
February 21, 2011, when he had a BAC of 0.22%.
encounter,

Denyakin

walked

without

stumbling,

During that
and

a

police

officer told him that he could shoot him if he failed to show
his hands.

The testimony also revealed that Denyakin threatened

to beat his girlfriend, punched her apartment window, and drew a
bloody symbol on her door.
Second, Johnson challenges the district court’s decision to
exclude two of Rankin’s Facebook postings from the liability
phase of trial.
evidence

of

Johnson sought to introduce the postings as

Rankin’s

motivation

for

shooting

Denyakin.

One

posting included a photograph of an ethnic lynching with the
caption, “LOVE IS . . . Doing whatever is necessary.”

Another

posting showed guns and gun-cleaning equipment with the caption
“Rankin’s box of vengeance” and the comment that it would be
better if Rankin were “dirtying” the guns.

The district court

concluded that the postings were “inflammatory” and decided to
bifurcate the issue of punitive damages from the rest of the
trial,

allowing

the

Facebook

evidence

damages stage.

5

only

at

the

punitive

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Third, Johnson contests the district court’s decision to
exclude

an

autopsy

photograph.

At

trial,

Johnson

called

Virginia Assistant Chief Medical Examiner Elizabeth Kinnison—the
doctor

who

witness.

performed
Kinnison

the

autopsy

testified

Denyakin’s right hand.

on

Denyakin—as

regarding

a

an

gunshot

expert

wound

on

According to Kinnison, “[t]he way that

the edges of [the wound] tore made me favor that [the bullet]
went from the palm of his hand to the back of his hand, but I’m
not absolutely certain that it couldn’t have gone from back to
front.”

Johnson sought to admit a photograph of the wound,

claiming that it showed that Denyakin’s hand could not have been
in

his

pants

typically

at

insert

facing the body.

the
their

time
hands

of

the

into

shooting

their

pants

because
with

people

the

palm

The court declined to admit the photograph

following this exchange with Kinnison:
THE COURT:

The issue was if this would help her
opinion or help her be more sure.

. . .
THE COURT:

THE WITNESS:

Does that photograph, Dr. Kinnison,
assist you in making any different
conclusion?
No, ma’am.

The court held that the photograph’s “prejudicial value clearly
outweighs any probative value on [Kinnison’s] testimony.”
On March 1, 2012, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Rankin

on

all

counts.

Johnson

6

filed

this

timely

appeal,

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challenging

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the

aforesaid

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evidentiary

decisions.

We

have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.
Johnson contends that the district court erred in admitting
prior bad act evidence that “portrayed Denyakin as . . . an
alcoholic, an abuser of women, and that he had previously been
arrested by a different police officer.” 2
stemmed

from

police,

during

Denyakin’s
which

a

February
police

21,

officer

2

Most of this evidence
2011,

encounter

informed

him

that

with
the

Johnson also challenges evidence “portray[ing] Denyakin as
a ‘foreigner’ and an illegal alien.”
The evidence showed that
Denyakin was from Kazakhstan and went by the nickname “KGB,”
which were simply facts of the case that Johnson’s own witnesses
discussed.
Rankin presented minimal evidence of Denyakin’s
immigration status through Denyakin’s brother’s deposition.
When Rankin asked Denyakin’s brother whether Denyakin had been
“arrested at any time before” the day of his death, his brother
answered “yes” and explained that “[t]he arrest was connected
with immigration policy.”
The deposition does not include any
further discussion of this arrest. This isolated comment hardly
“paint[s] Denyakin as a dangerous person of bad character” as
Johnson contends.
Furthermore, this evidence did not pervade
the trial to the extent that evidence of immigration status did
in the cases Johnson cited in the memorandum he references in
his reply brief.
See, e.g., TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306
S.W.3d 230, 245 (Tex. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff “sought
to hedge his theory by calling attention to [the defendant’s]
illegal immigration status whenever he could”); Maldonado v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 789 So. 2d 464, 466, 470 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001)
(deciding that the prejudicial effect of the defendant’s
immigration status outweighed its probative value when that
status was “a central feature” at trial).
We therefore do not
further consider this portion of Johnson’s argument.

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police

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could

shoot

instructions.

him

if

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he

did

not

comply

with

their

Although he was highly intoxicated, Denyakin was

able to walk without stumbling and behave violently toward his
girlfriend.
We

review

admissibility

the

of

district

evidence

court’s

for

abuse

rulings
of

regarding

discretion.

States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011).

the

United

A district

court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, see id.,
or

applies

“erroneous

legal

principles

to

the

case,”

States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1290 (4th Cir. 1995).
has

established

admissibility

of

a

four-part

prior

act

test

evidence

for
under

United

This Court

determining
Federal

Rule

the
of

Evidence 404(b):
(1) The evidence must be relevant to an issue, such as
an element of an offense, and must not be offered to
establish the general character of the defendant. In
this regard, the more similar the prior act is (in
terms of physical similarity or mental state) to the
act being proved, the more relevant it becomes. (2)
The act must be necessary in the sense that it is
probative of an essential claim or an element of the
offense. (3) The evidence must be reliable. And (4)
the
evidence’s
probative
value
must
not
be
substantially
outweighed
by
confusion
or
unfair
prejudice in the sense that it tends to subordinate
reason to emotion in the factfinding process.
Cole, 631 F.3d at 154 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 617
F.3d 286, 296-97 (4th Cir. 2010)).
With

respect

to

the

first

step

of

this

inquiry,

Rankin

contends that the evidence is relevant for two reasons that are
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unrelated to Denyakin’s general character.

First, the evidence

demonstrates that Denyakin was capable of charging at Rankin
while extremely intoxicated, which Johnson disputed.

Second,

the evidence shows that Denyakin was on notice that he would be
shot if he did not comply with Rankin’s instructions, which is
relevant to Rankin’s assumption of the risk and contributory
negligence defenses.
Johnson questions both of Rankin’s arguments in favor of
the relevance of this evidence.

First, Johnson argues that the

evidence merely shows Denyakin’s past experience with alcohol,
which is unrelated to the true issue in this case:
ability to attack a police officer.

We disagree.

Denyakin’s

The events of

February 21, 2011, demonstrate that Denyakin could walk, respond
lucidly to a police officer, and behave violently while drunk.
The

testimony

illustrates

his

regarding
heightened

Denyakin’s
ability

to

alcoholism
act

while

further

intoxicated.

Specifically, the testimony shows that Denyakin had developed a
tolerance to alcohol that allowed him to function with a high
BAC.

We therefore find that the evidence in question speaks to

Denyakin’s ability to function while intoxicated, which bears on
whether Denyakin could have charged at Rankin while drunk.
Second, Johnson contends that the contributory negligence
defense involves an objective inquiry, rendering irrelevant the
question of whether Denyakin was on notice that he could be
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shot.

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However,

pursuant

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to

Virginia

negligence has a subjective component:

law,

contributory

it “requires sufficient

evidence of knowledge on the part of [the] plaintiff of the
danger to be guarded against.”

Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson,

368 S.E.2d 268, 280 (Va. 1988); see also Arndt v. Russillo, 343
S.E.2d

84,

88

(Va.

1986)

(“To

establish

th[e]

[contributory

negligence] defense, [the defendant] was required to prove that
[the plaintiff] knew or should have known that [the plaintiff]
would

drive

recklessly

.

.

.

.”).

Furthermore,

Virginia’s

assumption of the risk defense requires the defendant to prove
that the plaintiff “fully appreciated” “the nature and extent of
the risk” and “voluntarily incurred” that risk.

Monk v. Hess,

191 S.E.2d 229, 230 (Va. 1972) (quoting Leslie v. Nitz, 184
S.E.2d 755, 757 (Va. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This

certainly

district

court

is
did

a

subjective

not

err

in

inquiry.
determining

Accordingly,
that

the

the

evidence

regarding Denyakin’s alcohol abuse and actions on February 21,
2011, was relevant.
The evidence in question also survives the second step of
the above test because “it is probative of an essential claim.”
Cole,

631

F.3d

at

154.

Each

of

Johnson’s

claims

turns

on

whether Rankin was justified in using lethal force, and evidence
that illustrates Denyakin’s ability to charge while intoxicated—
such

as

the

February

21,

2011,
10

incident

and

Denyakin’s

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alcoholism—speaks to whether Rankin was so justified.

The third

step of the above test—the reliability of the evidence—is not at
issue in this appeal.
Regarding the fourth step, the district court engaged in a
limited

inquiry

regarding

whether

the

prior

act

evidence’s

probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect under Federal
Rule

of

Evidence

403.

After

the

district

court

overruled

Johnson’s objection that the evidence constituted hearsay, the
district court noted that the evidence was “highly relevant to
contributory negligence, because . . . a person has for a second
time knowingly put themselves in the same path of danger.”

The

court

any

also

prejudice.

gave

a

In

cautionary

this

way,

the

instruction

to

district

combat

court

implicitly

recognized that the evidence’s probative value outweighed its
prejudicial effect.

This Court has explained that, “[a]s long

as

a

the

record

as

whole

indicates

appropriate

judicial

weighing, we will not reverse for failure to recite mechanically
the appropriate balancing test.”

United States v. Lewis, 780

F.2d 1140, 1142 (4th Cir. 1986).

We therefore determine that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that the evidence in question satisfies Rule 403.
evidence

regarding

Denyakin’s

alcoholism

and

Because the

prior

encounter

with police complies with this Court’s four-part test, we hold

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that the district court did not err in admitting this evidence
pursuant to Rule 404(b).

III.
Next, Johnson contends that the district court erred in
excluding Rankin’s Facebook postings from the liability phase of
the trial.
postings

At the time of trial, Johnson contended that the

were

“particularly

relevant

to

[Rankin’s]

motive,

intent, and state of mind as it relates to [Johnson’s] punitive
damages claims under § 1983 and the state tort claims” and “go
towards the issue of reckless or callousness under the Supreme
Court’s test [for punitive damages in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30,

56

(1983)].”

Johnson

now

contends

that

the

Facebook

postings speak to Rankin’s credibility, implying that they show
Rankin was motivated to intentionally engage in ethnic violence—
such

as

shooting

an

immigrant—and

lie

about

why

he

did

it.

Because Johnson failed to preserve his objection on credibility
grounds, we review the district court’s ruling only for plain
error.

See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 174

(1988) (to preserve an objection to the exclusion of evidence,
its proponent must “mak[e] known . . . the party’s objection
. . . and the grounds therefor”).
an

error,

rights,

(2)

and

which
(4)

is

which

plain,

To reverse, there must be (1)
(3)

seriously
12

which

affects

affects

“the

substantial
fairness,

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integrity,

or

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public

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reputation

of

judicial

proceedings.”

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993).
The

trial

court

excluded

the

Facebook

postings

on

the

grounds that they were (1) “inflammatory” and (2) irrelevant due
to the standard that the Supreme Court set forth in Graham v.
O’Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

In Graham, the Supreme Court

held that the plaintiff in a § 1983 excessive force case does
not

bear

the

“subjective

burden

of

proving

motivations”

490 U.S. at 397.

that

that

were

the

officer

“malicious

acted

and

with

sadistic.”

The Supreme Court also explained, however,

that evidence of the officer’s “ill-will” can come into play in
“assessing

the

credibility

of

an

officer’s

account

of

the

circumstances that prompted the use of force.”

Id. at 399 n.12.

Therefore,

Graham

contrary

to

Rankin’s

assertions,

does

not

indicate that evidence of motive—such as the Facebook postings—
is irrelevant to the § 1983 calculus.
Rankin’s

motive

and

credibility

could

also

Johnson’s gross negligence and battery claims.

weigh

on

In Virginia,

“‘[g]ross negligence’ is that degree of negligence which shows
an utter disregard of prudence amounting to complete neglect of
the safety of another,” Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 362 S.E.2d
688, 691 (Va. 1987), and battery is the “unwanted touching which
is neither consented to, excused, nor justified,” Koffman v.
Garnett,

574

S.E.2d

258,

261
13

(Va.

2003).

If

Rankin

was

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untruthful

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about

whether

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Denyakin

charged

at

him,

it

could

affect both of these claims by showing the unreasonableness of,
and lack of justification for, his actions.

The district court

therefore erred in concluding that the evidence was irrelevant
per se because it spoke to Rankin’s motivation.
But the error was not plain.
issue,

the

liability

in

Facebook
this

postings

case.

As

Apart from the credibility

are
we

irrelevant
explained

to

Rankin’s

above,

Rankin’s

motivation does not affect his liability under § 1983 due to the
Supreme Court’s Graham decision.

Rankin does not dispute that

he intended to shoot Denyakin, and his motive is irrelevant to
the battery inquiry apart from his justification for doing so.
See id.

Finally, because the tort of negligence is governed by

an objective standard, see Sturman v. Johnson, 163 S.E.2d 170,
176 (Va. 1968); see also Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Dungee, 520
S.E.2d 164, 174 (Va. 1999), Rankin’s Facebook postings are not
pertinent

to

credibility.
relevant

to

this
In

claim
sum,

Rankin’s

beyond
although

liability,

their
the
they

bearing
Facebook

are

on

Rankin’s

postings

relevant

in

are

such

a

limited way that we cannot say that their exclusion affected
Johnson’s “substantial rights” or contravened the fairness and
integrity of the trial.

See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.

This is especially so given that, in addition to excluding
the

evidence

for

lack

of

relevance,
14

the

district

court

also

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found that it was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
403.

The

court

agreed

with

Johnson’s

assessment

that

the

postings were particularly probative with respect to punitive
damages.

However, the court explained that the postings had

limited probative value with respect to Rankin’s liability under
the Graham objective reasonableness test.

The court also found

the postings “inflammatory” and opined that they could “take[]
everything off the track of what the jury should be deciding”
and “could skew a trial.”
relevance

to

value,

determine

we

Rankin’s

In light of the postings’ limited

liability

that

the

and

their

district

high

court

did

prejudicial
not

err

by

excluding these postings from the liability phase of the trial
pursuant to Rule 403.

IV.
Finally, Johnson argues that the district court erred in
excluding
Denyakin’s

an

autopsy

hand.

photograph

Johnson

showing

contends

that

a

gunshot
the

wound

to

photograph

is

especially probative of Rankin’s credibility because it shows
that the bullet entered Denyakin’s hand through the palm, making
it unlikely that Denyakin’s hand was in his pants at the time of
the shooting.

The court found that the photograph’s prejudicial

effect outweighed its probative value after Kinnison—the doctor
who conducted the autopsy—testified that the photograph did not
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make her any more sure of whether Denyakin’s hand was palmforward when the bullet entered it.

Kinnison testified that she

“favored” the theory that the bullet entered through Denyakin’s
palm based on the skin “tags”—or tears—on his hand.

She then

illustrated how she believed the bullet entered Denyakin’s hand
using her own hand.

However, Kinnison emphasized that she was

“not entirely certain” about how the bullet hit Denyakin’s hand
or what position he was in when he received the injury.
Johnson contends that the district court erred in hinging
the photograph’s admissibility on whether it would aid Kinnison
in illustrating her testimony.

However, the court simply used

the photograph’s usefulness to Kinnison to gauge its probative
value

for

the

Rule

403

balancing

test.

This

Court

has

recognized that autopsy photographs are highly prejudicial, 3 and
it will not disturb a district court’s decision regarding their
admissibility

“absent

a

clear

abuse

of

discretion.”

States v. Analla, 975 F.2d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 1992).

3

United
In light

Johnson recognizes that photographs of dead bodies are
highly prejudicial, arguing that the district court’s ruling
regarding the autopsy photograph was arbitrary and capricious
because it admitted a more graphic photograph from the scene of
the shooting.
However, Johnson simply cites the photograph
itself as support for his argument and does not explain why the
district court’s decision was arbitrary or capricious.
We
therefore see no reason to conclude that the district court
abused its discretion by disallowing the autopsy photograph but
admitting the scene photograph.

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of the abuse of discretion standard and the prejudicial effect
of autopsy photographs, we determine that the district court did
not

err

in

excluding

the

photograph,

even

if

it

had

some

probative value.

V.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court
did

not

Denyakin’s

abuse

its

discretion

alcoholism

and

in

prior

(1)

allowing

encounter

with

evidence
police

of

under

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), (2) excluding Rankin’s Facebook
postings

from

the

liability

phase

of

the

trial,

and

(3) excluding the autopsy photograph showing Denyakin’s hand.
We

therefore

affirm

the

district

court’s

evidentiary

determinations.
AFFIRMED

17