US v. 515 Granby, LLC

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:10-cv-00320-NKM-BWC. [999243455]. [12-2161]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2161

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
515 GRANBY, LLC; MARATHON DEVELOPMENT GROUP, INCORPORATED,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
1.604 ACRES OF LAND, more or less, situate in the City of
Norfolk, Commonwealth of Virginia,
Defendant,
SKYLINE STEEL, LLC,
Claimant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Norman K. Moon, Senior
District Judge. (2:10-cv-00320-NKM-BWC)

Argued:

September 19, 2013

Decided:

November 20, 2013

Before DUNCAN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and Gina M. GROH,
United States District Judge for the Northern District of West
Virginia, sitting by designation.

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Vacated and remanded with instructions by published opinion.
Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge
Groh joined.

ARGUED: William Walter Wilkins, NEXSEN PRUET, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellants.
Joan M. Pepin, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
ON
BRIEF: Kirsten E. Small, Andrew Mathias, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellants 515 Granby, LLC and
Marathon Development Group, Inc.
John C. Lynch, Ethan G.
Ostroff, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for
Appellant Marathon Development Group, Inc.
Joseph T. Waldo,
Stephen J. Clarke, Brian G. Kunze, WALDO AND LYLE, P.C.,
Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant 515 Granby, LLC.
Kris E.
Durmer, General Counsel, Julie A. Holvik, Assistant Regional
Counsel,
GENERAL
SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION,
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Ignacia S. Moreno, Assistant Attorney General,
John
E.
Arbab,
Georgia
Garthwaite,
Kristin
R.
Muenzen,
Environment
&
Natural
Resources
Division,
UNITED
STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C. for Appellee.

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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Appellants

515

Granby,

LLC

(“Granby”)

and

Marathon

Development Group, Inc. (“Marathon”) appeal the district court’s
denial of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, after prevailing against the United
States

on

the

proceeding.

issue

of

just

compensation

in

a

condemnation

The EAJA provides that a party who prevails in

litigation against the United States is entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees and expenses unless “the position of the United
States

was

substantially

make an award unjust.”

justified”

or

“special

circumstances

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

The district

court determined that, although the prelitigation position of
the

United

States

was

admittedly

unreasonable,

the

United

States’ overall position was substantially justified under the
totality of the circumstances.

We vacate and remand to the

district court with instructions regarding how to properly weigh
the government’s prelitigation position in determining whether
its

position

as

a

whole

is

substantially

justified,

and

to

consider, if necessary, whether special circumstances exist in
the first instance.

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I.
A.
Granby

owned

a

1.604-acre

parcel

of

land

in

Norfolk,

Virginia, on which it planned to develop luxury condominiums,
retail

establishments,

and

office

space.

Although

the

development project never materialized, Granby made improvements
to the land by preparing the site for construction, including
excavating and installing piles to support a high-rise building.
Granby hired Marathon to manage the development of the parcel.
Marathon held a lien of over $3 million on the property because
of its role in the project.

The Bank of the Commonwealth also

financed the development project and had a lien on the property.
The

United

States

was

interested

in

obtaining

Granby’s

parcel in order to expand the federal court building in Norfolk.
The United States conducted two appraisals of the property.
2008, appraisers valued it at $7 million.
was

reappraised

in

2009

at

In

After the economic

downturn,

it

a

value

of

$6.175

million.

The United States instructed the appraiser in each

instance to assess the property as if it were vacant--that is,
to ignore any improvements to the land.
After

negotiations

to

purchase

the

1.604-acre

parcel

failed, the United States initiated a condemnation proceeding in

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2010 to acquire it by eminent domain. 1
40 U.S.C. § 3113.

See U.S. Const. amend. V;

Based on the 2009 appraisal, the United

States offered $6.175 million as just compensation and deposited
that amount with the court.

Granby rejected the offer and the

case proceeded toward trial on the issue of just compensation
under

the

Fifth

lien,

the

United

action;

other

parties

but

Amendment’s
States

lienholders

were

not

Takings

joined
were

joined.

Clause.

Marathon
put

on

Marathon

as

Because

of

its

party

to

the

a

notice

as

interested

participated

in

the

lawsuit, but relied on Granby’s valuations of the property’s
fair market value.
Granby obtained two appraisals valuing the land at $36.1
million and $30.7 million, respectively.

These appraisals were

based, in part, on a variety of valuation techniques that the
United States opposed, such as valuing the land at its best use
and

including

incentive.

value

of

the

developer’s

entrepreneurial

The district court ultimately granted most of the

government’s
evidence.

the

motions

to

exclude

certain

types

of

valuation

As a result, Granby lowered its valuation to $16.32

million shortly before trial.

1

Because the condemnation proceeding relates to one of the
court buildings for the Eastern District of Virginia, Judge
Norman K. Moon of the Western District of Virginia was assigned
to the case.

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The

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government

ordered

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a

new

appraisal

for

its

trial

valuation of the property, this time including improvements to
the land, which raised its value to $9 million.

Each of the

parties rejected last-minute settlement offers: the government
offered $9.4 million and Granby offered $15.4 million.
B.
The matter was tried before a jury, which heard evidence
relating to Granby’s asserted value of $16.32 million and the
United States’ asserted value of $9 million.

The jury returned

a verdict of $13,401,741 as just compensation.
Granby and Marathon each applied for attorney’s fees under
the EAJA, asserting that they were entitled to such fees because
they prevailed in an action against the United States and the
other requirements of the EAJA were met.

The “prevailing party”

in an eminent-domain proceeding is the party whose highest trial
valuation of the property is closest to the final judgment.
U.S.C.

§

2412(d)(2)(H).

Here,

the

jury’s

verdict

of

28

$13.4

million was closer to Granby’s valuation of $16.3 million than
it was to the government’s valuation of $9 million.

That Granby

and Marathon prevailed is not contested.
The United States opposed an award of attorney’s fees on
the

grounds

that

the

government’s

position

was

substantially

justified and special circumstances existed that would make the
award of fees unjust.

The issue was referred to a magistrate

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judge,

who

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recommended

eligible

for

because

fees,

the

that

costs,

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both

and

government’s

Granby

other

and

expenses

position

was

Marathon
under

not

justified and there were no special circumstances.

found

that

justified,

the

it

did

circumstances.

government’s
not

position

reach

the

was

question

EAJA

substantially
The district

court rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
it

the

were

Because

substantially
of

special

This appeal followed.

II.
The arguments on appeal mirror those before the district
court.

Appellants argue that the government’s position was not

substantially
position

justified

should

because

automatically

substantial justification.

an

unreasonable

foreclose

a

court

prelitigation
from

finding

They contend that the district court

erred by considering their financial ability to litigate and the
reasonableness of their position. 2
find,

as

a

circumstances
district

matter
that

court

of

would

did

not

law,
make

Appellants also ask us to

that
an

reach

there

are

no

special

award

unjust.

Because

the

question

of

the

special

circumstances, we do not address it here.
2

We have considered the appellants’ argument regarding the
district court’s characterization of Marathon’s status and find
it to be without merit.

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We review the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees
under the EAJA for abuse of discretion.
487

U.S.

552,

562–63

(1988).

A

Pierce v. Underwood,

district

court

discretion when it makes an error of law.
Basham,

561

F.3d

302,

326

(4th

Cir.

abuses

its

United States v.

2009).

Although

this

standard is deferential, it is not merely “a simple, accept-onfaith,

rubber-stamping

fees under the EAJA.

of

district

court

decisions”

regarding

United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161,

1166 (4th Cir. 1992).
A.
As

we

have

stated,

the

EAJA

provides

that

parties

who

prevail in litigation against the government are entitled to an
award of attorney’s fees and other expenses “unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

The United States has the burden of

showing that its position was substantially justified.

EEOC v.

Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813, 815 (4th Cir. 1994).
We have held that a position is “substantially justified”
when it has a “reasonable basis in law and fact.”

Cody v.

Caterisano, 631 F.3d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pierce,
487 U.S. at 566 n.2).

In Pierce, the Supreme Court clarified

that the EAJA’s use of “substantially justified” is similar to
its use in other statutes, in which it has been defined as

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“justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person”
and

as

“more

than

frivolousness.”

487

context,

a

merely
U.S.

position

is

at

undeserving

of

565–66.

the

substantially

In

sanctions

for

eminent-domain

justified

when

“the

government’s refusal to offer more to the property owners as
just compensation ha[s] a reasonable basis in fact and in law.”
In re Lamson (Lamson I), No. 94-1249, 1995 WL 54025, at *4 (4th
Cir. Feb. 10, 1995).
While

seeming

relatively

straightforward,

“determining

whether the government’s position is substantially justified . .
. ‘has proved to be an issue of considerable conceptual and
practical difficulty.’”

Roanoke River Basin Ass’n v. Hudson,

991 F.2d 132, 138 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Paisley, 957 F.2d at
1165).

In particular, we have found little guidance on the

specific

question

of

balancing

the

government’s

prelitigation

and litigation postures in a case, such as ours, where they
differ.
Limited
concluding

guidance

that

the

notwithstanding,
government’s

we

have

prelitigation

no

difficulty

and

litigation

postures together comprise, in the words of the statute, “the
position

of

the

United

States.” 3

3

As

the

Supreme

Court

has

Significantly, the EAJA defines the government’s position
as “the position taken by the United States in the civil action”
(Continued)

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elaborated, courts must undertake “a single evaluation of past
conduct” that examines the “case as an inclusive whole, rather
than as atomized line-items.”
154, 159 n.7, 162 (1990).

Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S.

Moreover, although not directed to

the specific question at hand, we have noted the necessity to
“look

beyond

the

issue

on

which

the

petitioner

prevailed

to

determine, from the totality of the circumstances, whether the
government

acted

reasonably

in

causing

taking a stance during the litigation.”

the

litigation

or

in

Roanoke River Basin

Ass’n, 991 F.3d at 139.
Having

recognized

the

need

to

consider

both

the

government’s prelitigation and litigation positions, we now turn
to the more challenging question of how to assess substantial
justification when the government’s prelitigation position was
unreasonable but its litigation position was reasonable. 4

For

as well as “the action or failure to act by the agency upon
which the civil action is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D).
4

It is the multiple stages of this case that significantly
complicated the district court’s task of analyzing the totality
of the circumstances in the usual manner. Often, as in Roanoke
River Basin Ass’n, the district court must examine the
reasonableness of the government’s position on multiple issues
to determine whether it was, as a whole, substantially
justified.
991 F.3d at 138–39.
Here, on the other hand, the
district court has to balance two different positions on the
single issue presented in the case, which grafts an extra layer
onto our traditional analysis.

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this analysis, we can draw guidance from the views of our sister
circuits, who have addressed the question directly, albeit with
differing results.

Some have gone as far as stating that a

reasonable litigation position can never cure an unreasonable
prelitigation stance.

For example, the Second Circuit stated,

“[I]f the underlying Government position is not substantially
justified,

a

Government’s

court

must

litigation

considered alone.”

award

fees

position

is

.

.

itself

.

even

if

the

reasonable

when

Smith v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir.

1989); see also Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 684 (3d Cir.
1998).

Other circuits have emphasized the importance of the

prelitigation

position

without

creating

a

bright-line

rule.

E.g., Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007);
United

States

v.

Marolf,

277

F.3d

1156,

1164

n.5

(9th

Cir.

2002); Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1994).
As

we

elaborate

below,

we

endorse

the

latter

approach

as

consistent with our precedent generally and truer to the dual
purposes of the EAJA: providing incentives for private parties
to vindicate their rights in the judicial system and creating a
check on government action.

Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877,

883 (1989); see also H.R. Rep. 96-1418, at 9–10 (1980).
In

assessing

the

reasonableness

of

awards

of

attorney’s

fees under the EAJA, we have recognized that “Congress intended
to address governmental misconduct whether that conduct preceded

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litigation, compelling a private party to take legal action, or
occurred in the context of an ongoing case through prosecution
or

defense

of

unreasonable

Ass’n, 991 F.2d at 138.
that

when

the

positions.”

Roanoke

River

Basin

We have also held, more specifically,

government’s

unjustified

prelitigation

position

forces a lawsuit, the petitioner may recover fees under the EAJA
for

the

entire

suit,

even

position was reasonable.

if

the

government’s

litigation

Thompson v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 280,

281 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Roanoke River Basin Ass’n, 991
F.2d at 139

(stating that substantial justification “focuses .

.

reasonableness

.

on

the

of

[the

government’s]

position

in

bringing about or continuing the litigation”) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, Congress amended the EAJA in 1985, in part, to
emphasize
stance.

the

significance

of

the

government’s

prelitigation

Act of August 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183.

The legislative history of those amendments specifically notes
that

the

EAJA

unjustifiably

was

designed

forcing

to

litigation,

prevent
then

acting reasonably during the litigation.
at

9

(1984);

see

also

Jean,

496

U.S.

the

government

avoiding

from

liability

by

H.R. Rep. No. 98-992,
at

159

n.7.

Such

a

strategy of “curing” a purposefully unreasonable prelitigation
position would be particularly problematic in the context of an
eminent-domain proceeding because the government is required to
pay just compensation for a taking under the Fifth Amendment and

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42 U.S.C. § 4651.
369,

373

Pg: 13 of 17

See also United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.

(1943)

(defining

just

compensation

as

fair

market

value).
B.
In

light

of

the

principles

discussed

above,

we

are

constrained to conclude that the district court did not properly
weigh the effect of the government’s unreasonable prelitigation
position, particularly given the government’s burden of proof. 5
We therefore vacate and remand for a reexamination of the effect
of the government’s prelitigation position using the framework
provided below.
In

short,

prelitigation

we

adopt

position

will

the

view

that

generally

lead

attorney’s fees under the EAJA.
changes,

the

court

must

an
to

unreasonable
an

award

If the government’s position

independently

determine

whether

prelitigation and litigation positions were reasonable.
government’s

prelitigation

of

position

is

unreasonable

its

If the
and

its

litigation position reasonable, the government must then prove
that the unreasonable position did not “force” the litigation or
substantially alter the course of the litigation.

5

In doing so, we imply no criticism of the district court
because our guidance on substantial justification in this
context has been less than clear.

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For each government valuation position in a condemnation
proceeding, the district court should start by asking “whether
the government’s refusal to offer more to the property owners as
just

compensation

had

a

reasonable

Lamson I, 1995 WL 54025, at *4.
court

should

examine

basis

in

fact

and

law.”

In making this assessment, the

such

factors

as:

the

experience,

qualifications, and competence of appraisers; whether there is
evidence

of

bad

relationship

of

faith
the

on

the

part

government’s

of

the

various

government;

appraisals

to

the
each

other; the government’s explanations for changes in its asserted
valuations;

and

the

severity

of

the

alleged

governmental

misconduct.

See generally Roanoke River Basin Ass’n, 991 F.2d

at 139; United States v. 312.50 Acres of Land, 851 F.2d 117,
118–19 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lamson (Lamson II), No.
95-2770,

1996

WL

393171,

*2

(4th

Cir.

July

15,

1996)

(per

curiam); Lamson I, 1995 WL 54025, at *4.
If

the

prelitigation

district

court

valuation

finds

position

that

was

the

government’s

unreasonable

but

its

litigation posture reasonable, the court must then assess the
effect

of

the

compensation.

prelitigation

position

on

the

action

for

just

One important, but not determinative, factor is

the extent to which the government misconduct “compell[ed] a
party
Roanoke

to

resort

River

to

Basin

litigation
Ass’n,

991

14

or

to

prolong

F.2d

at

138.

litigation.”
Assessing

the

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of

the

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government’s

Pg: 15 of 17

misconduct

will

necessarily

vary

based on the particularities of the case, but could include an
examination of precondemnation negotiations, discovery, pretrial
motions practice, and settlement negotiations.

To be clear,

because the government has the burden of proving substantial
justification, it has the onus of justifying the changes in its
valuation figures.

See Lamson I, 1995 WL 54025, at *4; see also

Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d at 815.
The financial state of the prevailing party, however, is
not relevant in determining substantial justification.

Because

the EAJA itself defines which parties are eligible for EAJA fee
awards, the district court may not consider whether a party who
otherwise meets the statutory threshold “needs” fees in order to
litigate.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).

Additionally, the

district court may not determine that the government’s position
is substantially justified simply because it is more reasonable
than the private litigant’s.

See Jean, 496 U.S. at 165 (stating

that the substantial-justification requirement “properly focuses
on the governmental misconduct giving rise to the litigation”)
(emphasis

added).

In

other

words,

the

prevailing

party’s

position is relevant only to the extent that it is necessary to

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the

effects

of

Pg: 16 of 17

the

government’s

unreasonable

prelitigation position. 6
The

conduct

of

the

prevailing

party

may

also

become

important at a later stage of the EAJA fee process: assessing
the amount of fees to be awarded after the district court makes
the “threshold determination” on substantial justification.
Jean,

496

U.S.

justification

at

159.

Once

determination

is

the
made,

threshold
a

the

petitioning

party

is

entitled

to

fees

substantial-

sizeable

attorney’s fees and expenses is not automatic.

See

award

of

Id. at 163.

If

and

expenses,

the

district court has considerable discretion in determining the
amount of the fee award.

See id. at 161 n.9 (noting that, in

practice, district courts often do not grant the full amount of
attorney’s fees that parties request).
The EAJA specifically grants district courts the discretion
to reduce or deny an award “to the extent that the prevailing

6

Although the district court found the notion that Granby
and Marathon were compelled to trial to vindicate their rights
to be “fallacious,” J.A. 351, it did so by inappropriately
comparing the positions of the government and appellants at the
substantial-justification stage, see Estate of Baird v. Comm’r,
416 F.3d 442, 453–54 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the court
should only consider whether the government’s, not the private
party’s, position remained consistent).
For example,
the
district court considered the fact that the government’s motions
practice caused appellants to significantly lower their trial
valuation and the fact that this reduction was greater than the
change in the government’s valuations. J.A. 349, 351–52.

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party

Doc: 39

.

.

resolution

Filed: 11/20/2013

.

unduly

of

the

2412(d)(1)(C).

and

Pg: 17 of 17

unreasonably

matter

in

protracted

controversy.”

28

the

final

U.S.C.

§

The Supreme Court has also instructed courts to

assess the fees and expenses to be awarded in light of the
petitioning litigant’s success.
generally

Hensley

Therefore,

the

v.

Jean, 496 U.S. at 163 n.10; see

Eckerhart,

district

court

461
may

U.S.

424,

consider

436

the

(1983).

prevailing

party’s litigation conduct--that is, the reasonableness of their
position--in the determination of the fee award amount, rather
than in the determination of the party’s threshold eligibility
for fees under the EAJA.

III.
For

the

reasons

stated

above,

we

vacate

the

district

court’s opinion and remand for a reexamination of substantial
justification.

The issue of special circumstances under the

EAJA was not before us because the trial court made no finding
on

that

issue.

If

necessary

on

remand,

the

district

court

should also consider whether special circumstances would make an
award of attorney’s fees unjust.
VACATED AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS

17