Patrice Tavernier v. Health Management Associate

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 0:10-cv-01753-MBS Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998998362].. [12-1541]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1541
PATRICE L. TAVERNIER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HEALTH MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.; CHESTER HMA, LLC,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill.
Margaret B. Seymour, Chief
District Judge. (0:10-cv-01753-MBS)
Submitted:

November 7, 2012

Decided:

December 10, 2012

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lovic A. Brooks, III, BROOKS LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Lehrer, FORD & HARRISON
LLP, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Patrice Tavernier appeals the district court’s order
adopting

the

magistrate

judge’s

recommendation

and

entering

summary judgment in favor of Health Management Associates, Inc.,
(“HMA”)

on

Tavernier’s

Although

the

district

employment

court

discrimination

disposed

of

several

claims.

species

of

discrimination claims raised by Tavernier, Tavernier challenges
only

the

conduct

entry

of

violated

summary
the

judgment

Age

on

her

Discrimination

claim

in

that

HMA’s

Employment

Act

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-34 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012).

We

affirm.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing
reasonable

inferences

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

nonmoving party.

United States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569, 574

(4th Cir. 2010).

To withstand a summary judgment motion, the

nonmoving party must produce competent evidence sufficient to
reveal the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.
Power

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Thompson v. Potomac Elec.
Co.,

312

F.3d

645,

649

(4th

Cir.

2002).

Neither

conclusory allegations, speculative scaffolding of one inference
upon

another,

nor

the

production

of

a

“mere

scintilla

of

evidence” in support of a nonmovant’s case suffices to forestall
summary judgment.
Cir. 1985).

Id.; Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th

Instead, we will uphold the district court’s grant
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of summary judgment unless we find that a reasonable jury could
return

a

verdict

presented.

for

the

nonmoving

party

on

the

evidence

See EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167,

174-75 (4th Cir. 2009).
The

employee’s

forbids

action

employment

ADEA

against

age.

29

an

employer

an

U.S.C.A.

to

employee

take

an

“because

§ 623(a)(1);

Hill

adverse
of”

v.

the

Lockheed

Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2004)
(en

banc).

pursuant

to

A
the

plaintiff
ADEA

bringing

must

prove

a

disparate-treatment

that

age

was

not

suit

merely

a

motivating factor of the challenged adverse employment action
but was in fact its “but-for” cause.
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
either

present

employer’s

direct

or

impermissible

familiar

burden-shifting

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,

To do so, the plaintiff may

circumstantial

motivation
framework

or

evidence
proceed

established

in

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).

of

the

under

the

McDonnell
Gross, 557

U.S. at 175 n.2; Hill, 354 F.3d at 284.
Tavernier, who claims that HMA forced her to retire as
the CEO of a hospital because of her age, trains the bulk of her
appellate arguments upon the district court’s application of the
McDonnell Douglas scheme to her claims.

See Hill, 354 F.3d at

285 (detailing the applicable framework).

Despite Tavernier’s

assertions

HMA

otherwise,

we

conclude
3

that

articulated

a

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legitimate, age-neutral reason for Tavernier’s separation from
HMA’s employ: namely, the desire of Tavernier’s supervisor to
fashion

a

symbiosis

between

Tavernier’s

apparent

retirement

plans and the hospital’s need for a change in leadership, due to
Tavernier’s poor performance as CEO.
The record likewise convinces us that the evidence,
even viewed in the light most favorable to Tavernier, fails to
demonstrate

that

HMA’s

stated

age-neutral

rationale

is

pretextual.1

See Gross, 557 U.S. at 177-78 (burden of proof on

plaintiff to show discrimination); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (burden on plaintiff to
show pretext).
fundamental

Contrary to Tavernier’s repeated assertions, the

issue

in

this

appeal

is

not

whether

Tavernier

voluntarily accepted the retirement offer or actually wanted to
retire as early as she did.
discriminating

on

grounds

differentiating

for

reasons

An employer is liable only for
that
that

are
are

improper,
mistaken.

not

for

Holland v.

Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2007).

As a

result, “ultimately, it is the perception of the decisionmaker

1

Given our conclusion that Tavernier’s evidence clearly
failed to demonstrate that HMA’s conduct was pretextual for age
discrimination, we need not address the parties’ contentions
with respect to whether Tavernier established a prima facie case
of age discrimination.

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which

is

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relevant.”

Id.

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(internal

quotation

marks

and

alterations omitted).
In

our

view,

the

record

evidence

permits

only

the

conclusion that Tavernier’s supervisor actually believed — even
if erroneously — that Tavernier was a poor performer and was a
good

candidate

for

early

retirement,

supervisor acted on that belief.
369,

386

(4th

Cir.),

cert.

and

that

Tavernier’s

See Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d

denied,

132

S.

Ct.

398

(2011);

DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998)
(“[I]t is not our province to decide whether the reason was
wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was
the

reason.”).

Because

there

is

nothing

in

the

record

to

suggest that HMA’s stated rationale for offering Tavernier a
strong financial incentive to accept an early retirement buyout
was

false,

whether

Tavernier

HMA’s

motives

tinctured by age bias.

has
for

failed

to

put

instigating

into
her

genuine

separation

issue
were

See Gross, 557 U.S. at 177-78.2

Tavernier also contends that the district court erred
in failing to hold HMA to the burden of proof allocated to it
under 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2006).

2

We see no such error.

In

Notwithstanding Tavernier’s heavy reliance upon Clark v.
Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1993), we note
that Tavernier’s circumstances are clearly distinguishable from
those at issue in Clark.

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particular, § 623(f) does not, as Tavernier supposes, impose a
burden of proof upon an employer to explain its action absent a
showing that the employer’s conduct was “otherwise prohibited”
by the ADEA.

Id.

Instead, § 623(f) is a limited affirmative

defense available to employers whose conduct is shown to be agedifferential.

See EEOC v. Minn. Dep’t of Corrs., 648 F.3d 910,

913 (8th Cir. 2011).

Contrary to Tavernier’s assertions, even

an involuntary early retirement is not necessarily a violation
of the ADEA; the statute prohibits employers’ actions — coercive
or otherwise — only when they are undertaken because of the
employee’s age.

Gross, 557 U.S. at 180.

In arguing that HMA

must meet the burden imposed by § 623(f) where her evidence has
failed to generate a genuine dispute over HMA’s motivations,
Tavernier is placing the cart well before the horse.

See id.;

Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Falls Cent. Sch. Dist.,
374 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2004); Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah
River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 426 (4th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
legal
before

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions
this

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

will

not

in

aid

the
the

material

decisional

process.
AFFIRMED

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