Kelly Capital, LLC v. S&M Brands, Incorporated

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:10-cv-00728-REP Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999149695].. [12-1819]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1819

KELLY CAPITAL, LLC; KELLY ESCROW FUND V, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
S&M BRANDS, INCORPORATED,
Defendant – Appellee,
v.
SEI PRIVATE TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee of the SEI Private
Trust,
Third Party Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00728-REP)

Argued:

May 14, 2013

Decided:

July 15, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED:
David Barmak, MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND
POPEO, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
Bryan Michael
Haynes, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Andrew Nathanson, Bridget Moorhead, Matthew Cohen,
MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO, P.C., Washington,

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D.C., for Appellants. Alan D. Wingfield, Timothy J. St. George,
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
I.
In 1998, the Attorneys General of forty-six states entered
into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with four major tobacco
companies

to

resolve

class

actions

that

initiated against the manufacturers.

certain

states

had

See Grand River Enter. Six

Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).

Later, to broaden the reach of the MSA, states adopted

legislation,

commonly

known

as

Tobacco

Escrow

Statutes,

requiring all tobacco manufacturers either to (1) join the MSA
or

(2)

make

annual

contributions

to

escrow

purpose of paying tobacco-related claims.
669 F.3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2012).

accounts

for

the

VIBO Corp. v. Conway,

In this case, we deal with a

Virginia-based tobacco manufacturer, Appellee S & M Brands, Inc.
(S & M),

and

the

contributions

it

made

to

escrow

accounts.

Specifically, we consider the terms of a contract through which
it sold certain interests in those contributions.

A.
Virginia law mandates that escrow contributions remain in
escrow for twenty-five years and be used only to pay judgments
or settlements on tobacco-related claims.
4201(B).

Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-

Unused principal that remains in an account after

twenty-five years reverts back to the manufacturer that placed
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it in escrow.

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Id.

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Although manufacturers may invest the funds

and pocket any income generated from such investments, they may
not sell or transfer the fund principal.

Id.

Importantly,

however, they may sell their interest in the income earned on
fund

investments

principal.

and

See

investment

their

id.

income

reversionary

Here,

plus

the

we

term

reversionary

interest

the

in

the

in

the

interest

interest

an

“escrow

release.”
For tax purposes, S & M’s escrow accounts are classified as
Qualified

Settlement

characteristics:

Funds

(1)

it

(QSF).
is

A

established

QSF

has

via

two

court

primary
order

to

“resolve or satisfy,” inter alia, claims “[a]rising out of a
tort,

breach

of

contract,

or

violation

of

law,”

and

(2)

it

operates as a trust such that “its assets are . . . segregated
from other assets of the transferor.”

26 C.F.R. § 1.468B-1(c).

Additionally, in the eyes of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
a QSF is a person.

Id. § 1.468B-2(a).

Thus, its modified gross

income, such as the income generated by investment of escrowed
funds, is taxed.

Id.

The impact of this policy is significant

because it effectively subjects the income earned on investments
of escrowed funds to a double layer of taxation—not only does
the owner of the income pay taxes on what is earned, but the
QSF,

as

Moreover,

a

person

because

created
use

of

via
the

regulation,

QSF
4

principal

does
is

as

well.

limited

to

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satisfaction of tobacco-related claims, the taxes must be paid
from the repository of income earned.

It goes without saying

that these tax regulations somewhat inhibit the sale of escrow
releases associated with QSF-classified accounts.

B.
In

2009,

S &

M

began

negotiating

with

Appellant

Kelly

Capital, LLC, a private equity firm based in California, to sell
its escrow releases.

From the outset, S & M communicated that

the

QSF

escrow

double

accounts’

layer

of

taxation,

status
and

routes to avoid the double tax.

subjected
Kelly

their

Capital

income

pursued

to

a

various

Most notably, it posited that

because S & M would pay taxes on its income from the
sale of its escrow releases and because Kelly would
thereafter own all ‘income’ generated by the escrowed
funds, the QSF-status of the funds (and hence the QSFlevel taxes) would be eliminated upon the completion
of its transaction with S & M.
Kelly Capital, LLC v. S & M Brands, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 2d 659,
666 (E.D. Va. 2012).
traction.

The idea was novel, but it gained little

Indeed, early in the negotiation process, Kelly’s

lawyers advised it of the theory’s deficiency:

“[S]ince the

ownership of the account is still in the name of S & M Brands,
and the QSF is a separate tax entity, the QSF should [continue
to] pay taxes on earnings and transfer the remainder to Kelly

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Capital.”

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Id.

(alterations

Pg: 6 of 23

in

original)

(internal

quotation

marks omitted).

1.
On January 21, 2010, S & M provided the first draft of an
Escrow

Release

Relevant

Transfer

here,

section

Agreement
5.02(a)

(ERTA)

Kelly

Kelly

required

to

to

Capital.
“pay

all

applicable federal and state taxes, if any, required to be paid
by the Purchaser with respect to the Assigned Escrow Releases,
including the taxes for a Qualified Settlement Fund under the
Internal Revenue Code.”
On March 5, 2010, Kelly responded with a revised ERTA in
which

the

Settlement
stricken

phrase,
Fund

from

“including

under

section

the

the

Internal

5.02(a),

section 5.01(m), had been added.

and

taxes
Revenue
an

for

a

Code”

additional

Qualified
had

been

paragraph,

Section 5.01(m) required S & M

to “pay all applicable federal and state taxes, if any, required
to be paid by the Seller and the Qualified Settlement Funds,
including any taxes owed with respect to the Assigned Escrow
Releases prior to their receipt by the Purchaser.”

It also

provided that S & M would
indemnify the Purchaser and its Assignees for any loss
of Assigned Escrow Releases or Related Escrow Funds
proximately caused by the Seller’s or the Qualified
Settlement Funds’ failure to pay such liability and
breach of this Section 5.01(m) [and that S & M Brands
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would] promptly pay all reasonable legal and other
directly related expenses incurred by the Purchaser or
its Assignees in connection with any such dispute.
S & M responded on March 18, 2010, with a draft that rejected
Kelly’s amendments and provided instead that as to the QSF-level
taxes, S & M would pay only those taxes that had “accrued on or
prior to the Closing Date.”

It further agreed to indemnify

Kelly with respect to any legal action taken in the event that
S & M

failed

to

pay

such

pre-closing

taxes.

Kelly

these revisions and sent an amended ERTA to S & M.

accepted

The amended

ERTA included the following addition to section 5.01(m):
In the event that the Internal Revenue Service or any
state taxing authority makes any claim that the Seller
or the Qualified Settlement Funds owe any federal or
state tax liability (including any penalties or fines)
with respect to the Assigned Escrow Releases or
Related Escrow Funds accrued after the Closing Date,
the Seller shall use its best efforts to cooperate
with the Purchaser or its Assignee to defend such
claim . . . . The Seller shall promptly pay all
reasonable legal and other directly related expenses
incurred by the Purchaser or its Assignees in
connection with any such dispute as invoiced by the
Purchaser or its Assignee to the Seller.
S & M rejected this addition, responding with a version that
reversed the obligations of the section 5.01(m) language that
Kelly had proffered.

The new version replaced the last sentence

of Kelly’s proposed addition with a sentence requiring that “the
Purchaser

or

its

Assignee . . . promptly

pay

all

reasonable

legal and other directly related expenses incurred by the Seller
as invoiced by the Seller to the Purchaser or its Assignee.”
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2.
The parties eventually finalized the deal in April 2010
with an ERTA that gave Kelly Capital or its assignees the right
to purchase certain releases for thirty-four cents per dollar of
principal.

Relevant here, the final ERTA included the following

definitions:
“Escrow
Release(s)” means
all
right,
title
and
interest in and to and all rights under the Escrow
Agreement and the Tobacco Escrow Statutes with respect
to (i) release of Escrowed Funds on or after twentyfive (25) years after the original deposit of each of
such
Escrowed
Funds,
(ii)
interest
or
other
appreciation earned on such Escrowed Funds, (iii)
refund due to overpayment into such Escrowed Funds,
and (iv) other release of all or any portion of such
Escrowed Funds . . . or any earnings with respect
thereto or any securities or instruments in which such
Escrowed Funds are invested, together with each of the
following
rights
which
are
essential
for
the
protection and enjoyment of the foregoing: (1) the
right to co-control the defense against any claims,
allegations or proceedings that could result in the
forfeiture, disgorgement or release of the Escrowed
Funds, in whole or in part, and (b) the right to give
instructions to the Escrow Agent with respect to the
investment of the Escrowed Funds (provided that such
investments are consistent with the Tobacco Escrow
Statutes, Escrow Rules and Regulations and the Escrow
Agreement) and any release of the Escrowed Funds only
as described in (i) through (iv) above.
. . . .
“Qualified Settlement Fund” shall have the meaning set
forth in the applicable Tobacco Escrow Statutes.
“Qualified Settlement Funds” means the Qualified
Escrow
Funds
(comprised
of
the
Escrowed
Funds
(including
the
Related
Escrow
Funds))
each
as
classified for tax reporting purposes as a qualified
settlement fund by the Internal Revenue Service
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pursuant to a Private Letter Ruling dated January 11,
2007.
The ERTA’s relevant provisions read,
Section 2.01.

Purchase and Conveyance.

(a) Conveyance of Escrow Releases.
The Seller
does hereby agree to sell, transfer, assign, set over
and otherwise convey to the Purchaser . . . , without
recourse, all its right, title and interest in, to and
under each and every Escrow Release with respect to
the related Escrowed Funds described on Schedule B to
this Agreement and all amounts received with respect
thereto and all proceeds thereof from and after the
Closing Date . . . .
(b) Compliance with Tobacco Escrow Statutes;
Escrow Agreement. The Seller and the Purchaser hereby
acknowledge and agree that notwithstanding anything
contained herein to the contrary, the Related Escrowed
Funds shall remain deposited with the applicable
Escrow Agent . . . in the name of the Seller and be
available to satisfy Released Claims in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the applicable Escrow
Agreement and the Tobacco Escrow Statutes.
(c) Ownership. As of the Closing Date . . . the
Purchaser shall become the legal and equitable owner
of the Assigned Escrow Releases, and shall be entitled
to all of the rights, privileges, duties and remedies
applicable to said ownership. . . .
. . . .
Section 3.03.
Related Documents.
Concurrently
herewith
and
as
a
condition
for
closing
the
transaction, the parties shall execute and deliver the
Indemnity Agreement and Acknowledgement Agreement.
. . . .
Section 5.01. . . .
. . . .

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(m) Qualified Settlement Funds.
The Seller
shall pay all applicable federal and state taxes, if
any, required to be paid by the Seller and the
Qualified Settlement Funds accrued on or prior to the
Closing Date with respect to the Escrowed Funds. . . .
In the event that a final determination, judgment or
settlement of any dispute between the Internal Revenue
Service, any state taxing authority, the Seller and/or
the Qualified Settlement Funds and the Purchaser, if
applicable, with respect to any federal or state tax
liability (including any penalties or fines) owed by
the Seller and/or the Qualified Settlement Funds
accrued on or prior to the Closing Date, the Seller
shall indemnify the Purchaser and its Assignees for
any loss of Assigned Escrow Releases or Related Escrow
Funds proximately caused bye the Seller’s or the
Qualified Settlement Funds’ failure to pay such
liability and breach of this Section 5.01(m).
In
addition, the Seller shall also promptly pay all
reasonable legal and other directly related expenses
incurred by the Purchaser or its Assignees in
connection with any such dispute as invoiced by the
Purchaser or its Assignees to the Seller. . . . The
Seller shall use its best efforts to cause the Escrow
Agent to annually deliver to the Purchaser or its
Assignee a Form 1099–INT with respect to the Assigned
Escrow Releases.
In the event that the Internal
Revenue Service or any state taxing authority makes
any claim that the Seller or the Qualified Settlement
Funds
owe
any
federal
or
state
tax
liability
(including any penalties or fines) with respect to the
Assigned Escrow Releases or Related Escrow Funds
accrued after the Closing Date, the Seller shall use
its best efforts to cooperate with the Purchaser or
its Assignee to defend such claim, subject to Section
5.01(e). For such disputes, the Purchaser or its
Assignee shall promptly pay all reasonable legal and
directly related expenses incurred by the Seller as
invoiced by the Seller to the Purchaser or its
Assignee.
. . . .
Section 5.02. . . .
(a) Taxes and Fees.
The Purchaser shall pay all
applicable federal and state taxes, if any, required
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to be paid by the Purchaser with respect to the
Assigned Escrow Releases or Related Escrow Funds
received by it. The Purchaser shall pay all fees and
expenses
of
the
Escrow
Agent
related
to
the
maintenance of the Related Escrowed Funds.
. . . .
Section 8.12.
Schedules, Annexes and Exhibits.
The
schedules, annexes and exhibits attached hereto and
referred to herein, as the same may be supplemented
and amended from time to time as contemplated herein,
shall constitute a part of this Agreement and are
incorporated into this Agreement for all purposes.
In

addition,

the

ERTA

provided

options

to

purchase

escrow

releases in the future, subject to certain timing requirements.
Finally, as noted above, section 2.01(b) requires that the
Purchaser of the escrow releases comply with “the applicable
Escrow Agreement and the Tobacco Escrow Statutes.”

Relevant

here, the Escrow Agreement includes a provision that requires
the

Escrow

payment

Agent

and

limitation,

to

“comply

reporting
those

subject

to

section 1.468B
a

tax

on

all

its

applicable

requirements,
imposed

[section] 1.468B . . . .”
Regulation

with

As

we

modified

§ 1.468B-2(a).

11

gross

without

Treas.

already
that

filing,

including,

under

stipulates

tax

observed,
a

QSF

income.

is

Reg.
Treasury
a

person

26

C.F.R.

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3.
Following the ERTA’s execution, Kelly Capital assigned a
portion

of

Private

Trust

escrow

its

immediate
Company

releases

for

purchasing

(SEI),

rights

to

purchased

million.

$10.2

which

SEI

Appellant

$30

is

SEI

million

the

of

“directed

trustee” of a pension fund, and its purchases of the releases
were directed by its Investment Committee, comprised only of
Michael Kelly, the Chief Executive Officer of Kelly Capital, and
Nick

Spriggs,

Capital

the

assigned

former
the

President

remainder

of

of

Kelly

its

Capital.

immediate

Kelly

purchasing

rights to Appellant Kelly Escrow Fund V, LLC (Kelly Escrow), a
special

purpose

vehicle

purchase escrow releases.

that

Kelly

Capital

had

formed

to

Kelly Escrow purchased $40 million of

escrow releases for $13.6 million.
Soon thereafter, problems arose.

“Kelly Capital sought to

put together a securitization of the escrow release[s] already
purchased by [Kelly Escrow] and SEI to sell interest in the
package of escrow release[s] to third party purchasers.”
Kelly

Capital’s

investment

prospectus

for

the

disclosure

regarding

transaction
the

purchased escrow releases.”
not move forward.

bankers
would

payment

of

communicated
have
the

to
QSF

But

that

make
taxes

a

“the
clear

on

the

As a result, the securitization did

Of course, such struggles motivated Kelly to

continue researching options for avoiding the QSF-level taxes,
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and it did just that, asking two different law firms to research
the

issue.

Ultimately,

however,

these

efforts

proved

unavailing.
On September 9, 2010, Kelly Capital “took the position that
it was not liable for the QSF[] taxes” and communicated its view
to S & M.

S & M disagreed, maintaining that Kelly had “assumed

the risk of the QSF-level taxation in the ERTA.”

On September

13, 2010, Kelly Capital sought to extend its option to purchase
additional
effect.

releases;

thus,

it

sent

S & M

a

notice

to

that

S & M communicated that it would not extend the option

period unless Kelly Capital provided assurance in writing that
it would pay the QSF-level taxes.

Kelly Capital responded by

instituting

with

complaint

this
asked

action,
the

together

district

court

Kelly

to,

Escrow.

inter

alia,

The
(1)

“[d]eclar[e] that [it] ha[d] not assumed in the ERTA or the
amendments to the ERTA liability or responsibility for paying
the

QSF-related

taxes,

and

that

such

liability

was

not

transferred by S & M under the ERTA, as amended, or otherwise”;
(2) “[o]rder[] S & M to specifically perform the ERTA . . . by
selling to Kelly [Escrow] the additional income and remainder
interests

as

to

which

it

ha[d]

indicated

its

intention

to

purchase”; (3) “preserv[e] Kelly [Escrow’s] options to purchase
additional

income

and

remainder

interests

in

the

future

in

accordance with the ERTA”; and (4) “enjoin[] S & M from selling
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the additional interests to another buyer without first allowing
Kelly [Escrow] to do so in accordance with the ERTA . . . .”
S & M
and

responded

Kelly

Escrow,

claims.

with

also

counterclaims

naming

SEI

as

against
a

Kelly

defendant

Capital

to

these

S & M sought, inter alia,

a declaratory judgment that Kelly Capital’s . . .
interpretation of the ERTA, the Escrow Agreement and
associated documents [was] incorrect, that Kelly
Capital . . . [was] obligated to pay, or to allow to
be paid, all federal and state income taxes on the
assigned Escrow Release(s), and that S & M Brands
ha[d] no obligation to pay such taxes; [and]
a declaratory judgment that it [was] not in default
under the ERTA, the Escrow Agreement[,] and associated
documents, and that Kelly Capital . . . committed a
material anticipatory breach of its ERTA, the Escrow
Agreement and associated documents, thereby releasing
S & M Brands from any remaining obligations under the
ERTA, including as to the transfer of additional
Escrow Release(s) pursuant to the Option.
The

parties

conducted

summary judgment.

discovery

and

filed

cross-motions

The district court denied the motions and, in

so doing, concluded that the ERTA was ambiguous.
during

a

for

three-day

bench

trial,

the

court

Therefore,

consulted

parol

evidence and determined that Kelly Capital had obligated itself
to pay the QSF-level taxes.

The court also concluded that when

Kelly Capital communicated to S & M that it “was not liable for
the QSF[] taxes,” it committed a material anticipatory breach.
Accordingly,

the

obligation[] . . .

court
to

released
transfer

14

S & M

from

additional

“all

escrow

further
releases

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pursuant to the option provision of the [ERTA].”

Kelly Capital,

873 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
Kelly Capital, Kelly Escrow, and SEI (collectively, “Kelly
Capital”

or

“Kelly”)

appeal

the

district

court’s

order,

contending that it erred in concluding that Kelly Capital (1)
obligated itself to pay the post-closing QSF-level taxes and (2)
anticipatorily breached the ERTA.

For the reasons that follow,

we affirm the district court’s decision.

II.
Per the terms of the ERTA, New York law applies in this
case.

Under

New

York

law,

“whether

or

not

a

writing

is

ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the court,”
W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y.
1990).
“A contract is unambiguous if the language it uses has ‘a
definite

and

misconception

precise
in

the

meaning,

purport

of

unattended
the

by

danger

of

[agreement]

itself,

and

concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference
of opinion.’”

Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d

166, 170–71 (N.Y. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Breed
v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (N.Y. 1978)).
differently,

“If

the

agreement

on

its

face

is

Said

reasonably

susceptible of only one meaning, a court is not free to alter
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the contract to reflect its personal notions of fairness and
equity.”

Id. at 171; cf. US Oncology, Inc. v. Wilmington Trust

FSB, 958 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (“A contract is
ambiguous when ‘on its face [it] is reasonably susceptible of
more than one interpretation’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Chimart

Assoc.

v.

Paul,

489

N.E.2d

231,

233

(N.Y.

1986))).

Furthermore, “[e]xtrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent may be
considered only if the agreement is ambiguous.”

Greenfield, 780

N.E.2d at 170.
Both parties assert that the ERTA unambiguously supports
their

respective

positions.

Kelly

maintains

that

the

ERTA

reflects no “affirmative assumption” on its part of a duty to
pay the QSF-level taxes.

S & M counters by citing portions of

the ERTA that in its view “make[] clear . . . that Kelly assumed
the burden of all QSF-level taxes after closing.”

We agree with

S & M.

A.
As

is

evident

from

our

recounting

above,

the

correspondence, ERTA drafts, and other documentation associated
with negotiation of the final contract is extensive.

Even a

cursory review reveals that much wrangling occurred regarding
which party would pay the post-closing QSF-level taxes.

Thus,

it

court

is

somewhat

surprising

that,
16

as

the

district

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recognized, “[N]owhere in any of the[] [ERTA] provisions does
either party agree expressly to pay the QSF-level taxes.”
Capital, LLC, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 671.

Kelly

Such absence tempts us to

immediately rule the ERTA ambiguous as to this issue and resort
to

parol

evidence.

But

our

initial

focus

in

determining

ambiguity must concern the contractual language that exists, not
the language that is absent.
susceptible

of

meaning.

only

See

one

W.W.W.

And if the language is “reasonably

meaning,”
Assocs.,

we

accord

566

N.E.2d

Inc.,

must

it

such

at

642

(“[E]xtrinsic and parol evidence is not admissible to create an
ambiguity in a written agreement which is . . . unambiguous upon
its face.” (quoting Intercontinental Planning v. Daystrom, Inc.,
248

N.E.2d

omitted)).

576,

580

Thus,

(N.Y.

1969))

despite

the

(internal
ERTA’s

quotation

failure

to

marks
assign

responsibility for the QSF-level taxes by actually using the
term “Qualified Settlement Fund” in that context, we believe
that it unambiguously places the responsibility for payment of
these taxes with Kelly Capital.
According to section 2.01(c), when Kelly Capital signed the
ERTA, it “bec[a]me the legal and equitable owner of the Assigned
Escrow Releases” and, as such, became “entitled to all of the
rights,

privileges,

ownership.”
compliance

One
with

duties

duty,

the

as

“terms

and

remedies

outlined
and
17

in

applicable
section

conditions

of

to

said

2.01(b),

the

is

applicable

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Escrow Agreement.”

Pg: 18 of 23

And the Escrow Agreement requires the Escrow

Agent to “comply with all applicable tax filing, payment and
reporting

requirements,

including,

without

limitation,

those

imposed under Treas. Reg. [section] 1.468B.”

It seems to us

that

are

as

to

susceptible

the
of

issue

only

here,

one

these

sections

meaning”—namely,

that

“reasonably

purchasing

the

escrow releases includes an assumption of the duty to pay the
QSF-level

taxes—i.e.,

[section] 1.468B.”
a

conclusion,

the

taxes

“imposed

under

Treas.

Reg.

But if these sections leave doubt as to such
sections

5.01(m)

and

5.02(a)

provide

clarification.
Section

5.01(m)

states,

“The

Seller

shall

pay

all

applicable federal and state taxes, if any, required to be paid
by the Seller and the Qualified Settlement Funds accrued on or
prior to the Closing Date with respect to the Escrowed Funds.”
Thus, it implies that S & M will not pay the required taxes
after

closing

and

begs

the

question

Section 5.02(a) answers that question:

of

which

party

will.

“The Purchaser shall pay

all applicable federal and state taxes, if any, required to be
paid

by

the

Purchaser

with

respect

to

the

Assigned

Releases or Related Escrow Funds received by it.”

Escrow

It is true

that section 5.02(a) omits the term “Qualified Settlement Funds”
while

section

5.01(m)

includes

it.

Although

we

find

this

curious, we do not think that it renders the contract ambiguous
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Pg: 19 of 23

as to the payment of the QSF-level taxes.

Section 5.02(a) makes

clear

required

that

federal

the

and

Agreement,

purchaser

state
with

must

taxes,”

which

and

the

pay
as

all

stated

purchaser

earlier,

must

“applicable
the

comply,

Escrow

requires

payment of taxes “imposed under Treas. Reg. [section] 1.46B.”
In

short,

although

we

recognize

that

the

contract

does

not

assign responsibility for the QSF-level taxes by explicit use of
the term, we do not think that read as a whole it is susceptible
to more than one meaning on this point.

B.
In

spite

of

our

conclusion

that

the

ERTA

unambiguously

assigns responsibility for the QSF-level taxes to Kelly Capital,
we note for the sake of argument that even if we were to find
the contract ambiguous, Kelly would fare no better.

“When a

term or clause is ambiguous, ‘the parties may submit extrinsic
evidence as an aid in construction, and the resolution of the
ambiguity is for the trier of fact.’”

Geothermal Energy Corp.

v. Caithness Corp., 825 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
(quoting Pellot v. Pellot, 759 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003)).
intent

Here, the extrinsic evidence indicates the parties’
that

Kelly

assume

the

QSF-level

closing.

19

tax

obligations

upon

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Pg: 20 of 23

From the beginning of the negotiations, Kelly understood
that it would be responsible for the QSF-level taxes.

Indeed,

the record indicates that S & M communicated that fact early in
the process, such that Kelly was compelled to seek legal advice
regarding avoidance options.

Furthermore, section 5.01(m) of

the ERTA indicates S & M’s intent to assist Kelly practically,
by “caus[ing] the Escrow Agent to annually deliver” tax forms,
should the IRS pursue it regarding the tax obligations.
delineates

Kelly’s

agreement

to

reimburse

incurred as a result of such assistance.

S & M

for

It also
expenses

As the district court

aptly noted, “If Kelly did not believe that it, not S & M, was
responsible

for

the

QSF-level

taxes,

why

would

it

agree

to

indemnify S & M for its ‘cooperation’ in opposing efforts by the
IRS to collect those taxes from Kelly?”
F.

Supp.

2d

at

674.

Finally,

Kelly Capital, LLC, 873

Kelly’s

post-closing

conduct

reveals that it believed it was responsible for the taxes.

Not

only did it continue researching methods of avoiding the QSFlevel taxes; it failed to communicate to potential investors the
point it so adamantly argues here—namely, that S & M would pay
the taxes.

“If Kelly had believed that S & M was obligated by

the ERTA to pay the QSF-level taxes, it simply could have so
said in its disclosure to investors.”
not.

Id. at 675.

But it did

And its decision not to do so belies its claim against

responsibility here.
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Pg: 21 of 23

Because the district court rested its decision on a finding
of ambiguity, it addressed the intricacies of the parol evidence
in much greater depth than we do here.

We think it of some

import to note, however, that in its brief to this Court, Kelly
Capital

does

not

court relied.

contest

the

evidence

on

which

the

district

Rather, it simply contests the district court’s

determination of ambiguity and the methods by which it made that
determination.

Because our discussion of this issue rests on an

assumption of ambiguity for the sake of argument only, we need
not address Kelly’s allegations in this regard.

III.
Kelly

also

takes

issue

with

the

district

court’s

determination that it committed a material anticipatory breach
of the ERTA when it communicated to S & M that “it was not
liable for the QSF[] taxes.”

“Anticipatory repudiation occurs

when, before the time for performance has arisen, a party to a
contract declares his intention not to fulfill a contractual
duty.”

Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d

Cir. 2002) (applying New York law); see also De Lorenzo v. Bac
Agency

Inc.,

(indicating
indicated
respect

an
to

681
that

N.Y.S.2d

repudiation

unqualified
the

846,

entire

and

908

(N.Y.

App.

Div.

1998)

occurs

when

one

party

“has

to

perform

with

clear

refusal

contract.”).
21

“The

doctrine

of

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anticipatory

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repudiation

Pg: 22 of 23

entitles

the

nonrepudiating

party

to

immediately claim damages for a breach of contract where there
is a renunciation of the contract in which the repudiating party
has indicated an unqualified and clear refusal to perform with
respect to the entire contract.”

De Lorenzo, 681 N.Y.S.2d at

907–08.
Here, Kelly’s indication that “it was not liable for the
QSF[] taxes” constituted repudiation of the contract.

Kelly

maintains otherwise, averring that it “indicated its readiness
to

perform

the

declaration

of

obligations.”

entire
a

contract,

We disagree.

only

element

particular

subject

to

of

a

the

judicial
parties’

Regardless of whether Kelly was

ready to “perform the entire contract,” its determination not to
pay

the

QSF-level

consequence.

“[A]

taxes

was

‘material

a

declination

breach’

is

a

of

failure

material
to

do

something that is so fundamental to a contract that the failure
to perform that obligation defeats the essential purpose of the
contract or makes it impossible for the other party to perform
under the contract.”

23 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts

§ 63:3 (4th ed. 2007) (footnotes omitted); see also Callanan v.
Powers, 92 N.E. 747, 752 (N.Y. 1910) (counseling that rescission
of a contract in the context of repudiation is reserved for
breaches that are willful or “so substantial and fundamental as
to strongly tend to defeat the object of the parties in making
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the contract”).

Pg: 23 of 23

S & M testified at trial that Kelly knew it was

responsible for the QSF-level taxes and that S & M would not
have entered into the ERTA unless it believed Kelly had assumed
the QSF tax burden.
credible,

and

we

The district court found this testimony
find

no

reason

to

conclude

otherwise.

Accordingly, Kelly’s failure in this regard was material and
constituted
repudiation,

a

repudiation
S & M

performance.

was

of

the

entitled

Consequently,

we

contract.
to

Given

such

its

own

terminate

affirm

the

district

court’s

affirm

the

decision

of

decision as to this point.

IV.
For

the

reasons

above,

we

the

district court.
AFFIRMED

23