Estelle Singletary v. Department of Health and Human

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:11-cv-00307-BO Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999014043]. Mailed to: Singletary. [12-2002]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2002

ESTELLE SINGLETARY,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES/NC INFANT TODDLER
PROGRAM,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
DEBORAH CARROLL,
Officer,

Branch

Head;

PHILLIP

R.

DIXON,

Hearing

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:11-cv-00307-BO)

Submitted:

December 6, 2012

Decided:

January 3, 2013

Before AGEE, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Estelle Singletary, Appellant Pro Se.
Mabel Y. Bullock, Donna
Drake Smith, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Estelle

Singletary

appeals

the

district

court’s

dismissal of her civil complaint alleging violations of Part C
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C.

§§ 1431-1444

(2006).

The

district

court

dismissed

Singletary’s action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that
she failed to state a claim because she did not allege that her
daughter was denied a free appropriate public education under
the IDEA, and thus could not obtain relief on her claims that
the

Defendants

violated

the

IDEA’s

procedural

requirements.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Singletary

first

argues

that

the

dismissal

of

her

complaint deprived her of an opportunity to be heard on her IDEA
claims.

However, she received such an opportunity through the

adjudication
(2006).

To

of

her

the

complaint

extent

she

filed

under

contends

20

that

U.S.C.

the

§ 1439

traditional

pleading requirements and Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply
to

her

IDEA

claims,

posture of her case.

Singletary

misapprehends

the

procedural

See Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir Cnty. Bd. of

Educ., 216 F.3d 380, 387 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an IDEA
action under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) is not an appeal but an
“original

civil

action”

to

which

Procedure apply).

3

the

Federal

Rules

of

Civil

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Liberally
challenges

the

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construed,

dismissal

of

Singletary’s

her

claims

under

brief
Rule

also

12(b)(6).

This court reviews de novo the district court’s dismissal of a
complaint
claim.
Cnty.,

under

Rule

Kensington
Md.,

684

12(b)(6)

Volunteer

F.3d

462,

for

Fire

467

failure

Dep’t,

(4th

Cir.

Inc.

to
v.

a

Montgomery

2012).

A

complainant’s pleadings must be liberally construed.
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

state

pro

se

Erickson

Nevertheless, “[t]o survive

a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”
(2009)

(internal

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

quotation

marks

omitted).

Bare

legal

conclusions, unwarranted inferences, and unjustified conclusions
are insufficient to state a claim.

Id. at 664.

Part B of the IDEA ensures a free appropriate public
education

(“FAPE”)

for

children

with

disabilities

aged

three

through twenty-one, provided through an individualized education
program (“IEP”) focused on the child’s educational needs.

See

20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(d)(9)(B), 1412(a)(1)(A), 1414(d) (2006); JH ex
rel. JD v. Henrico Cnty. Sch. Bd., 395 F.3d 185, 187 (4th Cir.
2005).

In contrast, Part C ensures that states provide free and

appropriate

“early

intervention

services”

to

children

with

disabilities under the age of three through the implementation
of an “individualized family service plan” (“IFSP”).
4

20 U.S.C.

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§§

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1431(b), 1432(4).

services

as

diagnostic
provided

in

IFSPs may, as appropriate, provide such

occupational

and

evaluative

the

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child’s

and

services,
“natural

personnel.”

See 20 U.S.C. §§

Sch.

Broward

Bd.

2007).

of

physical

Cnty.,

and

therapy,
social

environment”

medical

work,
by

to

be

“qualified

1431(b), 1432(4) (2006); DP v.

483

F.3d

725,

726-27

(11th

Cir.

“While IFSPs may include an educational component, they

do not necessarily include such a component.”

DP, 483 F.3d at

727.
Both Part B and Part C provide procedural safeguards
to protect the child’s rights under the IDEA.

See 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1415, 1439.

As the district court noted, this court has held

that,

State’s

while

a

failure

to

comply

with

the

procedural

requirements in Part B may be sufficient to establish the denial
of a FAPE, a procedural violation will not support a cognizable
claim under Part B unless the parent can show the procedural
violation actually interfered with the child’s FAPE.

Gadsby by

Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 956 (4th Cir. 1997); see DiBuo
ex rel. DiBuo v. Bd. of Educ. of Worcester Cnty., 309 F.3d 184,
190-91

(4th

Cir.

2002).

However,

because

the

state

is

not

required to provide a FAPE under Part C of the IDEA, Singletary
could not be required to allege that her daughter was denied a
FAPE in order to properly allege a procedural violation under
Part C.

See, e.g., Andrew M. v. Del. Cnty. Office of Mental
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Health & Mental Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 348, 350 (3d Cir.
2007).
Nevertheless,

on

the

available

record,

we

find

no

basis to conclude that a principle analogous to that in Gadsby
should

not

be

applied

under

Part

C.

Applying

Gadsby

to

Singletary’s amended complaint, we conclude that Singletary did
not allege sufficient facts to plausibly demonstrate that her
daughter
under

was

Part

denied

C.

appropriate

Thus,

we

early

conclude

intervention

that

the

services

district

court

properly dismissed Singletary’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). *
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

*

Defendants Dixon and Carroll have not been made parties to
this appeal.
In any event, because we conclude that
Singletary’s amended complaint failed to state a cognizable IDEA
claim against any Defendant, dismissal of Singletary’s claims
against Dixon and Carroll ultimately was proper.

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