Fulcrum International, Inc v. Prince George Center I, Inc

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:11-cv-01390-JFM. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999008666].. [12-1695]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1695

FULCRUM INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PRINCE
GEORGE
CENTER
I,
INCORPORATED;
METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

WASHINGTON

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (8:11-cv-01390-JFM)

Submitted:

November 20, 2012

Decided:

December 21, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark J. Hardcastle, Columbia, Maryland; Terry B. Blair,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Carol B. O’Keeffe, General
Counsel, Bruce P. Heppen, Deputy General Counsel, Gerard J.
Stief, Senior Associate General Counsel, Tracie Dickerson,
Assistant General Counsel, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Fulcrum

International,

Incorporated

(“Fulcrum”)

appeals from the district court’s order granting the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”)’s Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1)

motion

to

dismiss

for

lack

of

subject-matter

jurisdiction its claim for detrimental reliance on the basis of
sovereign

immunity

and

the

court’s

subsequent

order

denying

Fulcrum’s motion for clerk’s entry of default against the Prince
George Center I, Incorporated (“PGCI”) and closing the case.
We affirm.
Assertions
addressed

under

assertion

of

Fed.

the

of

governmental

R.

Civ.

defense

of

P.

immunity

12(b)(1),

lack

of

are

which

permits

jurisdiction

subject matter of a claim for relief.

properly

over

such

12(b)(1),
existence
district

as

the
of

the

WMATA

challenges

plaintiff

bears

subject-matter

court’s

dismissal

the

jurisdiction
burden

jurisdiction.
under

Rule

subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.

the

Smith v. Wash. Metro.

Area Transit Auth., 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2002).
entity

the

of
Id.

12(b)(1)

When an

under

Rule

proving

the

We

review

a

for

lack

of

Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co.,

166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
The

WMATA

was

established

by

an

interstate

compact

(“the Compact”) among Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia to provide a regional transportation system for the
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Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.

Delon Hampton & Assocs.,

Chartered v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 943 F.2d 355, 357
(4th Cir. 1991).

The signatories to the Compact conferred each

of their respective sovereign immunities, including the immunity
from

suit

in

federal

court

afforded

Eleventh Amendment, upon the WMATA.
Area

Transit

Accordingly,

Auth.,
unless

295
the

F.3d

WMATA’s

to

Maryland

under

the

Watters v. Wash. Metro.

36,

39

sovereign

(D.C.

Cir.

immunity

2002).

has

been

waived, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment
against it.

Id. at 39-40.

Pursuant to Section 80 of the Compact, the WMATA has
waived its immunity in certain circumstances.
at 206.

Smith, 290 F.3d

Fulcrum contends that the terms of this section render

the WMATA subject to suit for contractual claims like the claim
for detrimental reliance it raised in this case.

After review

of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reject this argument.
In

Maryland,

claims

premised

detrimental reliance sound in estoppel.
A.S.

Johnson

Co.,

Inc.,

674

A.2d

on

a

theory

of

Pavel Enters., Inc. v.

521,

531-33

(Md.

1996).

Fulcrum, however, does not cite to any authority establishing
that the WMATA expressly waived its immunity for estoppel claims
in Section 80 of the Compact.

We require waivers of sovereign

immunity to be “clear and unequivocal.”

Lizzi v. Alexander,

255 F.3d 128, 133 (4th Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other
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grounds by Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003).

It is, however, neither clear nor unequivocal that the

WMATA has waived its sovereign immunity as to estoppel claims.
Martin v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 273 F. Supp. 2d 114,
119 (D.D.C. 2003).

Consequently, Section 80’s partial waiver of

immunity does not aid Fulcrum.
Fulcrum’s reliance on Section 12 of the Compact fares
no better.

Although Section 12 of the Compact allows the WMATA

to “[s]ue and be sued,” Md. Code Ann. Transp. § 10-204(12)(a),
Fulcrum’s argument that Section 12 of the Compact operates as an
expansive waiver of the WMATA’s sovereign immunity is foreclosed
by our decision in Lizzi, 255 F.3d at 132-33.

Because Section

80 of the Compact, which “specifically and expressly delineates
the scope of [the] WMATA’s consent to be sued,” id. at 133
(internal quotation marks omitted), does not waive the WMATA’s
immunity for claims of detrimental reliance, the district court
properly

dismissed

the

claim

for

lack

of

subject-matter

jurisdiction.
Turning to the district court’s denial of Fulcrum’s
motion for clerk’s entry of default against the PGCI, we reject
as meritless Fulcrum’s argument that the court erred in denying
the motion on the basis that its complaint was not served on the
PGCI.

The

record

before

us

simply

4

fails

to

establish

that

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Fulcrum effectuated proper service of the complaint on the PGCI,
in accordance with the provisions of Md. R. 2-124(d).
Accordingly,
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

we

affirm

argument

adequately

the

district

because

presented

in

court’s

orders.

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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