Millis Stokes v. Commonwealth of Virginia DOC

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:10-cv-00370-REP-MHL Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999053413]. Mailed to: Stokes. [12-2330]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2330

MILLIS STOKES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00370-REP-MHL)

Submitted:

February 22, 2013

Decided:

February 28, 2013

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Millis Stokes, Appellant Pro Se.
Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Appellee.

Gregory Clayton Fleming,
Richmond, Virginia, for

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Millis

Stokes

appeals

the

district

court’s

order

adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting
summary judgment to his former employer, the Commonwealth of
Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”), on his civil action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2012).

On appeal, Stokes challenges the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to VDOC on his claims under Title VII
for

retaliation

based

on

VDOC’s

failure

to

rehire

him.

We

affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de

novo,

drawing

reasonable

inferences

favorable to the non-moving party.

in

the

light

most

PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead

Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011).

Summary

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under

the

governing

summary judgment.”
242, 248 (1986).

law

will

properly

preclude

the

entry

of

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
To withstand a motion for summary judgment,

the non-moving party must produce competent evidence to reveal
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
2

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See Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th
Cir.

2002)

(“Conclusory

or

speculative

allegations

do

not

suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the

non-moving

party’s]

case.”

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted)).
Title
against

any

VII

prohibits

“applicants

for

an

employer

employment

.

from
.

discriminating

.

because

[the

employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation,

proceeding,

U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

or

hearing”

under

Title

VII.

42

Absent direct evidence of intentional

discrimination, claims under Title VII are analyzed under the
burden-shifting

framework

established

in

McDonnell

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973).
prima

facie

case

of

retaliation,

a

Douglas

To establish a

plaintiff

must

show

“(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and
the employment action.”

Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d

187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010).
If a plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the
burden

shifts

to

nondiscriminatory

the

employer

reason

Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03.

for

its

to

articulate

actions.

a

legitimate,

McDonnell

Douglas

Once the employer comes forward with
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such a reason, “the burden reverts to the plaintiff to establish
that the employer’s non-discriminatory rationale is a pretext
for intentional discrimination.”

Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank,

F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2006).

This “final pretext

inquiry merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that

the

plaintiff

has

been

the

victim

of

intentional

discrimination, which at all times remains with the plaintiff.”
Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 294
(4th

Cir.

2010)

(internal

quotation

marks

and

alteration

omitted).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to VDOC.

Assuming, as the district court did, that

Stokes made a prima facie showing of retaliation, he fails to
demonstrate that VDOC’s non-discriminatory reasons for refusing
to rehire him were a pretext for retaliation.

Stokes challenges

VDOC’s procedure in processing his employment applications and
inquiring into his personnel record.

Stokes fails to establish,

however, that VDOC based its refusal to rehire him on anything
other than the ineligibility notation present in his record.
Stokes also asserts on appeal that he has been eligible for
rehire since February 2003.
Stokes

failed

evidence.

to

The district court concluded that

substantiate

this

claim

with

admissible

We find no basis to disturb this determination.
4

We

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therefore conclude that Stokes has failed to demonstrate that
VDOC’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for declining to
rehire him were a pretext for retaliation.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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